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The wri t ings of Edward S. Corwin cover a wide array of 
pol i t ica l developments from the first half of the twentieth 
cen tu ry . They also reveal Corwin 's involvement in those 
even t s . The wri t ings manifest his association with Woodrow 
Wilson at P r ince ton Univers i ty , his support for and break 
from Frankl in Roosevel t , and his conserva t ive leanings in 
the 1950s. His personal role in politics allowed unique and 
influential pe r spec t i ve s . It also led to high ambitions and 
c r i t i c a l d isappoin tments . Edward Corwin offered advice to 
Wilson in the White House; pol i t ica l d i f ferences kept them 
apa r t . Corwin strongly supported Franklin Roosevelt and the 
New Deal in the 1930s; Corwin's personal investment in the 
i l l - fa ted Cour t -pack ing plan damaged his influence. It also 
sha t t e red his hopes for appointment to the Supreme Court. 
Corwin moved away from Roosevelt and toward some conserva-
tive posi t ions by the end of World War Two. Corwin is 
widely regarded as the most important political and consti-
tut ional commentator of his times. But his theories must be 
understood in the con tex t of his career and of his personal 
r o l e in c o n t e m p o r a r y p o l i t i c s . Moreover , awareness of 
Corwin 's theor ies and c a r e e r allows a deeper understanding 
of p o l i t i c a l events during the era of his ac t ive wri t ing, 
from 1900 to 1960. 
This co l l ec t i on of essays makes a c r i t i ca l and unique 
contr ibut ion to the l i t e r a tu re of American po l i t i c s . It is 
the resul t of severa l yea r s of studying Corwin 's life and 
wr i t i ngs . Many of Corwin 's books came from well-known 
p r e s s e s , and many of his e s s a y s a p p e a r e d in f a m i l i a r 
journa ls . Some of his important contr ibut ions to pol i t ical 
t h o u g h t , h o w e v e r , w e r e pub l i shed in l oca l n e w s p a p e r s . 
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f o r e i g n p e r i o d i c a l s , and o t h e r p u b l i c a t i o n s no l o n g e r 
a v a i l a b l e to many s c h o l a r s . Such e s s a y s c o n s t i t u t e the 
foundat ion of this book: C o r w i n ' s w r i t i n g s about the New 
Deal and C o u r t - p a c k i n g , his y e a r in Ch ina , his ambiguous 
suppor t for Woodrow Wilson, and his kind words for Eisen-
hower and Nixon in the 1950s. These essays also reveal a 
p r o m i n e n t s c h o l a r t a k i n g s t r o n g p o s i t i o n s on p o l i t i c a l 
e v e n t s , from the dec i s ion to e n t e r World War One to the 
c h a l l e n g e s of d e m o c r a c y under t h r e a t of a tomic war and 
expanding presidential powers. 
C o m p i l i n g t h e s e e s s a y s is t h e s e c o n d p roduc t of an 
examination of Edward Corwin that began in 1976. Greenwood 
P r e s s publ ished in early 1985 my first Corwin book, Edward 
S. Corwin and the Amer i can C o n s t i t u t i o n . That book is a 
c o m p l e t e b i o g r a p h y of Edward Corwin and an a n n o t a t e d 
b ib l iog raphy of w r i t i n g s by and about the p r o f e s s o r . The 
b iog raphy d e m o n s t r a t e s the con t inuous in terplay of personal 
p o l i t i c s with C o r w i n ' s s cho l a r l y achievements . The bibliog-
r a p h y a n a l y z e s a t r emendous volume of Corwin w r i t i n g s , 
inc luding more than twenty books , more than 200 e s s a y s , 
f i f t y - e i g h t l e t t e r s to e d i t o r s , and 150 book r e v i e w s . The 
ambi t ion is s t a g g e r i n g , and the information in nearly every 
work p r e s e n t s a va luab le and fresh p e r s p e c t i v e on diverse 
p o l i t i c a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t s . The need to 
c o l l e c t important essays that few scholars had ever seen was 
c lear . 
A s s i s t a n c e from many friends and supporters is necessary 
to comple t e any book . I thank the c o p y r i g h t holders who 
g r a n t e d pe rmis s ion to r e p r i n t i tems in th is c o l l e c t i o n . I 
acknowledged each of them a t the beginning of the appro-
p r i a t e e s s a y s . I give spec i a l t hanks to Thomas H. Wright, 
G e n e r a l Counse l and Secre tary of Princeton Universi ty. The 
Un ive r s i ty was the e v e n t u a l b e n e f i c i a r y of the e s t a t e s of 
P r o f e s s o r and M r s . C o r w i n . To the e x t e n t t h a t Corwin 
r e t a i n e d c o p y r i g h t i n t e r e s t s , pe rmiss ion for reprints had to 
c o m e from P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y . Mr. Wright quickly and 
e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y a r r a n g e d for the n e c e s s a r y a u t h o r i z a t i o n . 
I a lso thank Hugh D. Wise, Jr. of the Princeton law firm of 
Smith , S t r a t t o n , Wise , Heher & Brennan. Mr. Wise was the 
p e r s o n a l a t t o r n e y for t h e C o r w i n s , and he showed t h a t 
Princeton University was the beneficiary. 
John V. R i c h a r d s o n , J r . of the UCLA Graduate School of 
L ib ra ry and Informat ion S c i e n c e is my friend, advisor, and 
colleague. He continued his support for my work and kept me 
a l e r t to many d e t a i l s of s t y l e and content . John A. Gable 
of the Theodore Roosevelt Association has encouraged me for 
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t e n y e a r s , and he h a s r e p e a t e d l y p r o v e d the va lue of 
C o r w i n ' s w o r k . Marie Waters, reference librarian at UCLA's 
U n i v e r s i t y R e s e a r c h L i b r a r y , has t augh t me much about 
r e s e a r c h , and she accep ted the endless task of finding more 
i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t C o r w i n ' s C o u r t - p a c k i n g a r t i c l e in the 
e l u s i v e C a m p u s m a g a z i n e . T h a t a r t i c l e is r e p r i n t e d as 
C h a p t e r 15 of this book, and the copy in the Corwin Papers 
a t P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y r e m a i n s the only known o r i g i n a l . 
The Corwin P a p e r s hold many of the writings listed in the 
C o r w i n b i b l i o g r a p h y as wel l as s e v e r a l e s s a y s r e p r i n t e d 
h e r e . I con t inue my thanks to Nancy Bressler of Seeley G. 
Mudd M a n u s c r i p t L ib ra ry and to E a r l e E. Coleman of the 
P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y A r c h i v e s for a s s i s t i ng me through the 
years as I reviewed the Corwin Papers and obtained numerous 
copies of mater ia ls from them. I also thank Lea Chartok who 
typed and proofread parts of the manuscript . 
Some people deserve more than the most s incere apprecia-
t i o n . My wi fe , E l i z a b e t h S t . C l a i r C r e w s , did much more 
than a s s i s t wi th the t e x t . She t o l e r a t ed the many hours I 
i n v e s t e d in this project , beyond my law and business ca reers 
and my pursu i t of a d o c t o r a t e a t UCLA. El izabe th ' s good 
judgment and sound op in ions gave me the p e r s p e c t i v e and 
c r i t i c i s m I n e e d e d . She jo ins me to ded ica te this book to 
two f r iends and c o l l e a g u e s of Edward Corwin at Pr inceton. 
Alpheus Thomas Mason and his wife, Christ ine Mason, worked 
c l o s e l y w i t h C o r w i n and sha red his f r iendsh ip for many 
y e a r s . T h e i r k indnes s dur ing our v i s i t s to P r i n c e t o n and 
t h e i r en thus iasm for my study of Corwin made a c r i t i c a l 
d i f f e r e n c e in the qua l i ty of th is w o r k . I am del ighted to 
d e d i c a t e the book to them as a small gesture in return for 
their important support. 
Los Angeles, California 
December 18, 1985 
To 




The g rowth of p res iden t ia l powers and the expansion of 
federal authori ty in r ecen t decades require fresh examina-
t ion of Edward S . C o r w i n ' s wr i t i ngs and theor ies . His 
seminal s tudies of the president. Congress, and the Supreme 
Court became landmark works almost immediately upon their 
p u b l i c a t i o n in the f i r s t ha l f of t he t w e n t i e t h cen tu ry . 
Professor Corwin 's theor ies brought him praise and general 
I a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t as the most i n f l u e n t i a l c r i t i c of the 
I A m e r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t in his t i m e . Indeed , his general 
i t r e a t i s e s on the p r e s i d e n c y and the Consti tut ion remain 
; s t a n d a r d s long after his death in 1963. Such prominent 
works, however, often belie the steady flow of lesser-known 
I publ icat ions Corwin genera ted between 1900 and 1960. He 
'^ wrote more than twenty books, edited severa l o thers , and 
a u t h o r e d more than 400 a r t i c l e s , l e t t e r s to ed i tors , and 
book rev iews . Corwin was the recognized master of the 
essay--whether his essays were academic or popular. He was 
quick to of fer a l e g a l i s t i c and h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s of 
contemporaneous events , from income taxes and labor strikes 
to war powers and desegrega t ion . Yet the essays in this 
book r e v e a l a view of Corwin v i r t u a l l y unexplored by 
s t u d e n t s of A m e r i c a n po l i t i c s , law, and his tory; indeed, 
these essays c r e a t e a vision of Corwin unknown to many of 
his friends and close colleagues. 
Corwin published works with major university presses and 
in p r o m i n e n t law r e v i e w s , but many of his s ign i f ican t 
wri t ings appeared in local newspapers , foreign periodicals, 
and other sources not available in many libraries or to many 
r e s e a r c h e r s . The p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i v e of th i s Corwin 
c o l l e c t i o n is to make a v a i l a b l e some of Corwin 's most 
4 / CORWIN'S CONSTITUTION INTRODUCTION / 5 
i m p o r t a n t e s s a y s from such s o u r c e s . A second objective is 
to r e v e a l his wide r a n g e of i n t e r e s t s . Thus this collection 
i n c l u d e s a few i t e m s found in m a j o r r e s e a r c h l i b r a r y 
s t a c k s . An added benef i t of th is s e l e c t i o n of w r i t i n g s is 
t h a t we see an unabashed Corwin with a confident opinions: 
" W h e n e v e r he v e n t u r e d wi thin sniff ing d i s t a n c e of T a f t -
H a r t l e y , " sniped Corwin , "Mr. Truman i n v a r i a b l y th rew a 
conn ip t ion fit and b e c a m e to all intents and purposes drunk 
and disorder ly ."! 
Opinion and p r o v o c a t i o n c h a r a c t e r i z e d much of Edward 
C o r w i n ' s s t y l e from h i s e a r l i e s t c o l l e g e a r t i c l e s to his 
l as t l e t t e r s in the New York Times. Corwin discovered his 
t a l e n t s for a rgument whi le s tudy ing a t the Un ive r s i t y of 
Michigan where he was graduated in 1900. After two years of 
t e a c h i n g h igh s c h o o l s t u d e n t s , C o r w i n r e t u r n e d to the 
Un ive r s i ty as a g r a d u a t e s t u d e n t . He soon moved e a s t to 
ea rn his P h . D . in ea r ly American history from the University 
of P e n n s y l v a n i a in 1905 . Corwin t r a v e l e d to P r i n c e t o n , 
New J e r s e y tha t year to meet Woodrow Wilson, the president 
of P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y . Wilson p rompt ly inv i t ed young 
Corwin to become one of the s c h o o l ' s " p r e c e p t o r s " in the 
" p r e c e p t o r i a l p rog ram" Wilson i n n o v a t e d . The appo in tmen t 
began C o r w i n ' s a s s o c i a t i o n with Wilson and his long ca ree r 
a t P r i n c e t o n . In 1911 Corwin became a full professor, and 
in 1 9 1 8 he s u c c e e d e d to W i l s o n ' s f o r m e r p o s i t i o n as 
M c C o r m i c k P r o f e s s o r of J u r i s p r u d e n c e . Corwin held t h a t 
position until retir ing in 1946. 
Edward Corwin b e c a m e a p r emie r t e a c h e r and s c h o l a r . 
P r i n c e t o n s tudents regarded his courses in the Department of 
P o l i t i c s as the bes t and most demand ing ; co l leagues across 
the na t ion honored him with the presidency of the American 
P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e A s s o c i a t i o n . H e a c h i e v e d t h e s e 
p r o f e s s i o n a l g o a l s by the 1930s, and in t h a t d e c a d e he 
became a " s p e c i a l adv i so r" to Frankl in Roosevelt 's adminis-
t rat ion. Corwin's primary duty was to defend the New Deal 's 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . R o o s e v e l t ' s l e g i s l a t i o n t e s t e d t h e 
l imits of p r e s i d e n t i a l powers and of r e g u l a t i n g " i n t e r s t a t e 
c o m m e r c e . " Corwin p r e p a r e d the admin i s t r a t ion ' s arguments 
as the New Deal went before the Supreme Court, and he spoke 
o u t p u b l i c l y for t h e " r e v o l u t i o n " t h a t t h e New D e a l 
o f f e red . Corwin also became the intel lectual spokesman for 
R o o s e v e l t ' s " C o u r t - p a c k i n g " p r o p o s a l . When the S u p r e m e 
Cour t s t ruck down many New Deal m e a s u r e s as unconstitu-
t i ona l , R o o s e v e l t r e sponded by ask ing C o n g r e s s in 1937 to 
allow a new appo in tmen t to the Court for each justice who 
'i 
did not re t i re at age seventy. The Court would jump in size 
from nine to as many as fifteen members in one motion. 
The publ ic and C o n g r e s s doubted the p roposa l ' s wisdom. 
It was b l a t a n t t a m p e r i n g with the Supreme Court 's indepen-
d e n c e , a l though the plan i t se l f was c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Corwin 
rushed to the p r e s i d e n t ' s de fense and argued the case in a 
S e n a t e Jud i c i a ry C o m m i t t e e h e a r i n g . But the professor was 
nea r ly a l o n e . Few senators showed any sympathy, and even 
C o r w i n ' s a c a d e m i c c o l l e a g u e s g e n e r a l l y condemned "Cour t -
p a c k i n g . " F u r t h e r , the s e n a t o r s caught Corwin changing his 
op in ion . In the few months be fo re his c o m m i t t e e hear ing , 
Corwin w r o t e e x t e n s i v e l y about the Court and some sugges-
t ions for chang ing i ts p o s t u r e . Among the poss ibi l i t ies he 
men t ioned was i n c r e a s i n g the C o u r t ' s s ize to permit a few 
R o o s e v e l t appoin tees , but Corwin dismissed the notion as the 
b e g i n n i n g of unl imi ted and u n r e a s o n a b l e g r o w t h . He was 
f o r c e d to e x p l a i n h i s c h a n g e d op in ion , and he was not 
c o n v i n c i n g . The e p i s o d e c o s t Corwin some p r i d e , and it 
c losed the l ike l ihood of his gaining a seat on the Supreme 
C o u r t . His disappointment was profound. By the end of the 
1930s Corwin was a t t a c k i n g the president he had previously 
s u p p o r t e d . The n e x t d e c a d e s deepened the attack and even 
moved Corwin from liberalism to conservatism on many issues, 
part icularly presidential authority.2 
T h i s c o l l e c t i o n of a r t i c l e s d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t t r a n s i -
t i o n . Ea r ly essays show Corwin as a vociferous advocate of 
A m e r i c a n involvement in World War One. Corwin wrote firm 
w a r n i n g s of " t he Pacifism which springs from lack of hearty 
be l i e f in the future of our i n s t i t u t i o n s , a scepticism which 
s t r i k e s hands with p e r s o n a l d i s i n c l i n a t i o n for the hardships 
of w a r . It is th i s sort of Pacifism which consti tutes a new 
n a t i o n a l p r o b l e m . " 3 He d r e w s p i r i t from the gusto of 
T h e o d o r e R o o s e v e l t , h i s e a r l y i n s p i r a t i o n . This c o l l e c -
t i o n ' s l e a d e s s a y da t i ng from 1902 r e v e a l s C o r w i n - - t h e n 
s t i l l a s t u d e n t - - a d m i r i n g the "zest" and "sport" of Theodore 
R o o s e v e l t : "When th is man c a l l s ' F o r e ! ' it is qui te likely 
t h a t e a s y b o s s e s , d e f u n c t s e c r e t a r i e s of w a r , p o l i c e 
commiss ions , e n t r e n c h e d S p a n i a r d s , coa l b a r o n s e^ c e t e r a , 
will stand aside.""^ 
Corwin c o n c e n t r a t e d through the 1910s and 1920s on his 
g rowth as an academic. His writings were primarily scholar-
l y , bu t n e w s p a p e r r e p o r t e r s r e a c h e d him r e g u l a r l y for 
o p i n i o n s and c o m m e n t s on c u r r e n t e v e n t s . He p rof fe red 
advice to Wilson in the White House, but Corwin often argued 
a g a i n s t W i l s o n ' s c o n s e r v a t i v e p h i l o s o p h i e s . R a t h e r than 
tu rn ing to p o l i t i c s , Corwin in s t ead deve loped his exper t i se 
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as a t e a c h e r , p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t , and h i s t o r i a n . He s p e n t 
t h e a c a d e m i c y e a r of 1 9 2 8 - 1 9 2 9 in China as a v i s i t i ng 
p ro fe s so r , and Mrs . Corwin joined him for the year of study 
and world t r a v e l . In Ch ina , the professor gave a series of 
l e c t u r e s - - l a t e r p u b l i s h e d - - w i t h a view on the e m e r g e n c e 
of China as a unified and powerful na t ion . In one lecture 
he scrutinizes the Organic Law, a code for governing the new 
c o u n t r y . Corwin b rough t to the task his detailed knowledge 
of Amer i can exper iences and of the structure and functioning 
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t in the Uni ted S t a t e s . The 
p ro fes so r measu red the O r g a n i c Law a g a i n s t the A m e r i c a n 
C o n s t i t u t i o n to d e l i n e a t e the s t r e n g t h s and gaps in the 
Chinese system. 
The 1920s conf i rmed the d i v e r s i t y of C o r w i n ' s in teres ts 
a n d h i s p e n c h a n t for e x p l o r i n g t h e l i m i t s of f e d e r a l 
p o w e r s . His 1924 essay on the p r e s i d e n c y used the word 
" a g g r a n d i z e m e n t " to d e s c r i b e the e x p a n s i o n of p res iden t i a l 
p o w e r s . He was r e c o g n i z i n g an evo lu t ion of p r e s i d e n t i a l 
au tho r i t y t h a t was still in its infancy, and he found a word 
t h a t r e m a i n e d p r o m i n e n t in a l l of C o r w i n ' s s u b s e q u e n t 
p r e s i d e n t i a l s t u d i e s . Corwin a lso found an i n t e r e s t in the 
t r e a t y - m a k i n g powers of the p r e s i d e n t and C o n g r e s s . His 
f i r s t book explored that issue in 1913, and the next year he 
p r e s e n t e d a l i be ra l pos i t ion to the Lake Mohonk Conference 
on In ternat ional Arbitration in upstate New York. He argued 
t h a t the C o n s t i t u t i o n ve s t ed broad t r e a t y - m a k i n g au tho r i t y 
in the f ede ra l gove rnmen t : " t he Uni ted S ta te s has exact ly 
the same r a n g e of power in making t r e a t i e s t h a t it would 
h a v e if t h e s t a t e s did n o t e x i s t . " C o r w i n c a l l e d for 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t s to i m p l e m e n t soc i a l l e g i s l a t i o n 
o t h e r w i s e ou ts ide C o n g r e s s ' s p u r v i e w . He conc luded , "The 
d e v e l o p m e n t of u n i f o r m n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n , of a soc i a l 
c h a r a c t e r in pu r suance of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t , is but 
a n o t h e r phase of the b r o a d e r d e v e l o p m e n t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
s o l i d a r i t y . " 5 C o r w i n ' s e c l e c t i c i n t e r e s t s in t h e 1920s 
c o n t i n u e d t h roughou t the r e s t of his l i fe , and he subse -
quent ly w r o t e c r i t i c a l e s s a y s on nea r ly every constitutional 
i s s u e , i n c l u d i n g Benjamin F r a n k l i n ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the 
Constitution. 
The 1930s brought Professor Corwin a role in the federal 
government, and the New Deal raised issues of federal powers 
p e r f e c t l y ma tch ing his e s t a b l i s h e d e x p e r t i s e . As a Roose-
v e l t a d v i s o r , h o w e v e r , C o r w i n ' s d u t i e s w e r e more than 
s c h o l a r l y . He needed to reach the public and convince them 
of the New D e a l ' s soundnes s . His principal medium became 
d a i l y n e w s p a p e r s , and t h i s book i n c l u d e s his i m p o r t a n t 
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e s s a y s from C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e Moni to r and the Philadelphia 
R e c o r d . T h e s e e s s a y s a r e somet imes r e p e t i t i v e , but t he i r 
i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e s s t e m from c r i t i c a l Supreme Cour t 
ru l ings b e t w e e n t he i r pub l i ca t i on d a t e s . The P h i l a d e l p h i a 
R e c o r d s e r i e s a lso inc ludes C o r w i n ' s c r i t i c i s m of " C o u r t -
p a c k i n g " b e f o r e R o o s e v e l t announced his p lan ; t he se w e r e 
among the w r i t i n g s t h a t came into ques t ion in the S e n a t e 
h e a r i n g and p robab ly dimmed his p r o s p e c t s for joining the 
high Court . 
S u b s e q u e n t e s s a y s in this c o l l e c t i o n r e v e a l the turn of 
C o r w i n ' s theories and beliefs after the New Deal . He wrote 
" W h a t Kind of Jud ic i a l Rev iew did the F r a m e r s Have in 
Mind?" just months a f t e r the Sena te hearing, and he openly 
q u e s t i o n e d his e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s . His th ink ing a f t e r World 
War Two e v i n c e d a full r e v o l u t i o n : he not only a t t a c k e d 
R o o s e v e l t and his methods, but the New Deal itself. In "Of 
P r e s i d e n t i a l P r e r o g a t i v e , " the p r o f e s s o r ' s s e l f - r e a p p r a i s a l 
e x t e n d e d e v e n to h i s v i e w of the C o m m i t t e e on Pub l i c 
In fo rma t ion , a World War One agency he served for a short 
time in in 1918. The agency promoted America 's war effort--
a c a u s e in keep ing wi th C o r w i n ' s fe i s ty c l a ims about the 
m e r i t s of w a r and t h e d e t r i m e n t s of " P a c i f i s m . " His 
w r i t i n g s from t h e 1950s f i n a l l y d e m o n s t r a t e d C o r w i n ' s 
i n c r e a s i n g co n s e rv a t i v e ideology. He ridiculed Harry Truman 
and supported Dwight Eisenhower. Moreover, Corwin had kind 
r e m a r k s about Richard Nixon in the 1950s, calling him "such 
good mater ial to work upon" as Eisenhower tried to raise the 
vice presidential office from obscurity.6 
The book closes with selected views of Corwin from other 
w r i t e r s . Edward Corwin seemed to savor newspaper inter-
v i e w s . In 1927 he gave an e x t r a o r d i n a r y s i t t i n g with an 
A t l a n t a r e p o r t e r . The i n t e r v i e w was p r a c t i c a l l y a Corwin 
mono logue , and it de lved in to i ssues of c r ime and divorce 
n o t a p p e a r i n g in h i s o t h e r p u b l i c a t i o n s . He p r e s s e d 
s p e c i f i c a l l y for c a p i t a l pun ishment : " t he thought of the 
p e n a l t y and of the sureness with which it is enforced is the 
o n e t h i n g t h a t is g o i n g to l e s s e n c r i m e . " In the far -
r e a c h i n g s e s s i o n t h e p r o f e s s o r a l so sugges t ed s t r i c t gun 
c o n t r o l to curb c r i m e , and his c lo s ing comments opposed a 
th i rd term for p r e s i d e n t s . 7 The l a s t r emark foreshadowed 
C o r w i n ' s a t t a c k s on R o o s e v e l t in the 1940 e l e c t i o n . This 
b o o k ' s f inal pages inc lude a 1948 editorial from America, a 
C a t h o l i c m a g a z i n e , applauding Corwin's at tack on a Supreme 
Court decision affecting school prayer and a 1914 commentary 
p r a i s i n g C o r w i n ' s e a r l y work and a c k n o w l e d g i n g his rapid 
p r o m i n e n c e as a const i tu t ional scholar and powerful commen-
ta to r . 
8 / CORWIN'S CONSTITUTION 
Making these se lec t ions avai lable logically means making 
them avai lable in unaltered form. The full, original texts 
a p p e a r h e r e with only t h r e e t y p e s of c h a n g e s . F i r s t , 
t y p o g r a p h i c a l e r r o r s a r e c o r r e c t e d . Such e r r o r s were 
general ly misspellings and incomplete sets of parentheses or 
q u o t a t i o n m a r k s . A r c h a i c or a l t e r n a t i v e s p e l l i n g s a re 
p r e s e r v e d , such as " scep t i ca l . " All quotat ions, c i t a t ions , 
and i ta l ics are unchanged. Second, some punctuation has 
been changed to conform with modern s t anda rds . Some 
a r t i c l e s employed a s t e r i s k s as e l l i p s e s to note deleted 
mater ia l in quota t ions . Per iods serve as e l l ipses through-
out this book. When commas and periods coincided with the 
close of a quotation, the punctuation is placed inside the 
quotation marks, while question and exclamat ion marks are 
outside quotation marks unless par t of the quoted material. 
Severa l essays were inconsis tent on these mat ters . Incon-
s i s t e n c i e s of c a p i t a l i z a t i o n , s p e l l i n g , and t e r m i n o l o g y 
r e m a i n . Some might have been in ten t iona l ; o thers might 
r e v e a l the nature of contemporaneous publishing. In the 
case of the China a r t i c l e s , r eaders can only imagine the 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s of s e t t i n g t y p e for an Engl i s h - l a n g u a g e 
magazine with local labor from Shanghai or Beijing. 
The third edi tor ia l change in this book is that footnotes 
are numbered or renumbered into simple cardinal order. All 
f o o t n o t e s and c i t a t i o n s a r e as in the or iginal publ ica-
t i o n s . No e d i t o r i a l footnotes have been added, even to 
i den t i fy the many w r i t e r s , ph i lo sophe r s , and pol i t ic ians 
Corwin mentioned without using full names or explanations. 
The i n d e x , h o w e v e r , i d e n t i f i e s such persons . The first 
essay, for example, mentions "Mr. Balfour." Readers may 
turn to "Balfour" in the index to learn that Corwin was 
referr ing to Arthur James Balfour, who lived from 1848 to 
1930 and was a British Prime Minister. Original publication 
data appear at the bottom of the first page of each essay in 
t h i s book. Noted in b r a c k e t s with the c i t a t ions is the 
entry number for each original publication from the bibliog-
raphy in Edward S. Corwin and the American Constitution. 
That book is a comprehensive bibliography of writings by and 
about Corwin , together with a deta i led biography of the 
professor.8 
Some of these concerns may seem unduly technical, but 
t h e y a r e c r i t i c a l for a s s u r i n g t h a t the t e x t h e r e is 
o r i g i n a l and v i r t u a l l y e n t i r e l y u n e d i t e d . Th is book 
r e p r i n t s the e s s a y s as pub l i shed w i t h o u t e n t e r i n g the 
realm of "unpublished" works and the task of inferring an 
"original in tent ." The Corwin Papers at Princeton Univer-
s i ty c o n t a i n a w e a l t h of co r r e spondence , c l ippings, and 
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o t h e r i t e m s c r u c i a l for d e t a i l e d s t u d i e s of C o r w i n ' s 
wri t ings and his times. Corwin did not, however, save many 
of his o r i g i n a l manuscripts or page proofs . Only a few 
glimpses of Corwin 's added thoughts about his publications 
a p p e a r in his p a p e r s . His d i s t i n c t i v e longhand on an 
occas ional page proof or a r t i c l e offprint lends a t race of 
ins ight . But those comments rare ly affect the meaning of 
t h e pub l i shed w o r d s . E s s a y s r e p r i n t e d h e r e a r e thus 
products solely of the mind of Edward Corwin, the role of 
any o r i g i n a l e d i t o r s , and the consequences of prevai l ing 
publishing style and circumstances. 
These essays ul t imately provide important insight for all 
s c h o l a r s and s t u d e n t s of t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y pol i t ics and 
h i s to ry . They also confirm Corwin's position as the foremost 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h o l a r of his long e r a . He earned his 
s t a tu re from the depth of his approach and the originality 
of h i s a n a l y s i s . Corwin put c u r r e n t i s sues in t h e i r 
h i s to r ica l con tex t , and he explored a topic's full scope and 
ramif ica t ions . He also understood the divers i ty of consti-
tut ional law. The subjects in this co l lec t ion alone range 
from p res iden t i a l powers to d ivorce l eg i s la t ion . Fur ther , 
Corwin ' s s t rength came from sharing his scholarship with 
the g e n e r a l p u b l i c . His " l e t t e r s to the e d i t o r s " and 
i n t e r v i e w s in the New York Times and other newspapers 
i m m e d i a t e l y b r o a d e n e d p o p u l a r unders tand ing of cur ren t 
even t s . Perhaps one s ignif icant cr i t ic ism of the professor 
could come i ronical ly from the concen t ra t ion that c rea ted 
his prominence . Li t t le of Corwin 's life and work did not 
i n v o l v e the American Const i tu t ion . He thus deal t infre-
quently with the basic soc ie ta l and human concerns which 
form the ul t imate purposes of const i tu t ional law. Never-
the less , Corwin 's influence on the study of the Constitution 
remains dynamic, and his wri t ings leave a permanent and 
vi ta l record for all who study the pres ident , the Supreme 
Court, or any other aspect of American government. 
Part One 
The Early Years 
The roots of Edward Corwin's thoughtful analysis, philo-
sophic perspective 9 and complex writing style appear in two 
essays from Inlander, a periodical subtitled "A Monthly 
Magazine by the Students of Michigan University." Corwin 
studied history, politics, and economics as an undergraduate 
at the University of Michigan from 1896 to 1900, These 
earliest essays are peculiar and at times perplexing. In 
one work he admires the sportsmanlike qualities of Theodore 
Roosevelt, and in another Corwin calls on nearly every 
ancient Athenian philosopher to support his theories of 
democracy and political action, 
Edward Corwin joined the Princeton University faculty in 
1905 and soon wrote to his alma mater's alumni magazine 
describing the unique preceptorial program Woodrow Wilson 
was leading. These early kind words for Wilson and his 
initiatives later diminished as the two men diverged politi-
cally. Corwin remained at Princeton while Wilson went to 
the White House, but Corwin tendered periodic advice to the 
new president, Little of it received any action. Yet 
Corwin supported Wilson as the United States entered World 
War One, In a 1917 essay for the Pail y Princetonian, 
Professor Corwin argued in support of America's entry into 
the war, and he defied his readers' concerns directly by 
asserting that the nation's youth--presumably including 
Princeton students—should rightly be the ones called to 
action: "And war, on its dangerous side, enlists first our 
young men. The chivalry of youth so dictates, and so does 
natural equity. It is their heritage that demands protec-
tion--they stand at the threshold of the generation which is 
threatened." 
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In 1917 Professor Corwin wrote a longer argument in favor 
of the war effort. He showed not only the sophistication of 
his reasoning, but also his maturity as a scholar. His 
research crossed language barriers to explore political 
conditions and philosophical motivations behind the nations 
at war. Like Corwin's earliest student essays, philosophy 
took a prominent role in his political theories. These 
select essays highlight the philosophy, zeal, and critical 
reasoning that created foundations for later writings. 
These essays also reveal his admiration for Theodore 
Roosevelt and Corwin's long and uneasy relationship with 
Woodrow Wilson, 1 
The Sport of Life 
" S p e c t a t o r " in O u t l o o k , some t ime ago, made in te res t ing 
comment upon the way in which sport has affected d ress . 
Sport in the realm of fashion! A bull in a china shop! you 
say . But you forget that china shops are quite senseless 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , at t imes, and that even a mad bull 's icono-
c l a s m , h o w e v e r indiscr iminat ing, is not always rep rehen-
s ib l e . Whatever reforms Mr. Spor t ' s journeyman tailor has 
e f f e c t e d , h a v e b e e n g e n e r a l l y in the e l i m i n a t i o n of 
burdensome tawdry that we are all glad enough to be rid of; 
and in whatever freakish turns he has indulged himself are 
of so evident origin that we grant thei r val idi ty without 
q u e s t i o n . If for ins tance , one wears his t rousers turned 
up, he r e m e m b e r s then t h a t usage (or costume) is from 
t e n n i s , and t h a t t enn i s flannel has a cowardly habi t of 
shrinking from the encounter, so that one must needs have a 
strong reserve at hand. Again one may own no coach and four 
and st i l l wear his gloves turned down like a whip whose 
hands must be ever ready to the rein. 
Golf has re l ieved us of our headgear , s ince the golfist 
would find it sorry work a t tempting to "follow the ball" 
from under a Sombrero or picture-hat. We all rejoice in the 
freedom of Oxfords--thanks to sprinting, I suppose. 
"Spec t a to r " did not go on to show, as I think he might 
have , how sport has affected our whole attitude toward life; 
making here and there some wholesome eliminations of its too 
c o m p l i c a t e d f a c t o r s . We may put the mat te r even more 
b r o a d l y , and say that sport , in its universal vogue, has 
"The Sport of Life." Inlander 13 (December 1902): 87-90. 
Reprinted by permission. [Bibliography Entry D3] 
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become the m e t a p h r a n t of " s e r i o u s " life in to t e rms of i ts 
own co in ing , and all this with the prospect of a tremendous 
saving of nervous energy . In so far as this can be shown to 
be the c a s e , I b e l i e v e is due to the fact, that sport of its 
ve ry n a t u r e g ives e x p r e s s i o n to the sanest possible view of 
l ife with the bes t possible point and grace , and it is owing 
to just this r e a s o n , no doubt , t h a t s p o r t has e n t e r e d upon 
such a universal dominance. 
The d e f e n d e r s of spo r t a l w a y s h a s t e n to p roc l a im what 
e x c e l l e n c e of muscu la r s t r e n g t h and men ta l a l e r t n e s s t rue 
spor t is ab le to confer upon its devotees . But there is the 
t rue spor t sman as wel l as t rue s p o r t - - a n d in him wil l be 
found not m e r e l y p h y s i c a l p r o w e s s and r e a d i n e s s of in te l -
l e c t , bu t a l s o c e r t a i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g mora l v i r t u e s , t h a t 
spo r t a lone can furn ish . Of these virtues there are chiefly 
t w o - - t h o u g h , no doubt , if one t r i e d , he could find s e v e n . 
T h e y a r e , h o w e v e r , c h i e f l y t w o : I m p e r t u r b a b i l i t y and 
l o y a l t y . I m p e r t u r b a b i l i t y - - t o w h a t e v e r may befa l l be it 
victory or defeat which are alike to be borne with composure 
and equ inami ty , s i n c e the game i t s e l f is i t s own end and 
f i n a l c a u s e - - l i k e b e a u t y , " i t s own e x c u s e for b e i n g . " 
L o y a l t y - - t o the ru le s of the game, s i nce t h e r e i n r e s i d e s 
the whole essent ia l virtue of the sport, and not to abide by 
t h e s e , once to d e v i a t e from them, is to abandon the game, 
then and the re . 
It might seem, p e r h a p s , a t the f i r s t c a sua l glance, that 
i m p e r t u r b a b i l i t y w e r e not a v i r t u e a t a l l - - f r o m the s tand-
p o i n t of t h e g a m e a t l e a s t , which is w h a t i n t e r e s t s us . 
Conduc ive enough to the comfor t of us onlookers, you say, 
s i n c e we a r e t hus s p a r e d many uncomely and h a r r o w i n g 
s p e c t a c l e s of maudlin anguish or exultat ion, but what dowdy, 
l a c k a d a i s i c a l p l ay ing i t m e a n s , w h a t l i c e n s e to wh ims ica l -
i t y ! B u t n o t s o . I m p e r t u r b a b i l i t y s w i f t l y t u r n s an 
i nd i f f e r en t face g o a l - w a r d , allowing no inward misgivings as 
to t h e o u t c o m e to m a k e e x c u s e for p r e s e n t h a g g l i n g , 
fuddling, fooz l ing , clumsy tackl ing . Each moment it accosts 
as i t s own p e c u l i a r e t e r n i t y - - p r o c l a i m i n g a new " C a r p e 
d iem," without the jug of wine. Thus instead of making way 
w i t h e n t h u s i a s m , i t makes way for the g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e 
amount of it, at every instant of the encounter . So then be 
not d e c e i v e d by the ca sque of i m p e r t u r b a b i l i t y which the 
champion w e a r s ; for ve r i l y i t is but a p i e c e of the whole 
armor of r igh teousness , equipped with which he does doughty 
deeds of bat t le in the Here and Now. Imperturbability means 
then , simply i n d i f f e r e n c e to c o n s e q u e n c e . If it be brought 
over into the p r e s e n t m o m e n t ' s e n d e a v o r , e i t h e r i t is by 
pure a f f e c t a t i o n , or by force of c rude h a b i t wh ich cannot 
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m a k e n i c e d i s t i n c t i o n s . F o r t h e r e a l spor t sman simply 
c a n n o t r e s i s t t h e z e s t of p r e s e n t a c h i e v e m e n t s . What 
e n t h u s i a s t i c e n d e a v o r , w h a t s t i r r i n g s t r e n u o u s n e s s and with 
w h a t e f f i c i e n c y and economy working!--without apprehension, 
or mi sg iv ing , a g g r e s s i v e l y , unabashed , n e i t h e r boas t ing nor 
d e p r e c a t i n g , y i e l d i n g no single word of obeisance to Powers 
or P r i n c i p a l i t i e s or any other thing that makes and unmakes 
dest in ies . 
Then t h e r e is L o y a l t y - - l o y a l t y to the rules of the game. 
In o t h e r w o r d s , t h e s p o r t s m a n f r a n k l y and c h e e r f u l l y 
r e c o g n i z e s t h a t i t is th£ ru l e s t h a t make the g a m e . The 
l i m i t a t i o n s of the game are the very conditions of its being 
p l a y e d a t a l l . Why r a i l a t fa te? Ca l l it opportunity and 
go on . Th i s the t rue sportsman does; takes a "philosophical 
v i ew" of the g a m e - - o f l i f e . Thus the sportsman is sure to 
be well balanced in his view of the game, showing a sort of 
s e n s e of humor as i t w e r e . On the one hand he will not 
c o m p r o m i s e wi th the s i t u a t i o n - - t h e s i t u a t i o n is all " g r i s t 
to his mi l l ; " on the other hand he will not radically reform 
i t , u n l e s s of c o u r s e , he has chosen to p lay " t h a t game 
c a l l e d r e fo rm." L o y a l t y is c o n s e r v a t i v e , for t he game is 
a l w a y s o lde r than the g a m e s t e r . This, I think, reveals ye t 
a n o t h e r p h a s e of L o y a l t y . It is t ru th i ndeed , and c o n -
s t a n c y - - b u t i t is a lso j u s t i c e . Fo r whence came this game 
t h a t g a m e s t e r s p l ay? A r e not i t s c o n s t r a i n t s the result of 
a g r e e m e n t , h a v i n g for t h e i r p u r p o s e t h e a v o i d a n c e of 
i n e q u a l i t i e s , and p r o c e e d i n g even to h a n d i c a p s at times, if 
t he i n t e r e s t of the game is thus b e s t c o n s e r v e d ? A good 
game we w a n t , t h a t tests the p layers ' metal; the outcome is 
a m a t t e r of d i f fe rence . Thus Loyalty to sport is a cheerful 
j u s t i c e . Duty has for the nonce cast aside her scowls and 
martyr penances to do her masquerade role of Relaxat ion. 
W h a t z e s t in l i f e , w h a t w e a l t h in a c h i e v e m e n t t h e 
s p o r t i v e v iew of e x i s t e n c e and e x e r t i o n may contribute to, 
w e s e e in t h e c a s e of our P r e s i d e n t , a u t h o r of t h e 
" S t r e n u o u s Life." "War and Pol i t ics ," says he, "are the two 
grea tes t games agoing, and I mean to have my par t in them." 
H e r e is a view of l ife t h a t has s p i r i t and blood in the 
p r o p e r a d m i x t u r e . When th i s man c a l l s " F o r e ! " it is quite 
l i ke ly t h a t ea sy b o s s e s , de func t s e c r e t a r i e s of war , police 
commiss ions , e n t r e n c h e d S p a n i a r d s , coa l b a r o n s e_^  c e t e r a , 
will stand as ide. They must know very well that the warning 
w a s q u i t e formal and p e r f u n c t o r y , c a r r y i n g with it small 
h e e d of c o n s e q u e n c e s . Some o b s e r v e r s have s u p e r f i c i a l l y 
m i s t a k e n P r e s i d e n t Rooseve l t for a reformer, but this is far 
from be ing the c a s e . T h a t t he full l e t t e r of the law will 
r e c e i v e enforcement at his hands no one can doubt, but that 
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the law should undergo essential change through his agency--
is an e x t r a v a g a n t i d e a . Here is the true sportsman of 
imperturbabi l i ty and loyalty and of the personal honor that 
t h e s e v i r t u e s a t t e n d . The only th ing t h a t could drive 
Roosevelt to assume the a t t i tude of reformer would be the 
discovery that the rules of the game as it is now played, 
afford inadequate defense to personal honor and personal 
power, to both of which, as Ruskin suggests, full scope must 
be given. "The g rea t jus t i f icat ion of this game" [of war] 
he says , "is that it truly, when well played, determines who 
is the best man." So it should be of all games. Perhaps 
pol i t ics falls somewhat short of this ideal , and Mr. Roose-
velt would real ly prefer being a warrior to being a states-
man. You remember he said at West Point, to Mr. Bryan's 
g r e a t d i sgus t t h a t the good soldier "should not only be 
ready to fight but even anxious to fight." 
Mr. R o o s e v e l t is not the only example at hand. Mr. 
B a l f o u r s p e a k s of p o l i t i c s , a s " P l a y i n g the G a m e . " 
Van Maltke thought war a "game of chess ." And there is 
some evidence that Bismarck accep ted Talleyrand's idea of 
diplomacy as "La jonte des menteurs." 
Of course, throughout, I have been speaking only of sport 
in the b e s t s e n s e of the w o r d . S p o r t t h a t burns joss 
ne i ther to Fortuna in her ant ic aspect of inebriate Chance, 
nor to Plutus, the Exac t ing . When sport takes to specula-
tion, s tock-jobbing or other gambling, she deserves a strait 
j acke t . The professional sportsman is too much of a paradox 
to analyze here. I think we regard him about as the Greeks 
viewed those who taught for pay, or as the English, before 
Shakespeare's day, viewed vagrant actors. 
I have spoken, in short , only of that sport which finds 
its golden goal in each present moment of joyful effort. 
Democracy and Sophistry 
It is r a the r s t range that Grote should have deviated from 
his usual accuracy in order to prove that in the age of 
Sophists there were none. The task was too much, even for 
his i ngenu i ty , and what his e l abora te arguing beside the 
point goes to show is simply this: That the Sophists were 
c r e a t u r e s as well as c r ea to r s of their age and as such are 
justified. 
But this is a g rea t se rv ice that Grote has rendered us 
a f t e r a l l . We h a v e a l w a y s been accustomed to isolate 
Prodicus , P ro togoras , and Gorgias , Hippias, Euthydemus, and 
D i o n y s i d a r u s from t h e i r soc ia l environment , in order to 
ca s t i ga t e them in their helpless i so la t ion . Henceforth we 
s h a l l go and sin no more. The next time we pronounce 
j u d g m e n t it must be upon an age - - a heavy responsibi l i ty 
indeed, but one that cannot be shirked, whether we praise or 
whether we condemn. 
The term Sophist is specifically applied to one who prac-
t i c e s or t e a c h e s a cap t ious s ty le of disputat ion, having 
r e c o u r s e to a l l s o r t s of r h e t o r i c a l r h o d o m o n t a d e and 
t r i c k e r y . Such as is suited to wheedle common minds of 
t h e i r u n s c h o o l e d i n t u i t i o n s . But th i s de f in i t i on is too 
nar row. It gives its term more or less sharply technical 
the characteristics of an age and society that may be put in 
a much broader way. 
The Sophist of the academy and of the rostrum, putting 
forth his flamboyant parodies of sense, is actuated by the 
"Democracy and Sophistry." Inlander 10 (January 1900): 
64.-68. Reprinted by permission. [Bibliography Entry D1 ] 
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same mot ive t ha t a p p e a l s to all his ilk in h o w e v e r diver-
sif ied walks of life they a r e to be found. That motive is 
not inaccurately expressed by the maxim. 
"Noth ing s u c c e e d s l ike s u c c e s s . " The age of Sophis t ry 
means the apotheosis of success, with effort more or less of 
an ant ic . 
As a t e ache r the Greek sophist violated the ethics of his 
p r o f e s s i o n by t e a c h i n g for h i r e ; as a p h i l o s o p h e r h e 
r e p u d i a t e d all t h e o r e t i c a l i nqu i ry , making the s y s t e m s of 
his p r e d e c e s s o r s the foils of his a r t i s t i c ; as a G r e e k , by 
the o s t e n t a t i o u s manne r of his d e f e n s e of Greek tradit ions, 
he m a d e p a l p a b l e the mo t ive s for his a c q u i e s c e n c e in a 
d e c a d e n t c i v i l i z a t i o n . As a sculptor he had become a mere 
c h i s e l l e r ; as a d r a m a t i s t he was no more than a p u n s t e r . 
Even K r a t e s , Kra t inus and Aristophanes, when they make its 
i n s t i t u t i o n s o b j e c t s of t h e i r b i t t e r j i b e s , a r e b u t 
fol lowing the un ive r sa l t e n d e n c y and making game of the 
s h o r t c o m i n g s of t h e i r a g e , r a t h e r t h a n deve lop ing i ts 
c a p a b i l i t i e s . It w a s the age of E p h i a l t e s and P e r i c l e s . 
The d r a m a t i s t and the s cu lp to r had exposed to the vulgar 
g a z e - - o n t h e A c r o p o l i s and in the t h e a t e r - - t h e Gods of 
Greece; and now that both had done their best and worst for 
A t h e n s , t h e y b e c a m e m e r e t o o l - u s e r s , a p p r o p r i a t i n g the 
a v a i l a b l e , w h e t h e r it was an unexamined catch-word to hide 
lack of m e a n i n g , or e l a b o r a t e d r a p e r y e x e c u t e d in m a r b l e 
to t h e l a s t e x q u i s i t e d e t a i l , to c o v e r a n a k e d n e s s once 
ideal but now shameful. 
But it is in the p o l i t i c a l phase of G r e e k sophistry that 
we a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y in teres ted . Firs t , because Athens was a 
democracy and we are a democracy a lso . Second, because in 
the demos we get near the source of sophistry itself. 
T h e A t h e n i a n s t a t e by i t s d e m o c r a t i c s u p e r c i l i o u s n e s s , 
had i n v i t e d c h a l l e n g e from w i t h o u t . This c h a l l e n g e had 
mean t in the f i rs t i n s t a n c e w a r - - a n d later an inundation of 
b a r b a r i s m and of b a r b a r i a n s . The m i x t u r e was an e v e r 
w e a k e n i n g d i l u t e of A t h e n i a n p a t r i o t i s m - - a n d an e v e r 
s t r e n g t h e n i n g solut ion of Cosmopol i tanism. Consequently the 
i n d i v i d u a l was b e i n g r e l e a s e d from h i s t r a d i t i o n a l and 
nearest responsibil i t ies. 
I t is t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e a r m a r k of d e m o c r a c y t h a t it 
r e l i e s upon the i nd iv idua l . But when t h a t ind iv idua l loses 
his sense of dependence upon his fellows as members of the 
same s o c i e t y , and den ie s in a p o l i t i c a l s e n s e , t h a t he is 
h i s b r o t h e r ' s k e e p e r , t h e s o c i a l o r g a n i s m f a l l s to the 
g r o u n d . P e r s o n a l a c t i v i t y is no longer m o t i v a t e d by the 
social in a man, but by the merely selfish. Some men would 
have the s ta te become a dispenser of corn, some a dispenser 
I 
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of f a m e . I t d e p e n d s upon w h e r e t h e i r k e e n e s t s ense of 
s e l f - e x i s t e n c e is s e a t e d . S u c h a moment in a n a t i o n ' s 
h i s t o r y is the s o p h i s t ' s o p p o r t u n i t y . He a p p e a r s not only 
in his n a r r o w e r ro l e of the p r o f e s s i o n a l l y w i s e , but in a 
m y r i a d o t h e r r o l e s a l s o . Of chief consequence to the s ta te 
is t h e t r a n s f i g u r a t i o n of the p a t r i o t in to the p o l i t i c i a n . 
He who once was proud to own his duty to die for his nation 
w i l l now r e d u c e i t s p a r t to t h a t of a too l , in his own 
personal ac t iv i ty - - in his own grabbing after fame. 
T h e p e c u l i a r and h i s t o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r of the A t h e n i a n 
d e m o c r a c y - - i n d e e d of any unmi l i t a ry d e m o c r a c y made it 
e v i d e n t a long w h a t l ine success would succeed--v iz . : Public 
disputation and deba te . 
The s t a t e of the language at this time was exact ly fitted 
to t h e p u r p o s e of a n y o n e w i l l i n g to make it an a c t i v e 
i n c i d e n t in h i s s e l f - e x a l t a t i o n . D e v o i d of the b u o y a n t 
m e t a p h o r t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e d i t in the days when the poets 
f l o u r i s h e d , i t w a s s t i l l r e p l e t e w i t h u n i n v e s t i g a t e d , 
d u p l i c i t o u s exp re s s ions which the common mind, bereft of its 
i m a g i n a t i o n , c o u l d n o t q u i t e s o l v e . A few u n p r o b e d 
a m b i g u i t i e s , a few s q u i n t i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n s , a l a w , the 
g lamour of v i c t o r y is at tained without so much as an honest 
t h o u g h t . The publ ic consciousness is ensnared in a mesh of 
p h r a s e s . M e r c u r y , t h e God of e l o q u e n c e , t a k e s on the 
additional a t t r ibute of the patron of th ieves . 
Y e t , we must r e i t e r a t e , i t would be a g r a v e e r r o r , to 
r ega rd such farragoes and carryings-on as anything more than 
the w e a t h e r - v a n e of the t i m e s . The age was the a g e of 
S o p h i s t s and the m i s u s e r s of l anguage and thei r instructors 
c o n s t i t u t e d but one type of the many types to be found. It 
was an age of t a l e n t - - o v e r w e e n i n g t a l en t . An age of tool 
u s e r s , and not tool i n v e n t o r s . H e n c e men had recourse to 
the l i m i t a t i o n s of t h e i r age and no t to the development of 
its capabi l i t ies . 
S a y s F e l l e r : " T h e S o p h i s t i c movemen t is the fruit and 
the o rgan of the mos t comple te revolution that had hi therto 
t a k e n p l a c e in t h e t h o u g h t and i n t e l l e c t u a l life of the 
G r e e k s . T h i s n a t i o n s t o o d on t h e t h r e s h o l d of a new 
p e r i o d . T h e r e o p e n e d b e f o r e i t a view in to a p rev ious ly 
unknown world of freedom and cul ture. Can we wonder if it 
b e c a m e g i d d y on the h e i g h t so quick ly c l imbed , if self-
c o n f i d e n c e t r a n s c e n d e d t h e due l i m i t s , if man t h o u g h t 
himself no longer bound by laws when he had once recognized 
t h e i r s o u r c e in h u m a n w i l l and r e g a r d e d a l l th ings as 
sub jec t ive phenomena because we see all things in the mirror 
of our own consciousness." 
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Thus it was that the Greek, declar ing man to be the 
measure of all things, made the individual the sole measure 
of his responsibi l i ty and duty to the s t a t e and to society. 
Thus it was that the individual exalted himself to an end--
and derogated the state to a means. 
While sophistry is not always an inevi tab le and unusual 
tendency such as it was in Greece in the days of Pericles 
and before Aegospotami, while as it represented a material 
cu lmina t ion of the Sophis t ic idea, ye t Sophis ts , l ike the 
poor, are always with us. In proportion as they stand apart 
from t h e i r t i m e s , p r e s e n t i n g s t r o n g c o n t r a s t to honest 
e f f o r t and c o n s c i e n t i o u s e n d e a v o r , a r e t hey worthy of 
reprehension. At best, to use the words of Nordau, they are 
" in te l lec tua l eunuchs incapable of furthering an idea, and 
able only to imitate the process of production." 
The fact that any tendency or movement is the fruit of 
its age is ample apology for it , guarantee ing it immunity 
from indiscriminate censure. For condemn it and you condemn 
its age . Such is the defiance that Athenian Sophistry can 
hurl at its c r i t i c s . Now, do modern condi t ions present an 
e s s e n t i a l p a r a l l e l to t h o s e p r e v a i l i n g in the A t h e n i a n 
Democracy at the time of the Sophis t s - -does the circle of 
contemporaneity bound in an excuse for modern-day sophistry? 
The chief e lements of the s i tuat ion at Athens w e r e - - a 
democracy, fast becoming false to its t rad i t ions under the 
influence of a growing cosmopolitanism. A democracy failing 
as an end , and fas t becoming the tool of its individual 
c i t i z e n s . A t r eache ry to the ideals of the past, which had 
ceased to exac t more than lip homage, and not always that. 
A life with its goal outside i t se l f - - showing a s tep toward 
identification with a broader life. 
In America, we have a Democracy--a representative Demo-
cracy. Under no form of government does personality so soon 
become emphasized as mere means, as in a r ep re sen ta t i ve 
democracy . But first the r ep re sen t a t i ve is a means. The 
funct ion of r ep resen ta t ion has its own inheren t rank and 
g lory . It soon ceases to be a mere summation of popular 
opinion, a conducting medium through which the will of the 
masses is to act , though even as such the office is one of 
power and is inevi tably one more or less d iscre t ionary in 
its e x e r c i s e . Thus in time the position becomes a desider-
atum in and of itself, bringing a ce r ta in rank that serves 
to s e t the a g e n t above h i s p r i n c i p a l s . The se rvan t is 
exa l ted above his mas t e r s . What Bryce says of the presi-
dency may be ex tended to all the people ' s representatives, 
"In a country where there is no he red i t a ry aristocracy an 
office raised far above all o ther offices appears too great 
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a s t imulus to a m b i t i o n . Th i s g l i t t e r i n g p r i z e , a l w a y s 
dangling before the eyes of prominent statesmen, has a power 
s t ronger than any dignity under a European crown to lure 
them from the path of straight-forward consistency." 
The r ep resen ta t ive ceases to be an end to himself and a 
means to soc ie ty , making inevi tab le his choice as r e p r e -
sen ta t ive because of the concentrat ion within himself of all 
the mer i t s of democracy . More effect ive methods of self-
e leva t ion are sought . The means is suggested by the very 
nature of democracy--a state of men. Men must become his 
too l s . How to make them his tools is now the problem that 
confronts the s ta tesman . Obviously the popular traits of a 
so l ic i tor of suffrages must be cu l t iva ted . V/here ignorant 
and learned alike have a voice in the government no method 
can be more e f f e c t u a l than an a p p e a l to s e l f i s h n e s s , 
prejudice, and passion. 
Thus the very fact of representat ive government presents 
an a d e q u a t e mot ive for sophis t ry . We have noted other 
concomitant condi t ions of the Athenian s t a t e that made it 
i nev i t ab l e . Can a paral le l ism be t raced in the life of our 
own State? 
The d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t r a i t of democracy is its supreme 
arrogance and superciliousness. Every man is as good as any 
other man. Every man is a king. But kings are few in other 
lands . Hence the obvious superior i ty of democracies. This 
sense of supe r io r i t y - -pe rhaps this too conscious apprec ia -
tion of a f a c t - - s e r v e s to d i f fe ren t ia te and i so la te in the 
minds of i ts c i t i z e n s - - a democra t ic s t a t e from the rest of 
the world. 
Th i s r a t h e r s u p e r c i l i o u s a t t i tude is at first mit igated 
by a very laudable desire to extend to the outside world the 
benefi ts of democracy . The philanthropy is accepted. The 
world pours into our favored s ta te . Yet immigration cannot 
but d i l u t e o r i g i n a l i d e a l s . The movement from without 
inward becomes the movement from within outward. A general 
cosmopolitanism se t s the goal of national ambition somewhat 
beyond its former self and in the process of self-making and 
s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n , for which Democracy s tands both as to 
s t a t e and as to individual , both s t a t e and individual have 
conceived new ends and ideals. 
The new tendency may evince itself in two ways--(l) As 
scept icism of the old. (2) As strenuous, conscious ignoring 
of t h e n e w . Th i s is jus t w h a t s o p h i s t r y s t a n d s for . 
Essent ia l ly it has cas t aside the old, but in form, it may 
voice the old shibboleths and avow the old allegiancies. In 
such an age of duplicity and self-conflict of the state, the 
old s t a t e a g a i n s t the new s t a t e , words and t e rms are 
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d u p l i c i t o u s a l s o . The "do l l a r of the f a t h e r s " may mean 
a n y t h i n g or noth ing . "Providence" and "Destiny" are left to 
t he i r own i n t e r p r e t e r s . The ind iv idua l as individual has to 
be appealed to - - l e t him be the measure of the sense of such 
phrases, as he is the measure of all things. 
C o n c o m i t a n t wi th the soph i s t ry t h e r e a r e al l s o r t s of 
e v i d e n c e s of the s o p h i s t i c a l m o t i v e s inhering in the life of 
the t imes . The p a r t y e x a l t s the " a v a i l a b l e " m a n - - n o t the 
g r e a t man . The a t t o r n e y a d v o c a t e s r i g h t and wrong wi th 
i n d i f f e r e n c e . S a l v a t i o n is for a p r i c e and p r e a c h e r s 
squabb le over r a n k . The i n t e r e s t of the age is scient i f ic . 
Noth ing s u c c e e d s l ike s u c c e s s . Theo logy i n s i s t s upon the 
f i g u r a t i v e n a t u r e of p la in s t a t e m e n t , and whi le r e j e c t i n g 
t h e n a i v e s p i r i t of s c r i p t u r e hangs d e s p e r a t e l y upon i t s 
l e t t e r . All this is sophistry. 
In an age of soph i s t ry how can sophistry be condemned? 
When the i n t e r e s t of the individual has ceased to be in the 
s t a t e and is s e l f - c e n t e r e d , the r e s p e c t i v e ro les of individ-
ua l and s t a t e m u s t n e c e s s a r i l y be i n v e r t e d ; i n d e e d , the 
r e l a t i o n of ends and means r a d i c a l l y , i r r e p a r a b l y t w i s t e d . 
T h e f u n c t i o n of t h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u e n c y is to g r a b 
w h a t e v e r favors they can extend themselves. Relief without 
e f f o r t - - G o d ' s he lp wi thou t sel f h e l p - - t h i s is the motive of 
s o p h i s t r y . I t s c o n c r e t e e x p r e s s i o n is to be found in a 
P r o t e c t i v e Tariff and Quack Medicines. Unhampered exchange 
and hygiene are regarded with equal impat ience. At the same 
t ime, " v o c i f e r a t e d log ic" is found to be a good adu l t e ra te 
subs t i t u t e for c o r r e c t i n f o r m a t i o n . A need is suggested by 
t h e s i t u a t i o n t h a t t h e s c h o o l s of o r a t o r y f i l l ; a l so , the 
s c h o o l s t h a t t u r n o u t , in six m o n t h ' s t ime , full f l edged 
d i p l o m a p h y s i c i a n s to m i n i s t e r to t h e c r e d u l i t y of the 
p e o p l e . Y e t to a t t e m p t to s a v e the peop le under such 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s is to a t t e m p t to s ave them from themselves . 
Can that be presumed? 
The Princeton Preceptorial System 
It is g e n e r a l l y known t h a t , a t the beginning of the current 
academic year , a system of instruction, somewhat akin to the 
Oxford t u t o r i a l s y s t e m , was inaugurated at the University of 
P r i n c e t o n . T h e e s s e n t i a l i d e a of t h i s , to A m e r i c a n 
e d u c a t i o n , novel i n s t r u c t i o n , is to b r ing the s t u d e n t in to 
t h a t p e r s o n a l c o n t a c t with his teachers which the increasing 
s i z e of t h e U n i v e r s i t y of P r i n c e t o n was r e n d e r i n g more 
imposs ib l e e v e r y y e a r . The idea or b e t t e r , the i d e a l , of 
t h e p r e c e p t o r i a l sys tem i s , to quote P r e s i d e n t Wilson, to 
make the p r e c e p t o r a "guide, philosopher, and friend" of his 
s t u d e n t s . P r e c e p t o r i a l i n s t r u c t i o n is a f forded in al l the 
D e p a r t m e n t s of the U n i v e r s i t y and const i tu tes , so to speak, 
a r e d - l i n e running through the e n t i r e c u r r i c u l u m . But for 
r e a s o n s t h a t wi l l r e v e a l t h e m s e l v e s , the P r e s i d e n t ' s i dea l 
of his i nnova t i on is p robab ly most n e a r l y r e a l i z e d in the 
Depa r tmen t of History, Poli t ics and Economics. At any ra te , 
b e c a u s e t h a t is the D e p a r t m e n t wi th which I am personally 
c o n n e c t e d , mos t of my accoun t of the system will be taken 
from that source. 
When a P r i n c e t o n s t u d e n t in Arts reaches his Junior and 
S e n i o r y e a r s he is a l lowed to e l ec t three of his five units 
of work in a single department, in which department he then 
becomes " r e g u l a r l y e n r o l l e d . " Fo r the rest of his work he 
is a " f l o a t e r . " T h e c u r r e n t s e m e s t e r 199 J u n i o r s and 
S e n i o r s - - f o r t y more than w e r e a n t i c i p a t e d - - a r e r e g u l a r l y 
"The Princeton Precep tor ia l System." Michigan Alumnus 12 
(March 1906): 269-272. Reprinted by permission. [B ib -
l iography Entry D4.] 
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e n r o l l e d in t he D e p a r t m e n t of H i s t o r y , E c o n o m i c s and 
P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e . Under the a n c i e n t regime these students 
would have r e c e i v e d t h r e e lec tures weekly in each of their 
e l e c t i v e s : the Juniors in J u r i s p r u d e n c e , M e d i a e v a l H i s t o ry 
and the E lemen t s of Po l i t i ca l Economy: the Seniors in any 
t h r e e of t h e fo l l owing five sub j ec t s : A m e r i c a n H i s t o r y , 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a w , E n g l i s h H i s t o r y , Pub l i c F i n a n c e and 
Colonia l G o v e r n m e n t . Under the new arrangement, however, 
the number of lectures has been reduced to two weekly, and 
t h e t h i r d h o u r - - n o t n e c e s s a r i l y t h e s c h e d u l e d h o u r - - i s 
o c c u p i e d in c o n f e r e n c e on r e a d i n g , c o l l a t e r a l wi th the 
l e c t u r e s and p r e s c r i b e d by t h e l e c t u r e r in t h e g i v e n 
sub j ec t . To furnish these confe rences is the work of eight 
P r e c e p t o r s of the D e p a r t m e n t , to e a c h of whom, for th is 
purpose , a re ass igned e l even S e n i o r s and four t een Jun io rs . 
Only one of t h e s e P r e c e p t o r s does any l e c t u r i n g . The 
Facu l ty of the Depar tment of History, Economics and Pol i t i -
cal Economy fal ls t h e r e f o r e in to two well def ined groups , 
the Lec tu r e r s , who are mostly Professors and the Precep to r s , 
who a r e A s s i s t a n t P r o f e s s o r s . On t h e o t h e r hand , the 
L e c t u r e r s or (as in the case of President Vs^ilson's course in 
J u r i s p r u d e n c e ) t h e i r a s s i s t a n t s do someth ing l ike p r e c e p -
t o r i a l w o r k w i t h t h e " f l o a t e r s " t a k i n g t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r 
subjects. 
Each P r e c e p t o r en joys the g r ea t e s t latitude of discret ion 
in dea l ing with his charges . As for myself, I meet my men 
in my own rooms, in groups of t h r e e , four or f ive , for a 
weekly c o n f e r e n c e in each sub jec t , of a p p r o x i m a t e l y fifty 
minutes ' d u r a t i o n . In J u r i s p r u d e n c e , h o w e v e r , the r e a d i n g 
in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h w h i c h is b u l k y and di f f i cu l t - - for 
J u n i o r s - - e m b r a c i n g , as i t d o e s , H o l l a n d ' s J u r i s p r u d e n c e , 
Markby ' s Elements of Laws and Maine's Ancient Law, I have 
found it more s a t i s f a c t o r y recent ly to meet my men in two 
ha l f -hour c o n f e r e n c e s w e e k l y , one on Monday and one on 
Thu r sday . The s t u d e n t s ' r e a d i n g is thus b e t t e r d i s t r ibu ted 
th roughout the week , and t h e r e f o r e b e t t e r d o n e . A l s o , I 
have r e c e n t l y r educed my c o n f e r e n c e s wi th my S e n i o r s to 
f o r t y - f i v e minutes for each sub jec t , u t i l i z i ng the r e s i d u e 
of the hour in con f iden t i a l c o n f e r e n c e with an ind iv idua l 
S e n i o r . In this way I m e e t eve ry S e n i o r once a week in 
" h e a r t to h e a r t " c o n f e r e n c e on his work in g e n e r a l , his 
fa i l ings , e t c . I am thus able to prick up laggards, without 
too much e m b a r r a s s m e n t on e i t h e r s i d e , and a l so to g ive 
e x c e p t i o n a l men a d e g r e e of special at tention in connection 
with their special apti tudes. 
The p u r p o s e of t h e c o n f e r e n c e is twofold: F i r s t , to 
assure the reading's being done with some degree of ca re and 
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constant ly from week to week, instead of being postponed, as 
w a s a n c i e n t l y d o n e t i l l t h e w e e k b e f o r e e x a m i n a t i o n : 
S e c o n d l y , to make the r e a d i n g s i g n i f i c a n t . The ignorance 
t h a t S e n i o r s and Juniors in c o l l e g e are capable of display-
ing wi th r e f e r e n c e to g e o g r a p h y , c u r r e n t a f f a i r s , the most 
n o t o r i o u s e v e n t s a n d c h a r a c t e r s of h i s t o r y , is t r u l y 
a s t o u n d i n g . T h e k n o w l e d g e t h a t c o m p r e h e n d i n g r e a d i n g 
c o n s t a n t l y c a l l s in to r e q u i s i t i o n is more often lacking than 
no t . Now, i t is not the bus iness of a P r e c e p t o r to be a 
wa lk ing e n c y c l o p e d i a or a n y t h i n g of the sort, but it is his 
bus iness to a rouse his c h a r g e s to an i n t o l e r a n c e of t he i r 
own ignorance . Another very important use of the conference 
is to c o r r e l a t e the in fo rma t ion t h a t the student is gleaning 
from his v a r i o u s sub jec t s . For example: The "Ordinance of 
1787" has its place both in American History and in Colonial 
G o v e r n m e n t : a l so , the P r o t e c t o r a t e is a conception both of 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law and of C o l o n i a l G o v e r n m e n t : again , the 
de l ay of the Engl i sh in c o l o n i z i n g in America is connected 
wi th t h e i r s e a r c h for the Northwest Passage, which, in turn, 
is c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e no t ion of a " c lo sed s e a . " T h e s e 
e x a m p l e s wi l l suff ice to make my meaning c lea r . Pres ident 
W i l s o n ' s i d e a l of a P r e c e p t o r is n o t a s p e c i a l i s t in a 
s ing le l ine of i n v e s t i g a t i o n but a s t u d e n t of var ious allied 
s u b j e c t s , w h i c h he is c a p a b l e of v i ewing and of making 
o t h e r s view as members of a single body of knowledge. So 
much for the purpose of the p r e c e p t o r i a l conference: as I 
r e m a r k e d above , the modus operandi is quite of the individu-
al p r e c e p t o r ' s own e l e c t i o n . Certa in books being designated 
for each course and having to be got through by the end of 
t h e s e m e s t e r , t h e r e a d i n g e a c h w e e k is of a d e f i n i t e 
a s s i g n m e n t . So me t i mes the conference is more or less of a 
qu i z upon t h i s a s s i g n m e n t - - H o l l a n d ' s J u r i s p r u d e n c e , for 
e x a m p l e , l en t i t s e l f i n e v i t a b l y to such d r i l l work; some-
t imes the conference is an elaborat ion by the preceptor upon 
some i m p o r t a n t t o p i c o c c u r r i n g in the r e a d i n g ; most often, 
h o w e v e r , i t is an informal a l l - r o u n d a f f a i r - - a discussion of 
some topic cas t upon the waters by a question on the par t of 
somebody, involving as many modern instances as possible and 
inviting exchange of opinion. 
I t h i n k i t i n d u b i t a b l e t h a t the i nnova t ion has a l r e a d y 
won the g e n e r a l a p p r o v a l of the s t u d e n t s though na tu ra l ly 
t h e r e is h e r e and t h e r e a sulky fel low who ins i s t s upon 
t ak ing a p e r v e r s e view of things, and perhaps now and then 
one wi th a r e a l g r i e v a n c e a g a i n s t th is innovat ion upon his 
set t led routine of life. A Senior song last year had it: 
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"Here 's to those Preceptor guys, 
Who're coming here to make us wise . 
But they can ' t shove it down our throats . 
Naughty-six and seven- - they ' re the goats." 
P e r h a p s so, but fair ly wi l l ing g o a t s , I t h i n k . My men 
te l l me t h a t w h e r e a s , p rev ious falls all the conversation at 
t h e C lubs turned on foo t -ba l l and such t o p i c s , th i s y e a r 
t h e y ' r e t a l k i n g a b o u t m a t t e r s of i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n c e r n , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y e v e n t s of t h e d a y t h a t c a n be invoked in 
i l l u s t r a t i on of the i r work . S t u d e n t s a p p r e c i a t e the feature 
of pe r sona l c o n t a c t , and tes t i fy t h a t they would prefer to 
lose " t h r e e or four l e c t u r e s r a t h e r than one c o n f e r e n c e . " 
Moreover, the men are working. A Junior is quoted as having 
e x p l a i n e d to some one who inqui red "what this preceptor ia l 
s y s t e m w a s a n y w a y , " t ha t it was " a n o t h e r of Woodrow ' s 
schemes to make us work." If that was the purpose of the 
sys tem, it has been a c h i e v e d . Everybody of long res idence 
h e r e w i l l te l l you tha t the t r a n q u i l i t y of the campus a t 
n i g h t - t i m e is p e r f e c t l y ghos t ly as c o m p a r e d wi th former 
y e a r s ; and I am i n f o r m e d t h a t t h e p r o p r i e t o r s of t h e 
P r i n c e t o n Inn are almost persuaded that they have a case in 
damages against the University. 
Of cou r se , t h e r e a re o the r opinions besides those of the 
s tuden ts and the P r e c e p t o r s which must be canvassed before 
any thing l ike a r ea l v e r d i c t can be ventured: the opinion 
of the o lder men on the f acu l ty , the opinion of the town, 
the opinion of p a r e n t s . These opinions are not ye t c rys t a l -
l i z e d , t h o u g h i n t e r e s t i n g e x h i b i t i o n s of b ias c r o p out a t 
t i m e s . The f i rs t e x a m i n a t i o n s s ince the new s y s t e m was 
i n s t a l l e d a r e now under w a y . P e r h a p s the c o n s e n s u s of 
o u t s i d e o p i n i o n w i l l be d e t e r m i n e d by t h e s e . If many 
s tuden t s fail and a r e sen t home, naturally the question will 
be r a i s ed : "Wherein does the saving virtue of the p recep-
to r i a l system r e s i d e ? " This remark, however, applies ra ther 
to those d e p a r t m e n t s , l ike the Classical and the English, in 
which Freshmen and Sophomores predominate. Few Juniors or 
Sen io r s will be sent home. Accordingly, I feel warranted in 
saying tha t the v e r d i c t upon the preceptor ia l system in the 
D e p a r t m e n t of History, Poli t ics, and Economics, of which the 
P r e s i d e n t h i m s e l f is h e a d , is a l r e a d y s e t t l e d . I t is 
e x p r e s s e d in t h e s t a t e m e n t of o n e of my s t u d e n t s who 
d e c l a r e d at the close of the work for the semester , that he 
had got twice as much out of his course as he had last y e a r . 
Of course , the p r e c e p t o r i a l sys tem as f i r s t i n s t i tu t ed a 
few months ago, or indeed, as today operating, is no cut and 
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dr i ed a f f a i r . Indeed , no small f r ac t i on of the c r e d i t due 
P r e s i d e n t Wilson for his i nnova t ion should be a c c o r d e d to 
his courage in acting in the face of problems that could not 
p o s s i b l y be so lved t i l l the i n s t i t u t i o n t h a t t he i r so lu t ion 
m u s t m a k e or m a r , w a s a l r e a d y i n s t a l l e d . Ques t i ons of 
concern to the Precep tors as a body are sett led in a general 
c o n f e r e n c e of the P r e c e p t o r s of all depar tments . Those of 
d e p a r t m e n t a l c o n c e r n a r e s e t t l e d in a c o n f e r e n c e of the 
d e p a r t m e n t a l f a c u l t y - - l e c t u r e r s and p r e c e p t o r s , each having 
an ind iv idua l v o t e . A ques t ion of the l a t t e r sort arose in 
our d e p a r t m e n t as to the re la t ive weight to be given to the 
s t u d e n t ' s term work to his preceptor and to his work in the 
e x a m i n a t i o n s e t by t h e l e c t u r e r a t t h e c l o s e of t h e 
s e m e s t e r , in d e t e r m i n i n g the s t u d e n t ' s f inal s t a n d i n g . It 
was d e c i d e d in a conference of the lecturers and preceptors 
of our d e p a r t m e n t tha t the examination proper should be set 
by the l e c t u r e r w i t h o u t c r i t i c i s m from the p recep to r s , who 
m i g h t be t e m p t e d if t h e y c o n t r i b u t e d to making up the 
e x a m i n a t i o n q u e s t i o n s , to c r a m t h e i r c h a r g e s with the 
n e c e s s a r y pas s ing in format ion ; that g rea te r weight should be 
g iven to the p r e c e p t o r ' s word r e g a r d i n g a man's fitness to 
p a s s t h a n to t h e l a t t e r ' s e x a m i n a t i o n r e c o r d - - t h o u g h , of 
c o u r s e , the precep tors keep no wri t ten record of their men's 
w o r k ; - - t h a t a preceptor might even exclude a man al together 
from t a k i n g the examinat ion; and that after examination, the 
final standing of a man in a subject should be determined in 
a c o n f e r e n c e of the l ec tu re r and preceptors in that subject, 
in which the p r e c e p t o r s should be ent irely free to comment 
upon the r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of the examination, or of par t icular 
q u e s t i o n s . T h e s e ru le s have now been generally adopted by 
the other depar tments . 
The s y s t e m , I sa id , is not s t e r e o t y p e d . One i m p o r t a n t 
f e a t u r e in c o n n e c t i o n wi th the work in the D e p a r t m e n t of 
H i s t o r y , E c o n o m i c s , and P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , wh ich , I think, 
will undergo reform very soon, is the almost exclusive power 
of t h e l e c t u r e r in a s p e c i f i c s u b j e c t to p r e s c r i b e the 
r e a d i n g in t h a t s u b j e c t . The P r e c e p t o r s wil l be , in fac t 
a r e b e i n g , g i v e n g r e a t e r and g r e a t e r d i s c r e t i o n in the 
m a t t e r . The t ime wil l come when the r e a d i n g i n s t e a d of 
be ing conf ined to a few books which the student purchases 
and which a p p r o x i m a t e the n a t u r e of t e x t s , will be done 
t o p i c a l l y in a l i b r a r y g e n e r o u s l y equ ipped wi th d u p l i c a t e s 
of t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t w o r k s on t h e p a r t i c u l a r sub jec t , 
a c q u a i n t a n c e w i t h w h i c h is i t s e l f a m a t t e r of g e n e r a l 
cul ture . 
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Other reforms also will probably suggest themselves from 
t ime to t ime . Pres iden t Wilson's openness of mind with 




New National Problem 
It is a s t r ik ing fact that in all of our wars excep t the 
last we have been a divided people. The War of Independence 
was as much a war between Whig and Tory, as between British 
and Americans. From the War of 1812 the New England States 
held sulkily aloof. The Mexican War was esteemed a war of 
criminal aggression by the majority of people north of Mason 
and Dixon's line. The character of the Civil War appears in 
its name. 
We should not, therefore, be too much discouraged by the 
phenomena of Hyphenatism and Pacifism simply as divisive 
forces, but for what they betoken as to the condition of the 
national mind they may be more ominous. From this point of 
view Hyphenatism is far the less alarming ailment, being an 
affair of the stomach ra the r than of the soul--a species of 
indigest ion due to overrapid ea t ing , for the cure of which 
nothing could be be t t e r than the hear ty exe rc i se of war . 
But Pacifism is of the mind, though how deeply it affects 
the mind differs, na tura l ly , with c a s e s . Much of it is, no 
d o u b t , s h e e r i n e r t i a - - p a r t i c u l a r l y the i n e r t i a of the 
business man in an era of unexampled prosperity; he wishes 
to keep on his way, and war is an annoyance. On the other 
hand, however, is the Pacifism which springs from lack of 
h e a r t y bel ief in the future of our ins t i tu t ions , a s cep t i -
cism which s t r ikes hands with personal dis incl inat ion for 
the ha rdsh ips of war . It is this sort of Pacifism which 
constitutes a new national problem. 
"Pacifism Constitutes New National Problem." Daily Prince-
tonian, March 27, 1917, pp. 1, 4-. Reprinted by permission. 
[Bibliography Entry D24.] 
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But though we have usually been far from a united people 
when engaged in war , we have been singularly fortunate in 
l e a d e r s h i p , and t h i s f a c t h a s b e e n our s a l v a t i o n . All 
s tuden t s of Amer ican His tory t o - d a y know that long before 
the end of the Revolution was reached, the only forces that 
s tood be tween the country and ruin were the fidelity of our 
a l l i e s and the fortitude of our commander. In the Civil War 
t h e p r o b l e m was r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t - - i t was the problem of 
g e t t i n g s t a r t e d ; and h e r e L inco ln ' s abso lu t e c l a r i t y and 
de f in i t eness of purpose and his a l e r t n e s s to every opportu-
n i t y t h a t o f f e r e d , embodying t h a t purpose in an a roused 
popular s en t imen t , ach ieved the miracle . The Mexican War, 
too, though t he r e a r e s t i l l those who a p o l o g i z e for i t , is 
at l ea s t admirab le as a t r iumph of de l ibe ra t e purpose, that 
of James K. Polk, the most inconspicuous and most successful 
of our Presidents . 
Another i n e s c a p a b l e lesson of our military history which 
it is worth while br inging up at the moment, is our entire 
l a c k of a m i l i t a r y p o l i c y - - u n l e s s i n d e e d t h e v o l u n t e e r 
sys tem should be dignif ied by that designation. Our ear l ier 
w a r s h a v e taught us abso lu te ly no th ing on th is s u b j e c t - -
thanks to our own o b t u s e n e s s . In the midd le of the Civil 
War p r a c t i c a l e x i g e n c i e s compe l l ed r e c o u r s e to the d ra f t , 
but t h e v e r y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y m e a s u r e a d o p t e d w a s soon 
p r a c t i c a l l y a b a n d o n e d in f a v o r of t h e w a s t e f u l bounty 
s y s t e m . By the b e g i n n i n g of 1 8 6 4 , it was cos t i ng the 
a u t h o r i t i e s , na t iona l and local, nearly $800 merely to get a 
man into the r anks , and many of t hose thus placed stayed 
t h e r e as s h o r t a t i m e as p o s s i b l e . E n l i s t m e n t , boun ty , 
d e s e r t i o n , r e - e n l i s t m e n t , fresh bounty , and so on- - th i s was 
the o rder of p rocedure . One scamp was captured at Albany 
who claimed to have deserted and collected bounty 32 t imes. 
Many p e o p l e s t i l l c o n s i d e r t h e q u e s t i o n of c o m p u l s o r y 
s e r v i c e a very d e b a t a b l e t o p i c . I recommend them General 
U p t o n ' s book or Mr . F r e d e r i c k H u i d e k o p e r ' s more r e c e n t 
volume. 
There are o the r p r o s p e c t s , fo r tuna te ly , in which we are 
be t t e r fitted as a nation for war than ever before . For one 
th ing, t he re is less boodle and muddle about the o r d i n a r y 
e v e r y d a y conduc t of gove rnmen t than at any time previous. 
This is due to two th ings : a h igher public morality and a 
w i d e - s p r e a d a p p r e c i a t i o n of Government as service , and so, 
a s p r i m a r i l y t h e b u s i n e s s of e f f i c i e n t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
Again , popular con f idence is held out to the modern scien-
t if ic e x p e r t in public s e r v i c e to an ex t en t never claimable 
by the old w h e e l - h o r s e pol i t ic ian type of "incumberance" in 
o f f i c e . Yet again , the p a r a l y z i n g dogmas of a s t r a i g h t -
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l a c e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m w i l l n e v e r m o r e t h w a r t e f f e c t i v e 
g o v e r n m e n t a l a c t i on in emergency. "Sta tes- r ights" is to-day 
b u t a s u p e r s t i t i o n , and e v e n p r i v a t e r i g h t s mus t bow 
t e m p o r a r i l y be fo re publ ic n e c e s s i t y - - t h i s because as Lincoln 
saw, back of the cons t i tu t ion is the nation, whose safety is 
t h e d e e p e s t c o n c e r n of a l l . F i n a l l y , t h a n k s p a r t l y to 
m e d i c a l s c i e n c e bu t much more l a r g e l y to the vogue of 
a t h l e t i c s , the a v e r a g e hea l th of our younger men is much 
higher to-day than in 1861. 
And war , on i t s d a n g e r o u s s ide , e n l i s t s f i rs t our young 
men. The chivalry of youth so d ic ta tes , and so does natural 
e q u i t y . i t is t h e i r h e r i t a g e t h a t demands p r o t e c t i o n - - t h e y 
s t and a t the t h r e s h o l d of the g e n e r a t i o n which is t h r e a t -
ened. 
International Law Imperilled 
The g r ea t e s t of German jur is ts defines r ights as i n t e re s t s 
which s o c i e t y under takes to p ro tec t , not merely for the 
benefi t of the bea re r s of such r ights , but - -and primarily--
for i t s own b e n e f i t . It follows tha t the individual who 
a s s e r t s h is r i g h t s to the ex ten t of his abi l i ty performs 
t h e r e b y a s o c i a l s e r v i c e ; and so in f ac t Von I h e r i n g 
a rgues . "Every man," he declares, "is the champion of the 
law in the interest of society." 
What then is the duty of a s t a t e whose r ights under 
in te rna t iona l law have been trampled upon by another state? 
C lea r ly , to seek repara t ion from the t ransgressor . For as 
it is the object of municipal law to "secure the conditions 
r e q u i s i t e for s o c i a l l i f e , " so it is the object of in te r -
nat ional law to secure the condi t ions which are requis i te 
for t h e l i f e of t he c i v i l i z e d s t a t e s of the wor ld in 
community with one ano the r . Where therefore international 
law assures ce r t a in r ights to the individual members of the 
family of nations, its doing so may be taken as representing 
the ve rd ic t of mankind that the rights in question comprise 
e s s e n t i a l condi t ions of the life of nat ions in associa t ion 
with one another , and that the re la t ion of the individual 
members of the family of nat ions to such r ights is to be 
r e g a r d e d as one of o b l i g a t i o n as we l l as of p r iv i l ege . 
Fur thermore , the majority of men will hardly deny that the 
" I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law I m p e r i l l e d . " 
America's I n t e r e s t in the War, 
In The World Pe r i l : 
pp. 53-81. Written by 
Members of the Faculty of Princeton University. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1917. Reprinted by 
permission. [Bibliography Entry C4.] 
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m e e t i n g of t h i s o b l i g a t i o n must in c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
involve a r e s o r t to force . Accustomed to evaluate force as 
l e g i t i m a t e or i l l e g i t i m a t e a c c o r d i n g to its employment, they 
will s c a r c e l y c h a l l e n g e the s e l f - ev iden t fact that a society 
in which force was always more readily enlisted against the 
law than in its behalf must eventually d is in tegra te . 
The re is just one circumstance which may validly opera te 
toward r e l i ev ing a s t a t e from the duty otherwise incumbent 
upon it to v i n d i c a t e i t s a f f r o n t e d r i g h t s u n d e r i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l l a w , and t h a t is t h e l i k e l i h o o d of i n c u r r i n g 
overwhelming ca l ami ty if it under took the discharge of this 
du ty . It is for th is r eason t h a t in the p r e s e n t war those 
who a re banded t o g e t h e r in the effort to bring Germany to 
bar have overlooked the laches of the small s ta tes neighbor-
ing on Germany whose rights the la t ter has so systematical ly 
v i o l a t e d , s i n c e i t is a p p r e c i a t e d t h a t for S w i t z e r l a n d , 
H o l l a n d or t h e S c a n d i n a v i a n s t a t e s to a s s e r t t h e m s e l v e s 
a g a i n s t G e r m a n y in de fence of t he i r r i g h t s would be to 
inv i t e the fate that has already overwhelmed Belgium, Serbia 
and Rumania . But to risk ruin is one thing, to incur grave 
i n c o n v e n i e n c e qui te a n o t h e r ; and the s t a t e wh ich would 
f o r g o i t s r i g h t s mere ly in o rde r to avoid the immed ia t e 
a n n o y a n c e and e x p e n s e of asserting them would only expose 
i t se l f to fresh agg re s s ions which must in the end b e c o m e 
unbearable. 
The e n t r a n c e of the Uni ted S t a t e s in to the war against 
Germany was a duty which it owed itself both in its cha rac -
te r of cus tod ian of the r i g h t s of its people and in that of 
a m e m b e r of the family of n a t i o n s . Under the ru le s of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law the people of the Uni ted S t a t e s , so long 
as they remained n e u t r a l , had the r i g h t to v e n t u r e t h e i r 
l ives and the i r goods upon the high seas subject to cer ta in 
r i s k s . By her me thods of submar ine w a r f a r e Ge rman y has 
enhanced t h e s e r i sks i n t o l e r a b l y , and with resultant loss of 
A m e r i c a n l i v e s . In t h e f i r s t p l a c e , for the b e l l i g e r e n t 
r igh t of c a p t u r e at sea she has i n v a r i a b l y s u b s t i t u t e d the 
p r a c t i c e of o u t r i g h t d e s t r u c t i o n . In t h e s econd p l a c e , 
from t h e p r o c e d u r e of c a p t u r e s h e h a s e l i m i n a t e d the 
e s s e n t i a l s t e p s of v i s i t and s e a r c h , wi th the r e s u l t t h a t 
d e s t r u c t i o n is c a r r i e d out wi th l i t t l e or no warning to the 
v i c t i m s . In the th i rd p l a c e , for the duty of the captor to 
put those on board the c a p t u r e d ves se l in to a safe p l a c e 
before d e s t r o y i n g i t , she has subs t i t u t ed "the poor measure 
of safety" of entrusting them to the mercy of wind and wave 
in sma l l b o a t s many mi les from l a n d - - w h e n , i n d e e d , he r 
commanders have not murderously assailed them with shot and 
s h e l l . T h e n to t h e s e g r o s s i n f r a c t i o n s of t h e l aw of 
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nations Germany has added, in the case of the United S ta tes , 
an e q u a l l y g ross v i o l a t i o n of a s p e c i f i c p l e d g e . At the 
t ime of the c o n t r o v e r s y over the sinking of the Sussex, the 
German Government, after having forwarded our government an 
e x p l a n a t i o n of th i s o c c u r r e n c e which for sheer hardihood of 
p r e v a r i c a t i o n is unsu rpassed in the anna l s of d ip lomacy , 
gave its word that thenceforth merchantmen carrying American 
c i t i z e n s would be sunk by i t s v e s s e l s only a f t e r w a r n i n g . 
This u n d e r t a k i n g , wh ich indeed c o n t a i n e d an i n t ima t ion of 
i t s t e m p o r a r y c h a r a c t e r , was probably instigated by the fact 
t h a t up to th i s t ime submar ine w a r f a r e had not p roved a 
s u c c e s s and t h a t most of the submar ines of the o r i g i n a l 
p a t t e r n had been d e s t r o y e d by the Br i t i sh n a v y . By the 
beg inn ing of the current year , however, Germany had a new 
s tock of subsea vessels on hand of a much larger type . So, 
c o n f i d e n t of be ing ab l e to end the war by the use of the 
improved w e a p o n b e f o r e the Uni ted S ta tes could become an 
e f f e c t i v e enemy , the German Imper ia l Government, on Janu-
a r y 3 1 , 1 9 1 7 , b l u n t l y i n f o r m e d our G o v e r n m e n t t h a t it 
p r o p o s e d to r enew u n r e s t r i c t e d submar ine w a r f a r e on the 
fo l lowing day. This time at any ra te it was as good as its 
word , and on F e b r u a r y 1 began the course of events which 
c o m p e l l e d our Government to determine definitely whether to 
s u b m i t to i n j u r y c a p p e d by insul t or to join the l eague 
against the Ishmael among nations. 
At th i s po in t i t wi l l be a d v a n t a g e o u s to a n t i c i p a t e an 
o b j e c t i o n , t he c o n s i d e r a t i o n of which wil l b r ing us to the 
t h r e s h o l d of the p r i n c i p a l t op ic of th is c h a p t e r . I r e f e r 
to the argument which has appeared in cer ta in quarters that, 
w h i l e G e r m a n y u n d o u b t e d l y in f r inged upon our r i g h t s as 
n e u t r a l s . G r e a t B r i t a i n by he r e m b a r g o upon n e u t r a l t rade 
wi th G e rman y did the same th ing , and that, accordingly, it 
was not the v i n d i c a t i o n of our r i g h t s a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l law 
wh ich r e a l l y d e t e r m i n e d our e n t r a n c e in to the w a r . The 
a rgumen t c o n v e n i e n t l y i gno re s a ma te r i a l fact, namely, that 
G e r m a n y ' s v i o l a t i o n s of our r i g h t s w e r e of a v a s t l y more 
s e r ious n a t u r e than Grea t Bri tain 's and so required from our 
G o v e r n m e n t a c o r r e s p o n d i n g urgency in meeting them. This 
may be a s c e r t a i n e d by putt ing the following question: What 
was the menace held out respect ively by the British embargo 
and by German submarine warfare to American rights iri case 
t h e y w e r e a s s e r t e d in d e f i a n c e of t h e s e measu re s? The 
a n s w e r is o b v i o u s . The m e n a c e held out by the Br i t i sh 
e m b a r g o w a s , a t wors t , the seizure of American property on 
t h e h i g h s e a s and i t s i n d e f i n i t e d e t e n t i o n in B r i t i s h 
w a t e r s - - t h e r e f o r e , p r o p e r t y l o s s . The m e n a c e held out by 
German submar ine w a r f a r e , e s p e c i a l l y after it entered upon 
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i t s f i na l s t a g e on F e b r u a r y 1, 1 9 1 7 , w a s t h e o u t r i g h t 
d e s t r u c t i o n , wi thout an i n s t a n t ' s warning, of American lives 
as_ wel l a_s of Amer i can p r o p e r t y on the high seas . But it 
may be a rgued , along the line taken by the recen t Austrian 
n o t e to our Gove rnmen t , t ha t the d e s t r u c t i o n wrough t by 
G e r m a n s u b m a r i n e s is no t an unwarned d e s t r u c t i o n , t h a t 
indeed the warning is given even before American property or 
Amer ican l ives l eave the i r home por ts . In other words, we 
a re warned not to t ry to e x e r c i s e our r i g h t s on the high 
seas t h e n c e f o r t h . N a t u r a l l y , our Government has not given 
any heed to such warnings. It has proceeded on the assump-
tion tha t Amer i can c i t i z e n s would c o n t i n u e to a s s e r t their 
rights on the seas, the common highway of mankind. 
So the ques t ion turns upon the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the 
r igh t to life i tself , when one is w h e r e he is e n t i t l e d to 
be , and the right to property, which is but a means to life; 
on the d i f fe rence between a right which may be assessed in 
terms of do l l a r s and c e n t s and paid for, and a right which 
canno t be a s ses sed and paid for . It is a difference which 
the law has r e c o g n i z e d from a n t i q u i t y . S i r Edward Coke 
s t a t e d i t in M o u s e ' s C a s e , l w h e r e he he ld b l a m e l e s s a 
fe r ryman for j e t t i s o n i n g his c a r g o in an effort to preserve 
t h o s e on b o a r d . On t h e s a m e b a s i s r e s t s the r i g h t of 
m u n i c i p a l a u t h o r i t i e s to d e s t r o y p r o p e r t y in o r d e r to 
p r e v e n t the sp read of a c o n f l a g r a t i o n . I ndeed , even t h a t 
o t h e r w i s e so l i t t l e s a p i e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n c a l l i n g i t se l f "The 
Emergency P e a c e Commission" recognized that we could not 
a r b i t r a t e m a t t e r s w i t h G e r m a n y u n l e s s t h e l a t t e r f i r s t 
discontinued ruthless submarine warfare . 
The re is , m o r e o v e r , a larger aspect of the subject. The 
duty of our Gove rnmen t to come to the p r o t e c t i o n of the 
l i v e s of our c i t i z e n s in the e x e r c i s e of t h e i r r i g h t s of 
t r a d e and t r a v e l was a ve ry immed ia t e one , but i t was 
ove r shadowed in this i n s t a n c e by an even more imperat ive 
duty , and t ha t was to the future security of our communica-
t ions with western Europe. Germany has made a shambles of 
the A t l a n t i c h ighway , she has dyed wi th the blood of our 
c i t i z e n s those ve ry w a t e r s which make the roadway of the 
v a s t p a r t of b o t h o u r c o m m e r c i a l a n d i n t e l l e c t u a l 
e x c h a n g e s . Is s h e to be p e r m i t t e d to s u c c e e d in he r 
purposes by such methods? And if she, why not others? Are 
the t r a n s c e n d e n t l y impor t an t p a r t of our foreign t rade and 
t h e v i t a l t h r e a d of i n t e r c o u r s e wi th the s o u r c e s of our 
c i v i l i z a t i o n to be h e l d h e n c e f o r t h in fee to any i n t e r -
na t iona l maraude r which may c o n s i d e r i t se l f e n t i t l e d to a 
b igger " p l a c e in the sun"? The submarine is a new instru-
ment of warfare, and whether it is to prove a blessing or a 
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curse to mankind is now to be determined once for all . Used 
wi th in the l imi ts s e t by the ru les of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, it 
may w e l l p r o v e a v a l u a b l e a d d i t i o n to t h e a r s e n a l of 
de f ens ive w a r f a r e , and so a fo rce making for international 
p e a c e . Used in the way t h a t Germany is using it, it must 
r e m a i n a t e r r o r to c i v i l i z a t i o n u n l e s s i n v e n t i v e genius 
con t r ives some way of cancelling i t . And there is no nation 
whose c o n c e r n a t the ou tcome can surpass that of our own 
country. 
When, t h e r e f o r e , the German Imper ia l Government issued 
i ts chal lenge on January 31, 1917, our Government was bound 
t o t a k e i t up or e l s e to a b d i c a t e i t s t r u s t e e s h i p of 
e s s e n t i a l r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s of the American people. For 
in the face of the downr igh t d e c l a r a t i o n tha t every vessel 
encountered thenceforward by German submarines in the waters 
which wash the s h o r e s of G r e a t B r i t a i n , F r a n c e and Italy 
"would be sunk," that is, would be sunk without warning and 
r e g a r d l e s s of n a t i o n a l i t y , no s ing le loophole was left for 
e v e r so dex te rous a diplomacy. Yet it is not this fact, nor 
even German b r u t a l i t y of word and threatened ac t - - t o which 
indeed someth ing of grat i tude was due for clearing the issue 
of much o b s c u r a t i o n - - i t is not t h e s e which offer the most 
c o n c l u s i v e d e m o n s t r a t i o n of w h a t the cause of international 
law and o r d e r demands of us now that we are in the war . 
Germany has violated our r ights, and so has given us a casus 
b e l l i . But t he vas t l y more i m p o r t a n t c i rcumstance is that, 
p u r s u a n t of the p r i n c i p l e s avowed by her s t a t e s m e n , her 
j u r i s t s and men of l e a r n i n g , it was i n e v i t a b l e t h a t sooner 
or l a t e r she should do just th i s t h i n g . To put the mat ter 
somewha t d i f f e r e n t l y : While it is G e r m a n y ' s v i o l a t i o n s of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t h a t have b rough t us into the war , it is 
wha t t h e s e v i o l a t i o n s imply t h a t must keep us t h e r e unti l 
Germany is defeated, since they spring from ideas which make 
any r a t i o n a l hope of good o r d e r in the world of nations a_ 
permanent impossibility. 
Suppose we e x t e n d our compar ison of the derelict ions of 
G r e a t Br i t a in and Germany to the apologetic efforts of their 
s t a t e s m e n . T h e B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t o r i g i n a l l y sought to 
just i fy i ts embargo upon n e u t r a l t r a d e with Germany as a 
m e a s u r e of r e t a l i a t i o n for G e r m a n y ' s i n f r a c t i o n s of the 
ru le s of c i v i l i z e d w a r f a r e . But h o w e v e r a v a i l a b l e a g a i n s t 
t h e o t h e r b e l l i g e r e n t , t h e a r g u m e n t in ques t ion was no 
su f f i c i en t answer to n e u t r a l p r o t e s t s , s i n c e , as our S t a t e 
Depa r tmen t put it in answer to the German Government when 
the l a t t e r of fered the same a rgumen t in extenuation of the 
L u s i t a n i a c r i m e , a c t s of r e t a l i a t i o n " a r e m a n i f e s t l y 
i n d e f e n s i b l e when they d e p r i v e n e u t r a l s of t h e i r a c k n o w l -
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edged r ights ." And so the British Government has, in effect 
as l e a s t , s u b s e q u e n t l y a d m i t t e d . Thus in his e l a b o r a t e 
n o t e s to our Government of July, 1915, and A p r i l , 1916, 
Viscount Grey endeavored to present the British embargo as 
an a l l o w a b l e a p p l i c a t i o n , in v i e w of t h e c o n d i t i o n s of 
modern w a r f a r e , of the b e l l i g e r e n t r i gh t of b lockade . His 
a rgument , though e x c e e d i n g l y a d r o i t , is unconvincing, since 
t h e e f f e c t of i t is to wipe out the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n 
c o n t r a b a n d goods and innocent goods and to deny the United 
S t a t e s the benef i t s of the D e c l a r a t i o n of Pa r i s . Never the-
less , it has in candor to be admitted that the concept upon 
which the Br i t i sh Governmen t today r e s t s i t s case for the 
embargo , the doctrine of continuous voyage, also underwent a 
very r ad i ca l ex t ens ion at the hands of our own Government 
during the Civi l War, when Great Britain was the disadvan-
taged n e u t r a l . M o r e o v e r , the question of the convincingness 
of the Bri t ish a rgument is a m a t t e r somewha t b e s i d e the 
po in t . For w h e t h e r it is a sound a rgument or a fallacious 
o n e , i t is at any r a t e ari appea l to law and c o n s t i t u t e s 
t h e r e f o r e an admission that the issue which the embargo has 
raised between the United Sta tes and Great Britain is one to 
be de t e rmined under the law, whose u l t ima te vindication i^ 
thus a s su red . Nor is this a l l : from the outset the British 
Government has s t a t e d i ts w i l l i n g n e s s , in harmony with the 
e x i s t i n g t r e a t y b e t w e e n the two c o u n t r i e s , to r e f e r the 
d i s p u t e a t t h e c l o s e of h o s t i l i t i e s to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
tribunal. 
With this a t t i t u d e of humane r e a s o n a b l e n e s s , a d d r e s s i n g 
i t se l f to l ike r e a s o n a b l e n e s s with l ike r i g h t s and avowing 
i t s r e a d i n e s s to ab ide the v e r d i c t of the t r i buna l of the 
c i v i l i z e d w o r l d , c o m p a r e t h e o u t g i v i n g s of the German 
Imperial Government when it revoked the pledge it had given 
after the sinking of the Sussex. In the note which accompa-
nied its brusque announcement the German Imperial Government 
used these words: 
"Every day by which the t e r r i b l e s t r u g g l e is prolonged 
br ings new devastations, new distress, new death . Every day 
by which the war is sho r t ened p re se rves on both sides the 
l ives of thousands of b r ave f i gh t e r s , and is a b l e s s ing to 
tortured mankind. The Imperial Government would not be able 
to a n s w e r before i ts own c o n s c i e n c e , be fo re the German 
people and before h i s t o r y , if it lef t any means w h a t e v e r 
un t r ied to has t en the end of the w a r . . . . The Imper ia l 
G o v e r n m e n t , if i t d e s i r e s in a h i g h e r s e n s e to s e r v e 
humanity and not to do a wrong against its own countrymen, 
must cont inue the b a t t l e forced on it anew for e x i s t e n c e s 
with all its weapons." 
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" C o n s c i e n c e , " " h i s t o r y , " " s e r v i c e to human i ty , " " b a t t l e 
for e x i s t e n c e " - - b y such p h r a s e s does the German Imper ia l 
G o v e r n m e n t seek to a p p e a s e the moral sensibili t ies of those 
whose i n t e l l i g e n c e it a f f r o n t s . In the p resence of its own 
p e o p l e it is not so h a m p e r e d . On the same day t h a t the 
document jus t quoted from was handed to Mr. G e r a r d , the 
Imper ia l Chancel lor addressed the Ways and Means Committee 
of the R e i c h s t a g on the r e n e w a l of u n r e s t r i c t e d submarine 
warfare as follows: 
"We have been challenged to fight to the end. We accept 
the c h a l l e n g e , we s take everything, and we shall be vic tor i -
ous . . . . I have a l w a y s p r o c e e d e d from the standpoint of 
whether U-boat war would bring us nearer victorious peace or 
n o t . Eve ry m e a n s , I sa id in March, that was calculated to 
s h o r t e n the war c o n s t i t u t e [s ic] the most humane policy to 
follow.2 When the most ruthless methods are considered best 
c a l c u l a t e d to lead us to v i c t o r y , and swift victory, I said, 
they must be employed. 
"This moment has now arr ived. Last autumn the time was 
not y e t r ipe , but today the moment has come when with the 
g r e a t e s t p r o s p e c t of s u c c e s s we can u n d e r t a k e the e n t e r -
p r i s e . We must not t h e r e f o r e w a i t any l o n g e r . . . . As 
r e g a r d s al l t h a t human s t r e n g t h can do to en fo rce success 
for the F a t h e r l a n d , be a s su red , gent lemen, that nothing has 
been neglec ted . Everything in this respect will be done." 
Henry James in one of his c r i t i c a l e s s ays classifies the 
p l e a s u r e s of l i t e r a t u r e into the p l e a s u r e s of su rp r i s e and 
of r e c o g n i t i o n . The p l e a s u r e to be got from r e a d i n g the 
fo rego ing p a s s a g e must today unquestionably be set down as 
of the l a t t e r o r d e r , though t h r e e y e a r s ago i ts c lass i f ica-
t ion would have been a mat ter of more difficulty. For who 
can r e a d the words jus t quoted and fail to recall the same 
speaker ' s apology for the invasion of Belgium? 
" G e n t l e m e n , we a r e a t p r e s e n t in a s t a t e of necess i ty , 
and n e c e s s i t y k n o w s no law! Our t roops have occup ied 
L u x e m b u r g : p e r h a p s t h e y h a v e a l r e a d y e n t e r e d Be lg ian 
t e r r i t o r y . G e n t l e m e n , t h i s in c o n t r a r y to the ru les of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l aw. It is t rue t ha t the F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t 
h a s d e c l a r e d a t Brus se l s t h a t it would r e s p e c t Be lg ium's 
n e u t r a l i t y as l o n g as t h e a d v e r s a r y would r e s p e c t i t . 
H o w e v e r , we know t h a t F r a n c e was ready for an invasion.3 
F r a n c e could afford to w a i t , but we could not! A French 
invas ion on our flank on the lower Rhine might have been 
fa ta l to us . Thus we were forced to disregard the justified 
p r o t e s t s of Luxemburg and Belg ium. The w r o n g - - I speak 
o p e n l y - - t h e wrong which we thereby commit we shall try to 
make good as soon as our military aim is a t ta ined. Whoever 
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is t h r e a t e n e d as we a r e is not a l lowed to have any other 
consideration beyond how he will hack his way through." 
Read in the l ight of l a t e r e v e n t s , how t e r r i b l e appears 
the relentless candor of these words! Yet here are words of 
compunct ion , a confess ion of wrong, a pledge of reparat ion, 
n o n e of w h i c h m i t i g a t e s t h e s p e e c h of l a s t J a n u a r y . 
P r u s s i a n r u t h l e s s n e s s did n o t s p r i n g in to e x i s t e n c e full 
grown! 
We come t h e r e f o r e to the third dimension of our subject, 
so to speak . I have advanced the t he s i s t h a t G e r m a n y ' s 
a t t i t u d e t o w a r d t h e law of n a t i o n s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
ob l iga t ions c o n s t i t u t e s a p e r p e t u a l m e n a c e to i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
good o r d e r and n e i g h b o r l i n e s s , makes them, in t ru th , an 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y so l o n g a s i t s h a l l c o n t i n u e . O f f i c i a l 
G e r m a n y ' s a t t i t u d e in this r e s p e c t we have jus t passed in 
survey, and at any ra te the war must have made it evident to 
the dul les t a p p r e h e n s i o n . What I aim now to show is that 
the views of which Von Bethmann-Hollweg is mouthpiece in the 
pa s sages given above are by no means a product of the war 
a lone , but also of a way of thinking which, as it preceded 
the war , will be l ikely to surv ive i t , cer tainly if Germany 
is v i c t o r i o u s . Such v iews may at p r e s e n t w e a r the mask 
of e x i g e n c y , but in reali ty they are compound of the sinews 
and subs t ance of a considered philosophy. Their menace for 
the peace of the world is therefore no merely t ransient one. 
The founder of Pruss ian political thought was Hegel, who 
p r e s e n t s the S t a t e as the c o m p l e t e development of morality 
on e a r t h and as e n t r u s t e d with the mission of spreading its 
own pecu l i a r cu l tu re (Kultur) ; and especially was this so of 
the Pruss ian s t a t e , the l as t word of D e i t y in the field of 
s t a t e c r a f t . By wha t methods, however, is the Kul tu r -S taa t - -
P r u s s i a in p a r t i c u l a r - - t o fu l f i l l i t s m i s s i o n a r y rOle? 
Hegel does not say ; but his i n f luen t i a l d i s c i p l e . P r o f e s s o r 
Adolf Lasson, is more e x p l i c i t , as the fol lowing e x t r a c t s 
from his essay "Das^ Kultur-Ideal und de£ Krieg" will show:4 
"Between states war alone can hold the scep t re . Conflict 
is the e s s e n c e and rule of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s ; f r i end-
ship the accident and exception. . . . 
"A small s t a t e has a r i g h t to ex i s t ence only in propor-
t ion to i ts power of r e s i s t a n c e . - - B e t w e e n s t a t e s t h e r e is 
on ly one r i g h t in f o r c e and t h a t is t h e r i g h t of t h e 
strongest. . . . 
"A s t a t e is i ncapab le of committing crime. . . . Whether 
a t r e a t y should be obse rved or not is a ques t ion not of 
r i g h t but of i n t e r e s t . . . . Not all the t r e a t i e s in the 
world can alter the fact that the weak is always the prey of 
p 
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the s t r ong so soon as the la t te r finds it worth while to act 
on this pr inciple . . . . 
" T h e s t a t e which is o r g a n i z e d only for p e a c e is not a 
t rue s t a t e . . . . War is the fundamental phenomenon in the 
l ife of the s t a t e and the p r e p a r a t i o n for it o c c u p i e s the 
place of preponderant importance in the national life. 
" I t is not only the s t a t e ' s own possessions which are at 
s t a k e in w a r , but a lso those which it has not acquired and 
must c o n q u e r . It is absurd to p r e t e n d i nd igna t i on a t the 
idea of c o n q u e s t . The only e s s e n t i a l po in t is the purpose 
of conquest . . . . 
" C i v i l i z a t i o n is the g e n e r a l improvemen t of c i v i l i z a t i o n 
upon b a r b a r i s m . C u l t u r e [Kul tur] is the d i s t i n c t i v e form 
w h i c h c i v i l i z a t i o n t a k e s wi th th is or t ha t p e o p l e . The 
d i v e r s e f o r m s of C u l t u r e a r e m u t u a l l y o p p o s e d to one 
a n o t h e r . Each m e n a c e s the o t h e r , for e ach bel ieves itself 
the t rue and p e r f e c t form of civil izat ion, and so desires to 
e x t e n d i t s i n f l u e n c e . . . . Eve ry r a t i o n a l war is a war 
between competing cul tures . . . . 
" T h e N a t i o n a l S t a t e , r e p r e s e n t i n g the highest expression 
of the Culture of its r ace , can come into being only through 
the d e s t r u c t i o n of o t h e r s t a t e s , and this destruction can be 
e f f e c t e d o n l y by means of v i o l e n c e . . . . To demand a 
p e a c e a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t of the d i f f e r e n t forms of Culture is 
to d e m a n d t h e imposs ib l e , i t is to r e v e r s e the o r d e r of 
n a t u r e , i t is to s e t up a fa lse image in the p l a c e of the 
true moral i ty ." 
When in 1868 Lasson f i r s t pub l i shed the b r o c h u r e from 
which the above p a s s a g e s a r e b o r r o w e d , his v iews s t i r r e d 
l i b e r a l G e r m a n y to v e h e m e n t p r o t e s t , bu t t h e b r i l l i a n t 
s u c c e s s e s of B i s m a r c k ' s po l i cy of "blood and i ron , " in ter -
p r e t e d by t h e e l o q u e n c e of Von T r e i t s c h k e in t e rms of 
P r u s s i a n h i s t o r y , h a v e long s ince done t he i r work, as the 
pages of B e r n h a r d i and the pamphlets of the Pan-Germanists 
a t t e s t . The key to L a s s o n ' s p o s i t i o n , which is today the 
pos i t i on of a most i n f luen t i a l sect ion of German society, is 
f u r n i s h e d by h i s e x a l t a t i o n of t h e c l a i m s of c u l t u r e . 5 
A m e r i c a n s and E n g l i s h m e n , unb lessed by an o v e r w e e n i n g 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s of s u p e r i o r i t y or d iv ine ly appo in t ed miss ion 
to the r e s t of C h r i s t e n d o m , a r e ap t to r e g a r d c u l t u r e , in 
the s ense in which Germans use the t e rm, as cons iderably 
less i m p o r t a n t than c i v i l i z a t i o n , and this they look upon as 
p r i m a r i l y t h e w o r k of g i f t e d i n d i v i d u a l s and as o n l y 
i n d i r e c t l y s e r v e d by the s t a t e through i ts s e r v i c e of the 
i n d i v i d u a l . F u r t h e r m o r e , they hold t h a t t h e r e is normal ly 
no g r e a t e r s e r v i c e which the s t a t e can r e n d e r its ci t izens 
than to m a i n t a i n f r iendly c o n t a c t s with other s ta tes as the 
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e s s e n t i a l cond i t ion of c o o p e r a t i o n in the common t a s k s of 
civil ization. 
The Pruss ian po in t of view impinges upon i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law in two w a y s . Lasson ' s idea t h a t the S ta te can do no 
wrong of course makes international law impossible from the 
o u t s e t . T h e m o r e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e German v iew, h o w e v e r , 
though* it u l t ima te ly a r r i v e s a t the same result , does so by 
a more roundabout m e t h o d . In the phraseology of an expo-
n e n t , i t p l a n t s in the t imbe r s of the l ega l e d i f i c e " t h e 
s e c r e t worm" which u l t ima te ly consumes the whole f a b r i c . 
What this "secret worm" is we shall now see . 
One of the most remarkable products of a German pen since 
t h e o u t b r e a k of the war is a b r o c h u r e by Josef K o h l e r , 
w r i t t e n to defend the invas ion of Belgium and bearing the 
cap t i on " N £ i Kenn t Kein Gebot."6 Kohler, who is professor 
of j u r i sp rudence a t the Un ive r s i t y of Berlin and a Prussian 
P r i v y C o u n c i l l o r , is t h e most e m i n e n t of l iv ing German 
j u r i s t s and t h e mos t p ro l i f i c of al l j u r i s t s , "a v e r i t a b l e 
t w e n t i e t h cen tu ry L e i b n i t z , " with ove r five hundred t i t l e s 
of books and a r t i c l e s to his credi t . Though, like Lasson, a 
d i sc ip l e of Hege l , he was unt i l r e c e n t d a y s a preacher of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e a c e and c o o p e r a t i o n . Thus in his "Lehrbuch 
d e r R e c h t s p h i l o s o p h i e , " which a p p e a r e d in 1907, he had 
w r i t t e n : " P a s s i o n a t e devo t ion to one n a t i o n a l i t y . . . will 
long s t rugg le a g a i n s t the idea of bowing to a supernational 
l aw. N e v e r t h e l e s s , the idea must g r a d u a l l y p e n e t r a t e , and 
when it has become fully developed the chief step toward the 
peace of the nations will have been taken." And to Lasson's 
not ion of the i n e v i t a b l e an tagon ism of n a t i o n a l cultures he 
had opposed the ideal of their mutual to lerance , thus: "The 
individual s t a t e should not be the only c e n t r e of c u l t u r e , 
but t h e a t t i t u d e of a l l s t a t e s to one a n o t h e r should so 
conform to the cu l tu ra l o r d e r t h a t one does not clash with 
or o p e r a t e a g a i n s t the cu l tu ra l d e v e l o p m e n t of a n o t h e r . " 
But the iron of the war has entered into Kohler 's soul, and 
his r e c e n t w r i t i n g s p rove only too conclusively that he has 
j o i n e d forces with tha t s e c t i o n of German j u r i s t s one of 
whom has r e c e n t l y p roposed that the German Branch of the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law A s s o c i a t i o n had be t t e r cut loose from its 
foreign a f f i l i a t i ons , the r e a s o n given be ing t h a t "Germany 
has such d i f f e ren t i n t e r e s t s from those of o t h e r c o u n t r i e s 
t h a t i t s t e n d e n c i e s in this field a r e not t hose of o t h e r 
nations." 7 
With c h a r a c t e r i s t i c candor Kohler d i s t i n g u i s h e s a t the 
ou t se t of his e s say the two e n t i r e l y different but frequent-
ly c o n f o u n d e d n o t i o n s of s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n a n d s e l f -
d e f e n c e . He then proceeds to rake over the whole field of 
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c a s u i s t r y for the s tock s i t u a t i o n s in which the indiv idual 
in c o n f r o n t e d wi th the c h o i c e of v i o l a t i n g the r i g h t s of 
o t h e r s or h imself coming to grief. The crux of his position 
is d i s c l o s e d in h i s t r e a t m e n t of t h a t s i t u a t i o n which is 
l a b e l l e d the "Aut Ego aut Tu." In this case two men who 
have been s h i p w r e c k e d find t h e m s e l v e s grasping at a plank 
w h i c h is s u f f i c i e n t to b e a r them bo th ; the s t r o n g e r man 
pushes the w e a k e r away and is eventual ly saved, while the 
o ther is drowned. Commenting on this class of cases , Kohler 
w r i t e s : "When two p e r s o n s a c t in a condition of necessi ty 
[ N o t r e c h t ] and the l ega l o r d e r can d i s c o v e r no ground for 
g iving the p r e f e r e n c e to e i t h e r , then must the legal order 
g ive way to the natural order and crown the vic tor . Das i£ 
die Realdialektik der Welt." 
But if t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n of s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n may be 
c l a imed by the i nd iv idua l , Kohler continues, how much more 
may it be by the S t a t e , "a human institution of the highest 
r a n k and of d e e p s p i r i t u a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , as wel l as the 
economic foundat ion of our being." Hence, "the relat ions of 
one s t a t e to a n o t h e r a r e governed in the highest degree by 
the law of n e c e s s i t y [ N o t s t a n d s r e c h t ] . The s ta te which is 
f o r c e d to f i g h t for i t s e x i s t e n c e a c t s r i gh t ly if in the 
c o u r s e of i t s s t r u g g l e i t e n c r o a c h e s upon the r i g h t s of 
o t h e r s t a t e s , e v e n upon t h e r i g h t s of n e u t r a l s , for i t s 
e x i s t e n c e comes first; to this may everything or anything be 
s a c r i f i c e d . " A n d so i t was wi th G e r m a n y ' s invas ion of 
Belgium: " E v e n if we e n t i r e l y i gno re the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of 
s e l f - d e f e n c e and Be lg ium's e a r l i e r f o r f e i t u r e of he r r i gh t 
of n e u t r a l i t y , s t i l l Ge rmany was e n t i r e l y within her rights; 
what she did was not an excusable wrong, but she acted in 
e x e r c i s e of the law of neces s i t y , and at one and the same 
t ime fulf i l led a holy duty to h e r s e l f and to the wor ld of 
c u l t u r e [ K u l t u r ] . She p r e s e r v e d her exis tence; and Belgium 
t h e r e b y incurred a heavy fate, for which she has but herself 
to t h a n k . " - - T h u s Von Bethmann-Hol lweg, despite his seeming 
c a n d o r , spoke fa l se ly a f t e r a l l ! Ge rmany did no wrong in 
e n t e r i n g Be lg ium. True , she violated both her own promises 
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, but she fulf i l led a H ighe r Law, the 
law of he r n e c e s s i t y - - a s judged by herself; and Realdialek-
tik (which a p p a r e n t l y is H e g e l i a n for "Unser al te Gott" of 
t h e K a i s e r ' s i n c a n t a t i o n s ) had i t s way once m o r e . The 
though t o c c u r s . Why, if R e a l d i a l e k t i k is such a benef icent 
a g e n c y , s h o u l d i t s i n t e r v e n t i o n s be conf ined to c a s e s of 
necessity? 
Bu t t h e s u b j e c t has a lso i t s t e c h n i c a l s i de , and so I 
wish once more to confront the German point of view with the 
E n g l i s h - A m e r i c a n , or such e v i d e n c e s of the l a t t e r as seem 
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b e s t a u t h e n t i c a t e d ; and to begin a t the beg inn ing , I wil l 
match P ro fes so r K o h l e r ' s hypothet ica l case of "Aut. E^o aut 
Tu" with one which actually got into court . I refer to the 
^ s e of Regina v. Dudley and S t ephens , the facts in which 
were found by the jury as follows: "That on July 5, 1884, 
t h e p r i s o n e r s , w i t h o n e Brooks , all ab le bodied Engl ish 
seamen, and the d e c e a s e d [Pa rke r ] , an English boy between 
s e v e n t e e n and e i g h t e e n , the c r ew of an English yacht [the 
M i g n o n e t t e ] , w e r e c a s t away in a s torm on the high seas, 
s i x t e e n hundred mi les from the Cape of Good Hope , and 
were compel led to put into an open boat; . . . that on the 
e i g h t e e n t h day, when they had been seven days without food 
and five wi thout wate r , the prisoners spoke to Brooks as to 
what should be done if no succor came, and suggested some 
one shou ld be s a c r i f i c e d to s a v e t h e r e s t , but Brooks 
d i s sen t ed , and the boy, to whom they w e r e u n d e r s t o o d to 
r e f e r , was not consulted; that on the day before the act in 
ques t ion . . . the p r i s o n e r s spoke of t h e i r hav ing families, 
and sugges ted t ha t it would be b e t t e r to kill the boy that 
t h e i r l i v e s be s a v e d . . . ; t h a t n e x t d a y , no v e s s e l 
a p p e a r i n g , Dudley . . . made s igns to S t e p h e n s and Brooks 
t h a t t h e boy had b e t t e r be k i l l e d ; . . . t h a t S t e p h e n s 
ag reed to the a c t , but Brooks dissented from it . . . ; that 
Dudley with the a s sen t of S t e p h e n s wen t to the boy and 
tel l ing him his time had come, put a knife to his throat and 
k i l led him; t h a t the t h r e e men fed upon the boy for four 
days ; tha t on the fourth day a f t e r the a c t the b o a t was 
p i c k e d up by a p a s s i n g v e s s e l , and the p r i s o n e r s w e r e 
rescued. . . ." 
T h e ju ry pu t t h e q u e s t i o n to t h e c o u r t w h e t h e r the 
accused w e r e guil ty of m u r d e r . The court answered "Yes," 
and p r o c e e d e d to reduce defence's argument to an absurdity: 
"It was not c o n t e n d e d , " said t h e y , " t h a t the person killed 
u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s of s o - c a l l e d n e c e s s i t y would not be 
j u s t i f i e d in r e s i s t i n g . N o w , if r e s i s t a n c e is j u s t i f i ab l e 
a t a l l i t is j u s t i f i a b l e e v e n to t h e i n f l i c t i o n of dea th 
when one ' s own life is at s take . Therefore , we should have 
a s t a t e of th ings in which A is not pun i shab le for killing 
B, nor y e t B for k i l l ing A if he c a n n o t p r e v e n t A from 
ki l l ing him. But to say t h a t A may kill B if he can, and 
also tha t B may kill A if he can, is to deny the exis tence 
o_f any law a^ aU_," In o t h e r w o r d s . P r o f e s s o r K o h l e r ' s 
region of the Higher Law of Necessity in which Realdialektik 
holds sway is d ismissed as a region devoid of law! Justice 
Grove also added this interesting note: "If the two accused 
men were jus t i f ied in k i l l ing P a r k e r , t hen , if not r e s c u e d 
in t ime, two of the t h r e e su rv ivor s would be jus t i f i ed in 
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ki l l ing the t h i rd , and of the two who remained the stronger 
would be jus t i f i ed in k i l l ing the weaker , so that three men 
might be jus t i f i ab ly k i l led to give the fourth a chance of 
s u r v i v i n g . " 8 A g a i n , a s h o c k i n g l a c k of c o n f i d e n c e in 
Realdialektik! 
All the o b j e c t i o n s which e x i s t to admi t t ing the just i f i -
c a t i o n of supposed n e c e s s i t y for b r e a c h e s of the o rd ina ry 
law are reenforced when it comes to breaches of internation-
al l a w . For one thing, when it is brought into the ordinary 
c o u r t s the p l ea s ign i f i e s the grim issue of life and death, 
wh i l e as b e t w e e n s t a t e s the so -ca l l ed "right of se l f -preser-
v a t i o n " i s , in n i n e t y - n i n e c a s e s ou t of a hundred , the 
m e r e s t f igure of s p e e c h . Aga in , there is no tribunal above 
s t a t e s which is c a p a b l e of pass ing upon such a p lea with 
i m p a r t i a l i t y and p r e c i s i o n as t h e r e is over i nd iv idua l s , so 
t h a t e ach s t a t e is lef t o r d i n a r i l y to a s sess the sufficiency 
of the p l ea a d v a n c e d by i t se l f . F ina l ly , while internat ion-
al l aw d o e s n o t - - a n d p e r h a p s n e v e r c a n - - f o r m a c losed 
c i r c l e , and each s ta te is consequently left free to make war 
for r e a s o n s which seem good to it, ye t the advantage which 
a c c r u e s to a s t a t e from having the sanc t ion of law on its 
s ide is an i m p o r t a n t one and should not be available on a 
plea which frankly overr ides international law. 
Though English and American wri ters on international law, 
in a m i s p l a c e d zea l to become a p o l o g i s t s for c e r t a i n pe t 
d e r e l i c t i o n s of t h e i r own governments, have seemed at times 
to g ive the s o - c a l l e d " r i g h t of s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n " an undue 
e x t e n s i o n , y e t t h e b e t t e r c o n s i d e r e d u t t e r a n c e s of such 
w r i t e r s wi l l g e n e r a l l y be found to conf ine the idea to its 
p r o p e r f i e ld .9 A typical case , which is discussed by all of 
the a u t h o r i t i e s , is furnished by the ac t i on of the Br i t i sh 
G o v e r n m e n t in c o n n e c t i o n with the Caroline affair of 1837. 
This v e s s e l , which was c o n t r o l l e d by Canad ian rebels , was 
a t t a c k e d by a Br i t i sh e x p e d i t i o n whi le ly ing in A m e r i c a n 
w a t e r s . T h e B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t de fended the a c t as a 
n e c e s s a r y a c t of s e l f - p r o t e c t i o n against an impending injury 
for wh ich , if i t had occurred, the Government of the United 
S t a t e s w o u l d h a v e b e e n r e s p o n s i b l e . E v e n t u a l l y , our 
G o v e r n m e n t a c c e p t e d t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e af fa i r as 
s a t i s f a c t o r y . In the words of Mr. Webster, it was admitted 
t h a t , a s s u m i n g t h e r e w a s "a^ n e c e s s i t y of s e l f - d e f e n c e , 
instant and overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for d e l i b e r a t i o n , " and assuming the a c t i o n of the 
Br i t i sh G o v e r n m e n t to have been "limited by that necessity 
and k e p t c l e a r l y wi th in i t , " such a c t i o n was p r o p e r . In 
o t h e r w o r d s , the Br i t i sh G o v e r n m e n t e x e r c i s e d its right of 
s e l f - h e l p agains t an impending wrong. It may be added that 
46 / THE EARLY YEARS 
our c o n t r o v e r s y with Spain over the Virginius affair in 1873 
was adjusted along similar lines. 
But t h e c a p i t a l p r o d u c t of German thought of r e c e n t 
y e a r s , touching the r e l a t i o n of the s t a t e to i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law, has s t i l l to be c o n s i d e r e d . I r e f e r of cou r se to the 
d o c t r i n e of K r i e g s - r a i s o n . l Q The source of this doctrine is 
to be found in cer ta in passages of the Prussian Von Clause-
w i t z ' s work " Vom K r i e g e , " of w h i c h t h e fol lowing a r e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e : "War is an a c t of v i o l e n c e d e s i g n e d to 
f o r c e t he a d v e r s a r y to p e r f o r m our w i l l . . . . In the 
employment of such v i o l e n c e there are no limits. . . . War 
knows only one method : fo r ce , . . . and this employment of 
b ru te force is the abso lu te r u l e . " C e r t a i n German pub l i -
c i s t s however have sought a more r e p u t a b l e p a r e n t a g e for 
t he i r dar l ing theory in a p h r a s e from G r o t i u s ' g rea t work: 
"Omnia licere quae necesaria sunt ad finem bell i ," which may 
be r e n d e r e d in the words of the G r e a t G e n e r a l S ta f f as 
fol lows: "What is pe rmis s ib l e i nc ludes every means of war 
wi thout which the ob jec t of the war c a n n o t be o b t a i n e d . " 
Thus the founder of i n t e rna t i ona l law, who tells us that he 
w r o t e p r i n c i p a l l y to p r o t e s t a g a i n s t t h e b a r b a r i t i e s of 
warfare, is made sponsor for Prussian frightfulness! 
The fact of the m a t t e r is t ha t G r o t i u s ' words may be 
i n t e r p r e t e d in e i ther of two ways: They may mean that all 
methods of w a r f a r e a r e l e g i t i m a t e which are thought to be 
n e c e s s a r y ; or they may imply t h a t n e c e s s a r y m e t h o d s of 
w a r f a r e must f i rs t be l e g i t i m a t e ; t h a t is , w i th in the l a w . 
The English-American view of military necessi ty accords with 
t h e l a t t e r of t h e s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . By i t a m i l i t a r y 
commander , even when ac t i ng wi th in the ru l e s of civilized 
war fa re , is entitled to use no more violence at a given time 
than is n e c e s s a r y under the circumstances. The doctr ine of 
K r i e g s - r a i s o n , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , sub j ec t s the ru le s of 
c iv i l i z ed w a r f a r e a t all t imes to wha t a commander--and a_ 
f o r t i o r i , a g o v e r n m e n t - - m a y d e e m e s s e n t i a l to a c h i e v e 
s u c c e s s . The d o c t r i n e of " N e c e s s i t y " is thus d i v e s t e d of 
all d isguises and p r e t e n c e s : t h a t which is n e c e s s a r y and 
which t h e r e f o r e must be o b t a i n e d a t all hazards is German 
v i c t o r y ! T h e p r a c t i c a l c o n c l u s i o n s w h i c h t h e G e r m a n 
off ic ia l mind has drawn from these premises have been made 
known to a s t i l l amazed wor ld in terms of blood, ruin and 
d e f i l e m e n t : t h e i n v a s i o n of B e l g i u m , t h e a t r o c i t i e s of 
Louvain, Dinant and a score of other towns, the execution of 
i n n o c e n t h o s t a g e s , the she l l ing of Rheims C a t h e d r a l , the 
s ink ing of the Lus i t an ia , the use of poisonous g a s e s , the 
b o m b a r d m e n t of u n d e f e n d e d t o w n s , t h e i n d i s c r i m i n a t e 
s l augh te r of women and c h i l d r e n by exp los ives hurled from 
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a i r c r a f t , the e n s l a v e m e n t of Be lg ian workmen, the deporta-
t i o n of t h e y o u n g w o m e n of L i l l e , t h e d e v a s t a t i o n of 
n o r t h e r n F r a n c e , r u t h l e s s submar ine wa r f a r e , the sinking of 
hospital ships, and so on and so on. To be sure, the German 
Imper i a l G o v e r n m e n t has somet imes sought to a l l e v i a t e the 
od ium of u n i v e r s a l i nd igna t i on by s p e c i a l e x p l a n a t i o n s of 
some of t h e s e a c t s , but even w h e r e such explanations have 
n o t d e a l t in d o w n r i g h t f a l s e h o o d s , t h e i r u n a l l o w a b l e 
a s sumpt ions have a l w a y s revealed the lineaments of the real 
explanat ion. 
T h e r e a r e those who c o n t e n d , h o w e v e r , that it is futile 
to a t t e m p t to gove rn war by law, who seem indeed ra ther 
d i sposed to applaud Germany for making war as hideous as 
p o s s i b l e , s a y i n g t h a t the thing to do is to abolish war! Is 
K r i e g s - r a i s o n e n t i t l e d e v e n to t h i s somewha t ambiguous 
approval? No; for the maintenance of the law of war so long 
as we have wars and the abolition of war as soon as possible 
a r e c a u s e s wh ich , far from being opposed to one ano the r , 
have e v e r y t h i n g in common. For one th ing , the r e s t r a in t s 
which in t e rna t iona l law seeks to impose upon the business of 
w a r , and which Germany has so ruthlessly and systematical ly 
s w e p t a s i d e , r e s t upon the be l i e f t h a t t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n 
funded v a l u e s of C h r i s t i a n c i v i l i z a t i o n which no necess i ty , 
even of a s t a t e , is w a r r a n t e d in of fending , and the aboli-
t ion of w a r must a p p e a l to the same be l i e f . Again, those 
who advance this view seem not to perceive that the German 
d o c t r i n e which they so h e e d l e s s l y ra t i fy const i tutes a par t 
of G e r m a n y ' s p r e p a r a t i o n for war , and to t h a t e x t e n t an 
i n c i t a t i o n to w a r . Fo r not be ing hampered by the scruples 
w h i c h t r o u b l e o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t s , t h e G e r m a n I m p e r i a l 
G o v e r n m e n t has jus t t h a t a d d i t i o n a l reason to hope for the 
s u c c e s s of i t s a g g r e s s i o n s . F i n a l l y , the view in ques t ion 
i g n o r e s the fac t t h a t the difference between Anglo-American 
and German methods of warfare connotes a difference between 
t w o t h e o r i e s of the purpose of war which is of immense 
s i g n i f i c a n c e from the po in t of view of the movement for a 
permanent p e a c e . 
The German t h e o r y of the purpose of war is s ta ted by 
B e r n h a r d i as fo l lows: "War is an instrument of progress, a 
r e g u l a t o r in the l i fe of human i ty , an i n d i s p e n s a b l e f ac to r 
of c i v i l i z a t i o n , a c r e a t i v e p o w e r . " This is but Lasson ' s 
idea over again, that "War is the fundamental phenomenon in 
the l i fe of s t a t e s " ; o r , as Von Trei tschke has put it, "War 
is the forceful e x t e n s i o n of p o l i c y . " The English-American 
t h e o r y is v e r y d i f f e r e n t and p o i n t s to v e r y d i f f e r e n t 
r e s u l t s . It is t h a t wa r is p r i m a r i l y remedial , a redress of 
g r i e v a n c e s , a me thod of s e l f - h e l p . And be ing p r o c e d u r a l . 
» 
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w i t h t he v i n d i c a t i o n of t h e l aw i t s o b j e c t , t h e r u l e s 
govern ing it must be followed as a mat ter of course. More 
than tha t , howeve r , s ince war t a k e s p l a c e ch ie f ly for the 
l a c k of a b e t t e r m e t h o d of o b t a i n i n g o n e ' s r i g h t s , the 
e s s e n t i a l s t e p in i t s a b o l i t i o n m u s t be to s u p p l y t h e 
p r o c e d u r a l d e f i c i e n c i e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w . In s h o r t , 
w h e r e the P rus s i an idea of war p r e s e n t s i t as a p o s i t i v e 
good, the A n g l o - A m e r i c a n idea p r e s e n t s i t as a necessa ry 
ev i l , and offers the hope t h a t i t wi l l not a l w a y s be even 
necessary. 
The quarrel between our country and Germany comes, the re -
fore , ultimately to be a very deep seated one . Back of the 
c o n f l i c t i n g t h e o r i e s of lega l o b l i g a t i o n which it i nvo lve s 
s tand conf l i c t ing t h e o r i e s of the purpose of war and of the 
n a t u r e of c i v i l i z a t i o n i t se l f . Nor is th is r e m a r k a b l e when 
one c o n s i d e r s the c o n t r a s t e d h i s t o r i e s of the two n a t i o n s . 
The h i s to ry of Germany is simply the h i s t o r y of P russ ia ' s 
c o n q u e s t of the r e s t of G e r m a n y , of the t r iumph of the 
P r u s s i a n m i l i t a r y a u t o c r a c y o v e r t h e r i g h t s of w e a k e r 
popu la t ions and c o m m u n i t i e s . More u n f o r t u n a t e l y s t i l l , the 
p i e t i s t i c German mind has b rough t to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
th is h i s to ry the dange rous no t ions of r e l i g ious and p h i l o -
soph ic obscu ran t i sm, t r i c k e d out for modern use wi th the 
t e r m i n o l o g y of b i o l o g i c a l s c i e n c e . S i n c e the h i s t o r y of 
G e r m a n u n i f i c a t i o n has been a h i s t o r y of v i o l e n c e , th i s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n runs in effect, then violence must be the way 
of God. The Anglo-American mind is at once more mundane and 
m o r e r e v e r e n t . Mis t rus t fu l of "Dark F o r c e s , " i t f inds i t 
e spec ia l ly hard to believe that Providence is wont to employ 
t h e d e v i c e s of S a t a n . Its p o l i t i c a l a c h i e v e m e n t , w r o u g h t 
out m a i n l y by m e t h o d s of c o m p r o m i s e , is c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
d e m o c r a c y and i m p e r i a l f e d e r a t i o n ; i t s p o l i t i c a l i d e a l a 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of the equa l i ty of men with the rule of law. 
It r e g a r d s law as normally the triumph of opinion and so of 
r e a s o n , as so much s n a t c h e d from primit ive chaos, the way 
which c i v i l i z a t i o n must in the long run always take against 
b a r b a r i s m . T r u e , in an i m p e r f e c t w o r l d t h e l aw must 
f requent ly re ly on the suppor t of f o r c e , but i t is the law 
which validates force and not force which val idates the law. 
H e n c e , though we e n t e r e d the war in behalf of our own 
offended r ights , we fight in it in behalf of the law and the 
o rde r of the world. A nation which applauds such crimes as 
the s inking of the Lus i tan ia has lost all sense of responsi-
b i l i ty as a member of the family of nations; a nation which 
th inks and a c t s by the madcap logic of "world dominion or 
downfal l" is a p e r p e t u a l menace to the peace of the world. 
Such logic can be refu ted in only one way; for if nothing 
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s u c c e e d s l ike s u c c e s s , no th ing fa i ls l ike f a i l u r e . Germany 
wil l s ee e y e to e y e wi th her neighbors when she has been 
c h a s t e n e d by the b i t t e r d i s a p p o i n t m e n t of defeat . For her 
past meri ts the world owes her this boon. 
Part Two 
A Range of Expertise 
Edward Corwin's understanding of the Constitution's scope 
and effect was unmatched. Whether studying the Constitu-
tion' s historical development or its application to child 
labor laws, Corwin had firm opinions and made detailed 
academic analyses. The essays in this section demonstrate 
Corwin's diversity of interests and his special interests. 
He argued in the 1910s that international treaties could 
expand the federal government into areas otherwise reserved 
to states. After formulating the argument in early publica-
tions, Corwin proposed to President Wilson that a treaty 
with Japan could regulate the treatment of Japanese immi-
grants in California, Local treatment was then a matter for 
the states, A treaty between the two national governments, 
argued Corwin, could transform the local issue into a 
federal question, Wilson turned down the innovative 
suggestion. Subsequent political developments and Supreme 
Court decisions endorsed Corwin's theories about the scope 
of treaties. 
Many of Corwin's early writings refer to presidential 
powers in discussion of other issues. In 1924 he consol-
idated thoughts on the subject into one essay entitled 
simply "The Presidency," Corwin treated certain aspects of 
the office separately: elections, the cabinet, and leader-
ship. The brief study was the precursor for Corwin's 
institutional model of the presidency which he developed 
sixteen years later in The President: Office and Powers, 
Much like the 1924 article, the 1940 book examined the 
president ' s roles, from commander-in-chief to legislative 
leader. 
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Corwin also found an early interest in judicial review. 
He examined its history during his early decades at Prince-
ton, but judicial review gained modern significance when the 
Supreme Court declared a series of New Deal legislation 
unconstitutional. Corwin proposed many possible solutions 
to the stalemate with the Court—presented in Part Four--but 
he always endorsed the Court's power to determine the 
constitutionality of legislation. His most elaborate 
examination of the issue appeared in the Pittsburgh bar's 
local periodical, Corwin isolated three "types" of judicial 
review and traced their origins, developments, and current 
status. He returned to the subject in the 1950s to present 
an introductory essay on the meaning and history of judicial 
review. 
The bibliography of Edward Corwin reveals an expertise on 
more than just the Supreme Court, the presidency, and 
international treaties. He pursued income tax issues, labor 
law, civil liberties, and virtually every other concept 
within the sphere of constitutional law. He maintained his 
historical interests at all times. This section appro-
priately concludes with a historical consideration of 
Benjamin Franklin's contributions to constitutional law. 
Some Possibilities in the Way of 
Treaty-Making 
Under date of September 26, 1906, seven European nationsl 
e n t e r e d in to a t r e a t y by which they agreed to prohibi t 
within their r e spec t ive dominions the use of white phospho-
rus in the manufacture of matches, and, with other nations,2 
in to a n o t h e r t r e a t y by which they s imi la r ly agreed to 
prohibi t night work for women. These same countries have 
also en tered into t r e a t i e s with regard to the insurance of 
workmen aga ins t industr ial a cc iden t s . F inal ly , proposals , 
which have a l ready been formulated^ are to be submitted in 
S e p t e m b e r of t h i s y e a r for an i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement 
prohibi t ing the night work of young persons and fixing the 
maximum working day for women and young persons . The 
question a r i ses , why, if other countries may enter into and 
c a r r y in to e f f e c t such engagements , may not the United 
States? 
The p o w e r s of the Federa l Government of the United 
S t a t e s , though delegated powers, are each of them sovereign 
powers and keep pace in their development with the enlarge-
ment of the subject-matter amenable to them. Said the Court 
in South Carolina vs^ . The United States: 
"The Const i tut ion is a wr i t ten instrument. As such 
its meaning does not a l t e r , and what it meant when 
"Some Poss ib i l i t i e s in the Way of Treaty-Making." In 
Report of the Twentieth Annual Lake Mohonk Conference 
on I n t e r n a t i o n a l A r b i t r a t i o n , pp. 65-70. Edited by 
H. C. P h i l l i p s . Lake Mohonk, New York: Lake Mohonk 
Conference on International Arbitration, 19H» Reprinted 
by permission. [Bibliography Entry C3] 
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adopted it means now. Being a grant of powers to a 
g o v e r n m e n t , i ts l anguage is g e n e r a l , and as c h a n g e s 
come in soc ia l and p o l i t i c a l l i fe , it e m b r a c e s in i ts 
g rasp all new conditions which are within the scope of 
?he powers in t e rms c o n f e r r e d . In other words, while 
t h e p o w e r s g r an t ed do not c h a n g e , they apply from 
g e n e r a t i o n to g e n e r a t i o n to al l th ings to which they 
a r e in t h e i r n a t u r e a p p l i c a b l e . " (199 U . S . 4 3 7 , 
448-9.) 
W i t h t h e g r o w t h of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e r e l a t i o n s , 
i m m i g r a t i o n , and o the r forms of i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r c o u r s e 
the cond i t i ons of life wi th in p a r t i c u l a r - t i o n s become o 
e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g c o n c e r n to t h e i r n e i g h b o r s , ^ / ^h the result 
t ha t t r e a t y - m a k i n g is extended to mat te rs ear l ier deemed to 
l i e q u i t e wi th in i t s s p h e r e . In th is g e n e r a l d e v e l o p m e n t 
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s must and does p a r t i c i p a t e and for the 
r e s u l t a n t legal r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s the p o w e r s of the c e n t r a l 
g o v e r n m e n t a r e , if we a r e to a d h e r e to the h i s t o r i c a l l y 
s e t t l e d canons of Cons t i tu t iona l Law bearing on the subjec , 
e n t i r e l y a d e q u a t e . In the words of Ch ie f Just ice Marshall: 
"The Constitution was designed for ages to come and must be 
adapted to the various exigencies of human affairs. 
But it wil l be ob j ec t ed t h a t the regulat ion of the hours 
and cond i t i ons of labor fal ls in the Uni ted S ta tes to what 
is ca l l ed the po l i ce power of the s t a t e s . This is true but 
t ha t fact does not withdraw the same subject from regulation 
by the F e d e r a l Government in the bona fide exerc ise of its 
powers. The Federal Government has only cer tain enumerated 
power s , but it may e x e r c i s e these powers for all legit imate 
purposes of g o v e r n m e n t . Thus o b j e c t i o n was made to the 
r e c e n t Mann Act forbidding the t ransportat ion of women from 
one s t a t e to ano the r for immoral p u r p o s e s , that it did not 
r e g u l a t e commerce among the s ta tes for commercial purposes, 
but for m o r a l p u r p o s e s , and t h a t t h e r e g u l a t i o n of the 
p u b l i c m o r a l s f a l l s to t h e s t a t e s . B u t , s a i d J u s t i c e 
McKenna, speaking for the unanimous Court: 
"Our dual form of g o v e r n m e n t has i ts p e r p l e x i t i e s , 
s t a t e and na t ion having d i f f e r e n t s p h e r e s of j u r i s d i c -
t i o n , bu t i t must be kep t in mind t h a t we a r e one 
people; and the powers reserved to the s ta tes and those 
con fe r r ed on the na t ion a r e a d a p t e d to be exe rc i sed , 
w h e t h e r i ndependen t ly or c o n c u r r e n t l y , to promote the 
gene ra l w e l f a r e , m a t e r i a l and mora l . " (Hoke vs. U.S. , 
227 U.S. 308, 322.) 
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But now suppose the action taken by the Federal Govern-
men t c o n f l i c t s with t h a t t a k e n by the s ta te , with reference 
to the same s u b j e c t - m a t t e r . The per t inen t provision of the 
Constitution is undoubtedly Ar t . VI, par . 2: 
"Th i s C o n s t i t u t i o n , the a c t s of C o n g r e s s in pursu-
a n c e the reof , and the t r e a t i e s made or which shall be 
made under the authori ty of the United S ta tes , are the 
supreme law of the land; and the judges of each s tate 
sha l l be bound t h e r e b y , anything in the Constitution or 
laws of any s ta te to the contrary notwithstanding." 
The Uni ted S t a t e s has since 1789 entered into dozens of 
T r e a t i e s of Amity and C o m m e r c e , Ext rad i t ion Treat ies , and 
C o n s u l a r C o n v e n t i o n s , every one of which had to grea te r or 
l e s s e x t e n t i n v a d e d t h e f i e l d normal ly occup ied by the 
s t a t e s in the e x e r c i s e of t h e i r r e s e r v e d p o w e r s . Ye t no 
t r e a t y h a s e v e r b e e n d e c l a r e d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . T h i s 
n a t u r a l l y is a sub j ec t I c a n n o t e n t e r upon a t length in a 
s h o r t p a p e r . I must be content to refer the inquirer to my 
r e c e n t volume e n t i t l e d . N a t i o n a l S u p r e m a c y , T r e a t y Power 
vs. S ta t e Power (Henry Holt). 
But one t r e a t y I should l ike to make specif ic reference 
t o . Th i s is the C o n v e n t i o n of 1800 with France , which, in 
the language of the Supreme Court of the United S ta tes , gave 
c i t i z e n s of F r a n c e " t h e r i gh t to purchase and hold land in 
the Uni ted S t a t e s , " - - i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n of the Common Law 
Rule , then p r e v a l e n t in every s ta te in the Union,--"removed 
the i n c a p a c i t y of a l i enage and placed them in precisely the 
s a m e s i t u a t i o n a s if t h e y had b e e n c i t i z e n s of t h i s 
c o u n t r y . " Th i s , i ndeed , to quote At to rney-Genera l Gushing, 
is " t h e most e x p r e s s i v e of al l p r e c e d e n t s , it having passed 
t h r o u g h t h e h a n d s and r e c e i v e d the a p p r o b a t i o n of John 
Adams , John M a r s h a l l , O l ive r E l l s w o r t h , Thomas Jef fe rson , 
and James Madison , who , if anybody, should have understood 
the Constitution." 
On the p r e c i s e ques t ion t h e r e f o r e of the relation of the 
t r e a t y - m a k i n g power to the r e s e r v e d r i g h t s of the s t a t e s , 
our c o n c l u s i o n mus t be t h a t the l a t t e r do not l imit the 
f o r m e r to a n y e x t e n t ; t h a t , in o t h e r words , the United 
S t a t e s h a s e x a c t l y t h e s a m e r a n g e of power in making 
t r e a t i e s t h a t i t would have if the s t a t e s did not e x i s t . 
But I w i s h to p o i n t ou t f u r t h e r t h a t the same ru le of 
c o n s t r u c t i o n app l i e s as to the powers of C o n g r e s s , though 
those power s occupy only a po r t i on of the whole field of 
legislative powers . 
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The Convention of 1787 desired nothing so much as to get 
r id of t h a t s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n w h i c h h a d w r e c k e d t h e 
A r t i c l e s of C o n f e d e r a t i o n . This i t a c c o m p l i s h e d in t h r e e 
w a y s : (1) By p r o v i d i n g t h e n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t w i t h 
e x e c u t i v e m a c h i n e r y of i ts own; (2) by making the national 
Supreme Cour t the final i n t e r p r e t e r of the Constitution; (3) 
by p r o v i d i n g for the sup remacy in al l c a s e s of n a t i o n a l 
a u t h o r i t y as def ined by the C o n s t i t u t i o n over c o n f l i c t i n g 
s t a t e a u t h o r i t y . The poin t of view of the Convention was 
voiced by Wilson thus: 
"Wi th r e s p e c t to the p r o v i n c e and o b j e c t of the 
g e n e r a l g o v e r n m e n t they ( the s ta tes) should be consid-
ered as having no exis tence ." 
L a t e r a motion was offered in the Convention prohibiting the 
na t iona l government "to interfere with the government of the 
i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s in any m a t t e r s of i n t e r n a l p o l i c e which 
r e s p e c t s the g o v e r n m e n t of such s ta te only and wherein the 
g e n e r a l w e l f a r e of the Uni ted S t a t e s is not c o n c e r n e d . " 
Desp i t e the ca re fu l l anguage in which it was couched the 
motion was voted down by eight s ta tes to two.4 
The view t h a t the reserved powers of the s ta tes compro-
mise an i n d e p e n d e n t l imi t a t ion on n a t i o n a l power probably 
found expression in the debate on Hamilton's Bank Projec t of 
1791. Opposed as he was to the Bank, Madison pronounced the 
argument fallacious: 
" I n t e r f e r e n c e wi th the p o w e r s of the s t a t e s , " said 
he , "was no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r i t e r i o n of the power of 
C o n g r e s s . If the power was not given. Congress could 
no t e x e r c i s e i t ; if g i v e n , t h e y m i g h t e x e r c i s e i t , 
a l though it should i n t e r f e r e with the laws or even the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e s t a t e s . " ( A n n a l s of C o n g r e s s , 
Vol. II, Col. 1891.) 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , a g e n e r a t i o n l a t e r the same mot ion was 
again a foo t . "It has been con tended , " rec i tes Chief Justice 
Marsha l l , in his opinion in Gibbons v_s. Ogden (9 Wheat. 1, 
1824), " t h a t if a law passed by a s ta te in the exerc ise of 
i ts acknowledged s o v e r e i g n t y comes in to c o n f l i c t wi th the 
law passed C o n g r e s s in pu r suance of the Consti tution, they 
a f fec t the sub jec t and each o t h e r l ike equal and opposing 
p o w e r s . " "But ," the Chief Justice answered, "the framers of 
our Cons t i t u t i on foresaw th i s s t a t e of th ings and provided 
for i t ." Whenever the Federal Government has acted in the 
e x e r c i s e of powers ent rus ted to it, "in every such case the 
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a c t of C o n g r e s s or the t r e a t y is sup reme , and the laws 
of the s t a t e , though e n a c t e d in the exercise of powers not 
controverted, must yield to it." 
I admit t h a t in the period between the death of Marshall 
and the Civ i l War, the d o c t r i n e of Gibbons vs . Ogden was 
t e m p o r a r i l y a b a n d o n e d for the v iew, in s u p p o ^ of which a 
p e c u l i a r r e a d i n g of the Ten th Amendment was g iven , t ha t 
na t i ona l p o w e r is l imi ted by s tate power. But the Supreme 
Cour t has today r e t u r n e d to f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s . Of this such 
dec i s ions as in Henderson vs. New York (92 U.S. 279 1875)-
In r e R a h r e r (142 U . S . , 545 , 1891); the r e c e n ; Employers ' 
L i ab i l i t y C a s e s (Mondou v s . N .Y . , N . H . & H . R . R . C o . , 223 
U.S. ) , and M i n n e s o t a R a t e C a s e s (230 U.S . ) , furnish proof 
positive, to say nothing of a host of d ic ta . 
Thus in the E m p l o y e r s ' L i ab i l i t y C a s e s , the Cour t was 
con f ron t ed with the now no to r ious decision of Chief Justice 
Baldwin of the Connect icut Supreme Court in the Hoxie Case 
in which enforcement had been refused the act of Congress on 
t h e g r o u n d of i t s d i s h a r m o n y w i t h " t h e p o l i c y of t h e 
s t a t e . " S t r a n g e l y u n a w a r e as the Connecticut court showed 
I t s e l f to be of t h e e s t a b l i s h e d c a n o n s of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
Law, I ts v iew must a f t e r al l be admitted to have been the 
i n e v i t a b l e one if the r e s e r v e d p o w e r s of the s t a t e s l imit 
na t i ona l p o w e r . But , as I s ay , the Supreme Cour t of the 
United S t a t e s no longe r s u b s c r i b e s to this d o c t r i n e . The 
t h e o r y of the Connecticut court was accordingly swept aside 
in t h e fo l lowing l anguage t aken from the C o u r t ' s e a r l i e r 
opinion in Smith vs . Alabama: 
"The grant of power to Congress to regulate Congress 
. . . IS p a r a m o u n t ove r al l l e g i s l a t i v e powers which 
in c o n s e q u e n c e of not having been granted to Congress ' 
a r e r e s e r v e d to t h e s t a t e s . I t f o l l o w s t h a t any 
l e g i s l a t i o n of a s t a t e , a l though in pu r suance of an 
acknowledged power reserved to it, which conflicts with 
the a c t u a l e x e r c i s e of the power of Congress over the 
subject of commerce, must give away before the suprema-
cy of the national authori ty." (124 U.S., 508, 1888.) 
In the Minneso ta Rate Cases, 230 U.S., the Court invited 
<^ongress to t a k e over the bus iness of regulating the intra-
s t a t e ra tes so far as might be necessary and proper to make 
effective its regulation of in te rs ta te r a t e s . 
No doubt the same general principles determine the scope 
of the t r e a t y - m a k i n g power of the United S t a t e s and the 
a u x i l i a r y p o w e r s of C o n g r e s s u n d e r the " n e c e s s a r y and 
p r o p e r " c lause- of the Const i tu t ion. Let a mat ter arise that 
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i_s qj_ genuine i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n c e r n and the national power 
to n e g o t i a t e t r e a t i e s with reference to i_t and to give those 
t r e a t i e s the force and e f f ec t of law of the land becomes 
p e r f e c t e d . At this very moment I am informed from rel iable 
s o u r c e s an a g r e e m e n t is in p r o c e s s of format ion wi th the 
D o m i n i o n of C a n a d a which will have for i t s pu rpose the 
e x t e n s i o n of t h e p r o v i s i o n of the r e c e n t W e e k s - M c L e a n 
M i g r a t o r y B i r d Law to t h e c a s e of b i r d s pas s ing from 
C a n a d a . It would be d i f f icu l t to d i s t ingu i sh such a t rea ty 
in p r i n c i p l e from one of the so r t mentioned at the opening 
of this p a p e r , for the s t a t e ' s p o l i c e power wi th re fe rence 
to i t s w i l d g a m e is w e l l s e t t l e d . (Geer v£. C o n n . , 161 
U .S . ) . The p r e c e d e n t wil l be the more p r e c i o u s from i t s 
origin with a s ta te - r igh ts Administrat ion. 
The whole ques t i on , then , is w r a p p e d up in the p h r a s e 
" g e n u i n e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n c e r n , " and t h u s , a s I h a v e 
i n d i c a t e d , is a th ing e v e r a d v a n c i n g and developing. What 
with c a b l e , s t e a m s h i p , w i r e l e s s te legraphy and in te r -oceanic 
c a n a l s , t h e w o r l d t o d a y is a s t o n i s h i n g l y small and the 
c o n s e q u e n c e is t h a t the n a t i o n s can no longe r l ive unto 
t hemse lves as f o r m e r l y . The rise of an internat ional police 
power (Cuba and China and Mexico) and of an internat ional 
power of eminen t domain (Panama) exerc isable by the fitter 
members in the family of n a t i o n s , is a d e v e l o p m e n t c l e a r 
and p a l p a b l e be fo re our e y e s . The development of uniform 
na t iona l l e g i s l a t i o n , of a soc i a l c h a r a c t e r in p u r s u a n c e of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t , is but another phase of the broader 
development of international sol idar i ty . 
And it is the fundamenta l c o n t e n t i o n of this paper that 







The most s t r i k i n g th ing about the President is that there is 
only one of him at a t ime,--notwithstanding which, if we are 
to b e l i e v e the Chai rman of the Republican National Commit-
t e e , the D e m o c r a t s a r e t r y i n g to e l e c t two Presidents this 
e l e c t i o n . The uni ty of the P r e s i d e n c y is , m o r e o v e r , not 
only o r g a n i c , but func t iona l as w e l l - - t h e e n t i r e e x e c u t i v e 
power of the N a t i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t is c o n c e n t r a t e d in one 
p e r s o n . In th is r e s p e c t the off ice of P r e s i d e n t of fers a 
d e c i d e d c o n t r a s t to t h a t of G o v e r n o r . F o r w h i l e t h e 
G o v e r n o r is n o m i n a l l y the ch ie f e x e c u t i v e of the s t a t e , 
a c t u a l l y the e x e c u t i v e power t h e r e o f is usual ly p a r c e l l e d 
out among a number of e l ec t ive officers over whose official 
conduct the Governor has no control whatever . The executive 
u n i t y of the N a t i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t , on the o t h e r hand , is 
m a i n t a i n e d by a prac t ica l ly unrestr icted power of removal in 
the hands of the Pres ident . 
What is the " e x e c u t i v e power" mentioned in the opening 
c l a u s e of A r t i c l e II of the Co ns t i t u t i on? Is it the sum 
to ta l of the powers which are mentioned more specifically in 
the fol lowing p a r a g r a p h s of the a r t i c l e , l ike the power of 
Commande r - i n -Ch ie f , of Appointment, of Pardon, e t c . , or are 
these s p e c i f i c a l l y d e s i g n a t e d powers simply part and parcel 
of a l a r g e r t o t a l ? In a n s w e r i n g th is question, which arose 
very e a r l y , Hami l ton and Jef fe rson d i sagreed along charac -
t e r i s t i c l i n e s . In d e f e n d i n g W a s h i n g t o n ' s N e u t r a l i t y 
Proclamation of 1793, Hamilton invoked "the executive power" 
"The Pres idency." Princeton Alumni Weekly, October 22, 
1924., pp. 80-83. Reprinted by permission. [Bibliography 
Entry D59] . & ^ J' 
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of the P r e s i d e n t , wh ich , he contended, comprised the power 
of d e t e r m i n i n g our foreign r e l a t i o n s , e x c e p t as o t h e r w i s e 
p r o v i d e d by spec i f i c c l a u s e s of the C o n s t i t u t i o n , as , for 
e x a m p l e , t h a t c l ause which g ives C o n g r e s s the power to 
" d e c l a r e w a r . " Jef ferson was much disturbed by Hamilton s 
r e a s o n i n g , and asked Madison to prepare some papers on the 
o t h e r s i d e of the ques t ion , in which he should cu t him 
[Hamil ton] to p i e c e s in the face of the public." However, 
w h e n J e f f e r s o n b e c a m e P r e s i d e n t he himself r e s o r t e d to 
H a m i l t o n ' s r e a s o n i n g , l ay ing down the d o c t r i n e t h a t the 
t r a n s a c t i o n of bus iness with foreign n a t i o n s is e x e c u t i v e 
a l t o g e t h e r . " F i r s t and l a s t , H a m i l t o n ' s view has tended to 
e s t a b l i s h i tself , and it may be fa i r ly said that the history 
of presidential power has been one of aggrandizement . 
METHOD OF ELECTING THE PRESIDENT 
This be ing a campaign y e a r , it is of more than usual 
i n t e r e s t to note the method of e l e c t i n g the P r e s i d e n t . A 
c o l l e a g u e r e c e n t l y informed me that he intended to vote for 
Davis and D a w e s . I told him that that was i m p o s s i b l e - t h a t 
as a m a t t e r of fac t he would vo te for n e i t h e r - b e c a u s e , of 
c o u r s e , we do not vo te for the Pres iden t or Vice-Pres ident 
d i r e c t l y , bu t for " e l e c t o r s . " It is f r equen t ly said t h a t 
the Convention of 1787 was led to adopt this indirect method 
of e l e c t i o n by fear of democracy, but the real reason seems 
to have been somewhat d i f f e r e n t . The E l e c t o r a l C o l l e g e , 
a f t e r having been once vo ted down by the Convention, was 
f i n a l l y a d o p t e d because of Mad i son ' s sugges t ion t h a t the 
suff rage "was more widely diffused" in the Northern S ta tes 
than in the S o u t h e r n , and t h a t consequently under a system 
of popular e l e c t i o n the President was likely to be always a 
N o r t h e r n e r . It thus became necessary to adopt some method 
which would give each s t a t e its proport ionate weight in the 
choice of President , and at the same time save to it freedom 
in d e t e r m i n i n g i t s r u l e of s u f f r a g e . T h e C o l l e g e of 
Electors provided the desired solution. 
The C o l l e g e itself underwent a great transformation. The 
theo ry of the Convention was that the College would consist 
of a number of high-minded gentlemen who would choose the 
bes t man for P r e s i d e n t (at t h a t t ime e v e r y b o d y thought of 
Washing ton) , and t h a t fur thermore this same best man would 
probably be r e e l e c t e d an inde f in i t e number of t imes . The 
whole theory fell to the ground when in 1796 Washing ton 
dec l ined a th i rd e l e c t i o n . In the meantime party lines had 
become straightly drawn, so from 1796 to the present day the 
E l e c t o r a l C o l l e g e has been made up of pa r ty dummies. In 
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o t h e r w o r d s , in th is r e s p e c t the w r i t t e n C o n s t i t u t i o n has 
been a l t e r e d by C o n s t i t u t i o n a l u s a g e . Then in consequence 
of the e l ec t ion in 1800 the method of electing the President 
was fu r the r a l t e r e d by Constitutional Amendment. Originally 
e a c h e l e c t o r v o t e d for two m e n , w i t h o u t d e s i g n a t i n g a 
d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n his c h o i c e for P r e s i d e n t and for Vice-
P r e s i d e n t ; and in 1800 a l l t h e R e p u b l i c a n - D e m o c r a t i c 
e l e c t o r s , be ing anx ious not to lose any v o t e s , vo ted for 
Je f fe rson and Bur r , the p a r t y ' s nominees for the Presidency 
and V i c e - P r e s i d e n c y r e s p e c t i v e l y . In c o n s e q u e n c e of the 
r e s u l t i n g t i e , the e l e c t i o n was thrown into the House of 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , w h e r e the J e f f e r son i ans had to c a l l upon 
t h e H a m i l t o n i a n s to a s s i s t t h e m in e l e c t i n g J e f f e r s o n 
P r e s i d e n t . Under the Twelfth Amendment each e lec tor casts 
one vote for Pres ident , and one for Vice-Pres ident . 
V o l t a i r e d e c l a r e d of the Holy Roman Empire that it was 
neither holy, Roman, nor an empire. The College of Electors 
is n e i t h e r a c o l l e g e , nor is i t made up of e l e c t o r s . As 
be fo re r e m a r k e d , i t s member s a r e m e r e party dummies, and 
they never come together as one body. The respect ive s ta te 
d e l e g a t i o n s do m e e t a t the s t a t e c a p i t a l s and c a s t t h e i r 
v o t e s , which are then forwarded to Washington to be counted 
by C o n g r e s s , bu t if no o n e o b t a i n s a m a j o r i t y in the 
C o l l e g e , s o - c a l l e d , the C o l l e g e , n e v e r t h e l e s s , is th rough 
with the m a t t e r , and the e l e c t i o n now goes in the case of 
P r e s i d e n t to the House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , and in the case 
of Vice-Pres ident to the Sena te . 
B e c a u s e t h e r e a r e t h r e e p a r t i e s in the field th is y e a r 
t h e r e has been a good deal of speculation as to what might 
happen if none of them succeeds in obtaining a majority in 
t h e E l e c t o r a l C o l l e g e . If the C o l l e g e fai ls to c h o o s e a 
P r e s i d e n t by the r e q u i r e d m a j o r i t y , then the e lec t ion goes 
to the House , wh ich v o t e s by s ta tes , each s ta te having one 
v o t e . The House a l w a y s chooses from the three highest on 
t h e l i s t , a n d t h e s u c c e s s f u l c a n d i d a t e m u s t o b t a i n a 
major i ty of al l the s t a t es . Now it happens that neither the 
R e p u b l i c a n s nor Democrats control a majority of the existing 
d e l e g a t i o n s . T h e r e f o r e , un less the th i rd pa r ty turns in to 
a s s i s t one or the other , the House apparently will be unable 
to make a c h o i c e . Meantime the Senate would be trying to 
choose a V i c e - P r e s i d e n t from the "two highest on the list," 
each Senator having one vote . This would seem not to be an 
imposs ib le t a sk , and so we a r e p r o b a b l y sure of a V i c e -
Pres iden t , who, if the House has failed to make a choice by 
March 4, wi l l t h e r e u p o n become P r e s i d e n t . Nor is it very 
d o u b t f u l w h o t h i s V i c e - P r e s i d e n t would b e - - n a m e l y , the 
D e m o c r a t i c c a n d i d a t e , Mr. B r y a n , as he would probably be 
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e m i n e n t l y s a t i s f a c t o r y to Mr. L a F o l l e t t e , whose fo l lowers 
c o n t r o l the b a l a n c e of power in the Sena te . But of course 
it should be r e m e m b e r e d t h a t t h e r e is abso lu t e ly no legal 
compulsion upon the members of the Electoral College to vote 
for the i r p a r t y n o m i n e e s . T h e r e is , therefore , no legal or 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l o b s t a c l e in the way of e f fec t ing a combina-
t ion of e l e c t o r s c a p a b l e of choos ing a P r e s i d e n t , and this 
f a c t h a s led to t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t if the R e p u b l i c a n s , 
h a v i n g f a i l e d to ge t a ma jo r i t y in the C o l l e g e , wish to 
p r e v e n t Mr. Bryan from becoming Pres ident , they can turn in 
and help the D e m o c r a t s e l e c t Mr. D a v i s in the E l e c t o r a l 
C o l l e g e . A l t o g e t h e r , the D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y seems to have 
b e e n r a t h e r sh rewd in i ts c h o i c e of a c a n d i d a t e for the 
V i c e - P r e s i d e n c y a n d t h a t no d o u b t is t h e p o i n t of 
M r . B u t l e r ' s p l a i n t m e n t i o n e d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of th is 
address. 
T h e r e is one other mat ter that should be touched upon in 
c o n n e c t i o n with the e l e c t i o n of P r e s i d e n t - - i f the e l e c t i o n 
goes to C o n g r e s s it is to the e x i s t i n g C o n g r e s s ; in o t h e r 
words , a C o n g r e s s which may have been discredited by the 
e l e c t i o n . T h a t is a s i t u a t i o n w h i c h s u r e l y c a l l s for 
r e fo rm. The s o - c a l l e d Norris Amendment to the Constitution 
would provide the required reform by putting a new Congress 
in off ice the f i r s t Monday of the following January, and a 
newly e l e c t e d P r e s i d e n t in off ice the th i rd Monday of the 
same J a n u a r y . The i n t e r v a l of two w e e k s should be suffi-
c i e n t for count ing the e l e c t o r a l v o t e , and in c a s e i t was 
i n d e c i s i v e , for c h o o s i n g a P r e s i d e n t . A " l a m e duck 
C o n g r e s s " s h o u l d n o t e x e r c i s e the i m p o r t a n t funct ion of 
c o u n t i n g t h e e l e c t o r a l v o t e - - f a r less should i t h a v e the 
c h o i c e of P r e s i d e n t . F u r t h e r m o r e , the p r e s e n t s y s t e m , by 
which a newly e l e c t e d C o n g r e s s does not o r d i n a r i l y en t e r 
upon i t s w o r k un t i l t h i r t e e n months l a t e r , seems absurd , 
though it has had d e f e n d e r s . The N o r r i s Amendmen t has 
a l r e a d y passed the Sena te , and is at present pending before 
the House of Representa t ives . 
The C o n s t i t u t i o n is not v e r y e l a b o r a t e in i t s s t a t emen t 
of r e q u i r e m e n t s for e l i g i b i l i t y to the off ice of P r e s i d e n t . 
The P re s iden t must be "a natural-born ci t izen" of the United 
S t a t e s , must have been fou r t een y e a r s a r e s i d e n t of the 
Uni ted S t a t e s , and must be t h i r t y - f i v e years old. Would a 
person born ab road of A m e r i c a n p a r e n t s be "a natural-born 
c i t i z e n " ? He would be a ci t izen of the United S ta tes under 
t h e A c t of 1 8 5 7 , bu t t h i s a c t w a s pas sed by C o n g r e s s 
a p p a r e n t l y in e x e r c i s e of i t s power to e n a c t "a uniform 
n a t u r a l i z a t i o n l a w . " F u r t h e r m o r e , by t h e F o u r t e e n t h 
Amendment it would seem t h a t the only c i t i z e n s by b i r th 
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r e c o g n i z e d by the C o n s t i t u t i o n a r e those who a r e born in 
the United S t a t e s . Stil l the question is not se t t led . ~ 
A n o t h e r u n s e t t l e d q u e s t i o n i s , who is a u t h o r i z e d to 
d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r the P r e s i d e n t is ab le to d i s c h a r g e the 
p o w e r s and du t i e s of his of f ice with the r e s u l t t h a t the 
s a m e " s h a l l d e v o l v e upon the V i c e - P r e s i d e n t " ? Nor has 
C o n g r e s s e v e r p a s s e d a law on the sub jec t ; but if both 
P r e s i d e n t and V i c e - P r e s i d e n t are unavailable, then under the 
P r e s i d e n t i a l S u c c e s s i o n Ac t of 1886 the Secre ta ry of S ta te 
s u c c e e d s to the p o w e r s of the office, provided he possesses 
t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of P r e s i d e n t , - - i f n o t , 
then the Secre ta ry of the Treasury, and so on. Inasmuch as 
the S e c r e t a r y invo lved s u c c e e d s by virtue of his s ec re t a ry -
ship , he r e t a i n s t h a t off ice whi le a c t i n g as P r e s i d e n t . It 
wou ld be a g o o d t h i n g , p e r h a p s , if the off ice of V i c e -
P r e s i d e n t w e r e e l i m i n a t e d . The off ice is a pa radox . The 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of i t a r e so g r e a t t h a t an inferior man should 
neve r be chosen to i t , but the a c t u a l i t i e s a r e usual ly so 
un inv i t ing and uninspi r ing that superior men do not ca re for 
i t . V i c e - P r e s i d e n t Mar sha l l a d e q u a t e l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d the 
off ice when he compared the Vice-Pres ident to "a man in a 
c a t a l e p t i c f i t - - h e does not suffer , he knows what is going 
on, but he has no par t in it." 
PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 
B e f o r e e n t e r i n g upon the e x e c u t i o n of his o f f i ce , the 
P r e s i d e n t takes an oath to "preserve, protect and defend the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n of the Uni ted S t a t e s . " Some P r e s i d e n t s have 
t r e a t e d t h i s o a t h a s a u t h o r i z i n g them to pass upon the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a c t s of C o n g r e s s , but t h a t funct ion 
be longs to c o u r t s , and f inal ly to the Supreme Court . It is 
e v i d e n t t h a t the P r e s i d e n t does not protect the Constitution 
by e x e r c i s i n g powers which do not constitutionally belong to 
him. A l s o , the P r e s i d e n t ' s power s a r e g e n e r a l l y qual i f ied 
by the e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d duty " to t a k e c a r e t ha t the laws 
a r e f a i t h f u l l y e x e c u t e d . " If t h e P r e s i d e n t t h i n k s a 
p roposed a c t of C o n g r e s s is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , he may veto 
i t , but when it has been r e - p a s s e d over his ve to he must 
o r d i n a r i l y e n f o r c e i t un less and unt i l i t is s e t a s ide by 
judicial decision. 
T h e P r e s i d e n t ' s f i r s t a c t i v e duty is to c o n s t i t u t e an 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . In th is connec t ion he has two powers, that 
of a p p o i n t m e n t and t h a t of r emova l . The former he shares 
with the S e n a t e as to the more i m p o r t a n t o f f i ce r s , though 
not as to the most i m p o r t a n t , name ly , the members of the 
C a b i n e t , s i n c e by " s e n a t o r i a l c o u r t e s y " the P r e s i d e n t ' s 
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nominations to these are always ra t i f i ed . This, of course, 
is ex t r a - cons t i t u t i ona l , but then so is the Cabinet i tself . 
The Consti tut ion knows only of "heads of departments," and 
the P res iden t ' s consul tat ion of these is supposed to be in 
wri t ing . The original theory of the Constitution apparently 
was that the Senate should ac t as the Pres iden t ' s council, 
but again we have a case in which the original intention of 
the Const i tut ion has been over turned by usage. Washington 
did at tempt to use the Sena te as a council , but met with 
such an i r r i t a t i n g r e c e p t i o n on one o c c a s i o n t h a t he 
declared he would "be damned if he ever went there again." 
Thereaf te r when he consulted the Sena t e , it was at arm's 
length and by message. 
The evolution which the Cabinet has undergone is inter-
e s t i n g . Washington tr ied to make it non-par t i san , but it 
had become a par t i san body before the end of his first 
adminis t ra t ion . In the years preceding the Civil War it was 
a fundamental requirement that the two Sect ions should be 
fairly evenly represented in the Cabinet, and on account of 
this r ep resen ta t ive c h a r a c t e r it came to be understood that 
the Pres iden t was under a ce r ta in obligat ion to defer to 
c a b i n e t opinion. Lincoln himself put the question of the 
rel ief of For t Sumter to a cabinet vote, but when the vote 
went against his own views he disregarded it. He also took 
early occasion to disabuse Secretary Seward of the idea that 
the latter was the real head of the Administration. 
The member of a Cabinet finds himself vested with a dual 
role. On the one hand, he is a party leader whose personal 
loyalty is due to the P re s iden t . On the other hand, he is 
the head of a department of government vested with certain 
duties by law. In consequence he often finds himself in an 
embarrassing posi t ion. Thus, suppose Congress should pass 
an a c t e n t r u s t i n g the c a r e of c e r t a i n oil lands to the 
Sec re t a ry of the Navy, and then suppose the President to 
order him to t ransfer the lands in question to the care of 
the S e c r e t a r y of the I n t e r i o r . Would obedience to the 
Pres ident in such a si tuation be obedience to the law? At 
any r a t e , disobedience to the P res iden t would bring about 
the S e c r e t a r y ' s removal . This, of course, was the situation 
which faced Sec re t a ry Denby in 1921, and it was only a 
repe t i t ion of the si tuat ion which confronted the Secre ta ry 
of the Treasury in 1833, when President Jackson ordered the 
removal of the deposits from the Bank of the United States . 
In short , there are times when a cab ine t member may "be 
hanged if he does and be hanged if he doesn't." 
It has been frequently suggested in recent years that the 
members of the Cabinet ought to be admitted to seats in Con-
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gress . There seems to be no constitutional reason why this 
could not be done by act of Congress, or even by an ordinary 
resolut ion in each of the two houses. It would seem to be 
very des i rab le to put the S e c r e t a r i e s in a position where 
they could s t a t e their programmes directly to Congress and 
also where they would be subject to interpolation by members 
of Congress. One can hardly imagine a Fall and a Daugherty 
long remaining in office if confronted with such an ordeal. 
THE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM AND THE 
CABINET SYSTEM 
The difference between our own "Presidential System" and 
"the Cabinet System" of Great Britain and France is a matter 
which has been dealt with by many writers. The former rests 
upon the pr inc ip le of the separa t ion of powers and repre-
sents the idea that the execut ive power and the legislative 
power should be s t r i c t ly marked off from each other. The 
l a t t e r , on the o ther hand, combines these two powers under 
execut ive d i r ec t ion . Many people have felt that this brings 
about a harmony of opera t ion in government that is highly 
des i rab le , and they have yearned to see it established under 
our own Cons t i tu t ion . The fact of the mat te r is that we 
could obtain the Cabinet System if we wanted it without 
a l te r ing a word in the Const i tut ion. This could be brought 
about by the P r e s i d e n t c h o o s i n g h is C a b i n e t from the 
c h a i r m e n of the p r i n c i p a l c o m m i t t e e s of the House of 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , or of the two houses. These heads of 
commit tees could not, of course, be formally vested with 
e x e c u t i v e office, but they could be put in a position to 
d i rec t the conduct of the pr incipal offices if the President 
chose to e x e r c i s e the power of removal in accordance with 
their de s i r e s . Thus we should st i l l have heads of depart-
ments, but they would be subject to direction by a Cabinet 
consis t ing of the principal members of Congress. Of course, 
under such an arrangement the President would soon come to 
take an a t t i tude of non-par t i sansh ip , and the in i t ia t ive in 
government would proceed from the majority party in Con-
gress, probably that in the House of Representatives. 
The P r e s i d e n t ' s duty to " take ca re that the laws be 
faithfully executed" has been mentioned. It was the theory 
of the f r a m e r s of t he Const i tut ion that this duty would 
ordinar i ly be a fairly specific one, since this was to be "a 
government of laws and not of men." But again the Constitu-
tion has been grea t ly modified by usage. The discre t ion 
which is conferred upon the President in the enforcement of 
laws is frequently very broad. Under the legislation which 
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Congre s s passed during the World War the following powers, 
among o t h e r s , w e r e ve s t ed in the P r e s i d e n t : To c o n t r o l 
a b s o l u t e l y t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n of food 
s t u f f s ; to fix p r i c e s ; to l i c e n s e i m p o r t a t i o n , e x p o r t a t i o n , 
manufac tu re , s t o r a g e and d i s t r i bu t i on of the n e c e s s a r i e s of 
l i f e ; to o p e r a t e t h e r a i l r o a d s ; to i s s u e p a s s p o r t s ; to 
con t ro l c ab l e and t e l e g r a p h l ines ; to dec lare embargoes; to 
d e t e r m i n e p r i o r i t y of sh ipmen t s ; to loan money to fore ign 
g o v e r n m e n t s ; to e n f o r c e P r o h i b i t i o n ; to r e d i s t r i b u t e and 
regroup the e x e c u t i v e bu reaus , e t c . In c a r r y i n g out these 
powers the P r e s i d e n t ' s a u t h o r i z e d a g e n t s put in to fo rce a 
huge number of execut ive regulations having all the force of 
l aw. It used to be good d o c t r i n e t h a t Congres s could not 
d e l e g a t e its powers, but the doctrine today seems to be that 
it cannot do so unless it finds it convenient . 
The President is also Commander-in-Chief of the Army and 
N a v y . Before the Civi l War this power was r e g a r d e d as 
p r i n c i p a l l y a power of mili tary command. Lincoln, however, 
b rought his powers in this field to the support of his power 
as chief e x e c u t i v e , wi th the result that his successors have 
g e n e r a l l y felt free to use the Army and Navy, even in time 
of p e a c e , in enforcement of the law at home and the rights 
of Amer i can c i t i z e n s ab road , unless s p e c i f i c s t a t u t e s t i ed 
the i r hands in th is r e s p e c t . The r e c e n t opinion, therefore , 
of A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l Daugher ty that the Pres ident might not 
u s e t h e N a v y to e n f o r c e P r o h i b i t i o n w i t h o u t s p e c i f i c 
a u t h o r i z a t i o n by C o n g r e s s r e p r e s e n t e d a r e t u r n to o lde r 
d o c t r i n e . The dec i s ion of the Supreme Cour t in the Debs 
c a s e , s u p p o r t i n g P r e s i d e n t C l e v e l a n d ' s a c t i o n s in t h e 
Ch icago s t r i k e of 1894, r ep resen t s ra ther the point of view 
of Lincoln at the outset of the Civil V^ar. 
In war-t ime the powers of Commander-in-Chief at the "seat 
of w a r " a r e l i m i t e d on ly by m i l i t a r y n e c e s s i t y and the 
usages of m a r t i a l l aw. What is the "seat of war"? During 
the l a t e war with Germany S e n a t o r Chamber la in of Oregon 
c o n t e n d e d t ha t the conditions of modern warfare brought the 
e n t i r e Uni ted S t a t e s within the seat of war, although actual 
mi l i t a ry o p e r a t i o n s w e r e for the most part being carr ied on 
three thousand miles away. 
War, of c o u r s e , is only one b r anch of foreign re la t ions . 
The more fruitful b ranch is t h a t of re la t ionship in time of 
p e a c e . In t h i s field the P r e s i d e n t ' s i n i t i a t i v e is unmis -
t a k a b l e , due to h i s p o w e r of a p p o i n t m e n t , of r e c e i v i n g 
f o r e i g n a m b a s s a d o r s , and of n e g o t i a t i o n . The power of 
appo in tment is , of cou r se , sha r ed wi th the Sena te , but the 
p r a c t i c e of r e c e n t P r e s i d e n t s in the appointment of special 
a g e n t s , unoff ic ia l o b s e r v e r s , and the l ike , has r e s u l t e d in 
i 
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s u p p l e m e n t i n g the r e g u l a r d ip loma t i c e s t a b l i s h m e n t with a 
l a r g e n u m b e r of a g e n t s of d i p l o m a t i c q u a l i t y in whose 
a p p o i n t m e n t the S e n a t e has had no h a n d . In o ther words, 
u s a g e h a s a g a i n o p e r a t e d upon the w r i t t e n C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
Then because of his power to receive foreign ambassadors and 
fo re ign m i n i s t e r s , the President has come to have the power 
of d e t e r m i n i n g w h a t governments shall be recognized by the 
Uni ted S t a t e s as be ing in good international standing. Also 
the power of reception carr ies with it the power of dismiss-
a l , a n d in B e r n s t o r f f ' s c a s e t h i s mean t p r a c t i c a l l y the 
power of determining upon war or peace . 
NEGOTIATION OF TREATIES 
The P r e s i d e n t ' s nea r ly exclusive power in the negotiation 
of t r e a t i e s today a lso r e p r e s e n t s a fur ther modif icat ion of 
t he work ing C o n s t i t u t i o n to the Pres iden t ' s advantage. The 
C o n s t i t u t i o n s a y s no th ing about the n e g o t i a t i o n of t r e a -
t i e s . It s imply s a y s t h a t the P r e s i d e n t " sha l l have power 
by and wi th the advice and consent of the Senate , to make 
t r e a t i e s , p r o v i d e d t h a t t w o - t h i r d s of the S e n a t o r s p r e s e n t 
c o n c u r . " In o t h e r w o r d s , the P r e s i d e n t and S e n a t e a r e 
a s s o c i a t e d t h roughou t the e n t i r e p r o c e s s of t r e a t y - m a k i n g ; 
y e t from an e a r l y day the President has negotiated t rea t ies 
on his own i n i t i a t i v e and wi th only informal c o n s u l t a t i o n 
wi th such S e n a t o r s as he choose s to make his c o n f i d a n t s . 
The r e s u l t is that the Sena te ' s power has come to be pared 
d o w n t o t h a t of g i v i n g i t s c o n s e n t , c o n d i t i o n a l l y or 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y , to the r a t i f i c a t i o n of p roposed t r e a t i e s . 
F i r s t and l a s t , t h e S e n a t e h a s " a m e n d e d " a b o u t s i x t y 
t r e a t i e s wh ich were la ter ratified and about two dozen more 
wh ich , on a c c o u n t of i t s a c t i o n , w e r e not rat if ied. It has 
a lso r e j e c t e d o u t r i g h t or failed to ratify a small number of 
t r e a t i e s , s o m e of w h i c h , h o w e v e r , l i k e t h e T r e a t y of 
Versai l les , were very important . 
S h o u l d t h e S e n a t e ' s p a r t in t r e a t y - m a k i n g be s t i l l 
f u r t h e r d i m i n i s h e d ? Should the S e n a t e ' s c o n t r o l in th is 
m a t t e r be s u p e r s e d e d by the r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t r e a t i e s be 
r a t i f i e d by a majori ty of the two houses of Congress? This 
ques t ion d r a w s a t t e n t i o n to the fac t that the t reaty-making 
power is of undef ined scope, and that furthermore under the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n t r e a t i e s a r e no t only i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r a c t s , 
but " law of the l and . " In o t h e r w o r d s , the t r e a t y - m a k i n g 
power is a l a w - m a k i n g power of undefined scope. Thus in 
1916 the United S ta tes government made a t reaty with Great 
B r i t a i n under which our g o v e r n m e n t and the government of 
C a n a d a u n d e r t a k e to p r o t e c t m i g r a t o r y game b i rd s , making 
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seasonal flights from one country to the other. Under the 
a u t h o r i z a t i o n of th is t r e a t y C o n g r e s s has made a law 
penalizing the taking of such game birds except in accord-
ance wi th r e g u l a t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d by the S e c r e t a r y of 
A g r i c u l t u r e , and in the case of Missouri vs . Holland the 
Supreme Cour t s u s t a i n e d the law, the t r e a t y , and the 
S e c r e t a r y ' s regula t ions . It is worth noting that in some of 
the c o n v e n t i o n s which r a t i f i e d the C o n s t i t u t i o n of the 
United S ta te s , the indefiniteness of the treaty-making power 
was pointed to by the S t a t e s ' Rights people as cause for 
alarm, and that the advocates of the Constitution answered 
them by pointing to the safeguard which a two-thirds vote in 
the Senate established in defense of States ' Rights. 
Fur thermore, the Sena te ' s check in this field also has 
been weakened by the so-called Executive Agreement—that is, 
diplomatic arrangements with other governments which are not 
laid before the Senate for its approval . The Lansing-Ishii 
A g r e e m e n t was such an a r r angemen t ; also the so-ca l l ed 
"Gentlemen's Agreement ," by which from the year 1907 till 
last July immigration from Japan to the United States was 
r e g u l a t e d . It is of ten imposs ib l e to d i s t i n g u i s h such 
agreements in pr inciple from a t rea ty in the sense of the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . The ment ion, however, of the question of 
Japanese immigration cal ls a t ten t ion to the fact that while 
the Pres ident ordinari ly has the in i t i a t ive in the field of 
foreign re la t ions , ye t he is not a lways able to es tabl ish 
the condi t ions within which this in i t i a t ive may be e x e r -
cised. The Japanese exclusion measure adopted by the last 
Congress undoubtedly embarrassed the Adminis t ra t ion very 
seriously in the conduct of our re la t ions with the Japanese 
Imperial Government. Never the less , it is law of the land 
and the President cannot do other than enforce it . 
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 
P r e s i d e n t i a l leadership in the field of legis la t ion has 
been a n o t h e r s t r i k i n g d e v e l o p m e n t in the f ie ld of our 
Consti tut ional law and practice within recent years . By the 
Constitution the Pres ident has the veto power. He is also 
charged with the duty of giving Congress "information on the 
s ta te of the union," and recommending "to their considera-
t i o n such m e a s u r e s as he sha l l judge n e c e s s a r y and 
e x p e d i e n t . " It is ha rd ly n e c e s s a r y to po in t out how 
P r e s i d e n t s R o o s e v e l t and Wilson succeeded in v i ta l iz ing 
these provisions. Unquestionably the American people have 
a lways r e g a r d e d the Pres ident as especia l ly qualified to 
voice the sentiment of the country as a whole. Even in the 
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C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Convent ion of 1787 it was said that "the 
Execut ive ought to be so constituted as to be the protector 
of t he p e o p l e , " nor did Pres iden t Polk miss ta te popular 
under s t and ing of ma t t e r when in his message of 1848 he 
asser ted that the Pres iden t represents "the whole people of 
the Un i t ed S t a t e s , as e a c h member of the l e g i s l a t i v e 
department represents portions of them." 
The un i ty of the p r e s i d e n t i a l office also lay at the 
basis of Mr. Roosevel t ' s "Stewardship theory." This was, in 
effect , tha t the P res iden t is authorized to take any action 
which he deems to be for the best interest of the country, 
p r o v i d e d such a c t i o n is not prohibi ted by some specif ic 
provision of the Const i tu t ion, or by statute. The theory is 
not so very different from tha t which cost Char les I his 
head , and it is there fore not surprising to find Mr. Taft 
en ter ing a mild p ro tes t against it in his book entitled "Our 
Chief Magistrate and His Powers." Mr. Taft there points out 
that Mr. Roosevel t was wont to classify all Presidents into 
two types, the Buchanan type and the Lincoln type, Mr. Taft, 
of c o u r s e , exemplifying the first type and Mr. Roosevel t 
himself the second. This reminds Mr. Taft of the story of 
the l i t t le girl who came home from school and said that she 
was the best scholar in school. Her mother asked her if her 
t e a c h e r had sa id so . "No," said the l i t t l e gir l , "I just 
noticed it myself." 
It is unquest ionable , however, tha t Constitutional theory 
today a t t r ibu tes to the National Government large unspeci-
fied powers in deal ing with grave emergencies. Thus in a 
r ecen t case we find the Supreme Court declaring that "it is 
not lightly to be assumed tha t in matters requiring national 
act ion power which must belong to and somewhere reside in 
every civilized government is not to be found." And because 
of the very nature of an emergency the handling of it must 
o r d i n a r i l y fall to the Pres iden t in the first ins tance , as 
it did to President Cleveland in 1894. In the Convention of 
1787 i t s e l f i t was foretold that "in moments of passing 
d a n g e r the t r ied abi l i t ies and es tabl ished c h a r a c t e r of a 
favori te mag i s t r a t e will prevai l over respec t for the forms 
of the Const i tu t ion ." The prophecy has been vindicated by 
e v e n t on more than one c r i t i c a l occas ion. Even in "a 
government by laws," there is no substitute for men. 
8 
What Kind of Judicial Review did the 
Framers Have in Mind? 
The question whether the Framers intended to confer upon the 
Sup reme C o u r t the power to pass upon the consti tutionali ty 
of a c t s of C o n g r e s s is one of perennial in teres t . About 25 
y e a r s ago t h e r e was a great deal of writing on the subject, 
and the C o u r t ' s p r e t e n s i o n s w e r e g e n e r a l l y ra t i f ied , among 
t h e a p p r o v i n g v o i c e s being my own D o c t r i n e of Judic ia l 
R e v i e w . Ten y e a r s la ter , going over the evidence afresh, I 
had the fee l ing t h a t I might have been a l i t t le too confi-
d e n t of my e a r l i e r p o s i t i o n , and more r e c e n t s tudy has 
strengthened this impression. 
T h e c a p i t a l d i f f i c u l t y c o n s i s t s in the pauc i ty of the 
e v i d e n c e and t h e f r e q u e n t l y u n c e r t a i n b e a r i n g of wha t 
e v i d e n c e t h e r e i s . In the p r e s e n t s tudy , a c c o r d i n g l y , the 
inqui ry has been b r o a d e n e d to cover the ent i re period from 
t h e a s s e m b l i n g of t h e P h i l a d e l p h i a C o n v e n t i o n t o - - a n d 
t h r o u g h - - t h e dec i s ion in Marbury v^ . Madison; a p r o c e d u r e 
which s e r v e s to e n l a r g e the s o u r c e s of a v a i l a b l e informa-
t ion , and a t the same t ime r e p l a c e s the general issue with 
t w o m o r e d e f i n i t e ones : to wi t , t h a t of the a n t i c i p a t e d 
S c o p e of the C o u r t ' s power over n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n and 
that of its Effect. Let me elucidate these terms. 
The ques t ion of S c o p e may be ph rased thus: Does the 
C o u r t ' s p o w e r to i n t e r p r e t t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h is 
e x e r c i s e d only in c o n n e c t i o n wi th , and for the purpose of, 
the d e c i s i o n of "cases ," comprehend any and all questions of 
"What Kind of J u d i c i a l Review did the Framers Have i n 
Mind?" Pi t t sburgh Legal Journal , January 8, 1938, pp. k-
20, weekly e d i t i o n . Repr in ted by pe rmi s s ion from the 
Pi t t sburgh Legal Journa l . [Bibliography Entry D127] 
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const i tut ional in te rpre ta t ion a decision of which would bear 
upon the disposition of a case before the Court? To speak 
more prec ise ly , there seem at the outset to have been at 
l e a s t three dist inguishable theor ies on this point . There 
were those who regarded judicial review as a sort of veto 
power to be used by the Court chiefly, if not exclusively, 
in defense of "judicial power." Again there were those who 
confined judicial review to the enforcement of the d i rec t 
prohibitions in the Consti tut ion on Congress. Lastly, there 
were those who claimed for the Court the right to read the 
e n t i r e C o n s t i t u t i o n for i t se l f , i n c l u d i n g the g r a n t s of 
power to Congress. 
Likewise there were - -and indeed st i l l are t o d a y - - t h r e e 
views on the question of Effect or Finality, as it may also 
be termed. Fi rs t , there is the theory that a pronouncement 
by the Cour t of " u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y " upon an a c t of 
Congress merely se t t l es the law of the case in connection 
with the decision of which the pronouncement was made, and 
of such future cases as the Court may choose to apply it to 
on the s trength of the doctr ine of stare decisis. Secondly, 
there is the theory that such a pronouncement also settles 
f o r e v e r the fa te of the condemned s t a t u t e , in e f f e c t 
s t r i k i n g it from the s t a t u t e book. Last ly , there is the 
view that such a pronouncement also fixes the meaning of the 
Constitution against the Pres iden t and Congress until either 
the Court reverses its holding on ground of "error" or the 
Constitution is amended on the point involved. 
In short, the subject t r ea t ed in this paper is not simply 
whether judicial review of acts of Congress had come to be 
"intended" prior to the formal assertion of the power by the 
Court, but what kind of judicial review was intended, and 
has been in fact es tabl ished, as a sa l ien t feature of our 
governmental system. 
We begin with the fact that judicial review of acts of 
Congress were repeatedly t rea ted by its foremost advocates 
in e a r l y y e a r s as r e s t i n g primarily on a "pr inc ip le" or 
d o c t r i n e , " which was thought to be assumed r a the r than 
e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d in the Consti tut ion i tself . It was not, 
in o the r w o r d s , r e g a r d e d as being a mat te r of specif ic 
grant , as is for example the President's veto power; but was 
ar t icula ted with the Const i tut ion, as contemporaneously was 
the Pres ident ' s power of removal, by a course of reasoning 
and i n f e r e n c e . Not only is th i s t he p l a in p u r p o r t of 
Hamilton's Language in Federa l i s t 78, but in Federalist 81 
he asser ts flatly that there is no more foundation in the 
words of the United States Constitution for the power of the 
C o u r t to c o n s t r u e l e g i s l a t i o n in a c c o r d a n c e wi th the 
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C o n s t i t u t i o n than t h e r e is in a s t a t e const i tut ion for a 
f a m i l i a r power in s t a t e c o u r t s . And Marshal l ' s closing 
words in his op in ion in Marbury v^ . Madison, where the 
d o c t r i n e was t r a n s m u t e d in to const i tu t ional law, bear a 
s i m i l a r i m p l i c a t i o n . " T h u s , " he s a y s , " t h e p a r t i c u l a r 
p h r a s e o l o g y of t he C o n s t i t u t i o n of the Uni ted S t a t e s 
con f i rms and s t r e n g t h e n s the p r i n c i p l e , supposed to be 
essent ia l to all wr i t t en cons t i tu t ions , that a law repugnant 
to t he C o n s t i t u t i o n is void; and that cour ts , as well as 
other departments, are bound by that instrument." 
The question accordingly becomes, what were the postu-
la tes of the doc t r ine of judicial review? But this question 
g i v e s r i s e in turn to a n o t h e r o n e : w h a t d o c t r i n e is 
intended? For the re are three such doctrines, which I shall 
l a b e l r e s p e c t i v e l y the n a i v e d o c t r i n e ; the po l i t i c a l or 
departmental doctrine; and the juristic doctrine. 
Although reminiscent of an immensely interesting chapter 
of h i s to ry , the naive doct r ine of judicial review may be 
deal t with in the p resen t connect ion quite summarily. The 
doct r ine is embodied in the statement that "nobody is bound 
by an uncons t i t u t i ona l law." But e i the r this means that 
everybody has an equal r ight to determine what laws he is 
bound by, or e lse it means that nobody is bound by a law 
which has b e e n he ld to be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l bj_ p r o p e r 
au thor i ty , which of course leaves the essent ia l question of 
the location of such proper authority undetermined. 
But w h i l e l o g i c a l l y i n a d e q u a t e , the s t a t e m e n t t h a t 
"nobody is bound by an unconstitutional law" has played an 
i m p o r t a n t r o l e in f u r t h e r i n g the e x t e n s i o n of j u d i c i a l 
review by thrust ing forward the naive idea that cons t i tu-
tional issues are always c l e a r - c u t issues of const i tu t ional 
r ight and wrong, r a the r than often highly debatable issues 
of o p i n i o n . In o ther words, the s ta tement envisages the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n as a se l f - speaking , a se l f -enforcing law, of 
which the C o u r t i s , as Mon te squ i eu would have put it, 
"merely the mouthpiece ," o r - - in a more up - to -da t e te rmi-
nology--a sort of loud-speaker . It may be added that this 
notion or doc t r ine is today embalmed in our constitutional 
law in the "c lea r case" and "all reasonable doubts" stereo-
types. 
By t h e p o l l t i c a l or d e p a r t m e n t a l c o n c e p t i o n of it 
j u d i c i a l r ev iew, considered as an instrument of cons t i tu-
t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , is no t the ou tcome of a power 
peculiar to the courts, but results to them simply as one of 
three equal departments of government, each equally bound by 
the oaths of its members to support the Constitution; while 
conversely the other two departments are entitled to claim a 
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l ike p r e r o g a t i v e in c o n n e c t i o n with the e x e r c i s e of t h e i r 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f u n c t i o n s . F i n a l i t y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is 
h e n c e the o u t c o m e - - w h e n indeed it e x i s t s - - n o t of jud ic ia l 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the C o n s t i t u t i o n in the d e c i s i o n of c a s e s , 
but of a continued harmony oj; views among the three depar t -
m e n t s . It r e s t s , in o the r words , in the l a s t a n a l y s i s , on 
the vot ing power of publ ic op in ion . This t h e o r y is men-
tio"ned by Madison in F e d e r a l i s t 49 , w h e r e it is a t t r ibuted 
to the author of the N o t e s on Vi rg in ia . Jefferson's further 
relation to it is mentioned on a later page. 
The c l a s s i c s t a t e m e n t of the j u r i s t i c doctr ine in turn is 
from Hami l ton ' s pen and o c c u r s in F e d e r a l i s t 78 . It boils 
down to the fol lowing p r o p o s i t i o n s : 1. The in t e rp re t a t ion 
of the laws is the peculiar province of the judges. 2. The 
Cons t i t u t ion is law and "fundamental" law. 3. The identi ty 
w h i c h u s u a l l y o b t a i n s b e t w e e n the law and the jud ic i a l 
v e r s i o n of i t t h e r e f o r e o b t a i n s in th is c a s e . 4 . It i s , 
a c c o r d i n g l y , " n a t u r a l to s u p p o s e t h a t t h e c o u r t s w e r e 
des igned to be an intermediate body between the people and 
t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , in o rde r . . . to k e e p the l a t t e r w i th in 
t h e l i m i t s of t h e i r a s s i g n e d a u t h o r i t y . " L a s t l y i t is 
den ied tha t " th i s conc lus ion" supposes "a superiority of the 
j u d i c i a l to the l e g i s l a t i v e p o w e r " - - a den ia l which subt ly 
i n v o k e s t h e n a i v e t h e o r y a l r e a d y d e a l t w i t h , t h a t the 
Constitution speaks itself. 
When lawyers think about judicial review they think about 
i t in t h e t e rms of the j u r i s t i c d o c t r i n e , a t l e a s t to the 
e x t e n t of a c c e p t i n g i ts c o r e p r o p o s i t i o n of the iden t i f i ca -
t i o n of the jud ic ia l ve r s ion of the C o n s t i t u t i o n wi th the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . H o w , t h e n , s h o u l d t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n be 
e v a l u a t e d in te rms of ideas c u r r e n t in 1787? As was just 
i n d i c a t e d this p ropos i t ion comes f r o m - - i s indeed basic to— 
the common law. But while the only wri t ten evidence we have 
of the common law is comprehended in judicial decisions, the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s p o s s e s s e d in 1787 a 
documenta ry i den t i t y of i ts own. If, therefore , it was law, 
i t was so in v i r tue of having been e n a c t e d by law-making 
power ; but whose law-making power? Hamilton's answer was, 
t h a t t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n was an a c t of popu la r l e g i s l a t i o n . 
The people t h e m s e l v e s , he urged, were the supreme legisla-
t o r s , whi le the o rd ina ry l e g i s l a t o r s comprised "mere agents 
of the people." 
For all t ha t , th is pos i t ion was in 1787 ve ry far from 
being un ive r sa l ly a c c e p t e d . The p e o p l e , i t is t r u e , w e r e 
the au thors of the C o n s t i t u t i o n ; but i t was the peop le in 
e x t r a o r d i n a r y and revolutionary assembly, and once they had 
comple ted the i r task they lapsed back, as it we re - - save on 
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e l e c t i o n d a y s - - i n t o the every-day government, and especially 
in to the l e g i s l a t i v e assembly. To be sure, as the Ellsworth 
of C o n n e c t i c u t p u t i t on t h e f l o o r of the P h i l a d e l p h i a 
C o n v e n t i o n , "a new s e t of i d e a s " had " c r e p t in" ; and the 
p r o g r e s s of t h e s e was w i thou t doubt g r e a t l y a ided by the 
manner in which the C o n s t i t u t i o n of the United S ta tes was 
i t s e l f b r o u g h t i n t o e x i s t e n c e . F o r as c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
c o n v e n t i o n s came to be r e g a r d e d as a p a r t of the regular 
g o v e r n m e n t a l s e t - u p , c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g t o o k on t h e 
a p p e a r a n c e of l a w - m a k i n g in the s t r i c t e s t s ense . In 1787, 
n e v e r t h e l e s s , the new ideas w e r e s t i l l far from possessing 
the f ield to the e x c l u s i o n of the i d e a s which they e v e n -
t u a l l y r e p l a c e d . Thus , of the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n s then in 
fo rce s e v e r a l had been or iginal ly promulgated by the bodies 
w h i c h p r e s e n t l y b e c a m e t h e f i r s t l e g i s l a t i v e a s s e m b l i e s 
under t hem. Again, the governmental par t ies to the Art ic les 
of C o n f e d e r a t i o n w e r e deemed to be the s t a t e legislatures, 
which in the phraseo logy of the day were "the s ta te sover-
e i g n t i e s . " Indeed , in the e s t i m a t i o n of the authors of the 
Vi rg in i a and K e n t u c k y R e s o l u t i o n s , th is i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s t i l l 
held good as late as 1798-99. 
And the idea t h a t the c o u r t s may a lone i n t e r p r e t the 
s t a n d i n g law w i t h b i n d i n g a u t h o r i t y is e x p o s e d to l ike 
c r i t i c i s m , i n f e r r i n g as i t does a very much more e x a c t 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of " l e g i s l a t i v e " from " j u d i c i a l " power then 
g e n e r a l l y o b t a i n e d in the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n s in 1787. At 
t h a t d a t e , in f ac t , j ud ic i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the law was 
o f t e n n o t f i n a l e v e n in t h e dec i s ion of c a s e s , i t be ing 
common p r a c t i c e for the l e g i s l a t u r e to reverse decisions of 
t h e o r d i n a r y c o u r t s , to o r d e r c a s e s r e t r i e d or a p p e a l s 
g r a n t e d , a n d e v e n to a d j u d i c a t e c o n t r o v e r s i e s i t se l f . It 
was a t th is p r a c t i c e p r e c i s e l y t h a t the prohibition upon ex 
pos t f ac to laws was o r i g i n a l l y aimed. Indeed, the presence 
of t h i s c l a u s e in t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n af fords an a d m i r a b l e 
i l l u s t r a t i o n of the e x t e n t to which the u l t ima t e e s t a b l i s h -
m e n t of j u d i c i a l r e v i e w r e v o l u t i o n i z e d p r e v i o u s l y held 
views. 
F u r t h e r m o r e , the s imple f ac t was then , as it is t o d a y , 
t h a t every time ei ther Congress or the President do anything 
they imply a cer ta in view of their powers under the Const i-
tu t ion , and h e n c e e x e r c i s e i n t e r p r e t a t i v e powers. The only 
ques t ion i s , t h e r e f o r e , wha t de fe rence are they required by 
t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n to pay r e l e v a n t jud ic i a l v e r s i o n s of the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n , when any such a r e a v a i l a b l e ? The idea that 
b e c a u s e it r e s t s wi th one of the t h r e e "coord ina te depar t -
m e n t s " to b r i n g about c e r t a i n e f f e c t s by the use of i t s 
c o n c e d e d p o w e r s , t h e o t h e r d e p a r t m e n t s a r e t h e r e f o r e 
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forbidden to i n t e r f e r e with such effects by the use of their 
c o n c e d e d power s , is a t war wi th the C o n s t i t u t i o n a t any 
number of p o i n t s . So granting that the Court is enti t led to 
i n t e r p r e t the C o n s t i t u t i o n for i t se l f when d e c i d i n g c a s e s , 
w h i c h is i t s p r i m a r y funct ion , s t i l l i t would not n e c e s -
sa r i ly follow t h a t the o the r d e p a r t m e n t s had not an equal 
right to do the same thing for the purpose and in the course 
of d i s cha rg ing the i r p r imary func t ions , w h a t e v e r migh t be 
the e f fec t of their doing so upon the Court ' s version oX the 
Constitution. 
But now passing from the ideological atmosphere of 1787--
if you will pe rmi t the p h r a s e - - i n t o the Convention Hall at 
Philadelphia, what do we find in the records of those famous 
p r o c e e d i n g s t h a t b e a r s on our i n q u i r y ? Of p e r t i n e n t 
u t t e r a n c e s an even dozen are recorded in Madison's Journal, 
a l l q u i t e b r i e f and some of them by no means c l e a r of 
ambigu i ty . The occas ion for most of these remarks was the 
p r o p o s a l to g i v e t h e j u d g e s , e i t h e r i n d e p e n d e n t l y or in 
a s s o c i a t i o n with the e x e c u t i v e , a d i r e c t p a r t of l e g i s l a -
t i o n . A g a i n s t such an a r r a n g e m e n t t h e a r g u m e n t w a s 
immedia te ly for thcoming t h a t , inasmuch as the judges would 
be c a l l e d upon to expound the l aws , they ought to h a v e 
nothing to do with making them, and in this connection Gerry 
and Luther Mar t in urged also that they would pass upon the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a c t s of C o n g r e s s . W i l s o n t h o u g h t 
" t h e r e was w e i g h t in the o b s e r v a t i o n , " but he ld t h a t such 
power did not go far enough. Laws might be unjust, unwise, 
and d e s t r u c t i v e , and " y e t n o t so u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l as to 
just ify the judges in not g iving them effect"; and this also 
was Mason ' s p o s i t i o n . On the other hand, Mercer of Mary-
land, while willing that the judges should be endowed with a 
r e v i s i o n a r y p o w e r o v e r l a w s , s t r o n g l y d e m u r r e d to " t he 
d o c t r i n e t h a t the judges as e x p o s i t o r s of the C o n s t i t u t i o n 
should have au tho r i t y to d e c l a r e a law v o i d . He though t 
t ha t laws ought to be well and cautiously made, and then be 
u n c o n t r o l l a b l e , " a s e n t i m e n t which impressed Dickinson, He 
too " thought that no such power ought to ex is t . He was at 
the same t ime a t a loss wha t exped ien t to subst i tute . The 
J u s t i c i a r y of A r a g o n . . . b e c a m e by d e g r e e s the l aw-
g ive r . " Gouverneur Morr is interposed with the suggestion of 
"an absolute veto in the Executive." He could not, however, 
he added , " a g r e e t ha t the judic iary , which was par t of the 
e x e c u t i v e , should be bound to say that a d i rec t violation of 
the Constitution was law." 
To the l i s t of those who evidently accepted the idea of 
jud ic ia l rev iew as app ly ing a t l e a s t in some sense to acts 
of C o n g r e s s may be a d d e d w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e c e r t a i n t y 
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W i l l i a m s o n of N o r t h C a r o l i n a , and C h a r l e s P i n c k n e y and 
Rutledge of South Carolina, while Bedford of Delaware should 
p e r h a p s be p l a c e d on the list of opponents on the score of 
his s t r ong v iews r e g a r d i n g legislat ive supremacy. We learn, 
m o r e o v e r , from a l e t t e r which S p a i g h t of Nor th C a r o l i n a 
w r o t e during the Convention, apropos of the recent action of 
the S u p r e m e C o u r t of t h a t s t a t e in s e t t i n g a s ide a loca l 
s t a t u t e on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g rounds , t h a t he was opposed to 
t h e w h o l e t h e o r y of j u d i c i a l r e v i e w in r e l a t i o n to a 
c o o r d i n a t e l e g i s l a t u r e . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , S p a i g h t ' s 
c o l l e a g u e D a v i e had been one of counsel in this same case , 
and had urged the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a rgumen t upon the c o u r t . 
Also, there were at least two members of the Convention who 
had as judges in t h e i r own s t a t e s l en t t he i r in f luence in 
p romot ion of some sor t of judicial review some years before 
t h i s , B r e a r l y of New J e r s e y and Wythe of Virginia, and it 
may p e r h a p s be assumed that they would take a sympathetic 
a t t i t u d e t o w a r d j ud i c i a l r e v i e w under the national Constitu-
tion. 
C e r t a i n l y th is e v i d e n c e is far from affording ground for 
ve ry c o n f i d e n t pronouncements with regard to the att i tude of 
t h e C o n v e n t i o n as a b o d y . F i r s t and l a s t , only a small 
p o r t i o n of the m e m b e r s e x p r e s s e d t h e m s e l v e s regarding the 
m a t t e r ; and w h i l e t h e s e w e r e among the l e a d e r s of the 
C o n v e n t i o n , and a considerable majority of them appeared to 
favor the i d e a , y e t t h e i r l anguage was sometimes tenta t ive , 
the g rounds upon which they r e s t e d t h e i r be l i e f w e r e not 
u n i f o r m , and w h e n t h i s b e l i e f was c h a l l e n g e d , the only 
e f f o r t they m a d e - - i f indeed it is i n t e r p r e t a b l e as s u c h - -
t oward pu t t i ng the mat ter beyond doubt was the insertion of 
the words " t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n and" in the "a r i s ing" c lause- -
a c t i o n w h i c h , as I sha l l now show, may be qui te logically 
t u r n e d a g a i n s t j u d i c i a l d i s a l l o w a n c e of a c t s of C o n g r e s s 
e x c e p t for t r a n s g r e s s i o n of d i r e c t p r o h i b i t i o n s on i t s 
power. 
C o n s u l t i n g t h e n , t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n i t s e l f for s u c h 
t e s t imony as i t has to offer in the p r e s e n t connection, we 
find two p r o v i s i o n s to be of immed ia t e r e l e v a n c y - - A r t i c l e 
VI, c l a u s e 2 ( the Supremacy Clause) and Art ic le III, section 
2, clause 1. The former reads as follows: 
This Cons t i t u t ion , and the laws of the United Sta tes 
w h i c h s h a l l b e m a d e in p u r s u a n c e the reof ; and all 
t r e a t i e s m a d e , or w h i c h s h a l l be m a d e , under the 
a u t h o r i t y of t he Uni ted S t a t e s , shal l be the supreme 
law of the land; and the judges in every s ta te shall be 
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bound t h e r e b y , any th ing in the Constitution or laws of 
any Sta te to the contrary notwithstanding. 
The relevant portion of the la t ter reads as follows: 
The jud ic ia l power shall extend to all cases , in law 
and equ i ty , a r i s ing under th is C o n s t i t u t i o n , the laws 
of the United Sta tes , and t rea t ies made, or which shall 
be made under their authori ty. 
The C o n s t i t u t i o n , it should be o b s e r v e d , does not ca l l 
i t se l f " the supreme law of the l and . " The term comprises 
the C o n s t i t u t i o n , plus laws of the Uni ted S t a t e s made "in 
pu r suance" of the Cons t i tu t ion , plus t rea t ies made under the 
au thor i ty of the United S t a t e s ; and the supremacy which is 
mean t is supremacy over s t a t e constitutions and laws. Nor, 
aga in , is it spec i f i ed who shall determine whether a law of 
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i_s "in p u r s u a n c e " of the C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
Indeed , the term " p u r s u a n c e " is i t se l f not ent i rely c lear of 
ambigu i ty . As was sugges ted by opponents of the Consti tu-
t i o n in 1 7 8 7 , i t may mean only "in c o n s e q u e n c e of the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n , " "not ag reeab ly to it." The Supremacy Clause 
m a k e s t h e s t a t e c o u r t s a f i r s t l ine de fense of n a t i o n a l 
aga ins t s t a t e power , but i t s fu r ther i n t en t ions with respect 
to judicial review are speculat ive. 
Coming n e x t to A r t i c l e III, section 2--What is meant by 
" c a s e s a r i s i n g u n d e r t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n " ? A n s w e r i n g th i s 
question in the Federal is t Hamilton says: 
All the r e s t r i c t i o n s upon the authori ty of the s ta te 
l e g i s l a t u r e s furnish e x a m p l e s of i t . They are not, for 
i n s t a n c e , to e m i t p a p e r money ; but the i n t e r d i c t i o n 
r e s u l t s f r o m t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , and w i l l h a v e no 
connection with any law of the United S t a t e s . 
And s imi lar l anguage is used by Madison in the V i rg in i a 
Conven t ion and by Dav ie in the North Carolina Convention. 
It seems c l e a r , n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h a t th is de f in i t i on is m e a n t 
to be i l l u s t r a t i v e r a t h e r t h a n e x c l u s i v e . C e r t a i n l y it 
would be s t r a n g e if a s t a t e a c t v i o l a t i v e of a d i r e c t 
p r o h i b i t i o n of the C o n s t i t u t i o n could g ive r i s e to a c a s e 
" u n d e r t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n " and y e t t h a t a s imi l a r a c t of 
Congres s could no t . Tha t the p h r a s e may we l l have been 
in tended to compr i se both ca tegor ies of cases is also borne 
out w h e n we t u r n to the p r o c e e d i n g s in the C o n v e n t i o n 
i t se l f . A motion to impose c e r t a i n di rect prohibitions upon 
Congress was made on August 22nd, the clause moved reading 
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a s f o l l o w s : " T h e L e g i s l a t u r e s h a l l p a s s no b i l l of 
a t t a i n d e r , nor any ex pos t fac to l aw." Wilson spoke in 
oppos i t ion to the mot ion , "If," sa id he , " t h e s e prohibit ions 
in t h e S t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n s h a v e no e f f e c t , i t w i l l be 
u se l e s s to i n s e r t them in the C o n s t i t u t i o n . B e s i d e s , both 
s ides wi l l a g r e e as to the p r i n c i p l e , but wil l differ as to 
i ts a p p l i c a t i o n " - - t h i s wi th s p e c i a l re fe rence to the ex post 
f a c t o c l a u s e . Wi l l i amson , h o w e v e r , was for the r e s t r i c -
t ion : "such a p r o h i b i t o r y c l a u s e is in the Cons t i tu t ion of 
Nor th Carol ina ; and though it had been violated, it has done 
good t h e r e , and may do good h e r e , because the Judges can 
t a k e hold of i t . " The c l ause was a d o p t e d , the f i rs t p a r t 
unan imous ly , the second p a r t by a vo t e of seven s ta tes to 
t h r e e , the vote of North Carolina being divided. Three days 
l a t e r (August 25th) s e v e r a l o t h e r p r o h i b i t i o n s on C o n g r e s s 
w e r e a d o p t e d , inc lud ing the one which p r o t e c t e d the slave 
t r a d e u n t i l 1 8 0 8 ; and on August 2 7 t h - - t h e 26th be ing a 
Sunday-- the clause here under discussion was voted. 
I am a c c o r d i n g l y led to sugges t t h a t the impor tance of 
H a m i l t o n ' s de f in i t i on of th is c l ause l i es in the fac t t h a t 
it con f ines c a s e s " a r i s i n g under th is Const i tu t ion" to cases 
a r i s i n g in c o n s e q u e n c e of d i r e c t t r a n s g r e s s i o n s of spec i f ic 
p r o h i b i t i o n s of the C o n s t i t u t i o n . Such a defini t ion cuts in 
two d i r e c t i o n s . On the one hand, i t provides textual basis 
for one kind of j ud i c i a l review of acts of Congress; on the 
o t h e r hand , i t raises the question whether in the absence of 
equa l ly s p e c i f i c t e x t u a l p rov i s i on , any o t h e r kind can be 
deemed to have been intended. The modern interpreta t ion of 
the due p r o c e s s c l a u s e a s ide , however- -an interpreta t ion not 
d r e a m e d of in 1 7 8 7 - - t h e c h i e f f o u n d a t i o n of n a t i o n a l 
j ud i c i a l r e v i e w has been furnished, first, by the concept of 
Dual Federal ism, which was not recognized by the Court until 
a f t e r M a r s h a l l ' s d e a t h as a l i m i t a t i o n on n a t i o n a l power ; 
and s e c o n d l y , the d o c t r i n e - - o r assumption—that the Court is 
e n t i t l e d to c o n s t r u e for i t s e l f the t e rms in which power s 
a r e g r a n t e d to C o n g r e s s , and h e n c e to d i sa l low a c t s of 
Congress on the principle of ultra v i res . 
But the C o n s t i t u t i o n as it came from the Convention was 
only a p r o j e c t - - a p r o p o s a l a d d r e s s e d to c o n v e n t i o n s to be 
c a l l e d in t h e s e v e r a l s t a t e s . I t , t h e r e f o r e , b e c o m e s 
r e l e v a n t to ask w h a t v iews w e r e d e v e l o p e d r e g a r d i n g the 
sub jec t of our inqui ry in the cou r se of popula r d i scuss ion 
of th i s p r o j e c t . From c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t ime and s p a c e I 
sha l l conf ine myse l f to the v iews of the two chief protag-
onists of the Constitution, Hamilton and Madison. 
In F e d e r a l i s t 33 Hami l ton , in d i scuss ion the " n e c e s s a r y 
and p r o p e r " c l a u s e , puts the ques t ion , "Who is to judge of 
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the necessi ty and proprie ty of the laws to be passed for 
execut ing the powers of the United S t a t e s?" ; and answers, 
" tha t the National Government, like every other, must judge 
in the first ins tance of the proper exerc ise of its powers, 
and i t s c o n s t i t u e n t s in the las t ." Nor does he mention 
judicial review even when he points out that laws not "in 
pursuance" of the Constitution will not be laws, but "merely 
a c t s of u s u r p a t i o n , and wi l l d e s e r v e to be t r e a t e d as 
such." Who is to determine such matters he does not say. 
In Federa l i s t 78, on the other hand, Hamilton contends, 
as was before pointed out, that it is "natural to suppose 
that the courts were designed to be an in te rmedia te body 
between the people and the legislature, in order to keep the 
la t te r within the limits of their assigned authority"—which 
is the whole theory of judicial review on the basis of the 
ultra vires principle. 
Federa l i s t 78 was first published May, 1788--too late, it 
may be noted in passing to have influenced discussion of the 
Consti tution e lsewhere than in New York. Commenting the 
following October on Jefferson 's "Draught of a Constitution 
for Virginia," Madison wrote: 
In the S ta te Const i tu t ions & indeed in the Federal 
one a l s o , no p r o v i s i o n is made for the case of a 
disagreement in expounding them; and as the Courts are 
general ly the last in making ye decis ions , it resul ts 
to them by refusing or not refusing to execute a law, 
to stamp it with its final c h a r a c t e r . This makes the 
Judiciary Depar tment paramount in fact to the Legisla-
ture, which was never intended and can never be proper. 
intended.' 
There is a rule of law, no less than of common sense, 
^lat when two witnesses contradict each other the one better 
qua l i f i ed to tes t i fy as to the mat te r in issue should be 
followed. In the present ins tance this is c lea r ly Madison, 
th 
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not only b e c a u s e his a t t e n d a n c e upon the Ph i lade lph ia 
Convention was continuous while that of Hamilton was not, 
but also because he gave the s t r i c t e s t attention of any of 
i ts members to i ts proceedings and debates and left by far 
the best account we have of these . What is more, it is 
obv ious t h a t H a m i l t o n is no t p r o f e s s i o n to speak as a 
wi tness , but is making an argument, while Madison's tone is 
decidedly that of one offering testimony. 
Yet , within less than a year of making the above quoted 
s t a t e m e n t Mad i son made another which appears , on first 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n , to be much more n e a r l y a c c o r d a n t with 
H a m i l t o n ' s p o s i t i o n in F e d e r a l i s t 78 than with his own 
previously held v iew. Speaking in Congress early in June, 
1789, in support of the proposals to amend the Constitution 
which led to the Bill of Rights, he said: 
If t h e y a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d in to the C o n s t i t u t i o n , 
i n d e p e n d e n t t r ibuna l s of jus t ice will consider them-
s e l v e s in a p e c u l i a r manner the guardians of those 
r igh t s ; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against 
e v e r y a s s u m p t i o n of power in the L e g i s l a t u r e or 
Execut ive ; they will be natural ly led to res i s t every 
e n c r o a c h m e n t upon r ights express ly s t ipulated for in 
the Constitution by the declaration of rights. 
Yet is it r easonable to suppose that it was Madison's 
in ten t ion , in speaking thus, to discard the views to which 
he had given such posi t ive express ion eight months prior? 
S t i l l o t h e r w o r d s of his substant ia l ly contemporary with 
t h o s e l a s t quo ted forbid the hypothes i s . I refer to his 
con ten t ion , in the course of the debate on the establishment 
of the Department of State, that Congress had the power to 
de te rmine , and in a way to bind the courts, the location of 
the removal power. 
I acknowledge (said he) in the ordinary course of 
Government , tha t the exposi t ion of the laws and the 
Const i tu t ion devolves upon the Judiciary. But I beg to 
know, upon what principle it can be contended, that any 
one d e p a r t m e n t draws from the Const i tut ion g rea t e r 
powers than another , in marking out the limits of the 
powers of the several departments? 
The solution, therefore, of the conundrum which Madison's 
apparen t con t rad ic t ions on the subject of judicial review of 
acts of Congress in the years 1788 and 1789 poses, is to be 
sought at l eas t in par t , it seems to me in the diversity of 
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views c u r r e n t at the time regarding the two questions which 
I s e t forth a t the beg inn ing of th is p a p e r , concern ing the 
S c o p e of n a t i o n a l j u d i c i a l r e v i e w and i t s E f f e c t o r 
Final i ty . 
We come now upon a period of prosperity for the idea of 
jud ic ia l rev iew of C o n g r e s s i o n a l measures , the climax being 
r e a c h e d in the C a r r i a g e Tax C a s e of 1796, when Congress 
voted money for the payment of counsel on both sides of a 
moot c a se involv ing only the const i tut ional issue. Even so, 
t h e r e w e r e s t i l l s k e p t i c s , o n e . J u s t i c e C h a s e , be ing a 
member of the Court itself. Indeed, as late as 1800 we find 
Chase writing: 
Tha t all a c t s of the l e g i s l a t u r e in d i r e c t o p p o s i -
t ion to the p r o h i b i t i o n s of the C o n s t i t u t i o n , would be 
void, y e t it s t i l l r ema ins a ques t i on where the power 
r e s i d e s to d e c l a r e i t vo id . It i s , i n d e e d , a g e n e r a l 
opinion . . . e x p r e s s l y a d m i t t e d by al l th i s bar . . . 
t h a t the Supreme Court can dec lare an ac t of Congress 
to be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , and t h e r e f o r e i n v a l i d , and 
t h e r e is not ad jud ica t ion of the Supreme Cour t i tself 
on t h e p o i n t . I c o n c u r , h o w e v e r , in t h e g e n e r a l 
sentiment. 
It should be no ted , h o w e v e r , t h a t the judicial review to 
w h i c h C h a s e t hus s u b s c r i b e d w a s of r e s t r i c t e d S c o p e , 
c o v e r i n g only c a s e s of " d i r e c t oppos i t i on to the p r o h i b i -
t ions of the C o n s t i t u t i o n , " and not , his further words make 
p l a i n , " t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s c o n t a i n e d in the C o n s t i t u -
t ion . " For t h e s e , he a rgued , w e r e "no t to be regarded as 
ru les to f e t t e r and c o n t r o l , but as m a t t e r m e r e l y dec la ra -
tory and d i r e c t o r y " ; and among such g e n e r a l p r inc ip l e s he 
i n c l u d e d the p r i n c i p l e of the S e p a r a t i o n of P o w e r s . His 
pos i t ion seems to a p p r o x i m a t e ve ry closely that of Madison 
in 1789. 
Nor did t h e e r a of p r o s p e r i t y l a s t ve ry long . As a 
m a t t e r of fac t , t h e r e is r ea son to b e l i e v e t h a t i t s e x i s -
t e n c e at all was owing more to the a t t i t u d e of the rising 
Je f fe r son ian oppos i t ion t h a t to t h a t of the party in power, 
which with the lesson of the Pension Case of 1792 before it, 
may have been a p p r e h e n s i v e for some of i t s pe t measures . 
The re fusa l , h o w e v e r , of the n a t i o n a l judges to p ronounce 
the Sed i t ion Act void, or to permit juries to do so- -not to 
m e n t i o n t h e i r e n t e r t a i n i n g p r o s e c u t i o n on the bas i s of a 
supposed common law of the United S ta t e s - - a l l this cont r ib-
uted to p roduce a revuls ion of fee l ing toward the national 
jud ic ia l power which the e l e c t i o n of Jefferson in 1800 and 
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t h e c o n s e q u e n t r e v e r s a l of the r o l e s of the two p a r t i e s 
naturally intensified. 
Thus it is ha rd ly su rp r i s ing to come upon e v i d e n c e s of 
r e c i d i v i s m on t h e p a r t of J e f f e r s o n i a n s a t t h i s p e r i o d 
r e g a r d i n g j u d i c i a l r e v i e w , o n e of the b a c k s l i d e r s being 
C h a r l e s P i n c k n e y . A t Ph i l ade lph i a Pinckney had proclaimed 
t h a t the "judges would be umpires between the United S ta tes 
and t h e s t a t e s . " Y e t t w e l v e y e a r s l a t e r we find him 
declaring that on no subject was he "more convinced" than: 
T h a t i t is an unsafe and dange rous d o c t r i n e in a 
r e p u b l i c , e v e r to suppose that a judge ought to possess 
t he r i g h t of ques t ion ing or deciding upon the constitu-
t i o n a l i t y of t r e a t i e s , l aws , or any a c t of the legisla-
t u r e . It is p l ac ing the opinion of an ind iv idua l , or 
of t w o or t h r e e a b o v e t h a t of b o t h b r a n c h e s of 
Congress , and will not, I hope, long have any advocates 
in this country. 
And Abraham Baldwin of Georgia, also a former member of 
the C o n v e n t i o n , a p p e a r s to have undergone a similar change 
of h e a r t . In t h e c o u r s e of the d e b a t e of 1802 on the 
judiciary Baldwin s ta ted: 
If i t h a d been i n t e n d e d ( i . e . by the F r a m e r s ) to 
convey these distinguished powers, that would have been 
done in v e r y conspicuous charac te r s and not left to be 
o b s c u r e l y e x p l o r e d by c o n s t r u c t i o n , not enlightened by 
the least recol lect ion from anybody on a subject and on 
an o c c a s i o n c e r t a i n l y of the most impressive kind and 
so l i t t le likely to have been forgotten. 
Yet in the debate on the removal power in 1789 Baldwin had 
lef t no doubt t h a t he a c c e p t e d jud ic i a l r ev iew of national 
s ta tutes in at least some sense of the term. 
The ques t ion of the F i n a l i t y of judic ia l review, that is, 
t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e p o w e r of t h e C o u r t to s t a m p t h e 
C o n s t i t u t i o n wi th a f inal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c a p a b l e of binding 
al l o r g a n s of government with the authority of the document 
i t s e l f , w a s f i r s t i s o l a t e d from the ques t ion of i t s E x i s -
t ence and Scope by the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 
1798 and 1799. It was the purport of these pronouncements 
to deny such f ina l i ty as a g a i n s t the s tates; and it was the 
p u r p o r t of t h e a n s w e r s r e t u r n e d to them to a s s e r t such 
f i n a l i t y a t l e a s t as a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e s ; whi le Mad i son ' s 
answer to the a n s w e r s dea l s with the same issue in terms 
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s t i l l more c o m p r e h e n s i v e . The pe r t inen t passage of the 
document reads: 
It has been said that it belongs to the judiciary of 
the United S t a t e s , and not the S ta t e Legis la tures , to 
declare the meaning of the Federal Constitution. 
But a dec lara t ion that proceedings of the Federa l 
Government are not warranted by the Constitution is a 
nove l ty n e i t h e r among the c i t i z e n s nor among the 
Legislatures of the S t a t e s ; nor are the citizens or the 
Legislature of Virginia singular in the example of it. 
Nor can the dec la ra t ions of either, whether affirm-
ing or denying the constitutionality of measures of the 
Federal Government, or whether made before or after 
judicial decisions thereon, be deemed, in any point of 
view, an assumption of the office of the judge. The 
dec la ra t ions in such cases are express ions of opinion, 
unaccompanied with any other effect than what they may 
p r o d u c e on o p i n i o n by e x c i t i n g r e f l e c t i o n . The 
exposi t ions of the judic iary , on the other hand, are 
carried into immediate effect by force. The former may 
lead to a change in the leg is la t ive expression of the 
general wi l l - -poss ib ly , to a change in the opinion of 
the j u d i c i a r y - - t h e l a t t e r enforces the genera l will , 
whilst that will and that opinion continue unchanged. 
In s h o r t , j u d i c i a l r ev i ew considered as a^  method for 
i n t e r p r e t i n g the C o n s t i t u t i o n is^ ari i n t e r m e d i a t e , not a^  
f inal p r o c e s s . For wh i l e a judicial const ruct ion of the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n is f i n a l for t h e c a s e in w h i c h i t is 
pronounced, it is not final against the pol i t ica l forces to 
which a c h a n g e d opinion may give r i se , whether in the 
legis la ture , or in the judiciary i tself . Fur the rmore , it is 
l eg i t imate- - indeed to be e x p e c t e d - - t h a t public opinion will 
be agitated to bring about just such changes in it. 
And curiously enough the same general theory was voiced 
by a Federa l i s t opponent of the Jeffersonian Judiciary Act 
of 1802. I refer to Bayard of Delaware, who made the best 
s p e e c h t h a t was fo r thcoming from e i t h e r s i de on t h i s 
occasion: 
I did say the Const i tut ion was the property of the 
people; that the majority had a right to construe it as 
they pleased; and that I would obey their construction, 
that is, I would bow to what appeared manifestly the 
sense of the majority; . . . 
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And again: 
Let me now ask if the power to decide upon the 
val idi ty of our laws res ides with the people? Gentle-
men cannot deny this right to the people. I admit that 
they possess i t . But if, at the same time, it does not 
belong to the courts of the United States, where does 
it lead the people? It leads them to the gallows. 
That is to say, while judicial review is only an inter-
media te agency in in te rp re t ing the Const i tu t ion, yet it is 
of specia l value as a pro tec t ion of pr ivate rights, and the 
safe-guards which the Const i tut ion throws around the courts 
to s e c u r e t h e i r i n d e p e n d e n c e in i t s e x e r c i s e ough t , 
the re fo re , be carefully p rese rved . Of course, most of the 
Fede ra l i s t speakers took a much st iffer a t t i tude, while the 
ex t reme Jeffersonians repudia ted judicial review of acts of 
Congress altogether. 
Thi r teen months la te r Marshall handed down his famous 
judgment in Marbury y_. Madison, setting aside section 13 of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, on the ground that it unconstitu-
t i o n a l l y e x t e n d e d the or iginal jur isdic t ion of the Court . 
As Mr. Warren brings out in his book, there was at this time 
a s t r o n g movemen t in Congress for abolishing the lower 
F e d e r a l judiciary and dis tr ibut ing its jur isdict ion between 
the Supreme Court and the state courts. The decision spiked 
this movement, and might therefore be justified as protec-
t i v e of t he n a t i o n a l j u d i c i a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t and of the 
Court ' s own independency; or simply as an announcement by 
the Court that it claimed the r ight to construe for i tself 
the c l a u s e s of the Const i tut ion affecting its ju r i sd ic t ion . 
In point of fact, Marshall took occasion to notify all and 
sundry tha t the Court considered no part of the Constitution 
as closed to it; tha t , in other words, i ts power of review 
as applied t£ ac t s of Congress comprehends any and every 
q u e s t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which in i t s 
judgment requi res determination for the proper decision of £ 
case before rt. 
On the quest ion, on the other hand, of the Finali ty of 
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b y - p r o d u c t of t he j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s , 
M a r s h a l l ' s op in ion is ambiguous--perhaps de l ibera te ly so. 
His sweeping asser t ion that "it is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," 
and his content ion that judicial review is essent ia l to the 
p r e s e r v a t i o n of the C o n s t i t u t i o n a r e both t h o r o u g h l y 
H a m i l t o n i a n in assuming t h a t only judges can know the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n or wi l l b a s e t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of it on 
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knowledge rather than will . Yet when, toward the end of his 
op in ion , Marsha l l invokes the oath which the judges take to 
s u p p o r t t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n as f u r t h e r a u t h o r i z i n g them to 
p re f e r t he i r own u n d e r s t a n d i n g of it to t h a t of the o t h e r 
b r a n c h e s , he obviously abandons his p rev ious h igh-p re roga -
t ive pos i t i on . Members of C o n g r e s s and the President also 
t a k e such an oa th ; indeed , the t e rms of the l a t t e r ' s oa th 
a r e p r e s c r i b e d in t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n i t s e l f , w h e r e a s the 
judges ' oa ths come from and act of Congress . So, if taking 
an oath to p r e s e r v e the C o n s t i t u t i o n in fe r s t h a t the oath-
t a k e r is ves ted with the final a u t h o r i t y in i n t e rp re t i ng it, 
i t would s e e m t h a t t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n had d e s i g n a t e d t he 
President for this exalted ro le . 
And so we are brought to the close of the period which we 
s e t out to s u r v e y . Wi th y o u r l e a v e , h o w e v e r , I sha l l 
c o n t i n u e l ong enough to s k e t c h the l a t e r h i s t o r y of the 
issue of Final i ty . 
T h e j u r i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n of j u d i c i a l r ev i ew invokes a 
m i r a c l e . It supposes a kind of t r a n s u b s t a n t i a t i o n w h e r e b y 
the C o u r t ' s opinion of the C o n s t i t u t i o n , if per t inent to the 
dec i s ion of a c a s e p rope r ly be fo re the Court , becomes the 
v e r y blood and body of the C o n s t i t u t i o n . This d o g m a t i c 
a s s u m p t i o n of t h e i d e n t i t y of the law with the jud ic i a l 
ve r s ion of it is not , h o w e v e r , coeval with the Constitution, 
but long antedates it . It is fundamental to the common law, 
and has a dignified place in legal his tory. 
But the j u r i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n of j ud ic i a l review is, as we 
have seen , conf ron ted with the p o l i t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n , which 
r e g a r d s t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n as an i n s t r u m e n t of p o p u l a r 
gove rnmen t and h e n c e s t r e s se s the role of public opinion in 
i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and i n t e r m e d i a t e l y t h a t of the p o l i t i -
c a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e d e p a r t m e n t s . And w h e r e a s the d r iv ing 
p o w e r b a c k of t h e j u r i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n has a l w a y s been 
p r o f e s s i o n a l o p i n i o n , t h e d r i v i n g p o w e r b a c k of t h e 
p o l i t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n h a s a l w a y s b e e n P r e s i d e n t i a l 
l e a d e r s h i p . W h a t is t h e r e l a t i v e s t a n d i n g of t h e s e two 
conceptions today? 
The organon of the p o l i t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n i s , as we have 
s e e n , t h e d o c t r i n e of d e p a r t m e n t a l c o n s t r u c t i o n . Wr i t ing 
Mrs . Adams the year following Marbury v_. Madison, Jefferson 
set down the following criticism of it: 
N o t h i n g in t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n h a s given them ( the 
Supreme Cour t ) a r igh t to d e c i d e for the E x e c u t i v e , 
more than to the E x e c u t i v e to d e c i d e for them. The 
opinion which g ives to the judges the r ight to decide 
wha t laws a r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , and w h a t no t , not only 
KIND OF J U D I C I A L REVIEW / 87 
for t h e m s e l v e s in t he i r own s p h e r e of ac t ion , but for 
t h e L e g i s l a t u r e & E x e c u t i v e a l so , in t he i r s p h e r e s , 
would make the judiciary a despotic branch. 
And in h i s famous m e s s a g e of July 10, 1832, Jackson 
voiced like doctr ine: 
The Congress , the Execut ive, and the Court must each 
for i t s e l f be guided by i t s own opinion of the Const i-
t u t i o n . E a c h p u b l i c o f f i c e r w h o t a k e s an oa th to 
suppor t the C o n s t i t u t i o n swea r s that he will support it 
as he u n d e r s t a n d s i t , and not as it is u n d e r s t o o d by 
o t h e r s . . . . The opinion of the judges has no more 
a u t h o r i t y over C o n g r e s s than the opinion of Congress 
has ove r the judges, and on that point the Pres ident is 
i n d e p e n d e n t of b o t h . The a u t h o r i t y of the Supreme 
Cour t must no t , t h e r e f o r e , be permit ted to control the 
C o n g r e s s or the Executive when acting in their legisla-
t i v e c a p a c i t i e s , but to have only such influence as the 
force of their reasoning may deserve . 
W e b s t e r in the S e n a t e denounced the message as putting 
the P r e s i d e n t ab o v e the law, as c o n v e r t i n g " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
l i m i t a t i o n s in to m e r e m a t t e r s of op in ion , " as c o n t r a d i c t i n g 
" t r u t h s h e r e t o f o r e r e c e i v e d as indisputable" and denying "to 
the j u d i c i a r y the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the law"; to which Clay 
a d d e d t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t "no one s w e a r s to suppor t the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n as he u n d e r s t a n d s i t , but to suppor t it simply 
as i t is in t r u t h , " thus invoking e i t h e r the notion that the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n s p e a k s i tse l f , or the no t ion t h a t the jud ic i a l 
v e r s i o n of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n is the C o n s t i t u t i o n . At one 
po in t , none the l e s s , the a t t ack on the Message was effec-
t ive in fo rc ing a m o d i f i c a t i o n of the d e p a r t m e n t a l t heo ry . 
Y e a r s l a t e r Taney , the reputed author of the document, took 
p a i n s to i n s i s t t h a t J a c k s o n had had in mind only "his 
r i g h t s and his duty when acting as a part of the Legislative 
p o w e r , and not his r ight and duty as an Executive officer." 
" G e n e r a l Jackson," he continued, "never expressed a doubt as 
to . . . the o b l i g a t i o n upon him in his Executive charac te r 
to c a r r y i n t o e x e c u t i o n a n y a c t of C o n g r e s s r e g u l a r l y 
p a s s e d , w h a t e v e r his opin ion migh t be of the constitutional 
q u e s t i o n . " W h i l e t h i s r e t r a c t i o n from t h e d o c t r i n e of 
d e p a r t m e n t a l c o n s t r u c t i o n is a t the e x p e n s e of log ic , it 
undoubted ly r e p r e s e n t s the vast weight of p rac t ice from the 
beginning. 
A n d i t w a s u n d o u b t e d l y of the P r e s i d e n t ' s l e g i s l a t i v e 
ro le t h a t L inco ln was th ink ing when he d e a l t in his f i r s t 
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Inaugura l wi th the ques t ion of wha t weight should be given 
the Dred S c o t t dec i s ion as a r e a d i n g of the C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
L i n c o l n f r e e l y c o n c e d e d t h a t any dec i s ion of the Cour t , 
w h e t h e r based on the Const i tut ion or any other law, finally 
d i s p o s e d of t h e p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , and to t h a t e x t e n t was 
l ega l ly b inding on a l l . He further conceded that a reading 
of the C o n s t i t u t i o n made by the C o u r t for the purpose of 
deciding a case was enti t led to "very high respect" from the 
o t h e r d e p a r t m e n t s of t h e G o v e r n m e n t " in a l l p a r a l l e l 
cases." "At the same time," he continued: 
The cand id c i t i z e n must confes s t h a t if the policy 
of the G o v e r n m e n t upon v i t a l ques t i ons a f f e c t i n g the 
whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of 
t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t , t h e i n s t a n t t h e y a r e m a d e in 
o r d i n a r y l i t i g a t i o n b e t w e e n p a r t i e s in p e r s o n a l 
a c t i o n s , the p e o p l e wil l have c e a s e d to be their own 
r u l e r s , h a v i n g to t h a t e x t e n t p r a c t i c a l l y r e s i g n e d 
t h e i r G o v e r n m e n t i n t o t h e h a n d s of t h a t e m i n e n t 
t r i b u n a l . Nor is t h e r e in th is any a s s a u l t upon the 
Court or the judges. It is a duty from which they may 
n o t s h r i n k to d e c i d e c a s e s p r o p e r l y b rough t b e f o r e 
them, and it is no faul t of t h e i r s if o t h e r s seek to 
turn their decisions to polit ical purposes. 
In s h o r t , w h i l e t h e C o u r t can and must d e c i d e c a s e s 
a c c o r d i n g to i ts own i n d e p e n d e n t view of the Constitution, 
it does not in so doing decide questions. 
But whi le the p r e s s u r e of P r e s i d e n t i a l leadership in the 
f i e l d of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may be powerfu l so 
long as it is be ing e x e r t e d , i t is o r d i n a r i l y s p o r a d i c and 
d i s con t inuous . The p r e s s u r e which is e x e r t e d by the legal 
p ro fes s ion , to the c o n t r a r y , whi le of ten of a low order of 
a r t i c u l a t e n e s s , is c o n s t a n t and u n r e m i t t i n g . Brought up on 
the p r i n c i p l e of s t a r e dec i s i s , taught to search for the law 
in the pas t dec i s ions of the Cour t , the Bar has n a t u r a l l y 
been p rone to ident i fy the judicial version of the Constitu-
t ion as the a u t h e n t i c C o n s t i t u t i o n . Nor do members of the 
Bar , when t r a n s l a t e d to C o n g r e s s , invariably rid themselves 
of the professional bias . 
Indeed , I doubt if the doctrine of Finali ty has ever been 
s t a t e d in m o r e u n q u a l i f i e d t e r m s t h a n in the fol lowing 
passage from a Senate debate in 1933: 
I c a n n o t a g r e e with the Senator from Louisiana that 
we have the right to place our own construction on the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n when the Supreme Cour t of the Uni ted 
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S t a t e s , wh ich is so le ly v e s t e d with the a u t h o r i t y to 
t e l l us w h a t the C o n s t i t u t i o n m e a n s , has determined a 
p a r t i c u l a r q u e s t i o n . It may be that we could say that 
we d i sagree with its opinion, but however much we may 
d i s a g r e e wi th the opinion of the Supreme Cour t , that 
opin ion is r ight . It may not have been right 5 minutes 
b e f o r e the opinion was delivered; it may not have been 
r i g h t d u r i n g the e n t i r e h i s to ry of the Na t ion up to 
t h a t t i m e ; but the ve ry moment t h a t the opinion is 
h a n d e d down and goes in to the law books , when it 
b e c o m e s f ina l , then the C o n s t i t u t i o n means and must 
mean exact ly what the Supreme Court says it means. I 
can place no other construction on it . 
On the o t h e r hand , I do not find t h a t the Cour t i tself 
has e v e r c l e a r l y sanctioned such views. Thus in the Adkins 
C a s e , d e c i d e d in 1923, we find the leader of the conserva-
tive wing of the present Court saying: 
From the a u t h o r i t y to a s c e r t a i n and d e t e r m i n e the 
law in a g iven c a s e , t h e r e necessari ly results , in case 
of c o n f l i c t , the duty to d e c l a r e and e n f o r c e the rule 
of the sup reme law and r e j e c t that of an inferior act 
of l e g i s l a t i o n which , t r a n s c e n d i n g the C o n s t i t u t i o n , is 
of no e f f e c t and b inding on no o n e . This is not the 
e x e r c i s e of a s u b s t a n t i v e power to r e v i e w or nullify 
a c t s of C o n g r e s s , for no s u c h s u b s t a n t i v e p o w e r 
e x i s t s . It is simply a n e c e s s a r y c o n c o m i t a n t of the 
power to h e a r and d i spose of a c a s e or c o n t r o v e r s y 
p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h e C o u r t , to the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of 
which must be brought the test and measure of the law. 
No ta lk h e r e , i t wi l l be o b s e r v e d , about " the peculiar" 
or " e x c l u s i v e " power of judges in law i n t e r p r e t a t i o n - - n o 
ta lk about t h e i r o c c u p y i n g an " i n t e r m e d i a t e r o l e " be tween 
t h e o t h e r d e p a r t m e n t s and the p e o p l e . The s t a t e m e n t is 
e n t i r e l y h a r m o n i o u s w i t h t h e d o c t r i n e of d e p a r t m e n t a l 
c o n s t r u c t i o n . And the view which is p r e d o m i n a n t among 
l e a d i n g h i s t o r i a n s of t h e C o u r t and the C o n s t i t u t i o n is 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y the s a m e . The e s s e n c e of l e a r n e d opinion is 
condensed in Mr. Warren 's epigram: "However the Court may 
i n t e r p r e t t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , i t is s t i l l t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n 
which is the law and not the decision of the Court." 
M o r e o v e r , d e v e l o p m e n t s of r e c e n t y e a r s have se r ious ly 
impai red the s t a n d i n g of the d o c t r i n e of f ina l i ty in more 
t h a n o n e r e s p e c t . In t h e f i r s t p l a c e , t h e c o n s p i c u o u s 
b r e a k - d o w n of the p r i n c i p l e of s tare decisis in the field of 
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c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law has w e a k e n e d both i ts h i s t o r i c a l and its 
log ica l founda t ions . For wi th wha t c o n s i s t e n c y can it be 
a rgued t ha t the P r e s i d e n t and C o n g r e s s a r e bound by the 
C o u r t ' s p a s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the C o n s t i t u t i o n but t h a t 
the Cour t i t se l f is not? If the C o n s t i t u t i o n is only " t h e 
Supreme C o u r t ' s l a s t guess ," then the other departments are 
enti t led to their guess, too. 
In the second p l a c e , the professional at t i tude toward the 
jud ic i a l p r o c e s s , even in the field of p r i v a t e law, is far 
more sophisticated than it once was . Educated lawyers would 
t o d a y s m i l e a t M a r s h a l l ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t " c o u r t s a r e the 
mere i n s t r u m e n t s of the law, and can will nothing." Rather 
t h e y t a k e t h e i r s t a n d w i t h J u s t i c e Ho lmes ' s a c c o u n t of 
j ud ic i a l dec i s ion as involv ing a t e v e r y s t ep " t h e sovereign 
prerogat ive of choice." 
In the th i rd p l a c e , and as a n a t u r a l o u t g r o w t h of th is 
c h a n g e d a t t i t u d e toward the judicial process in general , the 
a p p o i n t i v e power has come to t ake into account to a much 
g r e a t e r e x t e n t t h a n f o r m e r l y t h e p r o b a b l e a t t i t u d e on 
b r o a d e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issues of sugges t ed appointees to the 
B e n c h . To be su re , such considerations were not a l together 
ignored in the pa s t , but d i scuss ion of them was sub rosa , 
and they were acted upon with searchings of consc ience . 
L a s t l y , t h e d r a m a t i c r e v o l u t i o n which the Cour t has 
i t se l f e f f ec t ed in our c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law by c e r t a i n of i t s 
d e c i s i o n s t h i s p a s t t e r m , c o m i n g as i t d id a f t e r t h e 
P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n , t h e C . I . O . s t r i k e s , and P r e s i d e n t 
R o o s e v e l t ' s Cour t P r o p o s a l , has t h rus t forward the polit ical 
a s p e c t of the C o u r t ' s ro le in c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
as never before. 
SUMMARY 
T h e r e l a t i o n in w h i c h t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t s t a n d s to 
C o n g r e s s today is as the P r e s i d e n t indicated in his Const i-
tu t ion Day a d d r e s s the r e su l t of an "evo lu t ion , " but of an 
evo lu t ion the s t r u c t u r a l l y de te rmina t ive stages of which had 
been passed by an ea r ly da te . The Philadelphia Convention 
may well have i n t ended to p rov ide for j ud i c i a l r e v i e w of 
l i m i t e d scope over a c t s of C o n g r e s s in the c l a u s e which 
e x t e n d s t h e j u d i c i a l p o w e r to " c a s e s a r i s i n g under th is 
C o n s t i t u t i o n " ; b u t if t h i s is t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e 
c l a u s e , t h e n t h e r e is a c l e a r log ica l i m p l i c a t i o n a g a i n s t 
jud ic ia l r ev iew of broader range. As the issue was already 
shaped p r io r to Marbury v_. Madison, the important question 
was whether the Court was confined to an enforcement of the 
d i r e c t p roh ib i t i ons of the C o n s t i t u t i o n , or whether it could 
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go fu r the r and p i t i t s c o n s t r u c t i o n of the g ran t s of power 
t o C o n g r e s s a g a i n s t t h a t a d o p t e d by C o n g r e s s i t s e l f . 
A c t u a l l y the C o u r t , as well as professional advocates of its 
p o w e r , h a s a l w a y s made a c o n s i d e r a b l e p o t h e r over the 
p r o h i b i t i o n of b i l l s of a t t a i n d e r and ex pos t fac to laws , 
w h e r e a s , in po in t of f ac t . C o n g r e s s has neve r pas sed any 
l e g i s l a t i o n which was thus d e s c r i b a b l e e x c e p t in a highly 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l s ense of those terms. As ear ly , on the other 
h a n d , as 1796, the jud ic ia l a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the p r i n c i p l e 
of u l t r a v i r e s to a c t s of C o n g r e s s seems to have been 
assumed in the Car r iage Tax Case and in Marbury v_. Madison 
it is c l e a r l y a s s e r t e d ; and e x c e p t for such modification of 
t h e p r i n c i p l e as r e s u l t s from t h e d o c t r i n e of " p o l i t i c a l 
ques t i ons" such has remained the position of the Court ever 
s i n c e . From 1803 , in o t h e r w o r d s , the S c o p e of jud ic i a l 
r e v i e w of a c t s of C o n g r e s s has been a funct ion of the 
C o u r t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a n y and a l l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
p r o v i s i o n s o r d o c t r i n e s w h i c h i t may d e e m to q u a l i f y 
C o n g r e s s ' s p o w e r s - - o r more b r i e f l y , a function of constitu-
tional law. 
As to t h e o t h e r d imens ions of the C o u r t ' s p o w e r - - t h e 
E f f e c t of i t s h o l d i n g an a c t of C o n g r e s s " u n c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a r ' - - t w o f a c t s ought to be remarked. The first is, that 
the d i spu te w h e t h e r such a p r o n o u n c e m e n t "invalidates" the 
c o n d e m n e d l e g i s l a t i v e a c t , whi le somet imes r e n e w e d even 
t o d a y , has been for all p r a c t i c a l pu rposes d e c i d e d in the 
a f f i r m a t i v e . C e r t a i n l y no P r e s i d e n t of the Uni ted S t a t e s 
would v e n t u r e nowadays to try to revive such an act unless 
or u n t i l t h e C o u r t r e v e r s e d i ts p r ev ious h o l d i n g . Con-
v e r s e l y , no P r e s i d e n t would o rd ina r i l y refuse to enforce an 
ac t of C o n g r e s s on the ground tha t i t was unconsti tutional 
unti l the C o u r t had so ruled. The idea, on the other hand, 
t h a t a p r o n o u n c e m e n t of u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y by the Cour t 
f i x e s t h e m e a n i n g ojf t h ^ C o n s t i t u t i o n as a g a i n s t t h e 
na t i ona l l e g i s l a t i v e power , though an i n e s c a p a b l e inference 
from t h e j u r i s t i c , o r H a m i l t o n i a n , c o n c e p t i o n of jud ic i a l 
r e v i e w , has n e v e r assumed a sufficiently authori tat ive shape 
to put i t beyond the r e a c h of important chal lenge. In this 
r e s p e c t , t h e p o l i t i c a l or d e p a r t m e n t a l c o n c e p t i o n of 
j u d i c i a l r e v i e w s t i l l o f f e r s a v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to 
political leadership . 
More c o m p a c t l y put , the "evolution" of judicial review in 
the field of the n a t i o n a l legislative power had gone through 
the fol lowing p h a s e s before the end of 1803: first, that of 
r ecogn i t ion , to some indeterminate extent , by the body which 
f r a m e d t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ; s e c o n d l y , t h a t of i n f e r e n c e , 
somewha t w i d e l y , from ideas becoming c u r r e n t during th is 
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per iod ; th i rdly , that of ra t iona l iza t ion on the basis of a 
s e l e c t i o n from t h e s e i d e a s , the work c o n s p i c u o u s l y of 
Hami l ton in Fede ra l i s t 78; fourthly, tha t of qual i f icat ion 
by cer ta in limiting ideas , the work primari ly of Madison; 
f i n a l l y , t h a t of d e f i n i t e es tabl ishment as a^  par t of the 
mechanism of government, the work primarily of Marshall. 
By the decision in Marbury v^ . Madison judicial review was 
put on a basis which left its future development as a factor 
of the n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i v e power wi th the C o u r t . Its 
importance, on the other hand, as an agency of cons t i tu-
tional in te rp re ta t ion is sti l l cont ingent on public opinion, 
and seems likely to remain so . And this is desirable, for 
"the Consti tut ion is not a mere lawyers' document"; it is a 
charter of Popular Government. 
APPENDIX 
(Furnished E.S.C. by Professor Frank M. Anderson of 
Dartmouth College.) 
From time to time during the Secession Crisis of 1860-
1861 a r t i c les dealing with cons t i tu t ional and governmental 
q u e s t i o n s appeared in the Courier by a wr i t e r who used 
Rutledge as his nom-de-plume. His article on Jan. 30, 1861, 
d e a l t wi th the form which the new government for the 
Southern Confederacy ought to t a k e . Incidenta l ly he had 
this to say about the United States Supreme Court: 
" I t is a s t r a n g e i n f a t u a t i o n which should invest 
half a dozen persons with power to de termine finally 
what is the Const i tut ion of the count ry . That Judges 
should determine what the common law is is reasonable; 
that is a body of unwritten principles, and when a new 
case ar ises a decision must be made, and it is for the 
in te res t of the whole country that that decision shall 
be final. But, in the case of a written instrument, in 
which legal technical terms are carefully avoided, that 
the whole country should submit forever to the opinion 
of half a dozen gentlemen is monstrous . It may be 
asser ted with truth that lawyers a re , of all men, the 
least competent to determine cons t i tu t ional ques t ions . 
Their whole training unfits them for it. They are more 
accustomed to look to decisions than to the reasoning 
of the case before them, and a shadow of opinion by a 
Judge has more weight than a volume of argument drawn 
from the nature of the case. 
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"The Federa l (Supreme) Court pronounced the Bank 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , the Missour i Compromise unconst i tu-
t i o n a l . P u b l i c o p i n i o n h a s r e v e r s e d t h e f i r s t 
judgment; the Union-savers are now str iving to over-
throw the second. Let us have no dangerous Courts to 
de termine const i tu t ional questions for us." - - "Let us 
p rese rve our independence and the respectability of our 
Judic iary , by refusing to establish a Court which shall 
be supreme." - - (Charleston Courier, January 30, 1861, 
p. 1, c. 5.) 
Rutledge was in genera l a strong conse rva t ive , a stout 
defender of property rights, e tc . 
Judicial Review 
and The "Higher Law" 
Judicial review is the power and duty of a court, when it is 
c a l l e d upon to e n f o r c e a legislative act in deciding a case , 
to say whether such act is valid under a higher law which is 
deemed to be b inding on both the court and the legislature; 
and the fu r the r duty to refuse enforcement to the act if it 
does not squa re with the court 's own independent reading of 
the h ighe r l aw. The term is a lso p r o p e r l y a p p l i c a b l e to 
c a s e s i n v o l v i n g a c t s of t h e E x e c u t i v e which pu rpor t to 
p r o c e e d d i r e c t l y from authority conferred by the higher law, 
l ike P r e s i d e n t T ruman ' s o r d e r l as t Apr i l s e i z i n g the s t e e l 
industry in order to head off a s t r ike . 
The foun ta inhead of the idea of jud ic i a l r e v i e w in this 
coun t ry is Chief J u s t i c e C o k e ' s famous dictum in Dr. Bon-
ham's case (1610) that "when an act of Parl iament is against 
common right and reason . . . the common law will control it 
and adjudge such act to be void." Commended by Lord Chief 
J u s t i c e s H o b a r t and H o l t , t h e dictum had won r e p e a t e d 
r e c o g n i t i o n in va r ious lega l abr idgements and digests before 
t he ou tbreak of the American Revolution. But it was in the 
a g i t a t i o n l e a d i n g to t h e R e v o l u t i o n t h a t i t was f i r s t 
invoked by Americans . 
T h e c r e a t i v e f i r s t s t e p w a s t a k e n by James Ot is in 
F e b r u a r y , 1761 , in his a rgument for the Bos ton m e r c h a n t s 
a g a i n s t an a p p l i c a t i o n by a Br i t i sh cus toms of f ic ia l for a 
g e n e r a l w a r r a n t a u t h o r i z i n g him to search their cel lars and 
" Jud ic ia l Review and The 'Higher Law'." Think 19 (April 
1953): 3 -5 . Reprinted by permission from Think Magazine. 
Copyright 1953. In t e rna t iona l Business Machines Corpora-
t i o n . [Bibliography Entry D166] 
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w a r e h o u s e s for s m u g g l e d g o o d s . An A c t of P a r l i a m e n t 
" a g a i n s t n a t u r a l e q u i t y , " Ot i s a s s e r t e d , was vo id . "If an 
a c t of P a r l i a m e n t , " he con t inued , "should be made in the 
ve ry words of this petition, it would be void," and it would 
be t h e du ty of t h e e x e c u t i v e c o u r t s to p a s s i t " i n t o 
disuse." 
Four y e a r s l a t e r , a c c o r d i n g to Gove rno r Hutch inson of 
M a s s a c h u s e t t s , the prevailing argument against the Stamp Act 
was that it was "against Magna Charta and the natural rights 
of Engl i shmen, and t h e r e f o r e , acco rd ing to Lord Coke, null 
and void," testimony which is borne out by a contemporaneous 
decision of a Virginia county court . On the very eve of the 
D e c l a r a t i o n of I n d e p e n d e n c e Judge William Cushing, later to 
become one of Washington's appointees to the original bench 
of the Supreme Court, charged a Massachusetts jury to ignore 
c e r t a i n acts of Parl iament as "void and inoperative" and was 
congratulated by John Adams for doing so. 
Nor did the e s t ab l i shmen t of the first American constitu-
t ions cause this cou r se of r e a s o n i n g to be abandoned. To 
the c o n t r a r y , the most eminent judges of the first period of 
A m e r i c a n const i tut ional law, which comes to an end approxi-
m a t e l y with the d e a t h of Marsha l l in 1835, appealed freely 
t o n a t u r a l r i g h t s and t h e s o c i a l c o m p a c t as l i m i t i n g 
l e g i s l a t i v e power , and based d e c i s i o n s on th i s ground, and 
the same d o c t r i n e was urged by the grea tes t lawyers of the 
period without reproach. 
But m e a n t i m e , a compe t ing c o n c e p t i o n of judicial review 
as someth ing a n c h o r e d to the w r i t t e n consti tut ion had been 
in t h e p r o c e s s of f o rmu la t i on in answer to B l a c k s t o n e ' s 
d o c t r i n e t ha t in e v e r y S t a t e t h e r e is a supreme , abso lu t e 
p o w e r , and t h a t th is power is v e s t e d in the l e g i s l a t u r e . 
From th i s ang le judic ia l review based on "common right and 
r e a s o n , " or on n a t u r a l law i d e a s , was an i m p e r t i n e n c e , as 
B l a c k s t o n e took pa ins to po in t out in his C o m m e n t a r i e s . 
Suppose, however, that the supreme will in the S ta te was not 
embodied in the l e g i s l a t u r e and i ts ac t s , but in the people 
a t l a r g e and t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n - - w h a t c o n c l u s i o n s would 
follow from th is p remise? In F e d e r a l i s t 78 Hamilton, with 
t h e p e n d i n g F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n in mind, a n s w e r e d th is 
ques t ion in the fol lowing words : "The interpretat ion of the 
laws is the p r o p e r and p e c u l i a r province of the courts . A 
c o n s t i t u t i o n is in f ac t , and must be regarded by the judges 
a s , a f u n d a m e n t a l l aw. It t h e r e f o r e be longs to them to 
a sce r t a in its meaning as well as the meaning of any part icu-
lar ac t p r o c e e d i n g from the l e g i s l a t i v e body , and, in case 
of i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the two, to prefer the 
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will of the peop le d e c l a r e d in the c o n s t i t u t i o n to t h a t of 
the legislature as expressed in s tatute ." 
Two t y p e s of jud ic ia l r e v i e w s tem from the Constitution 
of the United S t a t e s . The first, which we may term Federal 
j ud i c i a l r e v i e w , r e s t s on the sup remacy c lause (Article VI, 
p a r . 2) of the C o n s t i t u t i o n , which r e a d s as follows: "This 
C o n s t i t u t i o n , and the laws of the United S ta tes which shall 
b e m a d e in p u r s u a n c e thereof , and all t r e a t i e s made , or 
w h i c h s h a l l be m a d e , under the a u t h o r i t y of the Uni ted 
S t a t e s , shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges 
in e v e r y S t a t e s h a l l be bound t h e r e b y , a n y t h i n g in the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n or laws of any S t a t e to the contrary notwith-
standing." 
The power and duty of all c o u r t s in the United Sta tes , 
and u l t i m a t e l y of the Supreme Court at Washington, to pass 
upon the v a l i d i t y of S t a t e laws and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i -
s i o n s u n d e r t h e h i g h e r l aw which the supremacy c l ause 
de f ines is , t h e r e f o r e , squa re ly based on the words of the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n ; no r in f a c t h a s i t e v e r b e e n s e r i o u s l y 
challenged since Marshall 's day. 
H o w , t h e n , a b o u t n a t i o n a l j ud i c i a l r e v i e w , t h a t is to 
s a y , the power of the Supreme C o u r t to d i sa l low a c t s of 
C o n g r e s s on the ground of unconstitutionality? Even to this 
day the de f i n i t e assumpt ion of th is power by the Supreme 
Cour t under the leadership of Marshall in the famous case of 
Marbury y .^ Madison (1803) is sometimes termed "usurpation," 
a l t hough , i t would seem, w i t h o u t good r e a s o n . Thus while 
a c t s of Congress are part of the "supreme law of the land," 
they a r e so only if "made in p u r s u a n c e " of the C o n s t i t u -
t i o n . A g a i n , A r t i c l e III of the Cons t i tu t ion says that "the 
j ud i c i a l power [of the Uni ted S t a t e s ] shal l e x t e n d to all 
c a s e s a r i s i ng under th is Cons t i tu t ion ," language which is no 
l ess d e s c r i p t i v e of c a s e s in which the v a l i d i t y of ac t s of 
C o n g r e s s is c h a l l e n g e d than i t is of those in which the 
validity of S ta te acts is challenged. 
F u r t h e r m o r e , most of the leading members of the Federal 
C o n v e n t i o n which drew up our C o n s t i t u t i o n a r e on r e c o r d 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s l y wi th i ts e s t a b l i s h m e n t as 
a c c e p t i n g j ud i c i a l r e v i e w of C o n g r e s s i o n a l a c t s . Later , to 
be su r e , t h e r e was some b a c k s l i d i n g , the r e c o r d of James 
M a d i s o n , p u t a t i v e " F a t h e r of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , " b e i n g 
p a r t i c u l a r l y e r r a t i c in th is m a t t e r . On the floor of the 
C o n v e n t i o n Madison had a d v a n c e d the argument in favor of 
r e f e r r i n g the C o n s t i t u t i o n to c o n v e n t i o n s in the Sta tes for 
r a t i f i c a t i o n t h a t "a l aw v i o l a t i n g a C o n s t i t u t i o n e s t a b -
l i shed by the peop le themselves would be considered by the 
judges as null and void;" and in Federal is t 39 he refers to 
98 / A RANGE OF EXPERTISE 
the " t r ibuna l" which will draw the line between national and 
S t a t e p o w e r s . In O c t o b e r of the same y e a r , h o w e v e r , he 
r e p u d i a t e s jud ic i a l r ev iew as applied, whether in the S ta tes 
or in the proposed Federal Government, to acts of coordinate 
l e g i s l a t u r e s . "It m a k e s , " s a y s he , " t h e Jud i c i a ry D e p a r t -
ment paramount in fact to the Legislature which can never be 
p r o p e r . " But th is did not p r e v e n t him, wh i l e p i lo t ing the 
p roposed Bill of R igh t s through the f i rs t Congress in June, 
1789, from arguing t h a t once the proposed amendments were 
i n c o r p o r a t e d in t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e y w o u l d r e n d e r 
" i n d e p e n d e n t t r i b u n a l s in a peculiar manner the guardians of 
t h o s e r i g h t s . " H a m i l t o n ' s p o s i t i o n on t h e s u b j e c t ha s 
already been indicated. 
Congress went definitely on record as accepting the power 
of t h e C o u r t to p a s s on t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of i t s 
m e a s u r e s as e a r l y as 1795, when in a case challenging the 
v a l i d i t y of the " c a r r i a g e tax" it appropriated money to pay 
the a t t o r n e y s on both s ides of the ques t ion . The tax was 
s u s t a i n e d . When, n e v e r t h e l e s s , Je f fe r son came to power in 
1801, the d e b a t e was sha rp ly r e n e w e d . But save for some 
members of Congress from Virginia and North Carol ina, even 
J e f f e r s o n ' s fo l lowers g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d jud ic i a l r e v i e w as 
an a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d i n s t i t u t i o n ; and two y e a r s l a t e r in 
Marbury y_. Madison the Cour t c losed the d e b a t e . Nor has 
t h i s d e c i s i o n e v e r b e e n d i s t u r b e d . Indeed i ts i n f luence 
s p r e a d r ap id ly in to the S t a t e s , wi th the r e s u l t t h a t long 
b e f o r e t h e Civ i l War jud ic ia l r e v i e w by S t a t e c o u r t s of 
loca l l e g i s l a t i o n was e s t a b l i s h e d under the l oca l c o n s t i t u -
t i o n s , and usual ly wi th far less t e x t u a l suppor t than the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n of the Uni ted S t a t e s affords judicial review of 
acts of Congress . 
W h y , t h e n , has c r i t i c i s m of Marbury y_. Madison n e v e r 
c e a s e d ? T h e a n s w e r is t h a t , so f a r as s u c h c r i t i c i s m 
amounts to anything more than a rethreshing of old straw, it 
d e a l s with a ques t ion beyond the power of any c o u r t to 
d e t e r m i n e . I mean the ques t ion of w h a t degree of finality 
is to be a c c o r d e d a jud ic ia l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the consti tu-
t iona l document which was made in the first instance merely 
for t h e p u r p o s e of d e c i d i n g a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . T h a t it 
s e t t l e s t h a t c a s e and binds the p a r t i e s to it is, of course, 
c o n c e d e d . A l so , it is g e n e r a l l y conceded to determine the 
fate of any legislative enactment which was held void by the 
cour t in the course of r e a c h i n g i ts d e c i s i o n . But does it 
h e n c e f o r t h fix the mean ing of the Constitution on the point 
of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n involved un less and unt i l an o v e r r i d i n g 
constitutional amendment is adopted? 
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One o b s t a c l e in the way of an affirmative answer to this 
ques t ion was encoun te red almost at the outset in the refusal 
of c e r t a i n P r e s i d e n t s to r e g a r d the C o n s t i t u t i o n as prima-
r i l y a r u l e for j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n . I t w a s r a t h e r , they 
u rged , a b r o a d l y d i sc re t ionary mandate to themselves and to 
C o n g r e s s ; a n d w h i l e t h e y c o n c e d e d t ha t the Cour t was 
undoub ted ly e n t i t l e d to r ead the C o n s t i t u t i o n independently 
for the purpose of dec id ing c a s e s , th i s ve ry purpose, they 
c o n t e n d e d , a u t o m a t i c a l l y l imi ted the a u t h o r i t a t i v e n e s s of 
i t s r e a d i n g s ; and t h a t w i th in t he i r r e s p e c t i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n s 
P r e s i d e n t and C o n g r e s s en joyed the same c o r r e l a t i v e inde-
p e n d e n c e as t h e C o u r t did wi th in i ts j u r i s d i c t i o n . This 
w a s , in e f f e c t , t h e p o s i t i o n e a r l i e r of J e f f e r s o n and 
J a c k s o n , l a t e r of L inco ln , and in r e c e n t t imes that of the 
two Roosevel ts . 
A n o t h e r o b s t a c l e has been of the C o u r t ' s own mak ing . 
Whe the r b e c a u s e of the difficulty of amending the Constitu-
t ion or for c a u t i o n a r y r e a s o n s , the Court took the position 
as e a r l y as 1851 that it would reverse previous decisions on 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s w h e n c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e y w e r e 
" e r r o n e o u s . " An outstanding instance of this nature was the 
d e c i s i o n in the l ega l t e n d e r c a s e s , in 1870, r e v e r s i n g the 
d e c i s i o n which had been r e n d e r e d in Hepburn y^ . Gr iswold 
f i f t e e n m o n t h s e a r l i e r ; and no l e s s s h a t t e r i n g to t h e 
p r e s t i g e of s t a r e d e c i s i s in the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l field was 
t h e i n c o m e t a x d e c i s i o n of 1 8 9 5 , in w h i c h t h e Cour t , 
a c c e p t i n g Joseph C h o a t e ' s i n v i t a t i o n to " c o r r e c t a century 
of e r r o r , " g r e a t l y e x p a n d e d i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e 
"di rec t tax" clauses. 
The " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l revolution" of 1937 produced numerous 
r e v e r s a l s of e a r l i e r p r e c e d e n t s on the ground of " e r r o r , " 
some of them, t he l a t e James M. Beck compla ined , without 
" t h e d e c e n t o b s e q u i e s of a f u n e r a l o r a t i o n . " In 1944 
J u s t i c e Reed cited fourteen cases decided between March 27, 
1937 and June 14, 1943 in which one or more prior constitu-
t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s w e r e o v e r t u r n e d . On the same o c c a s i o n 
J u s t i c e R o b e r t s e x p r e s s e d the opinion t ha t adjudicat ions of 
the Cour t were rapidly gravitat ing "into the same class as a 
r e s t r i c t e d r a i l r o a d t i c k e t , good for th i s day and t ra in 
o n l y . " Cer ta in ly confession of error on such a scale by the 
o f f i c i a l w i e l d e r s of jud ic i a l r ev iew is not p e r s u a s i v e of 
its tendency to preserve the nation's Consti tution. 
T h e f a c t of t h e m a t t e r is t h a t j u d i c i a l r e v i e w as 
e x e r c i s e d by the Supreme Court both in the Federal and in 
t h e n a t i o n a l f i e l d h a s b e e n l e s s p r e s e r v a t i v e t h a n 
c r e a t i v e . The g r e a t bulk of the c a s e s have stemmed from 
four or five b r i e f p h r a s e s of the w r i t t e n C o n s t i t u t i o n and 
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from t h r e e or four d o c t r i n e s which the Const i tut ion is 
assumed to embody; and what has happened to these phrases 
and doctrines in the process is not a l i t t le. 
Consider, for example, what has happened to the "due 
process" clause at the hands of the American courts gener-
ally. As it appears in Amendment V of the Constitution this 
clause reads : "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or p r o p e r t y w i t h o u t due p r o c e s s of l aw ," which meant 
originally simply that no person should be sent to his death 
or f ined , or i m p r i s o n e d , e x c e p t following convict ion of 
crime in accordance with a ce r ta in p rocedure . What due 
process of law means today is "reasonable law," that is, law 
found by the Court to be reasonable ; and what " l ibe r ty" 
means is not merely freedom from imprisonment, but freedom 
of c o n t r a c t , of a s s o c i a t i o n , of speech, of press and of 
w o r s h i p . T h e s e l a s t t h r e e " f reedoms" a re , to be sure, 
s u f f i c i e n t l y p r o t e c t e d a g a i n s t C o n g r e s s by the F i r s t 
Amendment, but the enlarged conception of "due process of 
law" and " l i b e r t y " has been r ead in to the F o u r t e e n t h 
Amendmen t a l so , thereby render ing the g rea t substant ive 
r ights of person and proper ty secure l ikewise against the 
States. 
Then, by way of contrast, consider what has happened in 
r ecen t years to the doc t r ine , based on Amendment X, that 
c e r t a i n powers of the S t a t e s , the power for example to 
r e g u l a t e industr ial r e la t ions , limit Congress ' s powers , the 
s u p r e m a c y c l a u s e n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g . The " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
revolution" of 1937 has retired this doctrine into disuse. 
But w h a t , a p a r t from its c r ea t i ve function, has been 
judicial rev iew's greatest contribution? My answer would be 
that it has provided a smooth-working, unobtrusive technique 
whereby the American judiciary, operating under its mandate 
from the supremacy clause and captained by the Supreme Court 
at Vv^ashington, has kept the Federal system a going concern. 
10 
Franklin and the Constitution 
"Government is dissolved," proclaimed Patrick Henry in the 
first Cont inenta l Congress , "Where are your landmarks, your 
b o u n d a r i e s of c o l o n i e s ? . . . The d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n 
Virginians , Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers, and New Englanders 
are no more. I am not a Virginian: I am an American." 1 
This was in 1774. Some fifty years earlier, in 1723 to 
be exac t , a young printer's apprentice of Boston had already 
found p r o v i n c i a l b a r r i e r s to be "dissolved." That year 
Benjamin Frankl in , aged seventeen, seeking escape from the 
trammels of life with his too exacting family, went down to 
Boston Harbor and stole aboard a sloop which was about to 
sail for New York. Failing upon his arrival there, however, 
to obtain employment at his trade, the young man continued 
on by other conveyance to Phi ladelphia ; thereby e lec t ing 
h imse l f "The f i r s t Amer i can . " Frankl in gives us in his 
Autobiography a quaint p ic ture of himself on his entry into 
t he City of Brother ly Love. He ca r r i ed , he says , three 
loaves of bread, one under each arm, while he munched the 
t h i r d . Just how this feat of p res t id ig i ta t ion was accom-
plished he leaves unexpla ined. But undoubtedly the future 
inventor of the l ightning rod and the Franklin Stove was 
equal to the occasion. 
F r a n k l i n ' s i n i t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to Amer i can const i tu-
t ional law was his g r e a t e s t . It occurred in consequence of 
the convening, at the d i rec t ion of the Lords of Trade, of 
"Frankl in and the C o n s t i t u t i o n . " Proceedings of the 
American Ph i losoph ica l Society 100 (August 31 , 1956)7 
283-288. Reprinted by permission from the American Philo-
sophical Society. [Bibliography Entry DISC] 
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the Albany C o n g r e s s of 1754, comprising delegates from all 
the n o r t h e r n Colonies except New Jersey . The primary task 
of the C o n g r e s s was to s t r e n g t h e n the c rumbl ing a l l i a n c e 
between the Colonies and the Six Nations, it being agreed on 
a l l h a n d s t h a t war wi th F r a n c e was in the of f ing . The 
C o n g r e s s ' s i m m e d i a t e b u s i n e s s b e i n g s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
conc luded , the commissioners proceeded to propose a plan of 
d u r a b l e union b e t w e e n the Colonies and the Mother-country . 
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y F r a n k l i n had a l r e a d y been pondering the 
s u b j ec t , and when his s cheme was r e a d the o t h e r commis-
sioners scrapped theirs and accepted his . 
McLaugh l in , in his C o n s t i t u t i o n a l H i s t o r y of the United 
S ta tes , summarizes the plan as follows: 
Lt marks the beg inn ing of an e f fo r t to s ing le out 
t h e t h i n g s t h a t should be tu rned ove r to a_ c e n t r a l 
government or an agency of centra l administrat ion. Any 
e f f o r t to f o r m u l a t e a b a s i s of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a n d 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of powers is of commanding interes t to the 
s t uden t of the Amer ican polit ical system as it came to 
be. . . . 
T h e p l a n . . . g r a n t e d to t h e p r o p o s e d c e n t r a l 
government a method and the power of raising money; it 
marked out a fa i r ly d e f i n i t e s p h e r e of a c t i o n ; and it 
b e s t o w e d ample a u t h o r i t y over four subjects of supreme 
i m p o r t a n c e - - I n d i a n a f f a i r s , w a r , p u r c h a s e of w i l d 
l a n d s , and c o n t r o l , for a t ime a t l e a s t , of w e s t e r n 
s e t t l e m e n t . The commissioners even ventured to provide 
for p r o p o r t i o n a l r a t h e r than equal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of 
t h e s e v e r a l c o l o n i e s in t h e G r a n d C o u n c i l and to 
s u g g e s t qu i t e p la in ly the d e s i r a b i l i t y of l imi t ing the 
e x t e n t of the larger colonies, some of which had claims 
to a v a s t t e r r i t o r y beyond the m o u n t a i n s . Both of 
t h e s e l a t t e r p r o p o s a l s w e r e sure to a rouse oppos i t i on 
and in l a t e r y e a r s p roved to be e s p e c i a l l y perplexing 
obstacles in the way of forming a federal union.2 
The fa te of the p lan , r e m a r k s F r a n k l i n , "was singular." 
B e c a u s e of t h e c o n c e s s i o n i t m a d e to p r e r o g a t i v e , the 
c o l o n i a l a s s e m b l i e s unanimously r e j e c t e d it ; because of the 
c o n c e s s i o n it made to the co lon i a l i n t e r e s t the Crown did 
l ikewise. 
But does th is mean that the plan thereaf ter became more 
w a s t e p a p e r , a f r a g m e n t of t h e d e t r i t u s of h i s t o r y ? 
McLaughl in s a y s , by no means. "The significance," he says, 
"of t h e s e p r o p o s a l s l ies not so much in t h e i r s u g g e s t i o n s 
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for a method of saving the old empire as in their indication 
of the route that was to be followed in later years ."3 
W h e n , t w e n t y y e a r s l a t e r , a b r e a c h with t he M o t h e r -
c o u n t r y had b e c o m e v i r t u a l l y a c e r t a i n t y , F rank l in brought 
fo rward on July 2 1 , 1775, the " f i r s t s k e t c h of a plan of 
confede ra t ion which is known to have been presented" to the 
C o n g r e s s . I t s m o s t n o t a b l e p r o v i s i o n was one w h e r e b y 
I r e l a n d , the B r i t i s h West Ind ies , Canada , and Florida might 
be r e c e i v e d into the Confederat ion. No action was taken on 
t h e p r o p o s a l , and the same fa te met his suggestion a year 
l a t e r , when the D e c l a r a t i o n of Independence was before the 
C o n g r e s s , t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the Confederation, which it 
w a s a g r e e d should be s e t up, should be on the bas i s of 
p o p u l a t i o n . 4 in t he final s t e p s in the e l a b o r a t i o n of the 
A r t i c l e s of C o n f e d e r a t i o n F r a n k l i n had no part , being then 
in F r a n c e , but the r e c o g n i t i o n in the A r t i c l e s t h a t war , 
p e a c e and d ip lomacy must c o n s t i t u t e an e x c l u s i v e f ede ra l 
domain may ju s t i f i ab ly be r e g a r d e d as s temming from the 
Albany Plan. 
It would seem t h a t init ially Pennsylvania did not contem-
p l a t e inc lud ing F r a n k l i n in i t s delegat ion to the Convention 
of 1 7 8 7 , p r e s u m a b l y on a c c o u n t of his a g e . The ch ie f 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t b rough t about his a p p o i n t m e n t was the 
r e f l e c t i o n t h a t in the poss ib le absence of General Washing-
ton, it would be desirable to have "some one whom all could 
agree in calling to the chair ." His biographer adds: 
It was fortunate that even an unnecessary reason led 
to his be ing chosen , for all future g e n e r a t i o n s would 
h a v e fe l t t h a t an u n p a r d o n a b l e void had been left in 
t h a t famous a s s e m b l a g e , had the s age of America not 
b e e n t h e r e . C e r t a i n l y t h e " f i t ne s s of t h i n g s , " the 
h i s t o r i c a l p i c t u r e s q u e n e s s of the e v e n t , i m p e r a t i v e l y 
d e m a n d e d D r . F r a n k l i n ' s v e n e r a b l e f i g u r e in t h e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s of 
America.5 
F r a n k l i n ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n in the way of d e f i n i t e s u g g e s -
t i o n s to the l a b o r s of the C o n v e n t i o n in d r a w i n g up the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n , was e x c e p t in the t h r e e i n s t a n c e s m e n t i o n e d 
b e l o w , of s m a l l v a l u e . He a d v o c a t e d a w e a k n a t i o n a l 
government, and rever ted to ideas which he had advanced more 
t han a d e c a d e e a r l i e r in connection with the framing of the 
f i r s t P e n n s y l v a n i a c o n s t i t u t i o n - - a u n i c a m e r a l l e g i s l a t u r e , a 
m u l t i p l e e x e c u t i v e , g r a t u i t o u s publ ic s e r v i c e . Cur ious ly 
enough th is c o n s t i t u t i o n was s c r a p p e d in 1790 in favor of 
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one c lose ly mode l l ed on the new Constitution of the United 
S t a t e s . F r a n k l i n l amen ted the c h a n g e , quot ing va in ly the 
Prophet ' s words: "Stand in the old ways."6 
One instance in which Franklin made a forward looking and 
highly b e n e f i c i a l contr ibut ion to the work of the Convention 
o c c u r r e d when he jo ined forces with Madison and Wilson to 
oppose the i n s e r t i o n in the Constitution of a long residence 
r e q u i r e m e n t p r e l i m i n a r y to n a t u r a l i z a t i o n . He was not, he 
said, 
a g a i n s t a r e a s o n a b l e time, but should be very sorry to 
s e e a n y t h i n g l i k e i l l i b e r a l i t y i n s e r t e d in t h e 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . The p e o p l e in Europe a r e f r i end ly to 
th i s Country. Even in the Country with which we have 
been lately at war , we have now & had during the war, a 
g r e a t many f r i ends not only among the people at large 
bu t in b o t h H o u s e s of P a r l i a m e n t . In e v e r y o t h e r 
Coun t ry in Europe al l the people are our friends. We 
found in t h e C o u r s e of t h e R e v o l u t i o n , t h a t many 
s t r a n g e r s s e r v e d us f a i t h f u l l y - - a n d t h a t many n a t i v e s 
took p a r t a g s t . t h e i r C o u n t r y . When f o r e i g n e r s a f t e r 
looking about for some other Country in which they can 
ob ta in more happ ines s , give a preference to ours, it is 
a p r o o f of a t t a c h m e n t w h i c h o u g h t to e x c i t e our 
confidence & affection.7 
He also opposed clamping down on the S ta tes a provision 
which would have l imi ted the suf f rage in national e lect ions 
to f r e e h o l d e r s . To do th i s , he c o n t e n d e d , would " d e p r e s s 
the v i r t u e and public spirit of our common people."8 To all 
i n t e n t s and purposes his v iews prevailed on both points . It 
was left to e ach S t a t e to d e t e r m i n e i ts own rule of suf-
f r a g e , a p r e r o g a t i v e w h i c h w a s n o t d i s t u r b e d unt i l the 
adop t ion of the F i f t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t . And what period of 
r e s i d e n c e s h o u l d p r e c e d e n a t u r a l i z a t i o n w a s l e f t for 
C o n g r e s s to d e t e r m i n e , a c o n c e s s i o n the e f f e c t of which 
was not mater ia l ly modified by the provision that nobody but 
a n a t u r a l born c i t i z e n , "or a c i t i z e n of the United S ta tes 
a t the t ime of t h e " C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s a d o p t i o n , who had been 
four t een y e a r s a r e s i d e n t of the Uni t ed S t a t e s , should be 
e l i g i b l e to the P r e s i d e n c y , whi le s i m i l a r l y . S e n a t o r s must 
have had prior residence in the United S ta tes nine years and 
Representat ives seven yea r s . 
F r a n k l i n ' s m o s t e x t e n d e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n e x c e p t one in 
d e b a t e in the Conven t i on was an ou tg rowth of the quarrel 
b e t w e e n the "large" and the "small" S ta tes on the mat ter of 
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r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in C o n g r e s s . By June 28 the q u a r r e l had 
r e a c h e d a p i t ch of acrimony that threatened the break-up of 
the C o n v e n t i o n ; whe reupon F r a n k l i n moved that its sessions 
be opened each morning with p rayers . He said. 
Mr. President 
The small p r o g r e s s we have made a f t e r 4 or five 
w e e k s close a t tendance & continual reasonings with each 
o t h e r - - o u r d i f f e r e n t s e n t i m e n t s on a l m o s t e v e r y 
q u e s t i o n , several of the last producing as many noes as 
a y s , is meth inks a melancholy proof of the imperfection 
of the Human Understanding. We indeed seem to feel our 
own w a n t of p o l i t i c a l wisdom, s i n c e we h a v e been 
runn ing abou t in s e a r c h of i t . We have gone back to 
a n c i e n t h i s tory for models of Government, and examined 
t h e d i f f e r e n t forms of those Repub l i c s which hav ing 
been formed with the seeds of their own dissolution now 
no longer ex is t . And we have viewed Modern S ta tes all 
r o u n d E u r o p e , bu t f ind n o n e of t h e i r C o n s t i t u t i o n s 
suitable to our c i rcumstances . 
In t h i s s i t u a t i o n of th is A s s e m b l y , g rop ing as it 
w e r e in the dark to find p o l i t i c a l t r u th , and s c a r c e 
ab le to dis t inguish it when presented to us, how has it 
h a p p e n e d . S i r , t h a t we have no t hi ther to once thought 
of humbly app ly ing to the F a t h e r of l igh t s to illumi-
n a t e ou r u n d e r s t a n d i n g s ? In t h e b e g i n n i n g of the 
C o n t e s t w i t h G. B r i t a i n , when we w e r e s e n s i b l e of 
d a n g e r we had daily prayer in this room for the divine 
p r o t e c t i o n . - - O u r p r a y e r s . S i r , w e r e h e a r d , and they 
w e r e graciously answered. All of us who were engaged 
in the s t r u g g l e must h a v e o b s e r v e d f r equen t ins tances 
of a S u p e r i n t e n d i n g p r o v i d e n c e in our favor. To that 
k i n d p r o v i d e n c e we o w e t h i s h a p p y o p p o r t u n i t y of 
c o n s u l t i n g in p e a c e on the means of e s t a b l i s h i n g our 
future n a t i o n a l f e l i c i t y . And h a v e we now fo rgo t t en 
t h a t p o w e r f u l f r iend? or do we imagine t h a t we no 
longe r need his a s s i s t a n c e ? I have lived. Sir, a long 
t ime , and the longer I live, the more convincing proofs 
I s ee of th i s t r u t h - - t h a t God governs in the affairs of 
m e n . A n d if a s p a r r o w c a n n o t fall to the ground 
wi thou t his n o t i c e , is i t p r o b a b l e t h a t an empire can 
r i s e w i t h o u t his aid? We have been a s s u r e d . S i r , in 
the s a c r e d w r i t i n g s , t h a t " e x c e p t the Lord build the 
H o u s e t h e y l a b o u r in vain t h a t build i t . " I firmly 
b e l i e v e t h i s ; and I a l s o b e l i e v e t h a t w i t h o u t h i s 
c o n c u r r i n g a id w e s h a l l s u c c e e d in t h i s p o l i t i c a l 
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building no b e t t e r than the Builders of Babel: We shall 
be d i v i d e d by our l i t t l e p a r t i a l loca l i n t e r e s t s ; our 
p r o j e c t s w i l l be confounded , and we o u r s e l v e s shal l 
become a r e p r o a c h and bye word down to future ages . 
And wha t is w o r s e , mankind may h e r e a f t e r from th is 
u n f o r t u n a t e i n s t a n c e , d e s p a i r of e s t a b l i s h i n g G o v e r n -
ments by Human Wisdom and leave it to chance , war and 
conquest. 
I t h e r e f o r e b e g l e a v e to m o v e - - t h a t h e n c e f o r t h 
p r a y e r s imp lo r ing the a s s i s t a n c e of H e a v e n , and i ts 
b l e s s i n g s on o u r d e l i b e r a t i o n s , be h e l d in t h i s 
Assembly e v e r y morning before we proceed to business, 
and t h a t one or more of the C l e r g y of th is C i ty be 
requested to officiate in that s e rv i ce - -
Mr. Sharman seconded the motion. 
Mr. Hamil ton & several others expressed their appre-
hens ions t ha t h o w e v e r p r o p e r such a r e s o l u t i o n might 
have been at the beginning of the convention, it might 
a t t h i s l a t e d a y , 1. b r i n g on i t some d i s a g r e e a b l e 
a n i m a d v e r s i o n s . & 2 . lead the publ ic to b e l i e v e t h a t 
the e m b a r r a s s m e n t s and d i s s e n t i o n s wi th in the conven-
t ion , had sugges t ed th is m e a s u r e . It was answered by 
D o e r . F . Mr. She rman & o t h e r s , t h a t the past omission 
of a d u t y could not just i fy a fu r the r o m i s s i o n - - t h a t 
the r e j e c t i o n of such a p r o p o s i t i o n would e x p o s e the 
C o n v e n t i o n to more u n p l e a s a n t animadversions than the 
adop t ion of i t : and t h a t the a la rm out of doors that 
might be e x c i t e d for the s t a t e of things within, would 
at least be as likely to do good as i l l . 
Mr. Wi l l iamson, o b s e r v e d that the true cause of the 
omission could not be mistaken. The Convention had no 
funds.9 
D e s p i t e th is a n t i - c l i m a x , the e p i s o d e p roved b e n e f i c i a l 
by r e l a x i n g n e r v e s and reducing tempers . At any ra te , the 
C o n v e n t i o n did not b r eak up, a l though the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
q u e s t i o n was n o t f i n a l l y s e t t l e d u n t i l Ju ly 16 , by the 
adoption of the famed "Connecticut Compromise." 
F r a n k l i n had s t i l l a smal l , but not unimportant drama to 
enac t . I quote from Madison's Notes on the final day of the 
Convention: 
Monday Sepr. 17. 1787. In Convention 
The engrossed Constitution being read. 
Doer . Franklin rose with a speech in his hand, which 
he had reduced to writing for his own conveniency, and 
which Mr. Wilson read in the words following: 
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Mr. President 
I c o n f e s s t h a t t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l p a r t s of t h i s 
c o n s t i t u t i o n which I do not a t p r e s e n t approve , but I 
am not sure I shal l n e v e r a p p r o v e them: For having 
l ived long, I have exper ienced many instances of being 
ob l iged by b e t t e r in fo rmat ion or fuller c o n s i d e r a t i o n , 
to c h a n g e op in ions even on important subjects, which I 
o n c e thought r i gh t , but found to be o t h e r w i s e . It is 
t h e r e f o r e t h a t the older I grow, the more apt I am to 
doubt my own judgment, and to pay more respect to the 
judgmen t of o t h e r s . Most men indeed as well as most 
s e c t s in R e l i g i o n , think t h e m s e l v e s in possess ion of 
a l l t ru th , and t h a t wherever others differ from them it 
is so far e r r o r . S t e e l e , a P r o t e s t a n t in a Dedication 
t e l l s the P o p e , t h a t the only d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n our 
C h u r c h e s in t h e i r op in ions of the c e r t a i n t y of t he i r 
d o c t r i n e s is , the Church of Rome is infallible and the 
Church of England is n e v e r in the wrong. But though 
many p r i v a t e pe r sons think a lmos t as h ighly of t he i r 
own i n f a l l i b i l i t y as of t h a t of t he i r sect , few express 
i t so n a t u r a l l y as a c e r t a i n f rench l ady , who in a 
d i s p u t e w i t h h e r s i s t e r , said "I d o n ' t know how it 
h a p p e n s . S i s t e r but I m e e t wi th no body but myself , 
t h a t ' s a l w a y s in the r i g h t " - - " ! ] ^ n ^ a^  que moi qui a^  
toujours raison." 
In t h e s e s e n t i m e n t s . S i r , I a g r e e to th is Cons t i tu -
t ion wi th all i t s fau l t s , if they a r e such; b e c a u s e I 
th ink a g e n e r a l Government necessary for us, and there 
is no form of Government but what may be a blessing to 
t h e p e o p l e if wel l a d m i n i s t e r e d , and b e l i e v e f a r t h e r 
t h a t t h i s is l i k e l y to be w e l l a d m i n i s t e r e d for a 
c o u r s e of y e a r s , and can only end in Despo t i sm, as 
o t h e r forms have done before it, when the people shall 
become so c o r r u p t e d as to need d e s p o t i c Government , 
be ing incapab le of any other . I doubt too whether any 
o ther Convention we can obtain may be able to make a 
be t te r Consti tut ion. For when you assemble a number of 
men to have the a d v a n t a g e of t h e i r joint wisdom, you 
i n e v i t a b l y a s semble with those men, all t he i r p re ju -
d i c e s , t h e i r p a s s i o n s , t he i r e r r o r s of op in ion , t he i r 
l oca l i n t e r e s t s , and t h e i r selfish views. From such an 
A s s e m b l y can a p e r f e c t p roduc t ion be e x p e c t e d ? It 
t h e r e f o r e a s t o n i s h e s m e . S i r . to f ind t h i s s y s t e m 
a p p r o a c h i n g so n e a r to p e r f e c t i o n as it does ; and I 
t h i n k i t w i l l a s ton i sh our e n e m i e s , who a re wa i t i ng 
w i t h c o n f i d e n c e to h e a r t h a t our counc i l s a r e con -
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founded l ike those of the Bu i lde r s of Babe l ; and that 
our S ta tes are on the point of separat ion, only to meet 
h e r e a f t e r for t h e p u r p o s e of c u t t i n g one a n o t h e r ' s 
t h r o a t s . T h u s I c o n s e n t . S i r , to t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n 
b e c a u s e I expect no be t te r , and because I am not sure, 
that it is not the best . . . . 
On the w h o l e . S i r , I canno t help expressing a wish 
that every member of the Convention who may still have 
o b j e c t i o n s to i t , would with me, on this occasion doubt 
a l i t t l e of his own i n f a l l i b i l i t y - - a n d to make manifest 
our unanimity, put his name to this instrument.10 
In t h e s e w o r d s F r a n k l i n g a v e v o i c e to w h a t C l i n t o n 
R o s s i t e r , in h i s f i n e v o l u m e S e e d t i m e of the R e p u b l i c , 
h a p p i l y d e s c r i b e s as h i s g o s p e l of " p r a g m a t i s m " a n d 
"laissez-faireism." 
Fo l lowing his speech he, in collaboration with Gouverneur 
M o r r i s , pe r suaded the Convention to order that the Consti tu-
t ion be s igned by " S t a t e s , " a d e v i c e which e n a b l e d it to 
p r e s e n t t h e i n s t r u m e n t as " d o n e by the c o n s e n t of the 
' S t a t e s p r e s e n t , ' " t h e r e b y l eav ing the ind iv idua l member s 
who did not approve the document out in the cold; and it was 
w h i l e the s igning p r o c e e d e d in a c c o r d a n c e wi th th i s ru le 
t ha t - - t o quote--
Dr . F r a n k l i n lock ings t o w a r d s the P r e s i d e n t s Chair , at 
the back of which a rising sun happened to be painted, 
o b s e r v e d to a few members near him, that Pa in ters had 
found it d i f f icu l t to d i s t ingu i sh in t he i r a r t a r i s ing 
from a s e t t i n g sun. I h a v e , sa id he , of ten and often 
in the c o u r s e of the S e s s i o n , and the v i c i s s i t u d e s of 
my h o p e s and fea r s as to i ts i s sue , looked a t t h a t 
behind the P r e s i d e n t without being able to tell whether 
it was rising or sett ing: But now at length I have the 
h a p p i n e s s to know that it is a rising and not a set t ing 
Sun.l 1 
And at th i s po in t we migh t , s ave for a b r i e f summary, 
b r ing to a c l o s e the s to ry of Frankl in ' s contribution to the 
making of the Constitution of the United S ta tes , were it not 
n e c e s s a r y to g ive some a t t e n t i o n to a most e x t r a o r d i n a r y 
a t tempt to embroider the record, and in a way not at all to 
the enhancement of Franklin 's reputat ion. 
Under da t e of May 24, 1954, I received a le t te r from an 
Oklahoma f r iend , who had been a soldier in the Firs t World 
War, and a g a l l a n t one , but who had been v e r y "Amer ica 
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f i r s t " in h i s a t t i t u d e t o w a r d our p a r t i c i p a t i o n in World 
War I I . T h e l e t t e r e n c l o s e d a c l i p p i n g from the Tulsa 
Herald touching upon an incident which at date had Princeton 
much e x e r c i s e d , and enfo lded in the c l ipp ing was a st iff 
p r i n t e d c a r d which p u r p o r t e d to reproduce some remarks by 
F r a n k l i n a t the P h i l a d e l p h i a Convention, denunciatory of the 
Jews. It read, in part , as follows: 
In w h a t e v e r coun t ry Jews have sett led in any great 
number s , they have lowered the moral tone, depreciated 
the c o m m e r c i a l i n t e g r i t y , have s e g r e g a t e d themse lves , 
a n d have no t been a s s i m i l a t e d , have s n e e r e d a t and 
t r i e d to unde rmine the C h r i s t i a n r e l i g i o n , have bui l t 
up a s t a t e wi th in a s t a t e , and h a v e , when opposed , 
tr ied to s t rangle that country to death financially. 
If you do not e x c l u d e them from the United S ta tes , 
in the C o n s t i t u t i o n , in less than 200 y e a r s they will 
have swarmed in in such g r e a t numbers that they will 
d o m i n a t e and devour the land and change our form of 
government. 
These remarks were followed by the following statement: 
At the command of my mother while visiting the Benjamin 
F r a n k l i n Museum in P h i l a d e l p h i a , I cop i ed the above 
s ta tement from the Pinckney Papers . 
- -Mrs . Edward R. Dingley 
Washington, D.C. 
The " P r o p h e c y " s t ruck me at once as a phony, par t ly , I 
s u p p o s e , b e c a u s e I had n e v e r h e a r d of it b e f o r e . Beyond 
t h a t I was p r e s e n t l y informed t h a t t h e r e was no proof of 
t h e r e e v e r h a v i n g been a F r a n k l i n Museum. T h e r e was , 
h o w e v e r , t h e F r a n k l i n I n s t i t u t e a n d , of c o u r s e , t h i s 
S o c i e t y . A p p l y i n g to the former , I was put by i ts V ice -
P r e s i d e n t , Mr. A l l e n , on the t r a c k of a p a m p h l e t en t i t led : 
Benjamin F r a n k l i n V i n d i c a t e d - - A n E x p o s u r e of the Franklin 
" P r o p h e c y . " U n f o r t u n a t e l y the I n s t i t u t e did not possess a 
copy of th is document , but I soon learned that the Library 
of Congress did, and this the Pr inceton Library borrowed for 
my use. 
To cut a long s to ry s h o r t , i t a p p e a r s t h a t the "Proph-
e c y , " or an a p p r o x i m a t i o n to it, first saw the light of day 
in A s h e v i l l e , N . C . , on F e b r u a r y 3, 1934, in William Dudley 
P e l l e y ' s n o t o r i o u s p r o - N a z i s h e e t . T h e L i b e r a t i o n . Its 
s o u r c e was t h e r e a l l e g e d to be no t e s which w e r e kept by 
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C h a r l e s P i n c k n e y and were picturesquely enti t led "Chi t -Chats 
A r o u n d the T a b l e dur ing I n t e r m i s s i o n s " ; i . e . , in i n t e r v a l s 
b e t w e e n sessions of the Convention. Copies of the document 
w e r e admitted to be extremely rare because of the fact that 
Sherman had in his March to the Sea, been especial ly zealous 
in d e s t r o y i n g any p r i n t e d m a t t e r t h a t fell in his w a y . 
Lucki ly , one copy a t l e a s t had su rv ived the ho locaus t . It 
was the property of a descendant of Pinckney who apparently 
had not been in Sherman's line of march . Another pro-Nazi , 
or " S i l v e r S h i r t , " one R o b e r t Edward Edmonson, distributed 
in 1937 c o p i e s of the P e l l e y document among banke r s and 
b r o k e r s , the idea being to foil American Jewry from drawing 
us in to war wi th H i t l e r ' s G e r m a n y . Qu izzed by the l a t e 
P r o f e s s o r B e a r d , who seems to have headed the Vindicators , 
Edmonson said he "understood" that Madison Grant , well-known 
au tho r of The Passing of the Great Race - - the Teutonic race 
to w i t - - w a s i ts s o u r c e ; but G r a n t , when qu izzed in turn , 
a s s e r t e d t h a t wh i l e "some y e a r s ago" he had seen some 
s u p p o s e d r e m a r k s by F r a n k l i n b e f o r e t h e P h i l a d e l p h i a 
C o n v e n t i o n d i s p a r a g i n g the Jews , he had "no i n fo rma t ion 
w h a t e v e r as to the a u t h e n t i c i t y of the p a p e r . " P r o f e s s o r 
B e a r d c o n c l u d e s by q u o t i n g w i t h e v i d e n t a p p r o v a l , the 
v e r d i c t pas sed by the l a t e P r o f e s s o r J. F r a n k l i n Jameson , 
who was for many y e a r s a t the head of the M a n u s c r i p t s 
Division of the Library of Congress . Jameson pronounced the 
"Prophecy" "merely a forgery and a crude one at that ." 
I am c o n v i n c e d t h a t the au tho r of the " P r o p h e c y " was 
P e l l e y - - M r s . Dingley was a mere plagiar is t . The year before 
b r ing ing it out P e l l e y had founded the " S i l v e r S h i r t s , " an 
avowed p r o - N a z i o r g a n i z a t i o n , and the yea r following "The 
C h r i s t i a n P a r t y , w h i c h he d e s c r i b e d as C h r i s t i a n a n d 
R e p u b l i c a n " ; and first and last, he was the confessed author 
of s e v e r a l n o v e l s . " C h i t - C h a t s " e a s i l y f a l l s i n t o t h e 
c a t e g o r y of f i c t i o n , i t s v e r y t i t l e an a n a c h r o n i s m , I 
s t r o n g l y s u s p e c t . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , it is even more 
obvious , if p o s s i b l e , t h a t F r a n k l i n could not have w r i t t e n 
t h e d o c u m e n t . The fac t is t h a t , r e g a r d e d as a F r a n k l i n 
p r o d u c t i o n , the " P r o p h e c y " simply d o e s n ' t s c a n . It is not 
in t h e r h y t h m of F r a n k l i n ' s r e c o r d e d u t t e r a n c e s , e i t h e r 
spoken or w r i t t e n , or in that of his habitual posture toward 
men and t h i n g s . In th is c o n n e c t i o n , c o m p a r e i t wi th an 
acknowledged criticism of his, in a le t ter to John Adams, of 
wha t a p p e a r s to have been a p r o p o s a l by a Jewish money-
l e n d e r in r e g a r d to a l o a n to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . He 
i r o n i c a l l y r e c a l l s J a c o b ' s s canda lous dealings with Esau and 
the s e i z u r e of C a n a a n by the Jews who cut t h e i r v i c t i m s 
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" t h r o a t s in to the b a r g a i n " - - a p e r f o r m a n c e wh ich , F r a n k l i n 
w a s no d o u b t a w a r e , was c l o s e l y p a r a l l e l e d by our own 
dealings with the Indians in early days.12 
There is one minor mat ter that has to do with our general 
t o p i c . I c o n s i d e r i t wor th commenting upon in consequence 
of hav ing r e c e i v e d a visit from a noted columnist of one of 
the New York d a i l i e s wi th r e g a r d to i t . This g e n t l e m a n 
quo ted the la te Senator Barkley as having recent ly said that 
F r a n k l i n s u g g e s t e d in the Phi ladelphia Convention, when the 
ques t ion of t i t l e s was up, t h a t the Vice Pres ident ought to 
be c a l l e d "His super f luous E x c e l l e n c y . " Unlucki ly for this 
F r a n k l i n i a n qu ip , the sub jec t of t i t l e s was not discussed in 
the C o n v e n t i o n . It w a s , h o w e v e r , discussed at much length 
in t h e f i r s t C o n g r e s s , and in the c o u r s e of the h e a t e d 
debate on the subject - -Vice Pres ident John Adams and Senator 
Will iam Mac lay from th i s S t a t e , be ing the p r o t a g o n i s t s of 
t h e o p p o s e d v i e w s - - s o m e b o d y did m a k e t h a t sugges t i on , 
a c c o r d i n g to H a t c h and Shoup in their authori tat ive History 
of the V i c e P r e s i d e n c y ; but they don't say it was Franklin, 
and for good r e a s o n . The f i r s t Congress sat in New York 
City, and Franklin was not a member of i t . Even so, he may 
h a v e made the remark in Philadelphia, and it may have been 
p a s s e d a round , as any good th ing from F r a n k l i n ' s lips was 
apt to be; and if so, it was good prophecy of much that was 
to fol low, although it is so no longer. The Vice Presidency 
is today looking up. 
I sha l l c o n c l u d e with a charac te r iza t ion of Franklin by a 
fe l low d e l e g a t e , Wil l iam P i e r c e of G e o r g i a , and one by a 
French observer of the Convention's proceedings: 
D r . F r a n k l i n is w e l l k n o w n to be t h e g r e a t e s t 
p h y l o s o p h e r of the p r e s e n t a g e ; - - a l l the operat ions of 
n a t u r e he seems to u n d e r s t a n d , - - t h e very heavens obey 
h i m , a n d t h e Clouds y i e ld up t h e i r L igh tn ing to be 
impr i soned in his r od . But w h a t claim he has to the 
p o l i t i c i a n , p o s t e r i t y m u s t d e t e r m i n e . It is c e r t a i n 
that he does not shine much in public Council—he is no 
S p e a k e r , nor does he seem to l e t p o l i t i c s engage his 
a t t e n t i o n . He i s , h o w e v e r , a most ex t raord inary Man, 
and t e l l s a s t o r y in a s t y l e m o r e e n g a g i n g t h a n 
a n y t h i n g I e v e r h e a r d . Let his B i o g r a p h e r finish his 
cha rac te r .13 
Le D r . F r a n k l i n , P r e s i d e n t a c t u e l de c e t E t a t , est 
t r op b ien connu pour avo i r besoin des eloges que nous 
lui d e v o n s . II s e n t , plus que tout a u t r e A m e r i c a i n , 
que , pour ^ t r e v r a i m e n t p a t r i o t e , il faut e t r e I'ami de 
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la F r a n c e . Malheureusement ce phi losophe, qui a su 
braver les foudres du ciel et du Par lement d 'Angle -
t e r r e , ne lu t te ra plus longtemps cen t r e les infirmites 
de I ' a g e . Nous devons r e g r e t t e r que I ' immorta l i te 
n'appartienne qu'a son nom et a ses ecri ts . l4 
I g ive you, l a d i e s and gent lemen, Benjamin Frankl in , 
First American and first American Citizen of the World. 
Part Three 
The China Journey 
The Chinese republic established numerous contacts with 
Western countries in the 1920s when China enjoyed a flour-
ishing of creativity and intellectual freedom. Just as many 
Chinese were eager to learn from the West, so were many 
Westerners interested in exploring the Orient. Princeton 
University developed an affiliation with Yenching University 
in Beijing, and Edward Corwin spent the academic year of 
1928-1929 lecturing there and at Tsing Hua University and 
Boxer Indemnity College, The Corwin essays reprinted in 
this section appeared in English-language Chinese period-
icals soon after Corwin's arrival in the Orient, The 
Organic Law was the proposed Chinese constitution--the 
object of wide debate in 1928, Corwin examined its practi-
cal operation just as he often scrutinized the American 
Constitution, Moreover, he offered criticism and suggested 
improvements directly drawn from the American constitutional 
formula and experience, 
Corwin also studied extraterritoriality, a serious inroad 
into Chinese sovereignty and self-government. Here, too, 
his Western perspective prevailed. Corwin wrote of the 
issue's history, and he attempted to justify the sectors of 
legal authority that several foreign countries had carved 
from China, Corwin intended these essays for a Chinese 
audience. He clearly envisaged his role as that of a 
knowledgeable and objective counselor who might influence 
the shape of the evolving Chinese government. 
11 
Some Observations 
on the Organic Law 
The i r o n i c a l query is frequently heard in the United Sta tes , 
" W h a t ' s the C o n s t i t u t i o n b e t w e e n f r i ends?" The expression 
is sa id o r i g i n a l l y to have been e x t o r t e d from the notorious 
"Boss" Tweed, by the surprising and inopportune scruple of a 
f o l l o w e r . T h r e e hundred y e a r s e a r l i e r Sir John Selden had 
recorded in his Table Talk a similar quip: "What are twenty 
Acts of Parl iament amongst friends?" 
The new Organic Law of China, which was promulgated on 
O c t o b e r 3rd by the C e n t r a l P o l i t i c a l Counc i l , is decidedly 
"a c o n s t i t u t i o n among f r i ends , " but among friends who don't 
r e p o s e any too g r e a t amount of confidence in one another 's 
i n t e n t i o n s . It owes i ts o u t s t a n d i n g f e a t u r e s to t h e s e two 
facts . 
To speak more p r e c i s e l y , the Organic Law establishes in 
p o w e r , or r a t h e r it r e g u l a r i z e s the control of a revolution-
a r y a u t o c r a c y , but an a u t o c r a c y wi th a d i f f e r e n c e ; it is 
c o l l e g i a t e in f o r m - - a n d a lso in e s s e n c e , s i nce no man has 
y e t emerged as the real directing force of the government--
a n d i t is q u a l i f i e d by a p l edge to p r e p a r e the way by 
education for a truly democratic regime. 
The real power back of the Organic Law is, of course, the 
l e a d e r s h i p of the Kuomin tang , together with cer ta in military 
e l e m e n t s which have become more or less assimilated to it, 
and a r e a t any r a t e i n d i s p e n s a b l e to i t . This l e a d e r s h i p 
c o n s i s t s of a group of definite nameable persons and appears 
in t h r e e gu ises or d i sgu i ses : f i r s t , for p a r t y purposes it 
"Some Observations on the Organic Law." China Tomorrow, 
December 20, 1928, pp. 17-20. Reprinted by p e r m i s s i o n . 
[Bibliography Entry D69] 
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is the C e n t r a l E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e of the par ty , the body 
which to d a t e has d e t e r m i n e d the p e r s o n n e l and p r i n c i p a l 
o f f i c e r s of t h e new s y s t e m ; s e c o n d l y , for c o n s t i t u e n t 
purposes it is the C e n t r a l Poli t ical Council, the body which 
p r o m u l g a t e d t h e O r g a n i c Law; t h i r d l y , i t is a l s o t h e 
Gove rnmen t S t a t e Counc i l , which is c rea ted by the Organic 
Law and under it has final power of decision on all govern-
menta l p rog rammes and p o l i c i e s . The immediate purpose of 
t h e O r g a n i c Law is^  to hold t o g e t h e r the l e a d e r s h i p thus 
o r g a n i s e d as the e s s e n t i a l cond i t i on of i ts r e t a i n i n g the 
governing power over China. 
The c h a r a c t e r of the Organic Law as the instrument of a 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y a u t o c r a c y a p p e a r s a t the ve ry o u t s e t in the 
fac t t ha t it i nvokes in i ts P r e a m b l e no more u l t i m a t e or 
w i d e - s p r e a d popu la r a u t h o r i t y than the Kuomin tang i t se l f . 
T h e r e is no r e f e r e n c e to "We t h e P e o p l e , " a s t r i k i n g 
omission to the s t uden t of modern d e m o c r a t i c const i tut ions. 
T h e r e a r e also o t h e r n o t a b l e omissions, as, for instance, of 
any s t i pu l a t i on r e g a r d i n g the l eng th of o f f ic ia l t e rms ; of 
any p r o v i s i o n s touch ing the e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s of loca l 
g o v e r n m e n t ; of any a t t e m p t to define even as to its larger 
e s s e n t i a l s the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the E x e c u t i v e and the 
L e g i s l a t i v e D e p a r t m e n t s (Yuan) . T h e s e va r ious r e t i c e n c e s 
all warn us t h a t such ques t ions remain for determination by 
the powers behind the throne at their discretion and to meet 
their necessity or convenience. 
S t i l l a n o t h e r f e a t u r e of the O r g a n i c Law tha t stamps it 
wi th a r e v o l u t i o n a r y and a u t o c r a t i c c h a r a c t e r is the p a r t 
which it a s s igns to e x e c u t i v e p o w e r . Not only does th is 
c o v e r v i r t u a l l y the e n t i r e field of g o v e r n m e n t ( C h a p . II), 
but the de f in i t i on laid down a t the outset of the power of 
the N a t i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t ( C h a p . I) places its chief emphasis 
on the s p e c i f i c a l l y e x e c u t i v e powers of War and Diplomacy. 
And not only is the e x e c u t i v e power ment ioned before the 
l e g i s l a t i v e power , c o n t r a r y to g e n e r a l p r a c t i c e h i t h e r t o in 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d r a f t i ng , but the Executive Yuan has been the 
f i r s t to be o r g a n i s e d . I t i s , in f a c t , t h e f u n c t i o n i n g 
g o v e r n m e n t of C h i n a t o - d a y , whi le the o t h e r Yuan s t i l l 
remain for the most par t mere paper projects . 
But as I also remarked, one major purpose of the Organic 
Law is _to^  keep the e x i s t i n g c u s t o d i a n s of p o l i t i c a l power 
t o g e t h e r . T h i s is e v i d e n c e d in the e l a b o r a t e p r o c e d u r e s 
which a r e laid down for l eg is la t ion , t rea ty making, and the 
l i k e . A b i l l w i l l o r d i n a r i l y be i n t r o d u c e d i n t o t h e 
L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan from the Executive Yuan. It must then be 
passed by the former. But even after that happens it cannot 
be p romulga ted as law unt i l it has been a p p r o v e d by the 
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S t a t e Counc i l and has been s igned by the President of the 
N a t i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t and counters igned by the Presidents of 
the five Yuan . Such a p r o c e d u r e is c l e a r l y i n d i c a t i v e of 
r e c o g n i t i o n by the f ramers of the O r g a n i c Law t h a t the 
c o o p e r a t i o n of p rev ious ly a n t a g o n i s t i c i n t e r e s t s was to be 
s e c u r e d only by furnishing them with e v e r y possible assur-
a n c e a g a i n s t d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s s u r p r i s e and w i t h e v e r y 
pos s ib l e o p p o r t u n i t y to check one ano the r . Thus while the 
O r g a n i c Law e x h i b i t s a concent ra t ion of governing power in 
the hands of a small g roup , i t e x h i b i t s wi th even g r e a t e r 
c l a r i t y the e s s e n t i a l n a t u r e of th is group as an equilibrium 
m o r e or l e s s p r e c a r i o u s a m o n g d i v e r s e i n t e r e s t s . What 
M o n t e s q u i e u r e m a r k e d of the Engl ish C o n s t i t u t i o n is the 
e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , a p p l i e s w i t h t w o - f o l d fo rce to the 
Organic Law--before any part of the mechanism can move all 
the p a r t s must move t o g e t h e r . That is to say, in order to 
work a t al l the O r g a n i c Law r e q u i r e s that a single unified 
group be in control of all its pa r t s . 
Although projected primarily as a t rea ty , the Organic Law 
is a l s o m e a n t to s e r v e as a C o n s t i t u t i o n and to embody 
elements of a permanent constitution for China. 
I t s f i r s t f e a t u r e from th i s po in t of view is i t s i n c o r -
p o r a t i o n of t h e c l a s s i c p r i n c i p l e of t h e s e p a r a t i o n of 
p o w e r s in to L e g i s l a t i v e , E x e c u t i v e , and j u d i c i a l , to which 
a r e added two o t h e r of much more l imi ted n a t u r e , that of 
E x a m i n a t i o n of c a n d i d a t e s for publ ic o f f i ce , and t h a t of 
S u p e r v i s i o n (or C e n s o r s h i p ) and A u d i t . T h e q u e s t i o n 
s u g g e s t s i t s e l f w h e t h e r the l eg i s l a t ive and execut ive powers 
a r e i n t e n d e d to be kep t d i s t i n c t as under the A m e r i c a n 
P r e s i d e n t i a l s y s t e m , or blended as under the British Cabinet 
s y s t e m . S u c h i n d i c a t i o n s as we h a v e squin t t oward the 
l a t t e r r a t h e r t h a n t h e f o r m e r . A r t i c l e 22 of the Law 
r e a d s : "The following mat ters shall be decided at a meeting 
of the E x e c u t i v e Yuan: (1) Bi l l s on Legislat ive mat ters to 
b e i n t r o d u c e d in the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan; (2) Budge t s to be 
s u b m i t t e d to t h e L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan; (3) A m n e s t i e s to be 
submi t t ed to the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan; (4) D e c l a r a t i o n of war 
. . . c o n c l u s i o n of t r e a t i e s , and o t h e r i m p o r t a n t i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l m a t t e r s to be submi t t ed to the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan." 
Thus , as under the Cabinet system, the executive is to have 
a l e g i s l a t i v e i n i t i a t i v e , w h i l e , c o n v e r s e l y , a l l i m p o r t a n t 
m a t t e r s a r e u l t i m a t e l y to t a k e l e g i s l a t i v e form. E s s e n t i a l 
q u e s t i o n s , h o w e v e r , r emain unanswered: whether members of 
the o t h e r Yuan may hold seats in the legislature; whether in 
c a s e of d i s a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n the Executive and Legislative 
Yuan, the former will be expected to resign, or may, in the 
a l t e r n a t i v e , d i s s o l v e t h e l a t t e r ; w h e t h e r t h e r e is to be 
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" m i n i s t e r i a l s o l i d a r i t y " u n d e r t h e l e a d e r s h i p of t h e 
President of the National Government; whether the members of 
the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan may i n t r o d u c e l eg i s l a t i ve proposals of 
t h e i r own; to w h a t e x t e n t the Leg i s l a t ive Yuan may amend 
m e a s u r e s c o m i n g from the E x e c u t i v e Y u a n - - a n e s p e c i a l l y 
i m p o r t a n t ques t ion in r e l a t i o n to the b u d g e t . Unt i l such 
ques t ions have been determined by formal legislation or by a 
s e t t l e d c o u r s e of p r a c t i c e the final c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the 
N a t i o n a l Government according to the conventional ca tegor ies 
is impossible. 
In p o i n t of f a c t , s u c h q u e s t i o n s a r e t o - d a y l a r g e l y 
a c a d e m i c b e c a u s e of the in i t i a l charac te r of the Legislative 
Yuan, which is t h a t of a mere appointive body. Ar t ic le 27 
of the O r g a n i c Law r e a d s : "The Legis la t ive Yuan shall be 
composed of from f o r t y - n i n e to n i n e t y - n i n e m e m b e r s , who 
s h a l l be a p p o i n t e d by t h e N a t i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t a t the 
i n s t a n c e of the P r e s i d e n t of the said Yuan ." T h e revolu-
t i o n a r y and a u t o c r a t i c g e n e s i s of the O r g a n i c Law could 
s c a r c e l y a p p e a r more s t r i k i n g l y . But eventua l ly , it is fair 
to assume, the Legislative Yuan is planned to become a truly 
popu la r o r g a n . It is t h e r e f o r e , w o r t h wh i l e to d i scuss i t 
b r i e f ly as a f e a t u r e of p e r m a n e n t constitutional arrangement 
in C h i n a . From th i s po in t of view i t s s a l i e n t c h a r a c t e r -
i s t i c s a r e i t s u n i c a m e r a l m a k e - u p and i ts c o m p a r a t i v e l y 
smal l s i z e , both of which a r e of d e c i d e d i n t e r e s t to the 
polit ical sc ient is t . 
W h e t h e r a l e g i s l a t u r e s h o u l d h a v e a second c h a m b e r 
d e p e n d s in t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e on w h e t h e r more than one 
p r i n c i p l e of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is a d v a n t a g e o u s l y a v a i l a b l e in 
the s t a t e under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . In G r e a t B r i t a i n the House 
of Lords and the House of Commons are based on two radical ly 
d i f f e r e n t p r i n c i p l e s e a c h of which long rep resen ted a vital 
p r i n c i p l e of soc i a l o rgan i sa t i on in that country. The House 
of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and the Senate of the United S ta tes are 
a lso r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of d i f f e r e n t but v i t a l i n t e r e s t s . H e r e 
in C h i n a i t w o u l d s e e m t h a t o n e house might be made 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of popu la t ion and the o t h e r of l o c a l i t i e s - -
s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e p r o v i n c e s . Such an a r r a n g e m e n t would 
p e r f o r m t h e g r e a t s e r v i c e of a l l a y i n g , if not a l t o g e t h e r 
avo id ing , the susp ic ion t h a t one section of the country was 
utilising the centra l government to exploit other sec t ions . 
On the o t h e r hand, even if this comes about, it is to be 
hoped t h a t n e i t h e r house of the recons t ruc ted Yuan will be 
e n l a r g e d beyond wha t is absolutely necessary to give effect 
to the p r i n c i p l e on which it is b a s e d . The function of a 
l e g i s l a t u r e is t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n of p u b l i c o p i n i o n , t h e 
c r i t i c i s m of m e a s u r e s of g o v e r n m e n t , and debate leading to 
THE ORGANIC LAW / 119 
d e c i s i o n . L e g i s l a t i v e bod ies of the s i ze of the A m e r i c a n 
House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a r e no to r ious ly ineffective in the 
l a s t n a m e d ro l e , w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t the r e a l work of 
l e g i s l a t i o n is devo lved upon c o m m i t t e e s . In c o n t r a s t wi th 
t h e i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of l a r g e l e g i s l a t i v e bod ie s in d i s cus -
s i o n l e a d i n g to d e c i s i o n s t a n d s the o r d i n a r y c o r p o r a t i o n 
d i r e c t o r a t e . While d e b a t e in the American Congress rarely 
p e r s u a d e s anybody it is a notable fact that the decisions of 
c o m p a n y d i r e c t o r s in the Uni ted S t a t e s a r e in the o v e r -
w h e l m i n g n u m b e r of c a s e s u n a n i m o u s . A n d s t i l l m o r e 
c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e of the va lue of d i scuss ion in small 
g r o u p s , e v e n w h e r e sha rp ly opposed i n t e r e s t s a r e r e p r e -
s e n t e d , is a f f o r d e d by t h e p r o c e e d i n g s of c o n c i l i a t i o n 
b o a r d s for the s e t t l e m e n t of d i spu te s b e t w e e n labour and 
c a p i t a l . S t a t i s t i c s show that these arr ive very commonly at 
u n a n i m o u s or n e a r l y u n a n i m o u s v e r d i c t s . T h e f u r t h e r 
i l l u s t r a t i o n of the same point by the common law jury needs 
only passing mention. 
C h a p t e r IV of the O r g a n i c Ac t provides for the Judicial 
Yuan . In i t s o r i g i n a l form the chapter made no mention of 
" c o u r t s , " and a l though th is omission has since been supplied 
the chapter still remains fragmentary. 
But in a n o t h e r r e s p e c t chap t e r IV is more reveal ing. It 
s h o w s t h a t C h i n a has de f i n i t e l y a d o p t e d the C o n t i n e n t a l 
sy s t em of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o u r t s in p r e f e r e n c e to the Anglo 
A m e r i c a n sys tem of Rule of Law. The point is the bet ter 
w o r t h no t ing since it is likely to have the effect of making 
t h e s t u d y of C o n t i n e n t a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law an i m p o r t a n t 
feature of poli t ical science and legal curricula in China. 
In c h a p t e r V e s t a b l i s h i n g the E x a m i n a t i o n Yuan China 
c a p i t a l i s e s h e r own i n s t i t u t i o n a l h i s t o r y in n o t e w o r t h y 
f a s h i o n . The i m p o r t a n c e of the old e x a m i n a t i o n system in 
s t a b i l i s i n g g o v e r n m e n t by d rawing the t a l e n t of society to 
i t s s e r v i c e h a s r a r e l y r e c e i v e d due a p p r e c i a t i o n from 
c o m m e n t a t o r s on C h i n e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s . In th is r e s p e c t it 
s e r v e d much the same purpose as has the Br i t i sh peerage , 
wh ich by a b s o r b i n g t a l e n t from the ranks long kept popular 
d i s c o n t e n t from d e v e l o p i n g a d a n g e r o u s leadership; while in 
a n o t h e r r e s p e c t it was r e m i n i s c e n t r a t h e r of the C a t h o l i c 
C h u r c h of the Middle A g e s , s i nce the r anks and privileges 
conferred by it were not hered i ta ry . The system was thus at 
o n c e c o n s e r v a t i v e and d e m o c r a t i c , r e a l i s i n g wi th unique 
success Napoleon's demand for "an open career to ta lents ." 
To be su r e , c iv i l s e r v i c e e x a m i n a t i o n s a r e employed in 
o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t s , but only for subo rd ina t e offices. China 
h a s a l w a y s u s e d them even for the h i g h e s t o f f i ces , and 
a p p a r e n t l y means to c o n t i n u e doing s o . This exal tat ion of 
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the e x a m i n a t i o n p r i n c i p l e , one immed ia t e purpose of which 
p e r h a p s is to e n f o r c e t e s t s of party regular i ty , is indeed a 
c o n t r i b u t i o n of m o r e t h a n p a s s i n g s i g n i f i c a n c e , for t he 
t e n d e n c y of gove rnmen t the world over to-day is to become 
b u r e a u c r a t i c and p rofess iona l , and this tendency is bound to 
i n c r e a s e w i t h t h e e x t e n s i o n a n d g r o w i n g c o m p l e x i t y of 
governmental functions. 
We come next to the Control Yuan (Chap. IV) the business 
of w h i c h w i l l be to s u p e r v i s e the work ing of the o t h e r 
organs of government, and which is vested with the power of 
impeachment over the members of the other Yuan. Here again 
C h i n a is e n d e a v o u r i n g to c a p i t a l i s e he r own i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
h i s t o r y , so t h a t it is wi th some r e l u c t a n c e t h a t I confess 
my d o u b t s as to t h e w o r k a b i l i t y of th is f e a t u r e of t he 
O r g a n i c Law. The problem being deal t with by this par t of 
t h e O r g a n i c Law is a d i f f icu l t one for two r e a s o n s , t he 
f i r s t of wh ich is conveyed by the old query, "Quis custodiet 
i p s o s c u s t o d e s " ("Who t h e n w i l l s t a n d g u a r d o v e r t h e 
g u a r d i a n s t h e m s e l v e s " ) ? The second c o n s i s t s in the d i f f i -
cu l ty of, a t one and the same t ime , having the advantages 
and avo id ing the d a n g e r s of d i s c r e t i o n a r y a u t h o r i t y . The 
p r o b l e m of c r e a t i n g a due r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on the p a r t of 
d i s c r e t i o n a r y o f f i c e r s h a s n e v e r y e t been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
so lved in any c o n s t i t u t i o n . The C a b i n e t system establishes 
p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i t is t r u e ; bu t t h i s is n o t a 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to s t a n d a r d s , i t is on ly r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to 
the expediency of a pa r ty . In the United S ta tes three forms 
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i l l be found , a l l i m p e r f e c t in t h e i r 
f u n c t i o n i n g ; f i r s t , r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to t h e o r d i n a r y l a w , 
which is c a p a b l e of r e a c h i n g a c t u a l v i o l a t i o n s of the law, 
and s o m e t i m e s does ; s e c o n d l y , i m p e a c h m e n t , a l e g i s l a t i v e 
func t ion , and one which has g e n e r a l l y been found unwork-
a b l e - - i n J e f f e r s o n ' s w o r d s , "a m e r e s c a r e c r o w " ; t h i r d l y , 
p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , t h a t i s , a c c o u n t a b i l i t y to t h e 
v o t e r s on e l e c t i o n day , wh ich is usual ly nil , otherwise the 
Republican party would hardly have been returned to power at 
t he e l e c t i o n just h e l d . As one sat i r is t acutely remarked in 
t h e r e c e n t c a m p a i g n : "The R e p u b l i c a n p a r t y is a forward 
looking party because it does not ca re to look backward." 
Tha t , t h e r e f o r e , the framers of the Chinese Organic Law 
did not put c o n f i d e n c e in any of t h e s e d e v i c e s is h a r d l y 
s t r a n g e . But is the method they have contrived any bet ter? 
A c e n s o r ought obviously to be a man of par ts , and such a 
pe r son is not l ike ly to be content with making his office a 
s i n e c u r e ; he will want to make it act ive and important . He 
wi l l , in o t h e r w o r d s - - w o r d s of American s lang--be very apt 
to b e c o m e a " M e d d l e s o m e M a t t i e . " T h e r e is a C h i n e s e 
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a p h o r i s m to t h e e f f e c t t h a t "If you t rus t a man do not 
d i s t r u s t him; if you d i s t r u s t him do not t ru s t him." The 
c e n s o r a t e , h o w e v e r , is a so r t of o r g a n i s e d d i s t r u s t of the 
r e s t of the g o v e r n m e n t . No doubt o f f i c i a l s wi l l depart at 
t imes from the paths of official rec t i tude . When they do so 
they should be p r o c e e d e d a g a i n s t under the o r d i n a r y law; 
t h a t is to s a y , t h e c e n s o r a t e is h a r d l y r e q u i r e d , if i t s 
only funct ion is to d u p l i c a t e the ordinary machinery of the 
l aw . On the o t h e r hand , if the censora te goes beyond this 
i t wi l l be c o n s t a n t l y in t rud ing upon the n e c e s s a r y latitude 
of judgment of other departments , which would be mischievous 
for t w o r e a s o n s . It would make for of f ic ia l t imid i ty in 
o t h e r d e p a r t m e n t s ; a n d . i t wou ld of ten s e t i g n o r a n c e in 
j u d g m e n t o v e r in f o r m e d n e s s , s i n c e no c e n s o r a t e c a n 
o r d i n a r i l y m a k e i t s e l f m a s t e r of all the data underlying the 
d e c i s i o n s of o t h e r o f f i ce r s and depa r tmen t s ; or if it could, 
then such unusual t a l e n t should be b e t t e r employed than in 
f au l t f i nd ing . Nor can the c e n s o r a t e fail to offer a handle 
to m a l i g n a n t s in s e a r c h of an oppor tun i ty to embarrass the 
p a r t y in p o w e r , or such departments and officers as provoke 
their special mal ice . 
The argument for the Control Yuan doubtless res ts , as was 
s u g g e s t e d , upon the n e c e s s i t y t h e r e had been for a similar 
o rgan under the Empi re ; and it is t rue t h a t the s t o ry of 
t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n h a s i l l u s t r i o u s p a g e s . Bu t t h i s is just 
b e c a u s e t h e i m p e r i a l c e n s o r a c t e d under such a we igh ty 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; he l i t e r a l l y t o o k h i s l i f e in h i s h a n d s . 
There is no evidence that the Control Yuan would be similar-
ly curbed. 
I m i g h t add t h a t t h e c e n s o r s h i p i d e a was o r i g i n a l l y 
u t i l i s ed in two of the s t a t e s of the United S ta te s , Pennsyl-
van ia and Vermont . It has long since disappeared from both 
t h e s e g o v e r n m e n t s , principally because it was found that the 
c e n s o r s d iv ided on p a r t y and personal l ines. Their verdicts 
w e r e d i s c r e d i t e d wi th a l a r g e part of the population before 
they w e r e u t t e r e d . The Audit feature of Chapter VI is, of 
c o u r s e , t h o r o u g h l y s o u n d so far as i t goes , for i t s t i l l 
awaits development by appropriate legislat ion. 
The O r g a n i c Law is only a s k e l e t o n of g o v e r n m e n t , as 
indeed a c o n s t i t u t i o n should b e . Even so, there are points 
a t wh ich it m igh t we l l be e l a b o r a t e d a t an e a r l y d a t e ; I 
sugges t two . So v a s t a count ry as China must always rely 
for i t s e f f e c t i v e g o v e r n m e n t to a l a r g e e x t e n t on loca l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , or e l s e such a c o n c e n t r a t i o n of power a t the 
c e n t r e as w i l l a l w a y s t h r e a t e n a r e v i v a l of i m p e r i a l i s m . 
Should not then the Organic Law adumbrate a sort of federal-
i sm, o n e by d e v o l u t i o n no doubt , but s t i l l involv ing the 
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p r i n c i p l e t h a t as much a u t h o r i t y sha l l be r e l e g a t e d to the 
p r o v i n c e s as poss ib le? Along with this fac t - - the great size 
of C h i n a - - g o e s moreover the sure prospect that the political 
e d u c a t i o n of t h e p e o p l e w i l l p r o c e e d ve ry uneven ly in 
d i f f e r e n t p a r t s . By t h e e x p e d i e n t of d e v o l u t i o n t h e 
d e l e g a t i o n of functions of government to the provinces could 
be m a d e to march with the d e v e l o p m e n t of the p o l i t i c a l 
c a p a c i t y of the va r ious p r o v i n c i a l p o p u l a t i o n s . Nor would 
t h e s e be the only advantages that might be ant icipated from 
such a quasi f ede ra l i sm, or even pe rhaps its g rea tes t ones. 
It would c r e a t e a m u l t i p l i c i t y of v i t a l un i t s of government 
w h i c h wou ld be b o t h s c h o o l s for p o l i t i c a l t r a i n i n g and 
l a b o r a t o r i e s for p o l i t i c a l e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n . It would c h e c k 
the o v e r d e v e l o p m e n t of a c e n t r a l b u r e a u c r a c y ; and by the 
s a m e t o k e n i t wou ld b r i n g m a n y of t h e p r o c e s s e s and 
a c t i v i t i e s of g o v e r n m e n t under d i r e c t public scrutiny in the 
loca l un i t s . The a rgument a g a i n s t too much government is 
of ten as Si r F r e d e r i c k Pollock has pointed out, an argument 
against too much central government. 
Not less i m p o r t a n t is the omission from the Organic Law 
of a B i l l of R i g h t s . It a f fords no r e c o g n i t i o n w h a t e v e r 
t h a t the ind iv idua l has r i g h t s a g a i n s t the g o v e r n m e n t , an 
idea which l ies a t the v e r y roo ts of the democrat ic theory 
of s t a t e . It should neve r be f o r g o t t e n t h a t d e m o c r a c y is 
only a d e v i c e looking t o w a r d s se l f -government . It res ts on 
the fundamenta l no t ion t h a t the u l t i m a t e source of all just 
p o w e r is the human ind iv idua l , from which it n e c e s s a r i l y 
fol lows t h a t the r i gh t of even a d e m o c r a t i c government to 
c o n t r o l the ind iv idua l has l i m i t s . But not only is a Bill 
of Rights an a t t e m p t to r e c o g n i s e th is wholesome principle 
of the autonomy of the ind iv idua l , and the i n h e r e n t limits 
of a u t h o r i t y ; i t a l so has va lue for the r e i n f o r c e m e n t of 
g o v e r n m e n t i t s e l f in i t s r i g h t f u l a u t h o r i t y b e c a u s e i t 
c o n s t i t u t e s an a s s u r a n c e a t the o u t s e t aga ins t governmental 
e x c e s s e s . If the c i t i z e n is a s su red t h a t the g o v e r n m e n t 
will pay for any property which it takes from him for public 
i m p r o v e m e n t s , his a t t i t u d e towards such projects will be far 
d i f f e r en t than if the g o v e r n m e n t has a f ree hand to seize 
p r o p e r t y without making compensation; and the ci t izen who is 
a s s u r e d of t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of h a b e a s co rpus wi l l be far 
less apt to s e t up as a c e n s o r of the just severi ty of the 
laws. 
To r e - i t e r a t e , t h e p r e d o m i n a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the 
O r g a n i c Law is t h a t i t e s t a b l i s h e s a p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y 
a u t o c r a c y in p o w e r . This a u t o c r a c y is qua l i f i ed by the 
m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n of those who wie ld it to u n d e r t a k e the 
p o l i t i c a l e d u c a t i o n of the masses so t h a t the l a t t e r sha l l 
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be e n a b l e d in t ime to assume u l t ima t e c o n t r o l . What the 
p r e s e n t sys tem aims a t , in o t h e r t e rms , is the a r r e s t in 
m i d - c a r e e r of a r evo lu t i on with a view to con t inu ing it 
under gu idance and d i r e c t i o n . T h a t is a difficult task, but 
not an imposs ib le o n e . The f ramers of the Constitution of 
the Uni ted S ta tes accomplished it, and Bismarck accomplished 
it in G e r m a n y . The founders of the F r e n c h Const i tu t ional 
Monarchy of 1789 fa i led in their similar effort, as did also 
the founders of the Russian Republ ic of 1917. The f i rs t 
duty incumben t upon the present rulers of China is indicated 
by t h e s e f a c t s . It is tha t of making their power viable by 
e n l a r g i n g the foundat ion on which it r e s t s . The pyramid of 
p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y in China today s t a n d s on i t s apex, and 
obviously it must be eased to a broader and less precarious 
b a s i s as s p e e d i l y as p o s s i b l e . Two th ings a t l e a s t a r e 
n e c e s s a r y : f i r s t , the s i n c e r e c o - o p e r a t i o n of the e x i s t i n g 
e l e m e n t s of party leadership as against the endeavour on the 
p a r t of th is or t h a t e l e m e n t , or th is or that individual, to 
p l a y a l o n e h a n d ; s e c o n d l y , the e x t e n s i o n of the p a r t y 
m e m b e r s h i p as swif t ly as poss ib le to all a s s i m i l a b l e and 
i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t s of the n a t i o n , and the r ap id absorption 
of t h e a v a i l a b l e p o l i t i c a l t a l e n t of the n a t i o n . T^ the 
l a t t e r m e a s u r e t h e r e i_s, i_n fac t , only one a l t e r n a t i v e , the 
i n d e f i n i t e c o n t i n u a n c e of m i l i t a r i s m . N o r is t h i s to 
ques t ion the soundness of the One Par ty idea when properly 
a p p l i e d . Any g o v e r n m e n t based on revolu t ion must exclude 
from power those who do not accept the basic principles of 
the t r i umphan t c a u s e . Yet such t e s t p r i n c i p l e s should be 
b a s i c ; and w i t h i n t h e p r e c i n c t s w h i c h t h e y m a r k ou t 
d iscuss ion and diversity should be welcomed. Within the One 
P a r t y , and in no wise c h a l l e n g i n g i t s d i s t i n c t i v e p r i n c i -
p l e s , should a r i s e " p a r t i e s " in the moderated and modulated 
s ense of W e s t e r n d e m o c r a t i c p r a c t i c e . The i r e x i s t e n c e is 
the i n d i s p e n s a b l e cond i t i on of p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y , for unless 
t h e r e is an a l t e r n a t i v e p a r t y to which he may turn , what 
s e c u r i t y h a s a l o n e c r i t i c of t h e powers t h a t be? To 
r e p e a t , the c o - e x i s t e n c e of s t rong contending groups within 
t he a g r e e d p r e m i s e s of the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e i^ 
the c o n d i t i o n of s ine qua non of p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y , and i_n 
the last analysis of individual l iber ty . 
Returning to the Organic Law--After all is said and done, 
i t s m o s t n o t a b l e a s p e c t is i ts e n d e a v o r to e s t a b l i s h an 
i n s t i t u t i o n in power i n s t ead of an i n d i v i d u a l . This e f for t 
has n e c e s s i t a t e d r e c o u r s e to an i n t r i c a t e and cumbersome 
c o u r s e of p r o c e d u r e a t e s s e n t i a l p o i n t s , y e t o n e n o t 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e e l a b o r a t e t h a n t h a t of c e r t a i n o t h e r 
c o n s t i t u t i o n s , for e x a m p l e , that of the United S t a t e s . What 
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has kept such c o n s t i t u t i o n s w o r k a b l e instruments of govern-
ment is "party politics" as the West knows them. Abstract ly 
t h e r e is no reason for thinking that the Organic Law is not 
an e n t i r e l y f eas ib le v e h i c l e of p a r t y government. Whether, 
on the o t h e r hand , the O r g a n i c Law might be expected to 
endu re for any g r e a t l eng th of time as the instrument of a 
m u l t i p l e - h e a d e d a u t o c r a c y is a d i f f e r e n t question, regarding 
which I should h e s i t a t e to v e n t u r e p r e d i c t i o n . As George 
E l io t sens ib ly sa id , "of al l forms of human er ror prophecy 
is surely the most gratuitous." 
12 
Extraterritoriality: an American View 
T h e E x t r a l i t y I s s u e is due in no small m e a s u r e to the 
a c c i d e n t t h a t I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law was o r i g i n a l l y e r e c t e d so 
l a r g e l y on t h e n o t i o n of t e r r i t o r i a l s o v e r e i g n t y . The 
sub j ec t s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, we a r e taught, are sovereign 
s t a t e s , and a s o v e r e i g n s t a t e is one which has jurisdiction 
o v e r a l l p e r s o n s and t h i n g s wi th i ts t e r r i t o r i a l bounda-
r i e s . T h i s c o n c e p t i o n is an u n n e c e s s a r i l y n a r r o w o n e . 
A b s t r a c t l y t h e r e is no r e a s o n why International Law should 
not have been founded on more c a t h o l i c p r inc ip les , pr inci-
p l e s w h i c h a d m i t t e d of m o r e v a r i e t y in t h e j u r i s t i c 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of s t a t e s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y as by th is very 
p r i n c i p l e of t e r r i t o r i a l s o v e r e i g n t y , when p r e s s e d to i ts 
logical conclusions International Law is not law at all! 
In p o i n t of f a c t I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law has begun wi th in 
r e c e n t y e a r s to show itself somewhat less hide-bound in this 
r e s p e c t . S e v e r a l member s of the League of N a t i o n s fall 
c o n s i d e r a b l y sho r t of m e e t i n g the s t a n d a r d de f in i t ion of a 
s o v e r e i g n s t a t e . W h a t is m o r e , t h e r e a r e even t o - d a y 
e x c e p t i o n s to t h e t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e m o s t 
c o m p l e t e l y s o v e r e i g n s t a t e s , which represent the pers is tence 
in I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law of an e a r l i e r p r i n c i p l e . A sovere ign 
on v i s i t c a r r i e s with him his own law; and diplomatic agents 
a r e n o t s u b j e c t to t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of the c o u n t r i e s to 
which they are accred i ted . Earl ier a like immunity extended 
to c o n s u l a r a g e n t s and even to fore ign m e r c h a n t s , who at 
" E x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l i t y : an American View." 
Review, December 22, 1928, pp. 154.-156. 
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t h a t per iod w e r e about the only p r i v a t e persons to venture 
abroad. 
The immunizing p r i n c i p l e thus i l lustrated is known as the 
pe r sona l i t y of the law, and owed its appearance in the West 
wi th in h i s t o r i c a l t imes to the Teutonic tr ibes which invaded 
the Roman E m p i r e . For some cen tu r i e s following the over-
throw of the Wes te rn Empi re the c o n q u e r i n g t r i b e s , wh i l e 
app ly ing t he i r own laws to their own peoples, accorded the 
c o n q u e r e d Romans the r e c i p r o c a l p r i v i l e g e . F u r t h e r m o r e , 
w h e r e the t r i b e s mingled e a c h h a b i t u a l l y app l i ed i ts own 
cus toms in c a s e s invo lv ing i t s own m e m b e r s . The ultimate 
a b s o r p t i o n of t h e j e a l o u s p r i n c i p l e of t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s -
d i c t i on from the Roman Law was due, in the first instance, 
to t h e a m a l g a m a t i o n of p o p u l a t i o n s , and was c o m p l e t e d 
by the r i se of the feudal system, when the law of the fief 
succeeded that of still indentifiable tribal e lements . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e p r i n c i p l e of " p e r s o n a l i t y " - - o r as we 
t o - d a y t e r m i t , " e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l i t y " - - h a s an o b v i o u s 
c o n v e n i e n c e for c e r t a i n situations, and has always tended to 
r e a s s e r t i t s v a l i d i t y in the p r e s e n c e of such s i t u a t i o n s . 
One such situation is where members of one civil isation have 
found t h e m s e l v e s in numbers and for a l eng th of t ime in 
r e g i o n s s u b j e c t t o a s h a r p l y d i f f e r e n t c i v i l i s a t i o n . 
C r u s a d e r s of t h e 1 1 t h , 12th, and 13th c e n t u r i e s c a r r i e d 
t h e i r own laws and customs with them into Asia Minor, and 
e v e n a f t e r they had been e x p e l l e d by the more c u l t u r e d 
Saracens the merchants whom they left behind were permitted 
to have t h e i r own laws applied through their own consuls, a 
sys tem which e v e n t u a l l y r i p e n e d in to the C a p i t u l a t i o n s of 
t h e 16th c e n t u r y . The immunity which t h e s e c o n v e n t i o n s 
a c c o r d e d the sub j ec t s of European s ta tes resident within the 
dominions of the Subl ime P o r t e from t h e l a t t e r ' s j u r i s d i c -
tion endures until the outbreak of the Grea t War. 
The f i r s t in t rus ion of Westerners into the Chinese Empire 
r e p e a t e d in all e s s e n t i a l s w h a t had occurred ear l ie r in the 
c a s e of T u r k e y . The W e s t e r n e r s came to t r a d e , and used 
fo rce to gain an e n t r a n c e in to the c o u n t r y for t h a t pur -
p o s e . C h i n a , h o w e v e r , a t the o u t s e t was able to establish 
bounds to t h e i r ambit ion, and their invasion was confined to 
c e r t a i n d e s i g n a t e d p o r t s . H e r e t h e y c o n g r e g a t e d in 
c o l o n i e s , and h e r e , as the Empero r was a l t o g e t h e r wil l ing 
t h a t they should do, they submi t t ed t h e m s e l v e s to consular 
c o u r t s of t h e i r s e v e r a l n a t i o n a l i t i e s . In s h o r t , e x t r a -
t e r r i t o r i a l i t y was c o n c e d e d the W e s t e r n e r in return for his 
e x c l u s i o n from the i n t e r i o r of the c o u n t r y . C o n v e r s e l y , 
when Ch inese began to visit or to migrate to the West they 
w e r e n e i t h e r a c c o r d e d immunity from the jurisdiction of the 
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f o r e i g n s t a t e nor p r e v e n t e d from pass ing to the i n t e r i o r 
thereof. Later developments between China and the West have 
been less c o n t r o l l e d by th is reciproci ty of benefit . By the 
T r e a t y of T i e n t s i n (1858), t hanks e s p e c i a l l y to the pious 
fraud of the F r e n c h Jesu i t D e l a m a r r e , supplemented by the 
e v e r - s e r v i c e a b l e "most f avored na t ion" c l a u s e , miss ionar ies 
w e r e p e r m i t t e d to p e n e t r a t e to the in te r io r of the Empire, 
and even to rent land and to construct houses, and all under 
t h e a e g i s of e x t r a l i t y . S t i l l l a t e r , the r i g h t which the 
C h i n e s e had h i t h e r t o en joyed to s e t t l e in foreign countries 
began to be b rough t under d r a s t i c curtailment, especially in 
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ; w h i l e from t h e f i r s t , f o l l o w i n g the 
precedents which had been crea ted in the case of the Turkish 
E m p i r e , t h e e x t r a l i t y p r i n c i p l e had been i n t e r p r e t e d as 
r e l e g a t i n g "mixed c a s e s " to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of d e f e n d a n t s 
c o u n t r y , w h e r e a s under the o p e r a t i o n of t e r r i t o r i a l s o v e r -
e i g n t y i t is t h e p l a in t i f f who usual ly c h o o s e s the forum 
when the law affords a choice . 
A s a l r e a d y i n d i c a t e d , t h e r a t i o n a l f o u n d a t i o n of 
e x t r a l i t y is d i v e r s i t y of i n s t i t u t i o n s , and e s p e c i a l l y in 
l e g a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and i d e a s . In the c a s e of Ch ina this 
d i v e r s i t y , or b e t t e r , i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y , was a t the o u t s e t 
r e - i n f o r c e d by a mutual h o s t i l i t y , t e m p e r e d on the par t of 
the W e s t e r n e r by a z e s t for t r a d e . F a r from des i r i ng to 
e x t e n d t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n s to the W e s t e r n e r , the C h i n e s e , 
l i k e t h e e a r l y R o m a n s , d e e m e d t h e f o r e i g n e r e n t i r e l y 
u n w o r t h y of s u c h d i s t i n c t i o n . A Confuc ian c o m m e n t a t o r 
quoted by Wil loughby in his Foreign Rights and Interests i_n 
C h i n a , ( v o l . I I , p . 5 5 1 ; s e e F o r e i g n P o l i c y A s s o c i a t i o n 
In format ion S e r v i c e , v o l . IV, p . 306-7) p robab ly e x p r e s s e d 
the C h i n e s e v iew of the m a t t e r ve ry a d e q u a t e l y when he 
w r o t e : "The b a r b a r i a n s are like beasts and not to be ruled 
on the same p r inc ip l e s as c i t izens . Were anyone to at tempt 
c o n t r o l l i n g them by grea t maxims of reason it would tend to 
no th ing but confus ion . The a n c i e n t k ings wel l u n d e r s t o o d 
t h i s , a n d a c c o r d i n g l y r u l e d t h e b a r b a r i a n s by m i s r u l e ; 
t h e r e f o r e , to ru le b a r b a r i a n s by mis ru le is the t rue and 
b e s t way of ru l ing them." Not much here cer ta inly of the 
s e n t i m e n t of " e q u a l i t y . " T h a t , on the o t h e r hand, the 
W e s t e r n e r f e l t a l i k e d i s t r u s t of t h e C h i n e s e , and a 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g d i s t r u s t of C h i n e s e i n s t i t u t i o n , is a l s o 
probably t rue. 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y enough , the fundamenta l i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y of 
i n h e r i t e d C h i n e s e l ega l i n s t i t u t i o n s and ideas with Western 
is c l o s e l y p a r a l l e l to t h e d i f f e r e n c e a l r e a d y e l u c i d a t e d 
b e t w e e n the d o c t r i n e personal i ty of the law and the princi-
ple of t e r r i t o r i a l s o v e r e i g n t y . The former de r ives directly 
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from the family organisat ion of soc ie ty , and every man is 
deemed entit led to the law he was born under as his "blood 
r ight ." The l a t t e r re f lec ts the organisa t ion of society by 
the power of a ruler whose commands alone are law. But the 
d i v e r g e n c e wh ich is of i m m e d i a t e i n t e r e s t to us goes 
deeper . In the West, just because of the vast power which 
has come to be a t t r i b u t e d to g o v e r n m e n t , i t has been 
n e c e s s a r y to curb the a r b i t r a r y t endenc i e s of pol i t ica l 
authori ty by se t t ing up another p r inc ip le , tha t of the rule 
of law, so that today it is a universally accepted doctrine 
in the West, that while there is no law but a command of the 
S t a t e , y e t to be law a command of the S t a t e must be 
announced beforehand, and must be general in its terms and 
impart ial in i ts app l ica t ion . In China, on the other hand, 
due to the p e r s i s t e n c e of the family pr inc ip le , and the 
benign sway of the father, checked at every turn by the play 
of natural affect ion, no such pr inc ip le as the rule of law 
has ar i sen . On the con t r a ry , the concept of l_i_ with its 
"maxims of reason" is a d i r ec t denial of the rule of law 
pr inc ip le . On its jur is t ic s ide, the doc t r ine of U^  a sse r t s 
that if jus t ice is to be done each case must be determined 
on i t s own m e r i t s , and ui l i gh t of al l t he a t t e n d a n t 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . It accordingly repe ls the idea tha t cases 
can be advantageously classif ied beforehand, on a basis of 
typical r ecu r ren t facts , and a fair rule laid down for them 
wi th only t h e s e f a c t s in mind . In th i s r e s p e c t \i_ is 
reminiscent of the ideal of jus t ice to which English equity 
original ly sought to approximate when the common law had 
d e v e l o p e d into a premature r ig id i ty . It also r eca l l s the 
agi ta t ion of ce r t a in modern Cont inenta l jur is ts for what is 
t e r m e d " f r eedom of j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n , " t h a t is a c a r t e 
blanche for the mag i s t r a t e ' s in tu i t ions . Conversely, in the 
f ie ld of i t s most i n t i m a t e app l i ca t ion H^  as "r ight" has 
long since become s t e reo typed as "ri te," while China's own 
r u l e r s admit t he i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y of i ts t each ings in the 
c a s e of the a l i e n . T h e i r demands for the aboli t ion of 
e x t r a l i t y is a c c o m p a n i e d by an a n n o u n c e m e n t of thei r 
in tent ion to supersede the ancient forms of Chinese justice, 
t he p r i n c i p a l s e a t of which is the v i l l a g e c o u n c i l of 
elders, with nation-wide codes based on western models, what 
a re to be applied through courts also shaped on Western 
lines and governed by Western professional ideals. 
C h i n a ' s a t t i t u d e t o w a r d e x t r a l i t y is based par t ly on 
sent imenta l , par t ly on theo re t i ca l , and par t ly on prac t ica l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . E x t r a l i t y in the l i m i t e d sense a l ready 
discussed appears , and justly, to the Chinese mind as simply 
par t and parcel of a system involving many more serious and 
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less defensible intrusions upon her sovere ign ty . Again the 
R e v o l u t i o n i t s e l f t e s t i f i e s to the profound hold which 
Western pol i t ica l concepts have obtained upon the minds of 
the governing and the rising generat ion of Chinese. China 
has had many revolut ions before . Chinese poli t ical theory 
teaches that a bad ruler may and ought to be displaced; but 
no p r e v i o u s r e v o l u t i o n had e v e n t u a t e d in a R e p u b l i c . 
Western ideals of democracy are, however, not to be divorced 
from the Western theory of S t a t e , in which the concept of 
t e r r i t o r i a l s o v e r e i g n t y is b a s i c . The same c o u r s e of 
r ead ing and thinking that has infused the mind of Young 
Ch ina wi th r epub l i can i sm has hardened its hea r t against 
e x t r a l i t y . Moreover , it is likely that the Revolution has 
a l r e a d y s h a k e n the old c o n s a n g u i n e o u s o r g a n i s a t i o n of 
C h i n e s e s o c i e t y more s e v e r e l y than as has ye t c lear ly 
appeared . Why is it tha t China has continued on the basis 
of the family so long after the rise in the West of politi-
ca l s o c i e t y , of wh ich the i n d i v i d u a l is the cons t i tuent 
e l e m e n t ? The a n s w e r is that for some reason or other 
warfare has always been a more important pre-occupation in 
the West than in C h i n a ; for w a r f a r e on the one hand, 
enhances the power of the S t a t e , and on the other, in its 
effort to obtain the service of the young and active part of 
the populat ion, t ea r s the family down. Its two-fold product 
is the r e l e a s e d individual and the sovereign S t a t e . The 
mi l i t a r i sm of r ecen t China, whereby so many millions of 
young men have been wrested from their local habitations and 
given a new outlook and allegiance, may prove, in the long 
run, to have been its most profoundly revolut ionising and 
transforming force. 
In brief the re is a fundamental disharmony between the 
revolut ionary movement as a whole in China and extrality, 
and this quite apar t from the natural tendency of a revolu-
t ion to s t i r p a t r i o t i c s e n s i b i l i t i e s to a new acu teness . 
Nor a re the p rac t i ca l object ions to ex t r a l i t y of negligible 
impor tance , though their scientific study seems to have been 
s i n g u l a r l y n e g l e c t e d . T h e i r g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r , and 
especia l ly from the point of view of law enforcement , is 
none the l e s s f a i r l y mani fes t . Ex t ra l i ty means for one 
thing that for the cases which fall to the consular jur is -
d i c t i o n t h e r e a r e as many systems of law as there are 
jur i sd ic t ions , s ince each consular court enforces the law of 
its own coun t ry . The resul t is hardly accordant with the 
ru le of law i d e a , to say the l e a s t . Again, a consular 
official is seldom versed in law, nor are his regular duties 
such as are ca lcu la ted to qualify him for the role of the 
proverbia l just judge. His major business is to protect the 
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in te res t s of his own nationals, and in a case between one of 
t h e s e and a C h i n e s e it would be s trange indeed if he were 
n o t o f t e n p a r t i p r i s from the b e g i n n i n g . This o b j e c t i o n 
has , to be sure, been largely if not completely met by the 
Uni ted S t a t e s and Great Britain through the establishment at 
Shangha i of r e a l courts presided over by men whose judicial 
work is t he i r v o c a t i o n , not t h e i r a v o c a t i o n . And there is 
a n o t h e r r e s p e c t in which the pos i t ion of a defendant under 
t h i s s y s t e m is unfa i r ly a d v a n t a g e o u s , owing to the r i g h t 
which he o r d i n a r i l y has of t ak ing an appea l from his own 
c o n s u l a r cou r t to a home c o u r t or c o u r t s . Obvious ly th i s 
p o s s i b i l i t y puts a C h i n e s e c l a i m a n t at a grave disadvantage 
in p r e s s i n g for a se t t l ement whether in or out of court; his 
t o r t - f e a s o r has r a t h e r more than the nine points of the law 
in his favor to begin w i t h . On the other hand, the system 
l a v i s h e s al l i t s t e n d e r n e s s on the d e f e n d a n t , the presumed 
w r o n g - d o e r ; f o r e i g n c l a i m a n t s a g a i n s t C h i n e s e must s t i l l 
r e ly upon s e c u r i n g r e d r e s s through the n a t i v e a g e n c i e s of 
j u s t i c e . A l l of w h i c h is s a i d , of c o u r s e , wi th p r i v a t e 
claims in mind. When one turns to the criminal law phase of 
t h e m a t t e r o n e o f t e n f i n d s t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s ob t ruded by 
e x t r a l i t y in the way of l a w - e n f o r c e m e n t great ly aggravated 
by the e x i s t e n c e of fore ign concess ions--a system in which, 
o u t s i d e of S h a n g h a i , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s happ i ly no 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n . In t h e f a c e of t h i s t w o - f o l d d i f f i c u l t y 
e f f e c t i v e e n f o r c e m e n t of t h e l aw c a l l s for the c l o s e s t 
poss ib le c o - o p e r a t i o n of C h i n e s e and f o r e i g n e r s ; whi le as 
the o b j e c t i o n to e x t r a l i t y i n c r e a s e s the l i ke l i hood of such 
c o - o p e r a t i o n s t e a d i l y d i m i n i s h e s . T h e p r e s e n t c r i m e 
s i t u a t i o n in Shangha i , which seems to be especial ly acute in 
the International Set t lement amply bears out this remark. 
And so much for the detriment of ex t ra l i ty which are felt 
e s p e c i a l l y by the C h i n e s e , though not exclusively by them. 
A f i n a l d i s a d v a n t a g e is e x p e r i e n c e d p r i m a r i l y by t h e 
W e s t e r n e r , and is l ike ly to become more so as re -cons t ruc-
t ion p r o c e e d s in C h i n a . Indeed it is not imposs ib le t h a t 
even if the ques t ion w e r e n e v e r a g i t a t e d by the C h i n e s e 
e x t r a l i t y would e v e n t u a l l y be abol i shed on the ini t iat ive of 
i t s own b e n e f i c i a r i e s . E x t r a l i t y s t i l l r e t a i n s some measure 
of i t s o r i g i n a l c h a r a c t e r of a c o n c e s s i o n in return for the 
e x c l u s i o n of the f o r e i g n e r from the Chinese in ter ior . Even 
t o - d a y A m e r i c a n bus iness is r e s t r i c t e d to some fifty t rea ty 
p o r t s . That China in her present s ta te of mind will take no 
s t e p s to i n c r e a s e the a c c e s s i b i l i t y of the i n t e r i o r of the 
c o u n t r y to f o r e i g n i n t e r e s t s who c la im e x t r a l i t y may be 
t aken for g r a n t e d . But m e a n t i m e s e v e r a l important nations 
have lost th i s s t a t u s th rough t h e i r own voluntary surrender 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY / 131 
of i t or as a r e s u l t of the World War . The d i sadvan tage 
w i l l , t h e r e f o r e , be n o t o n l y a b s o l u t e , bu t r e l a t i v e , a 
m a t e r i a l h a n d i c a p in c o m p e t i t i o n . The poin t is the more 
wor th considering because of the tendency of Western powers 
in t h e i r po l icy toward China to march a b r e a s t under the 
b a n n e r of t h e "most favored na t i on" c l a u s e . Should the 
"most favored nations" once conclude that they were the less 
f avoured , the e x t r a l i t y issue would be put on its way to a 
speedy solution. 
There can be no question that so far as China 's claim for 
t h e a b o l i t i o n of e x t r a l i t y r e s t s on the claim of r igh t to 
e q u a l i t y of s t a t u s and t r e a t m e n t under International Law, it 
has been won a l r e a d y ; c e r t a i n l y th is is true so far as the 
U n i t e d S t a t e s is c o n c e r n e d . On J anua ry 26 th , 1927, the 
American Secre ta ry of S ta te issued a Memorandum of which the 
fo l lowing is the s i g n i f i c a n t pa rag raph : "The Government of 
the United S ta tes was ready and is ready now to continue the 
n e g o t i a t i o n s on t h e e n t i r e s u b j e c t of t h e t a r i f f and 
e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l i t y , or to t a k e up n e g o t i a t i o n s on behalf of 
the United S ta tes alone. The only question is, with whom it 
sha l l n e g o t i a t e . As has been said heretofore , if China can 
a g r e e upon the a p p o i n t m e n t of d e l e g a t e s r e p r e s e n t i n g the 
a u t h o r i t i e s or the people of the country we are prepared to 
n e g o t i a t e such a t r e a t y . Hov/ever , e x i s t i n g t r e a t i e s which 
w e r e r a t i f i e d by the Sena te of the United S ta tes cannot be 
a b r o g a t e d by the P r e s i d e n t , but must be superseded by new 
t r e a t i e s n e g o t i a t e d with somebody r e p r e s e n t i n g China and 
s u b s e q u e n t l y r a t i f i e d by the S e n a t e of the Uni ted S ta tes . " 
S i n c e th is d a t e a N a t i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t over all China has 
b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d a t N a n k i n g , and the Uni ted S t a t e s has 
n e g o t i a t e d a t a r i f f t r e a t y t h e r e w i t h on a bas i s of e x a c t 
equal i ty . 
The problem t h a t remains with respect to ext ra l i ty is an 
i m p o r t a n t one ; y e t e s s e n t i a l l y it is a problem of de ta i l - - i t 
is t h e p r o b l e m of e f f e c t i n g the t r a n s i t i o n from the old 
sys t em to the new with as much consideration as possible to 
a l l c o n c e r n e d . T h u s to s p e a k w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 
d e f i n i t e l y in m i n d , b e f o r e i t s u b m i t s t h e p e r s o n s and 
p r o p e r t y of i t s c i t i z e n s in China to the jurisdiction of the 
C h i n e s e law and Chinese courts, it will not improbably seek 
a r e a s o n a b l e d e g r e e of a s s u r a n c e on t h r e e po in t s ; f i r s t l y , 
as to the permanence of the existing regime; secondly, as to 
i t s p r e d o m i n a n t l y c i v i l i a n c h a r a c t e r ; t h i r d l y , as to i ts 
a b i l i t y th rough i ts c o u r t s to e x t e n d to Americans in China 
equa l r i g h t s wi th those en joyed by its own nationals, under 
a modern system of law. It may be said that the first point 
is a l r e a d y a s su red , but the second c l e a r l y is not , so the 
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question remains even with r e fe rence to the first , of the 
e x t e n t to wh ich the s t a b i l i t y of the exis t ing regime is 
dependent on the preponderance of its military element. In 
view of their age- long prejudice agains t mi l i ta ry interven-
tion in affairs of government, it is extremely unlikely that 
e i ther the United S t a t e s or Grea t Britain would consent to 
e x c h a n g e t h e p r o t e c t i o n of c iv i l i n s t i t u t i o n s for i t s 
nat ionals in favor of one res t ing too over t ly on mi l i ta ry 
force, and subject to its hazards. 
The r e a l l y fundamental of the above th ree points is, 
h o w e v e r , t he t h i r d , namely a reasonable assurance that 
Americans in China shall receive from the Chinese courts a 
law which, besides being modern in form and content, is fair 
and equa l in i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to C h i n e s e and foreigners 
a l ike . The pr inc ip le of equal i ty before the law is funda-
mental to modern jur isprudence no less than to democratic 
t h e o r y of s t a t e . In the Uni ted S t a t e s , however , it is 
ca r r i ed far ther than anywhere else on earth, inasmuch as it 
is p leadable agains t even s t a t u t e s . The Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United S ta t e s Const i tu t ion forbids a s t a t e to 
"deny to any p e r s o n w i t h i n i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n the equa l 
p ro tec t ion of the law," and word "person" covers aliens as 
well as c i t i z e n s . In the famous Queue Case decided a half 
century ago a lower Federal Court held void and inoperative 
as to C h i n e s e o f f e n d e r s a local ac t which required all 
pr i soners to submit to having their heads shaved . It was 
pointed out that his queue was (at that time) to a Chinese 
badge of honor, and loss of it a corresponding dishonor. In 
such a c a s e the a p p l i c a t i o n of the a c t in quest ion to 
Chinese was held to resul t in substant ia l inequality before 
the law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. In the still 
more famous case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court of 
Uni ted S t a t e s i tself interposed its veto upon a municipal 
ordinance which laid down ce r t a in precautionary restrictions 
on the conduct of the laundry business in frame buildings 
b e c a u s e it was shown to have been unfairly enforced as 
against Ch inese . Said the Justice who spoke for the Court: 
"Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in 
i t s a p p e a r a n c e , ye t if it is applied and adminis tered by 
public au thor i t ies with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so 
as p r a c t i c a l l y to make unjust and i l legal d iscr iminat ions 
between persons in similar c i rcumstances , material to their 
r i g h t s , the d e n i a l of equa l j u s t i c e is s t i l l w i t h i n the 
prohibition of the Constitution." 
The process of t rans i t ion from the system of ex t r a l i t y 
should be made a more or less gradual one, as in fact it is 
in the r e c e n t t r e a t i e s of the Nat ional Government with 
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Belgium and I t a ly . These t r e a t i e s recognise in pr inciple 
the val idi ty of China's demand; but the actual assumption by 
China of jur isdic t ion over Belgian and I tal ian nationals in 
China after January 1st, 1930 is left dependent, first, upon 
China 's promulgation before that date of modern law codes; 
and secondly , upon her success in effecting within the same 
period "de ta i led ar rangements with" Belgium and Italy for 
bringing the t ransi t ion to the new system about. So far as 
the United S t a t e s is concerned, I venture to suggest that 
such a r rangements might advantageously comprise the follow-
ing s teps : f i rs t , the promulgation by China of the modern 
codes on which the au thor i t ies of the National Government 
a r e a t p r e s e n t engaged; secondly, the adoption of these 
codes by the United States for its court in China, which in 
legal theory even to-day exercise not American but Chinese 
sovere ign ty ; th i rd ly , the es tabl i shment of appeals from the 
American court to the Chinese Supreme Court on questions of 
law cer t i f ied by the former; fourthly, the erection by China 
of courts of the first ins tance specia l ly qualified by the 
l e a r n i n g r e q u i r e d of t h e i r members and the securi ty in 
office guaranteed them to ac t in cases affecting foreigners 
(This would be analogous to the action of the United States 
in 1789 in conferr ing jur isdict ion over tor t cases involving 
a l i e n s upon the F e d e r a l c o u r t s , a l t h o u g h s t a t e c o u r t s 
normally have the exclusive jurisdiction of such cases); and 
fifthly, the enac tment by China of a commercial arbitration 
s t a tu t e along Br i t i sh -Amer ican l ines, such statute to render 
agreements between firms to arbi t ra te their disputes instead 
of c a r r y i n g them i n t o c o u r t e n f o r c e a b l e by su i t s for 
s p e c i f i c p e r f o r m a n c e , and the d e c i s i o n of the a rb i t ra l 
t r i b u n a l s e n f o r c e a b l e by the same p r o c e s s as j u d i c i a l 
d e c i s i o n s . S t a t u t e s of this nature are gaining in popu-
l a r i t y in the United S t a t e s . They afford a way around 
clogged court c a l enda r s , and they make available an expert 
t r ibunal chosen by the pa r t i e s themselves for the unravel-
ling of unusually complex or de l i ca te ques t ions . Inciden-
t a l l y , t hey seem to approximate more near ly to Chinese 
t rad i t ions regard ing law than they do to Anglo-American , 
and to r ep re sen t in a measure gravitation toward a common 
pos i t ion . Just how long it would take for China to obtain 
complete jur isdic t ion over American residents and American 
p r o p e r t y in China if this programme were followed it is 
i m p o s s i b l e to p r e d i c t ; but t he p r o c e s s should not be a 
p r o t r a c t e d one if the general fortunes of the new Republic 
continue favorable. 
The final and indispensable guaran tee of equal jus t ice 
according to American ideals is, of course, an independent 
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and i m p a r t i a l j u d i c i a r y , which d e p e n d s in turn upon the 
c r e a t i o n of a l e a r n e d bar i n c u l c a t e d wi th t h e s e idea ls—in 
o t h e r words , upon the development in China of legal educa-
t ion a long Western lines. The judiciary in the West regards 
i t s e l f as , in Burke ' s w o r d s , "a body e x t e r i o r to g o v e r n -
men t , " and as c o n s t i t u t i n g to some e x t e n t an in te rna t iona l 
f r a t e r n i t y which owes a duty of ten t r a n s c e n d i n g n a t i o n a l 
i n t e r e s t s . An i n s t a n c e of th i s out look is furn ished by a 
c a s e m e n t i o n e d in the p r e s s r e c e n t l y , in wh ich a B r i t i s h 
cou r t in South Africa held that cer ta in lands claimed by the 
Crown under the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s still belonged to the 
e x - K a i s e r . The issue turned on the narrow question whether 
the lands invo lved had been held by the Kaiser in a public 
or p r i v a t e c a p a c i t y . The a n n a l s of p r i z e c o u r t s furnish 
m a n y s imi la r i n s t a n c e s of j ud i c i a l a p p l i c a t i o n of the law 
c o n t r a r y to the i m p o r t u n i t i e s of government , which are the 
more impre s s ive for hav ing o c c u r r e d in the s t r e s s of wa r 
t ime. 
C h i n a ' s own j u d i c i a r y , though of so recent creat ion, has 
o w n e d t h e p o t e n c y of such i d e a l s more than o n c e . The 
m a r t y r d o m of Judge Bien in Shan tung under t he outrageous 
Chang T s u n g - c h a n g is a recent case in point. Some ear l ie r 
c h a p t e r s from th i s b r i e f h i s t o r y , equa l ly to t he g lory of 
t h e j u d i c i a l o f f i c e t h e w o r l d o v e r , a r e r e c o u n t e d by 
Dr . Cheng in his " i n t r o d u c t i o n " to C h i n e s e S u p r e m e C o u r t 
D e c i s i o n s . T h e p a s s a g e r e f e r r e d to r e a d s as f o l l o w s : - -
(pp . i i i - iv ) "In the fourth y e a r of the Republic, when Yuan 
S h i h - k a i l i t e r a l l y had ' l aw in his mouth and fortune in his 
h a n d , ' he gave i n s t r u c t i o n s for the prosecution of a cer ta in 
p r o v i n c i a l governor for alleged embezzlement . The case was 
t r i e d by Judge Chu of the Supreme Court, who, upon finding 
t h a t t h e r e was no ev idence to support the charge , dismissed 
the case . Pres ident Yuan who expected a conviction was much 
offended and vented his wrath be instructing the Administra-
t i v e C o u r t to e n q u i r e in to the c o n d u c t of the of fending 
j u d g e . Of c o u r s e no th ing wrong could be found, and, as a 
l a s t means of g r a t i f y i n g himself , he r e p r i m a n d e d the judge 
for be ing ' t oo s u b s e r v i e n t to the l a w ' - - a p h r a s e t h a t has 
now b e c o m e h i s t o r i c and wi l l e v e r be w r i t t e n in go lden 
l e t t e r s in books t h a t dea l wi th the history of the reformed 
j u d i c i a r y of C h i n a . The o t h e r i n c i d e n t o c c u r r e d in t he 
fo l lowing y e a r , when the Supreme Court came into collision 
w i t h P a r l i a m e n t o v e r the ques t ion of a p p e a l in e l e c t i o n 
c a s e s . It was c o n t e n d e d by P a r l i a m e n t t h a t the S u p r e m e 
C o u r t had no jur isdic t ion over such appeals, as the law was 
s i l e n t on the po in t , whi le the Sup reme C o u r t r e p l i e d tha t 
a c c o r d i n g to i ts i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the law, a function that 
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i t a l o n e lawfully p o s s e s s e s , it had such j u r i s d i c t i o n . This 
led P a r l i a m e n t to pass r e s o l u t i o n s denounc ing i ts decisions 
and d e c l a r i n g them to be null and void. The then Govern-
ment , too , was on the s ide of Pa r l i amen t , but the Supreme 
C o u r t was as f e a r l e s s as it was r i gh t , po in t ing out t ha t 
though P a r l i a m e n t could make laws, i t s resolut ions had not 
the c h a r a c t e r of l a w . R e a s o n s in the end p r e v a i l e d , and 
P a r l i a m e n t gave in ." But a j ud i c i a ry c a n n o t s t and a l o n e . 
It mus t be suppo r t ed by a s t rong ba r , hav ing the publ ic 
c o n f i d e n c e a n d i m b u e d w i t h t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l s p i r i t ; in 
short , it must be the law teachers of China. 
One fu r the r point : Some of the more eager advocates of 
t he abo l i t i on of e x t r a l i t y - - n o t t ha t t he i r i m p a t i e n c e is by 
any means unwarran ted- -have argued that the s ta tes nationals 
a t p r e s e n t e n j o y t h i s p r i v i l e g e , wou ld have no th ing to 
a p p r e h e n d if it w e r e d i s c a r d e d o u t r i g h t , s ince International 
Law i t s e l f m a k e s p a r t i a l and i n e q u i t a b l e d e c i s i o n s by 
fo re ign c o u r t s a ground for d ip loma t i c p r o t e s t on the part 
of a country whose ci t izens are injured thereby. To be sure 
i t d o e s ; bu t q u i t e a s i d e from t h e f a c t t h a t d i p l o m a t i c 
p r o t e s t s a r e often inef fec t ive , and even when successful are 
u s u a l l y l o n g - d r a w n - o u t a f f a i r s , no na t ion r e a l l y r e l i s h e s 
t h e i d e a of c h a r g i n g to c o u r t s of a f r iendly s t a t e wi th 
i n j u s t i c e ; n o r d o e s n a t i o n a l p r i d e , on t h e o t h e r hand, 
e a s i l y s tomach such c h a r g e s . A wel l -war ran ted rel iance on 
the p a r t of s t a t e s on the i n t e g r i t y and general impartiality 
of o n e a n o t h e r ' s c o u r t s is a fundamenta l bas i s of i n t e r -
national goodwill, and one which is bound to become more and 
more important as international contacts multiply. 
The p r e s e n t pos i t ion of the e x t r a l i t y issue so far as it 
i nvo lves the Uni ted S t a t e s and China boils down then to 
t h i s . China b a s e s her case on the principle of the equality 
of s t a t e s b e f o r e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law; the United S ta tes urges 
t h e p r i n c i p l e of t h e e q u a l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s before the 
o r d i n a r y law; and e a c h accepts the validity of the principle 
urged by the o t h e r . With both sides holding clearly before 
t h e m t h e s e i n h e r e n t l y - - a s wel l as h i s t o r i c a l l y - - r e c i p r o c a l 
p r i n c i p l e s , the p rob lem of dev i s ing a p r a c t i c a l arrangement 
w h e r e b y t h e y c a n be g i v e n e f f e c t i v e , r e c i p r o c a l , and 
c o n s t a n t l y e x p a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n unt i l both a r e comple t e ly 
r e a l i s e d becomes a question of detail , even though at points 
of d e l i c a t e d e t a i l . It is a ques t ion t ha t ought to be well 
wi th in the c o m p e t e n c e of s t a t e s m e n having re l iance on one 
another 's general intentions. 
Part Four 
The New Deal 
The New Deal brought Corwin's greatest personal accomplish-
ments as well as his most serious disappointments, He was a 
member of the executive branch, advising the government on 
the era's progressive legislation. He worked with the 
Justice Department to argue the constitutionality of the New 
Deal before the Supreme Court. When the Court struck down 
the acts of Congress, Corwin became a public spokesman on 
the "problem of the Supreme Court." His writings and 
comments appeared often in the popular media, from radio 
shows to local newspapers. In early 1937, President 
Roosevelt deepened the debate by proposing a "Court-packing" 
plan; he asked Congress to expand the size of the Supreme 
Court by one seat for each justice who did not retire at age 
seventy. If the measure passed Congress, Roosevelt could 
have immediately appointed as many as six new justices. The 
new panel could then change the direction of constitutional 
law. Edward Corwin was among the possible appointees. 
Corwin promptly spoke in favor of Roosevelt's plan, but 
the issue found few other supporters. Moreover, Corwin's 
enthusiasm directly contradicted statements from his recent 
essays against expanding the Court. His ideological 
isolation and transformation were underscored in an embar-
rassing Senate hearing and in the newspapers. Corwin failed 
to persuade Congress, and he fell from the list of Supreme 
Court contenders. 
Reprinted here are two of Corwin's newspaper articles 
expounding on the Court's rejection of the New Deal. The 
legislation was necessary, he argued, and the Court somehow 
had to change the law. In the second essay, he makes his 
remarks against packing the Court just two months before 
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Roosevelt announced the Court-packing plan. The third piece 
is Corwin's conjecture about possibilities if the pres-
ident's plan failed. The Court itself, however, resolved 
all debate by accepting New Deal legislation in April 1937, 
and retirements soon allowed Roosevelt to make his own Court 
appointments. Edward Corwin never again received serious 
consideration for a Supreme Court seat. 
13 







The Supreme Court's decision in the poultry case has caused 
ce r t a in people to ra ise again the perennial question of the 
r i g h t of the c o u r t to se t aside ac t s of Congress which 
confl ict with i ts view of the Const i tu t ion . The crit ics of 
the court have in this r espec t l i t t l e ground to 
The Const i tut ion des ignates i tself as "law" and 
the j u d i c i a l power of the United S t a t e s shall 
"cases" ar is ing "under the Const i tu t ion," and a 
not only the power but the duty to decide cases 
ance with the law under which they arise. Furthermore, that 
the Const i tu t ion overrides any subordinate law with which it 
conflicts, nobody doubts. 
On the other hand, the cour t ' s champions, who have so 
z e a l o u s l y b e l a b o r e d the P r e s i d e n t for demurring to the 
c o u r t ' s r e a d i n g of the Const i tut ion in the poultry case , 
assume a posit ion that is just as untenable. They say that 
the court has "saved the Constitution" and at the same time 
imply that the Const i tut ion is always to be identified with 
the cour t ' s reading of i t . Obviously the two proposi t ions 
do not hang toge the r . If there was a Const i tut ion to be 
saved, it was there before the court came so gallantly to 
the rescue. 
"P re s iden t , Court and Constitution." Christian Science 
Monitor, July 3 , 1935, p. 18; July 5, 1935, p. 18; and 
Ju ly 6, 1935, p . 16. Reprinted by permission from the 
Christian Science Monitor. [Bibliography Entries D92-D9^] 
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What is the cons t i tu t iona l duty of a Pres ident as regards 
an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Constitution which was made by the 
Supreme Cour t in the decision of a case properly before it, 
if he d i s a g r e e s w i t h t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ? Th i s ques t i on , 
a l so , is not a novel one ; i t was r a i s e d in Jefferson's day, 
a g a i n in J a c k s o n ' s day , y e t aga in in L inco ln ' s d a y - - w i t h 
r e f e r e n c e to the Dred S c o t t d e c i s i o n . Pres ident Roosevelt , 
in d i scuss ing the pou l t ry c a s e , a l luded to the Dred S c o t t 
c a s e , and i n d e e d t h e p a r a l l e l b e t w e e n the two c a s e s is 
ra ther striking. 
In the Dred S c o t t c a s e the c o u r t , b e l i e v i n g i t had the 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o s e t t l e t h e i s s u e of s l a v e r y in t h e 
t e r r i t o r i e s , w e n t out of i t s way to d e c l a r e the Missouri 
compromise u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . In the poultry case , the court 
l ikewise traveled out of its path to pronounce the NIRA void 
under the commerce clause after having already pronounced it 
v o i d for d e l e g a t i n g l e g i s l a t i v e power u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y . 
What is more, the court laid down doctr ine with reference to 
C o n g r e s s ' s p o w e r s unde r the c o m m e r c e c l a u s e which far 
e x c e e d e d the necessi t ies of the case even had the commerce 
clause furnished the sole basis of its decision. 
D e a l i n g in his f i r s t inaugura l wi th the ques t ion posed 
a b o v e , in r e l a t i o n to t h e D r e d S c o t t d e c i s i o n , L inco ln 
d e v e l o p e d the fol lowing p o s i t i o n . He did no t deny that a 
d e c i s i o n of t h e c o u r t f i n a l l y d i sposed of the p a r t i c u l a r 
c a s e and to t h a t e x t e n t was l ega l ly b ind ing on all and 
s u n d r y . Nor did he question that a reading of the Consti tu-
tion made by the court for the purpose of deciding such case 
was fur ther e n t i t l e d to "ve ry high r e s p e c t " from the other 
departments of the Government "in all paral le l cases ." 
"A t the same t i m e , " he c o n t i n u e d , " t h e c a n d i d c i t i z e n 
must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital 
ques t i ons a f f ec t i ng the whole p e o p l e is to be i r r e v o c a b l y 
f ixed by d e c i s i o n s of the Supreme Cour t , the ins tan t they 
a r e made in o r d i n a r y l i t i g a t i o n b e t w e e n par t ies in personal 
a c t i o n s , the people will have ceased to be their own rulers , 
hav ing to t h a t e x t e n t p r a c t i c a l l y resigned their Government 
in to the hands of t h a t eminen t t r i b u n a l . Nor is t h e r e in 
th is any a s s a u l t upon the court or the judges. It is a duty 
which they may not shrink to decide cases properly brought 
be fo re them, and it is no faul t of thei rs if o thers seek to 
turn their decisions to political purposes." 
In s h o r t , an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the C o n s t i t u t i o n by the 
c o u r t is s u p r e m e l a w of t h e l a n d for t h e c a s e in the 
dec i s ion of wh ich it was r e n d e r e d ; and by the doctr ine of 
s t a r e d e c i s i s it may be a c c o r d e d s imi l a r force in "similar" 
in c a s e s found by the c o u r t to be s imi lar . c a s e s - - t h a t is, 
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And fur ther than th is the P r e s i d e n t and C o n g r e s s owe the 
Supreme C o u r t ' s v i ews of the C o n s t i t u t i o n such respec t as 
t h e y t h i n k t h o s e v i e w s e n t i t l e d to on a c c o u n t of the i r 
intr insic mer i t s . 
II 
T h e r e i s , to be su re , a n o t h e r way of looking a t this 
mat te r of Supreme Court decis ions-- the way sanctioned by the 
P r e s i d e n t ' s c r i t i c s . As we h a v e s e e n , they hold in effect 
t h a t the c o u r t ' s v iew of the C o n s t i t u t i o n is the a u t h e n t i c 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . W h e n c e i t f o l l o w s t h a t i n a s m u c h as the 
P r e s i d e n t and C o n g r e s s a r e bound by the Constitution, they 
are therefore bound by the court 's view of i t . 
This pos i t i on r e s t s a t bas i s on ari a c t of faith—namely, 
t h a t judges know the law (which inc ludes the Constitution), 
wh i l e o t h e r p e o p l e a r e capable only of enter ta ining opinions 
about i t . Even so , w h a t r e a s o n is there for believing that 
a S u p r e m e Cour t judge knows the law b e t t e r than a lower 
c o u r t judge ; or t h a t a d issent ing judge knows it worse than 
a judge who h a p p e n s to be in the ma jo r i t y? The assumed 
magic is an a t t r ibute of the judicial office. 
Then t h e r e is the t r o u b l e s o m e fac t t h a t the cour t has 
o v e r r u l e d i ts own p rev ious i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the Const i tu-
t ion many , many t imes , on the ground of "error ." Is there 
good s ense in c l a iming p l e n a r y inspiration for "the Supreme 
C o u r t ' s last guess" when everyone knows that said last guess 
may be presently supplanted by another from the same source? 
L i n c o l n ' s p o s i t i o n , t h e p o s i t i o n i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e 
P r e s i d e n t ' s c r i t i c i s m of the pou l t ry c a s e , is c e r t a i n l y the 
m o r e r e a s o n a b l e o n e . I n d e e d , i t would seem to be the 
pos i t i on l o g i c a l l y impl ied in the cour t ' s own explanation of 
j u d i c i a l r e v i e w . An e x c e l l e n t s t a t e m e n t b e a r i n g on the 
po in t is that of Justice Sutherland in the minimum wage case 
of 1923: 
From t h e a u t h o r i t y to a s c e r t a i n and d e t e r m i n e the 
law in a g iven c a s e , t h e r e necessari ly results, in case 
of c o n f l i c t , the duty to d e c l a r e and e n f o r c e the rule 
of the supreme law and r e j e c t that of an inferior act 
of l e g i s l a t i o n which , t r a n s c e n d i n g the Cons t i t u t i on , is 
of no e f f e c t and b ind ing on no o n e . This is not the 
e x e r c i s e of a s u b s t a n t i v e power to rev iew and nullify 
a c t s of C o n g r e s s , for no s u c h s u b s t a n t i v e p o w e r 
e x i s t s . It is simply a n e c e s s a r y concommi tan t of the 
power to h e a r and d i spose of a c a s e or c o n t r o v e r s y 
p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h e c o u r t , to the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of 
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which must be brought the test and measure of the law. 
(261 U.S. 544). 
Thus the power of j ud ic i a l review is a purely der ivat ive 
power , a c o r o l l a r y of the jud ic i a l duty to decide cases in 
a c c o r d a n c e wi th the law, of which the C o n s t i t u t i o n is a 
p a r t , and r e c e i v i n g i ts scope from that duty. On the other 
hand, the P r e s i d e n t is r e q u i r e d by the exp l i c i t mandate of 
t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , on assuming o f f i ce , to t a k e an oa th to 
" p r e s e r v e , p r o t e c t , and defend the C o n s t i t u t i o n . " Judges 
a lso have to t a k e an oath to "support" the Consti tution, but 
the form, of the oath comes from an act of Congress, not the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . If any d e p a r t m e n t of the Government may be 
s a i d to s t and in such a p e c u l i a r l y p r o t e c t i v e r e l a t i o n to 
the C o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t i t s v e r s i o n t h e r e o f should be deemed 
the a u t h e n t i c C o n s t i t u t i o n , i t would seem to be the Pres i -
dent ra ther than the judiciary. 
T h e r e a r e , m o r e o v e r , c e r t a i n o t h e r cons ide r a t i ons which 
go to r e n d e r L i n c o l n ' s pos i t ion s t r o n g e r today than it was 
o r i g i n a l l y . What Lincoln sa id , as Jackson had said before 
him, was in e f f ec t t h i s : t h a t the P r e s i d e n t and C o n g r e s s 
s h o u l d n o t , in p l a n n i n g f u t u r e l e g i s l a t i o n , l e t t h e i r 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s be unduly in f luenced by the f ac t that these 
might not j ibe in al l r e s p e c t s with announced views of the 
Supreme Court . 
F o r o n e th ing the c o u r t ' s own a t t i t u d e t oward e a r l i e r 
d e c i s i o n s suppor t s th is p o s i t i o n . As m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , the 
c o u r t has o v e r r u l e d i t s own p r e v i o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n aga in and aga in , and especially has it done so 
wi th in r e c e n t y e a r s . The ve ry day the pou l t ry c a s e was 
d e c i d e d , the c o u r t over ru led in par t its decision of 1926 in 
Myers v . Uni ted S t a t e s r e s p e c t i n g the P r e s i d e n t ' s r emova l 
p o w e r . J u s t i c e S u t h e r l a n d , s p e a k i n g for t h e c o u r t , 
e x p l a i n e d t h a t the b road l anguage of the e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n 
ought to be in terpreted in light of the facts of the c a s e . 
One can easily imagine the court explaining away much or 
most of the ch ie f j u s t i c e ' s opinion in the p o u l t r y case on 
s i m i l a r grounds a y e a r or two h e n c e . At any r a t e , few 
u n p r e j u d i c e d p e o p l e w i l l b e c o m e g r e a t l y e x c i t e d when 
C o n g r e s s e v i n c e s s i g n s of s k e p t i c i s m as to the c o u r t ' s 
a d h e r i n g h e n c e f o r t h and f o r e v e r m o r e to w h a t i t sa id so 
gratuitously and unnecessarily the other day. 
Ill 
Why has the doc t r ine of s tare decisis become so unstable 
in t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f i e l d ? I t is due p r i m a r i l y to the 
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v a s t e x t e n s i o n of j u d i c i a l r e v i e w w i t h i n t h e l a s t half 
c e n t u r y . T h e D r e d S c o t t c a s e , d e c i d e d f i f ty - four y e a r s 
a f t e r Marbury v . Madison, was the second instance in which 
the court had disallowed an act of Congress on the ground of 
unconst i tut ional i ty. 
Modern d o c t r i n e s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law, h o w e v e r , confer 
upon t h e c o u r t a s u p e r v i s o r y p o w e r o v e r c o n g r e s s i o n a l 
l e g i s l a t i o n t h a t is w i t h o u t s t a t a b l e l i m i t s . To ins i s t in 
the f ace of th i s fac t upon the duty of the national legisla-
t i v e p o w e r to follow a l w a y s in the wake of the c o u r t ' s 
p r o n o u n c e m e n t s is s i m p l y to i n s i s t t h a t n a t i o n a l power 
should be s te r i l ized . 
F i n a l l y , it must be owned t h a t today the c o u r t , p a r t l y 
for r e a s o n s a l r e a d y i n d i c a t e d , partly from other causes, has 
b e c o m e s o m e t h i n g which r e s e m b l e s a s u p e r l e g i s l a t u r e much 
more closely than it does a court , as a court was thought of 
when the Constitution was framed. As I have put the mat ter 
e l s e w h e r e , " a l t e r n a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d 
a l t e r n a t i v e l i n e s of p r e c e d e n t c o n s t a n t l y v e s t the c o u r t 
w i t h a f reedom v i r t u a l l y l e g i s l a t i v e in s cope in choos ing 
the va lues wh ich it shall promote through its reading of the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . " ( S e e my T w i l i g h t of the Supreme Cour t , 
p . 117.) 
Or as Professor Powell has phrased the same idea: 
Nine men in Washington have a pret ty arbi t rary power 
to a n n u l a n y s t a t u t e or o r d i n a n c e or a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
o r d e r t h a t is properly brought before them. The power 
is an a r b i t r a r y p o w e r , e v e n though it may not be 
a r b i t r a r i l y e x e r c i s e d . I t is a r b i t r a r y in the s ense 
t h a t in the l a s t a n a l y s i s it is e x e r c i s e d as five or 
more of the nine men think best . 
The S u p r e m e C o u r t can h a r d l y be said to be con-
t r o l l e d by the C o n s t i t u t i o n because so seldom does the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n c l e a r l y d i c t a t e a d e c i s i o n . It is not 
c o n t r o l l e d by i t s own p r e c e d e n t s , for it feels free to 
o v e r r u l e t h e m . I t f e e l s e v e n m o r e f r e e to m a k e 
d i s t i n c t i o n s t h a t no s e n s i b l e pe r son would think of 
making e x c e p t to avoid confess ion that a precedent is 
be ing d i s r e g a r d e d . All th is r e m a i n s t rue even though 
in mos t of the c a s e s it is a l so t rue t h a t a p p l i c a b l e 
p r e c e d e n t s a r e e i t h e r fol lowed or are not there to be 
invoked. The Supreme Court does what it prefers to do 
when it prefers to do as nearly as possible what it has 
done before . (Columbia Law Review, Vol. 32, p . 768.) 
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But it may wel l be doubted if the framers intended the 
c o u r t to govern the count ry ; nor, in fact, can the court do 
s o . Its power is a purely negative one- - i t can str ike down, 
but it c a n n o t p r o v i d e so lu t ions of its own. Such being the 
c a s e , the a rgumen t for keep ing the c o u r t a c o u r t is ve ry 
c o g e n t ; and a c o n t r i b u t i o n toward this end is to recognize, 
as Lincoln did, t h a t the l ega l effect of its readings of the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n s h o u l d be c o n f i n e d to t h e j u d i c i a l f i e l d . 
F u r t h e r t h a n t h a t the c o u r t ' s r i g h t to guide should r e s t 
exclusively on its wisdom. 
W h a t e v e r may be said of the s p e c i f i c c r i t i c i s m s wh ich 
P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t made of the C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n in the 
p o u l t r y c a s e , his a s s e r t i o n of the r i g h t to speak on the 
s u b j e c t was soundly g rounded , and should be app l auded as 
t end ing to v i t a l i z e g o v e r n m e n t a l p r o c e s s , and we l l as the 
political thought of the country. 
14 
Corwin on the Court 
I 
The wri ter before the elect ion found himself the member of a 
g r o u p w h i c h w a s d i s c u s s i n g t h e p r o b a b l e future of the 
Supreme Court, when one of those present made the inevitable 
a l l u s i o n t o t h a t f a m e d p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s t , t h e l a t e 
Mr . D o o l e y , and his c lassic remark about the Supreme Court 
f o l l o w i n g t h e e l e c t i o n r e t u r n s . T h e q u e s t i o n now i s , 
o b s e r v e d a th i rd member of the p a r t y , wil l the e l e c t i o n 
re turns follow the Supreme Court? 
T h a t question has since been answered, and not in a way 
f a v o r a b l e to the court . However, let me hasten to add that 
in w r i t i n g thus I h a v e no i n t e n t i o n of imput ing " p o l i t i c a l 
m o t i v e s " to t h e c o u r t in t h e n a r r o w s e n s e of p a r t i s a n 
m o t i v e s , for as has been po in t ed out more than once in 
r e c e n t m o n t h s , the J u s t i c e who has f launted his opposi t ion 
to the New Dea l mos t conspicuously was at the time of his 
appo in tmen t a Democrat , while one of the three Justices who 
h a v e come most of ten to the d e f e n s e of the New Deal, in 
dissenting opinions, was when appointed a Republican. 
For al l t h a t , t he c o u r t is a p o l i t i c a l body, and that in 
the most s i g n i f i c a n t and v i t a l s ense of the t e r m . It is a 
b o d y w h i c h h a s an i m p o r t a n t v o i c e , a l t h o u g h a m e r e l y 
"Corwin on the Court ." Phi ladelphia Record, November 30, 
1936, pp. 1-2; December 1, 1936, sec . 1, p . D5; December 2, 
1936, s ec . 1, p . F12; December 3 , 1936, sec . 1, p . D19; and 
December 4 , 1936, sec . 1, p . D19. Each day ' s a r t i c l e had a 
s e p a r a t e t i t l e under the general banner "Corwin on the 
Court ." Reprinted by permission from The Charter Company. 
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n e g a t i v e one , in the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of national governmental 
pol icies . 
Indeed , i t s c h a r a c t e r in th is r e p e c t has come to o v e r -
shadow i ts c h a r a c t e r as a j ud ic i a l t r i b u n a l , as such bodies 
a r e e l s e w h e r e u s u a l l y t h o u g h t of. And th is is so , not 
n e c e s s a r i l y b e c a u s e the p r e s e n t J u s t i c e s wish it to be so, 
bu t b e c a u s e th is ro le has been t h ru s t upon them by the 
d e c i s i o n s of t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s - - e s p e c i a l l y t h e i r immedia te 
predecessors--and by the pressure of the American Bar. 
T h e m o s t v a l u e d a t t r i b u t e of the Judge, from a n c i e n t 
t imes to the p r e s e n t , has a l w a y s been i m p a r t i a l i t y . But, 
l i k e o t h e r v a l u a b l e t h ings , j ud ic i a l i m p a r t i a l i t y does not 
come free, and one of the things that must be paid for it is 
t h e c o n f i n e m e n t of t h e J u d g e to t h o s e l e s s e r i ssues of 
soc ia l life for the so lu t ion of which a g r e e d p r i n c i p l e s of 
fairly definite scope exis t . 
N e v e r is j ud i c i a l i m p a r t i a l i t y more p r e c a r i o u s than in 
t h e p r e s e n c e of i s s u e s of f e l t p u b l i c i m p o r t a n c e , and 
e s p e c i a l l y when only vague, general formulas exist for their 
determinat ion. 
It was b e c a u s e he p e r c e i v e d these truths so clear ly that 
the l a t e J u s t i c e Holmes, who was a learned historian of the 
law as wel l as a Judge , i n v a r i a b l y d e p r e c a t e d interference 
by the c o u r t wi th l e g i s l a t i v e action, except when absolutely 
and unmis takab ly n e c e s s a r y in o r d e r to uphold some wel l -
u n d e r s t o o d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ru le in a c a s e as to which i ts 
application was not a mat ter for reasonable doubt. 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Ju s t i ce Holmes usual ly l abo red with his 
b r e t h r e n in va in on th is po in t , wi th the r e s u l t t h a t the 
c o u r t now finds i t se l f at the c e n t e r of a p o l i t i c a l w h i r l -
wind and fac ing the d a n g e r o u s p o s s i b i l i t y of be ing tossed 
off its rim. 
With an ove rwhe lming popular indorsement of his policies 
back of him, one must e x p e c t t h a t the P r e s i d e n t will give 
e a r l y a t t e n t i o n to the problem of placing these policies on 
an assured c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b a s i s , and to the re la ted problem 
of s e c u r i n g the c o - o p e r a t i o n of the F e d e r a l j u d i c i a r y in 
their implementation. 
Indeed , t h a t he by no means c o n t e m p l a t e s leaving these 
v e r y e s s e n t i a l m a t t e r s to c h a n c e was c l e a r l y ind ica ted by 
his r e i t e r a t e d p romise th roughou t the c a m p a i g n - - a p romise 
vo iced wi th s p e c i a l emphas i s in his Madison Square Garden 
s p e e c h the S a t u r d a y n ight b e f o r e e l e c t i o n - - t h a t he would 
" p r e s s forward" with the reforms for which he has come to 
s t a n d . What r o u t e , t hen , is he likely to take to his goal? 
The answer must depend in part on what routes are open to 
him. 
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Let us f i r s t weigh in th is connect ion the suggestion that 
t he A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ought to re ly on the amending p r o c e s s 
laid down in A r t i c l e V of the C o n s t i t u t i o n to va l ida te its 
measures as these are successively overturned by the court . 
D e s p i t e the fac t t h a t it is t h rus t forward most i n s i s -
t e n t l y by people who would unquestionably do their utmost to 
d e f e a t any amendments looking to the above end, the sugges-
t i o n p o s s e s s e s a c e r t a i n p l a u s i b i l i t y w h i c h c h a l l e n g e s 
scrutiny, though--as will be seen- - i t hardly survives i t . 
In t he f i r s t p l a c e , as compared with a general elect ion, 
and e s p e c i a l l y one of so d e c i s i v e a c h a r a c t e r as t h a t of 
N o v e m b e r 3 , t h e amending p r o c e s s is NOT a d e m o c r a t i c 
process . An amendment may be defeated by 13 S ta tes contain-
ing less than 5 p e r c e n t of the popu la t ion of the c o u n t r y . 
C l e a r l y , r e fo rms which a r e demanded by the overwhelming 
v e r d i c t of popula r opinion should not be exposed to such a 
hazard unless the step is absolutely necessary . 
A g a i n , the amending p r o c e s s is apt to take years , while 
t ime is of ten the ve ry essence of reform. Two amendments 
o w e t h e i r p r e s e n c e in the C o n s t i t u t i o n e x c l u s i v e l y to an 
e f f o r t to o v e r c o m e a d v e r s e d e c i s i o n s of the c o u r t . The 
f i r s t of these is the 11th amendment, which took almost four 
y e a r s in be ing a d o p t e d ; the o t h e r is the 16th amendmen t , 
which was b e f o r e the country three and a half years before 
the required number of S ta tes had ratified i t . 
A l a t e r p roposa l of the same n a t u r e , " t h e chi ld l abor 
a m e n d m e n t , " has a l r e a d y been before the country 12^ years 
and is s t i l l f a r from a d o p t i o n , h a v i n g m e a n t i m e b e e n 
s u b j e c t e d to c r i t i c i s m o f t e n of a h i g h l y a l a r m i s t and 
disingenuous cha rac t e r . 
To be su r e , t h e r e a r e s i t u a t i o n s in which the amending 
p r o c e s s may not be s i d e s t e p p e d . In f ac t , i t may be said 
t h a t the v a s t ma jo r i t y of the ind iv idua l s t a t e m e n t s which 
make up the Constitution are couched in language which is so 
p r e c i s e and d e f i n i t e t h a t they may not be a l t e r e d by any 
other method without affront to the Constitutional Document. 
Thus when the o r i g i n a l method of choosing the Pres ident 
was found to be faulty, the 12th amendment was adopted; and 
when , m o r e than a c e n t u r y l a t e r , the peop le dec ided that 
t hey p r e f e r r e d to c h o o s e t he i r S e n a t o r s themse lves instead 
of l e a v i n g the job to the S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e s , they adopted 
t h e 17 th a m e n d m e n t . But t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i f f i cu l t i e s 
which the New Dea l has e n c o u n t e r e d have not arisen from 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s c h a r a c t e r , and t h i s 
circumstance makes all the difference. 
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II 
The argument for the constitutionality of most of the New 
Deal legis lat ion invoked either one or both of two and only 
two clauses of the Cons t i t u t i on - - tha t which gives Congress 
the power to " regula te commerce among the several States," 
and that which gives it the power "to lay and collect taxes" 
in order "to provide for the . . . genera l wel fare of the 
United States." 
T h a t the former c o m p r i s e d the power to " l imit and 
r e s t r a i n c o m m e r c e a t p l e a s u r e " was i n i t i a l l y a c c e p t e d 
without question, a view which, moreover, still holds as to 
Congress' power over foreign commerce. 
When, nevertheless. Congress attempted, by the NIRA, and 
la te r by the Guffey coal conservation act, to put a stop to 
trading among the States in commodities which were produced 
under conditions deemed by it to be unsocial and uneconomic, 
it was told by the Court that it was not regulating commerce 
among the S t a t e s , but was invading "the reserved power of 
the States" to regulate "production." 
E a r l i e r , however , the Court had repea ted ly recognized 
that " the reserved powers of the S t a t e s " do not limit the 
g r a n t e d p o w e r s of C o n g r e s s . Thus in 1914 the C o u r t 
sustained against this very objection the power of Congress 
to regula te the local r a t e s of i n t e r s t a t e c a r r i e r s for the 
p u r p o s e of m a k i n g i t s r e g u l a t i o n of i n t e r s t a t e r a t e s 
ef fec t ive , and in defending this decision the present Chief 
Justice asserted: 
Within its sphere as recognized by the Constitution, 
the nation is supreme. The question is simply of the 
Federa l power as granted , where there is author ized 
exe rc i se of that power there is no reserved power to 
nu l l i fy i t - - a p r i n c i p l e obv ious ly e s s e n t i a l to our 
n a t i o n a l i n t e g r i t y , y e t c o n t i n u a l l y cal l ing for new 
applications. 
The s t a t e m e n t is e x a c t l y in the s p i r i t of Madison's 
a sse r t ion in 1791 " tha t the powers of the S t a t e s are no 
constitutional criterion of the powers of Congress." 
And the decis ion se t t ing the A.A.A. aside is open to 
similar comment. Here Congress was told that in requiring 
a g r i c u l t u r i s t s to s i g n c o n t r a c t s a g r e e i n g to c u r t a i l 
product ion, as a condit ion to rece iv ing ce r t a in payments , 
the object of which was to relieve them from the financial 
s t r e s s c a u s e d by o v e r p r o d u c t i o n , i t was "coe rc ing" its 
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supposed benef ic ia r i e s , and hence was invading again "the 
reserved powers of the States" over production. 
Y e t s h o u l d a p r i v a t e p h i l a n t h r o p i s t t a k e the l ike 
precaut ion agains t the cause of the d is t ress he was trying 
to r e l i e v e , w h o e v e r would d ream of c a l l i n g his act ion 
"coercive"? 
But " the reserved powers of the States" is not the only 
concept of indefini te scope which the Court may and does 
app ly at d i s c r e t i o n ; the same is a l so t r u e of the due 
process clause of the Fifth amendment. This says that "no 
p e r s o n sha l l be d e p r i v e d of l i f e , l i b e r t y or p r o p e r t y 
without due process of law." 
All tha t these words meant in 1792 when they were first 
put in the Const i tu t ion , was that persons accused of serious 
offenses should have a fair t r ia l , following formal accusa-
tion by a Grand Jury. 
What, in effect , they mean today is that legislation to 
be va l id and e n f o r c i b l e must f i r s t r e c e i v e the Court ' s 
i m p r i m a t u r as be ing " r e a s o n a b l e . " Thus , in the Alton 
Rai l road case , in which it over turned the ra i l road pension 
ac t , the Court held that for Congress to require a carrier 
to pension superannuated employes was to deprive the carrier 
of " l ibe r ty" and "proper ty" "without due process of law," 
al though had it required the re t i r ement of such employes 
without pensions its act would not have been open to similar 
attack by them. 
And e q u a l l y i n d e f i n i t e and u n p r e d i c t a b l e as to i t s 
appl ica t ion is the third pr incipal ground upon which New 
Deal legis la t ion has been set as ide . That is the maxim, 
n o w h e r e s ta ted in the Const i tu t ion, that " the Legis la ture 
may not delegate its power." Although there were some very 
sweeping delegations of legislative power by Congress to the 
P res iden t in the ear ly history of the Constitution, down to 
the decision in the hot oil cases ear ly in 1934 no act of 
Congress had ever been set aside on this ground. Nor can it 
be said that this decision makes the maxim less vague as a 
tes t of legis la t ion than it was before—any less vague, that 
is, as a basis of judicial censorship of legislation. 
In s h o r t , most, if not all , of the pr incipal New Deal 
legis la t ion might have been sustained had the Court chosen 
to g ive the d o c t r i n e s invoked a g a i n s t it as l iberal an 
appl ica t ion as it has sometimes done in the past ; or if it 
had simply chosen to give the words of the Const i tut ion 
itself their logical and historical meanings. 
But if th is is so, what would be the point in adding 
"new" powers to Congress by constitutional amendment? And 
m o r e espec ia l ly , what would be the point in doing so if 
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these powers were to be exposed to the same principles of 
construction that made them necessary? 
How long would they, subjected to the vague, indefinite 
t es t s of cons t i tu t ional i ty to which the New Deal legislation 
succumbed, remain adequate to the purposes for which they 
were adopted? 
The further question accordingly a r i ses , whether those 
who urge Const i tu t ional amendment as the best means of 
meeting the present s i tuat ion would like to see the above 
m e n t i o n e d t e s t s of cons t i tu t iona l i ty abolished? It seems 
not. 
What they propose is rea l ly that the power which was 
original ly granted in broad terms to the national Government 
should be r e -g ran t ed piece by p iece , and that without any 
guaranty that the re-grant would be more effective than the 
original grant has turned out to be! 
This may not be quite the same thing as proposing that 
the nat ional leg is la t ive power be gradually transferred from 
Ar t i c le I to Ar t i c l e V of the Constitution, but it is pretty 
nearly that. 
The suggestion of specific Constitutional amendments as a 
means of meet ing the presen t s i tuat ion may, the re fore , be 
ruled out without more ado. If the Court does not exchange 
i t s p r e s e n t a p p l i c a t i o n of " t h e r e s e r v e d powers of the 
S t a t e s " concept , the "due process of law" concept, and the 
maxim against de lega ted legis la t ion for more liberal views, 
such amendments would not suffice—indeed, they might prove 
a posi t ive menace to admitted powers , on the wel l -known 
p r i n c i p l e of c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t a s p e c i f i c power argues 
against a more general one. 
If, on the other hand, the Court does come around to the 
l i b e r a l v i ews on wh ich the New D e a l l e g i s l a t i o n was 
j u s t i f i a b l y p r e d i c a t e d , then such a m e n d m e n t s would be 
unnecessary. And this would also be the case if in some way 
the censorship of the Court could be obviated--in a word, we 
are back at our starting point, the Court! 
Ill 
Nine men in Washington have a pretty arbitrary power 
to annul any s t a t u t e or ord inance or adminis t ra t ive 
order that is properly brought before them. The power 
is an a r b i t r a r y p o w e r , even though it may not be 
a r b i t r a r i l y e x e r c i s e d . It is a rb i t r a ry in the sense 
t h a t in the last analysis it is exe rc i sed as five or 
more of the nine men think best. 
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So speaks Thomas Reed Powell, professor of constitutional 
law in the Harvard Law School. 
Whi le u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e x e r c i s e of power by the 
execu t ive and legislative branches of the Government is 
subject to judicial r e s t r a in t , the only check upon our 
own e x e r c i s e of power is our own s e n s e of self-
restraint. 
So speaks Justice Stone of the Court itself. 
How is this g r ea t power to be brought to the support of 
t h e New Dea l ? May it be c o n c i l i a t e d or must i t be 
diminished? And if the l a t t e r , what s teps may be taken 
either by constitutional amendment or otherwise? 
The most obv ious p o s s i b i l i t y would be the o u t r i g h t 
aboli t ion of the power of the Court to pass on the constitu-
t i ona l i t y of ac t s of Congress . Speaking in 1913, Just ice 
Holmes said; 
I do not think the United States would come to an 
end if we lost our power to declare an act of Congress 
void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we 
could not make tha t declaration as to the laws of the 
several States. 
The case might be put even more positively. The Court's 
supervision of S t a t e legislation has, on the whole, been one 
of t he d i s t i n c t succes ses of the Cons t i tu t ion . No other 
method could have been devised at once so effective and so 
unobtrusive. 
The Court has had occasion to in te rvene agains t S t a t e 
legis la t ion express ive of local narrowness of view and local 
i l l ibe ra l i ty again and again; and in so doing it has built 
up sound ideas of the nat ional basis of our prosper i ty , of 
freedom of speech and the press, of equality before the law, 
of the requirement of a fair trial, and on other matters. 
No such record of achievement can be granted it in the 
f ie ld of n a t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n , where its in tervent ion has 
often been based on highly debatable grounds, and at times 
has been marked by a frightful lack of pol i t ica l common 
sense—once or twice, indeed, by lack of common humanity. 
In t h i s f ie ld of jud ic ia l review the country has paid 
handsomely for a doubtful blessing; and the pr ice is st i l l 
b e i n g p a i d , as was e a r l i e r i n d i c a t e d , in the inevi table 
sacrifice by the Court of judicial impartiality. 
The Cour t is a hybrid, mingling judicial and pol i t ical 
powers . The independence of mind which it should enjoy in 
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the exe rc i se of the former is constant ly endangered by its 
participation in the lat ter . 
On the other hand, there has undoubtedly come to be a 
ce r t a in symbolic value a t tach ing to the Court 's authentica-
tion of an ac t of Congress as constitutional, and there have 
been t imes in the past , most conspicuously in Marsha l l ' s 
day, when the Court magnif icently voiced the principles of 
national aspiration and growth. 
As a ma t t e r of fact , it does not appear that anybody is 
a t the moment propos ing to abolish outr ight the Cour t ' s 
power of judicial review of acts of Congress . Rather the 
a t t a c k is taking two other forms. On the one hand the 
h is tor ica l val idi ty of this p re roga t ive is being quest ioned; 
on the other hand various devices a re being suggested for 
curtailing its exercise. 
The h is tor ica l question may be dismissed very br ie f ly . 
That many of the leading members of the Convention of 1787 
an t ic ipa ted that the Court would exercise some such function 
is a l t o g e t h e r c l e a r , and i ndeed the C o n s t i t u t i o n i tself 
f u rn i she s ample v e r b a l b a s i s for t he func t ion up to a 
ce r t a in po in t - - a qual i f icat ion which will be understood in a 
moment. 
At the same t i m e , i t is equally c lea r tha t very few 
people in 1787 had any prevision of the immense role into 
which the Court has gradually lifted itself, or could have 
had, in view of the prevalence at that date of the doctrine, 
taught by both Locke and Blackstone, of the natural suprema-
cy of the legislative power in a constitutional government. 
However, it is vain to suppose tha t judicial review of 
a c t s of C o n g r e s s can be c o n j u r e d away by h i s t o r i c a l 
r e s e a r c h . It has existed for more than 130 years, and that 
is historical authentication enough. 
But t h e r e is one a s p e c t of the h i s t o r i c a l q u e s t i o n , 
n e v e r t h e l e s s , on which the c r i t i c s of judicial review a re 
e n t i t l e d to a h e a r i n g , and t h a t is on the q u e s t i o n of 
finali ty of the Supreme Cour t ' s dec is ions . The American 
Liberty League would like to have us believe that, once the 
C o u r t has la id down a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a 
cons t i tu t ional provision in the course of deciding a case , 
such in t e rp re t a t ion becomes to all in tents and purposes a 
pa r t of the Const i tu t ion by which the nat ional l eg i s la t ive 
power is h e n c e f o r w a r d bound until the i n t e rp re t a t i on in 
question can be amended out of the Constitution or until the 
Court itself, in deciding some future case , overturns it as 
having been erroneous all along. 
The t h e o r y fa l l s of i t s own weigh t . The Court has 
repea ted ly abandoned its own interpretat ions of the Consti-
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tut ion, although if they are a par t of the Consti tution, it 
would be as much bound by them as the other branches. 
But even more important is the adverse attitude of such 
men as Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and the first Roosevelt, 
not to mention the most eminent historians of the Constitu-
t ion. As Lincoln put the mat te r in his first inaugural, to 
a t t r ibu te such finality to an u t t e r ance of the Court made 
m e r e l y in the c o u r s e of d e c i d i n g l i t i g a t i o n , would be 
tantamount to saying that the people had "ceased to be their 
own ru le rs , having to that ex ten t practically resigned their 
Government into the hands o f the Court. 
Undoubtedly, the re fo re , it is open to the national legis-
l a t i v e power to c u r t a i l t he p r a c t i c a l effect of judicial 
d isa l lowance of i ts measures, by continuing to adhere to its 
own views of the requirements of the Constitution and to act 
upon those views. 
IV 
Yes te rday I said it is open to the nat ional leg is la t ive 
power to cur ta i l the p rac t i ca l effect of judicial disal low-
ance of its measures , by continuing to adhere to i ts own 
views of the requirements of the Const i tu t ion , and to act 
upon those views. 
But what form or forms may such action take without the 
necess i ty of resor t ing to cons t i tu t ional amendment? Recent 
proposals along this line have for the most part followed in 
the t rack of ea r l i e r suggest ions . The following four are 
the principal ones: 
(1) That Congress increase the size of the court so that 
the P res iden t , ac t ing with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, may appoint to it Judges who may be expected to be 
sympathetic toward the New Deal. 
Nobody denies the power of Congress to enlarge the court 
for whatever reason . It has , in fact , exercised this power 
more than o n c e . The c o u r t o r ig ina l l y consis ted of six 
Judges and it now has nine; while at one period during the 
Civil War it had 10, the temporary increase being motivated 
in c o n s i d e r a b l e p a r t at leas t by the fear les t the then 
existing court would overturn essential war measures. 
The disadvantage, however, of this method of dealing with 
the p r e s e n t p rob lem is obvious on the face of i t . The 
opera t ion is one which might be r epea ted indefinitely until 
the court , loaded with superfluous members and become the 
f o o t b a l l of p o l i t i c s , would have lost all semblance to a 
judicial tribunal and all claim upon popular regard. 
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(2) Another proposal is that Congress should deprive the 
cour of its appe l la te jur isdict ion in cases in which any 
q u e s t i o n r e g a r d i n g the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of an a c t of 
rnnzress has been raised by either party. 
The proposal is ambiguous. If it means tha t the cour t 
should be e n t i r e l y ous t ed of jur isdict ion in such cases 
uch an act would 'unquest ionably be constitutional, inasmuch 
as the c o u r t ' s a p p e l l a t e ju r i sd ic t ion is, by the def ini te 
terms of the cons t i t u t i on , subject to "such regulations and 
«;nrh exceotions as the Congress shall make. 
" ' But any such sweeping measure would, by leaving the fina 
decision of the cases covered by it to ^^'^llf\°'}°lZ 
cour ts , both S t a t e and F e d e r a l , produce a legal chaos that 
would be utterly intolerable. nronosal 
If, on the other hand, it is the sense of the ProPO«al 
t h a t t he c o u r t should s t i l l r e t a i n j u r i s d i c t i o n of such 
a L . but be deprived of the right to take the Constitution 
in to cons idera t ion in deciding them, then the proposal is 
clearlv unconstitutional. , 
The court has the r ight to decide on appeal only the 
c a s e s to wh ich i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n is e x t e n d e d by ac ts of 
c o n g r e s s ; but as long as it retains jurisdiction o any case 
w h a t e v e r i t is under the necess i ty of deciding it is in 
I c c o r d a n c e with the law, of which ^he Constitution by th 
theory of judicial review, is a judicial ly appl icable p a r t . 
The proposal really overthrows judicial review. 
(3) St i l l another proposal is tha t Congress should lay 
down a rule tha t any decision adverse to the constitution-
ali ty of an act of Congress should have the support of more 
than a mere majority of the bench. Writing in favor of such 
a proposal in 1923, Senator Borah said: 
This, of course , is not a new proposition. It is a 
subject which has had cons idera t ion from almost the 
beginning of our Government and at the hands of some of 
our mos t d i s t i n g u i s h e d l a w y e r s and s t a t esmen . . . . 
From the ea r l i e s t days of our Republic , Congress has 
determined not only the number of justices but also the 
number which shall cons t i tu te a quorum. . . . J ^ J^^ ^ 
Congress invading the "judicial power" when it declares 
t h e n u m b e r of j u s t i c e s r e q u i r e d to c o n s t i t u t e a 
quorum? I th ink n o t . Is i t d e r o g a t i n g from the 
"judicial power" when it provides by law that less than 
a quorum shall be authorized to do certain things? It 
would seem n o t . . . . In other words may we not 
provide under the scope of " regula t ions" touching the 
appe l la te jur isdic t ion, that before an ac t of Congress 
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s h a l l be d e c l a r e d void at l e a s t seven Judges shall 
concur? It seems to me that we have that power. If we 
have the power, it is perfect ly c lear tha t we should 
use it. 
Sena tor Borah also pointed out that neither Webster nor 
Clay had ra ised cons t i tu t ional object ions to a proposal of 
this kind; but that was a long time ago and much water has 
passed through the judicial mill race since then. 
The enac tment of such a measure would today be very 
l i k e l y to p r e c i p i t a t e a s t r u g g l e be tween the court and 
C o n g r e s s w h i c h , aga in in the i n t e r e s t of the j u d i c i a l 
character of the court, ought, if possible, be avoided. 
(4) F i n a l l y , i t is s u g g e s t e d in some q u a r t e r s t h a t 
Congress ought to have the right, by a two-thirds majority, 
to o v e r r i d e the d e c i s i o n s of the c o u r t a d v e r s e to i t s 
m e a s u r e s . In o t h e r w o r d s i t is p r o p o s e d to t r e a t the 
cour t ' s decis ions in this field as a species of veto akin to 
t h a t of the P res iden t , and undoubtedly that is just what 
they are today. 
A l though C h i e f Jus t ice Marshall was evident ly of the 
op in ion a t one t ime t h a t some such procedure could be 
es tabl i shed by mere informal ar rangement between Congress 
and the c o u r t , such a proposal would today undoubtedly 
require a constitutional amendment to put it into effect. 
Assuming that judicial review of ac ts of Congress ought 
to be curtailed by some outside force, the proposal has much 
to be said for it , especia l ly on the score of its tendency 
to r e s to r e the judicial c h a r a c t e r of the cour t to its due 
prominence. 
But is the in te rvent ion of an outside force necessary, or 
may the court itself supply the required remedy? So far at 
any r a t e as the cour t ' s own past decisions go, the question 
is very far from being foreclosed. In the pertinent words 
of Professor Powell: 
The Supreme Court . . . is not controlled by its own 
p r e c e d e n t s , for i t f e e l s free to overrule them. It 
f ee l s even more f ree to make d i s t inc t ions that no 
sensible person would think of making except to avoid 
confession tha t a p receden t is being disregarded. All 
this remains true even though in most of the cases it 
is a l so t r u e t h a t a p p l i c a b l e p r e c e d e n t s are e i ther 
followed or are not there to be invoked. The Supreme 
Court does what it prefers to do when it prefers to do 
as nearly as possible what it has done before. 
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In short , while the court has thus far slammed the door 
in the face of the New Deal , it has not bolted that door 
past its own un lock ing- - i t is st i l l mas ter of the situation, 
t he d o c t r i n e of s t a r e d e c i s i s to the c o n t r a r y notwi th-
standing. 
The question remains, however, whether the present bench 
would c a r e to e x e r c i s e i t s f reedom in t h i s r e s p e c t - - a 
question not free from personal e lement . In the past the 
court has usually taken its time in working away from its 
more serious errors, although there are one or two conspicu-
ous except ions to the con t r a ry , but today the practicability 
of such gradual methods is open to doubt. 
Manifest ly , the presen t s i tuat ion would be considerably 
aided by one or two resignations from the bench, and surely 
the martyrdom of re t i r ing upon a pension equal to one ' s 
salary ought to appeal to justices who have shown themselves 
in r ecen t months to be such fervent opponents of constitu-
t ional change . The court is the very last thing they would 
wish to see materially altered. 
In short , it is well within the powers of Congress to 
bring about judicial approval of the New Deal . It is also 
well within the power of the court to do so. The disadvan-
t a g e of the former method is the wound, not necessar i ly 
immedicable, which it might give the court in i ts judicial 
c a p a c i t y . The l a t t e r m e t h o d would l a r g e l y avoid this 
disadvantage. 
V 
F i n a l l y we come back to the problem of permanent ly 
reorganiz ing the judicial review of acts of Congress in such 
a way as to r e c o n c i l e i t , c o n s i d e r i n g the t r e m e n d o u s 
dimensions it has today a t t a ined , with the idea of popular 
government. 
On this point too, the Court could go a long way toward 
s u p p l y i n g the n e e d e d r e m e d y , n a m e l y , by reshaping its 
procedures with a view to making rea l ly ef fec t ive cer ta in 
l imitat ions which a l ready ex is t theore t i ca l ly on its power 
of judicial review. 
No p r o p o s i t i o n of cons t i tu t iona l law, for ins tance , is 
b e t t e r e s t a b l i s h e d than t h a t a l l doub t s r e g a r d i n g the 
cons t i tu t iona l i ty of a leg is la t ive ac t should be resolved in 
favor of the a c t . Today this "smoothly t ransmi t ted plati-
tude," as some one has cal led it, means simply nothing at 
all , for the reason that it had been left to each Judge to 
determine for himself whether there was such a reasonable 
doubt. 
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But j u d i c i a l r e v i e w is a func t ion not of i n d i v i d u a l 
j u s t i c e s , but of t he c o u r t as a whole, and the rule of 
reasonable doubt ought to govern the court as such, just as 
an analogous rule governs the jury as such, through making 
the r ea sonab le doubt of a single member con t ro l l ing . In 
short the cour t should simply announce that henceforward it 
will hold no act of Congress void unless it is unanimously 
of opinion that such act is void. 
The court would have as good right to lay down such a 
rule as the Court under Chief Just ice Marshall had to lay 
down the rule tha t it would not dec la re a leg is la t ive ac t 
void e x c e p t by a majori ty of the en t i r e cour t , although 
ordinary judicial functions are discharged by a majority of 
a quorum. 
But as a l ready hinted, the power of the court is one 
t h ing and i t s d i s p o s i t i o n at any par t i cu la r moment is a 
quite different th ing . That is to say, the problem of the 
proper r eo rgan iza t ion of the cour t ' s censorship of ac t s of 
C o n g r e s s rea l ly weights upon the problem of get t ing the 
right kind of court and keeping it right. 
And to t h i s p u r p o s e , i t is the w r i t e r ' s op in ion , no 
reform could be be t t e r adapted than the requirement, to be 
la id down by an a c t of C o n g r e s s , or, if necessa ry , by 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment, tha t no Judge may hold office 
under the United States beyond his seventieth birthday. 
Judicial appoin tees who have already completed a career 
at the bar , very frequently in the service of great corpora-
t i o n s , c a n n o t o r d i n a r i l y be e x p e c t e d to make the most 
sa t i s fac to ry instruments of the vast pol i t ica l powers which 
are today wielded by the Supreme Court , and to a lesser 
e x t e n t by all Federa l courts . Even fifty years ago, Justice 
Miller remarked of such Judges: 
It is in vain to contend with Judges who have been 
a t the ba r t he a d v o c a t e s for 40 y e a r s of ra i l road 
c o m p a n i e s , and al l the forms of associa ted cap i t a l , 
when they are ca l led upon to decide cases where such 
i n t e r e s t s a r e in c o n t e s t . All t h e i r t r a i n i n g , al l 
thei r feelings are from the start in favor of those who 
need no such influence. 
Today those words apply with re-emphasized force. Nor is 
this to imply that Federa l Judges are corrupt or dishonest. 
Indeed, the gentleman who recent ly wrote a book to prove 
tha t the Justices of the Supreme Court are honest owes them 
an apology. 
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What Just ice Miller is real ly saying is that Judges, like 
all other people , are the c r ea tu re s of their education and 
e x p e r i e n c e . And as someone once remarked in a similar 
connect ion , the re is no pressure like that of a tmosphere , 
w h i c h , h o w e v e r , is n o t f e l t , b e c a u s e it is e x e r t e d 
internally as well as externally. 
To sum up: The proposal to render the New Deal constitu-
tional by specif ic amendments to the Constitution purporting 
to add to C o n g r e s s ' power is u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . Congress 
a l r e a d y has s u f f i c i e n t power when t he C o n s t i t u t i o n is 
construed with the same l iberal i ty as it has been at times. 
Nor could such "additions" to Congress' power be expected to 
r e m a i n e f f e c t i v e if t hey w e r e s u b j e c t e d to the same 
i n d e f i n i t e t e s t by wh ich New Deal legis la t ion has been 
overturned. 
The r e a l p r o b l e m b e f o r e the c o u n t r y is t he p r o p e r 
o r g a n i z a t i o n of the c o u r t ' s power to d i s a l l o w a c t s of 
Congress . The exe rc i s e of this power today rests on such 
i n d e f i n i t e and inde te rmina te grounds that it overruns all 
s t a t a b l e l im i t s s e p a r a t i n g j u d i c i a l and p o l i t i c a l power . 
Congress unquestionably has powers whereby it could bring 
the court up with a round turn, but is properly embarrassed 
in employing them by the considerat ion that in doing so it 
would s e r i o u s l y harm the p r e s t i g e of t he court as the 
highest court in the country. 
The ideal solution would be for the court to supply its 
own s o l u t i o n , which could p r o p e r l y t a k e t he form of 
announcing that it would hereafter hold no acts of Congress 
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e x c e p t by the unan imous v o t e of i t s 
members . In the absence of such a solution a constitutional 
amendment authorizing Congress to overrule adverse decisions 
of the court by a two-thirds vote of each house would be in 
point. 
In any case , the requirement ought to be laid down for 
Judges holding office under the Consti tution that they must 
r e t i r e at the age of 70. Such a requirement would tend to 
k e e p the c o u r t in touch with public sent iment , both by 
assuring a more rapid rep lacement of its members and by 
securing jus t ices of younger and more flexible minds. The 
Supreme Court exercises immense political powers, and should 
be at least that responsive to popular opinion. 
15 
The Supreme Court: Prophecy 
W h a t r e s u l t s a r e l i ke ly to flow from the P r e s i d e n t ' s 
proposal and from the fact of its having been made? 
If the proposal is re jec ted without something roughly its 
e q u i v a l e n t b e i n g subs t i t u t ed for it , the cause of reform 
will be slowed up indef in i te ly . The Court will have been 
given a vote of conf idence, and so long at leas t as the 
e x i s t i n g personnel remains unchanged the a t t i tude of the 
cont ro l l ing conse rva t ive majority toward the New Deal and 
all its works will have been stiffened. 
The C o u r t has r a r e l y shown any grea t disposit ion to 
c o n s i d e r i t s r e l a t i o n to the d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s or to 
r e c o g n i z e any s p e c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t he successful 
f u n c t i o n i n g of this p rocess . Early in its h i s to ry , to be 
sure, it laid down the maxim tha t a legis la t ive act should 
never be dec la red unconst i tu t ional unless it was clearly so 
and tha t all doubts on that score must be resolved in favor 
of the l e g i s l a t i v e b o d y . But this "smoothly t ransmit ted 
p la t i tude" has saved few if any leg is la t ive acts during the 
las t half cen tury , and meantime the grounds on which acts, 
whether s t a t e or na t ional , may be set aside by the Court 
have become vaguer and vaguer and the Court's application of 
them more and more a matter of sheer choice. 
If the p resen t proposal fails, the Court may have learned 
d i sc re t ion for the time being, but it will hardly have been 
d i scouraged in its quest for power. Fur thermore , it will 
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have been taught to regard its power in a more negat ive 
light than ever , having learned that its friends are to be 
found in the main among those who oppose extension of the 
powers of government, and especia l ly those of the national 
government. 
A few years ago Chief Justice Hughes wrote: 
We should be fai thless to our supreme obligation if 
we in te rp re ted the g rea t gene ra l i t i e s of the Constitu-
tion so as to forbid f lexibi l i ty in making adaptat ions 
to meet new conditions and to prevent the correction of 
new abuses incident to the complexi ty of our life, or 
a s c r y s t a l l i z i n g our own n o t i o n s of p o l i c y , our 
personal views of economics and our theories of moral 
or social improvement. 
In the Poultry Case the Chief Justice turned his back on 
this approach to the problem of Cons t i tu t ional i n t e r p r e t a -
tion and the Court followed in his wake . Defea t of the 
P r e s i d e n t ' s proposal would encourage the l a t t e r a t t i t ude , 
for it would mean that while the American people are glad to 
have their government exe r t i tself in times of acute crisis, 
ye t once the cr is is is over they discountenance any attempt 
on the par t of the government to correct underlying causes. 
Sufficient unto the day is the prosperity thereof. 
And w h i l e t he C o u r t w i l l have r e c e i v e d a v o t e of 
confidence the P res iden t will have rece ived a vote of no 
c o n f i d e n c e , and his p r e s t i g e wi l l h a v e b e e n s e r i o u s l y 
i m p a i r e d . I n d e e d , dawning a p p r e c i a t i o n of this fact is 
causing many l ibera ls who regard the P r e s i d e n t ' s proposal 
with cons iderable d i s t a s t e , to take the posi t ion that they 
must never the less support i t . Such a posit ion is certainly 
unders tandable when we review the his tory of past liberal 
movements and thei r f rustrat ion at the moment of apparent 
success . Thus the impulse for reform which made Woodrow 
Wilson Pres iden t in 1913 was diverted into a blind alley by 
the World War before more than a fraction of its objectives 
had been r e a l i z e d ; and we all know the outlook of the 
s u c c e e d i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o w a r d r e f o r m , p r i o r to the 
collapse of 1929. 
As the Pres ident has said, "Time is of the essence," and 
e s p e c i a l l y is t h i s so in a d e m o c r a c y in which popular 
i n c a p a c i t y for s u s t a i n e d a t t e n t i o n is p i t t ed agains t the 
u n r e l a x i n g v i g i l a n c e of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s . T h i s , 
however , is not to say that the fai lure of the President ' s 
proposal would mean violence or revolution at any near date, 
if eve r . On the con t r a ry , it would only mean, for a long 
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t ime a t l e a s t , s t a g n a t i o n . In o t h e r w o r d s , the reform 
impulse would bog down and would continue in that way until 
the next depression. 
All of which becomes of great importance when we reflect 
tha t if the P r e s i d e n t ' s proposal is defeated the forces of 
reform will have only one recourse left them for ge t t ing 
w h a t t hey w a n t , t h a t of const i tu t ional amendment. The 
d i f f i c u l t i e s w h i c h h a v e been encoun te red in framing an 
amendment program capable of commanding liberal support will 
have been aggrava ted by the division of the liberal forces 
themselves . At the same time those who want no change in 
the s ta tus quo and for that reason have been urging the 
amendment method as the only "square and honest way" of 
b r ing ing change about will , of course, have been grea t ly 
e n c o u r a g e d . In short , if const i tu t ional amendment was a 
hazardous exped ien t before, it will now have become doubly 
so. 
Defeat of the Pres ident ' s proposal would mean, therefore, 
tha t the obs t ruc t ive power of judicial obscurantism would be 
enhanced, tha t the leadership which the President has thus 
given the forces of reform would be weakened, and that the 
p rospec t of subs tant ia l const i tu t ional amendment, never too 
bright, would have been dimmed. 
What , on the o ther hand, would be the resul t of the 
success of the P re s iden t ' s proposal? The first result would 
be a new Court which could probably be relied upon to adopt 
a new approach to fundamental const i tu t ional problems. In 
other words, we should within a comparat ively short time 
receive a new Constitutional Law. And yet it would not be a 
new Const i tu t ional Law strictly speaking; it would be rather 
a r e v i v a l of o l d e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r inc ip les . The Court 
would abandon the a t tempt , at leas t for the time being, to 
set up the rese rved powers of the states as an independent 
l imitat ion on the de lega ted powers of Congress . It would 
m i n i m i z e i t s r i g h t to set legis la t ion aside on the vague 
grounds of being "unreasonable" and hence not "due process 
of law." It would probably drop the a t tempt to make the 
maxim agains t de legat ion of leg is la t ive power a judicial ly 
e n f o r c e a b l e l i m i t a t i o n on t he p o w e r s of Congress , thus 
re turning in effect to its p r a c t i c e pr ior to the "Hot Oil" 
C a s e s . I t wou ld c e r t a i n l y d i s c a r d the d o c t r i n e t h a t 
C o n g r e s s may not p r o t e c t i n t e r s t a t e commerce from the 
i n t e r r u p t i o n s and d e t r i m e n t s which reach it " ind i rec t ly" 
from labor conditions in the states. 
A question a r i ses , however: how long could this more 
l i b e r a l a t t i t u d e on t he p a r t of the C o u r t t o w a r d the 
leg is la t ive branch be counted on to continue? That would 
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depend upon the kind of appointments that the President and 
Sena te made to the new justiceships. It is conceivable that 
t he P r e s i d e n t would appoin t men who would support his 
measures , but would ultimately come to regard themselves as 
sor t of specia l Providence in the same way as the control-
ling majority of the existing Bench do. On the other hand, 
he might appoint people who would feel that the p resen t 
d e v e l o p m e n t of j u d i c i a l r e v i e w has p r o d u c e d a serious 
i m b a l a n c e in our C o n s t i t u t i o n in favor of governmental 
inact ion, and would labor even after Mr. Roosevelt left the 
White House for the correction of this imbalance. 
In e i ther event the adoption of the Pres ident ' s proposal 
is not l ikely to provide a final solution of the problems to 
which the proposal is addressed and especially the problem 
of redefining the re la t ionship of the power of Congress to 
tha t of the Cour t . For such a solution we shall have to 
look to f u r t h e r l e g i s l a t i o n or p e r h a p s to cons t i tu t ional 
amendment. 
The chief jus t i f icat ion for the P r e s i d e n t ' s proposal lies 
in t he f ac t t h a t the p r e s e n t C o u r t is no t su f f i c i en t ly 
contemporaneous in i ts point of view. Its chief defect is 
tha t it does not provide adequately agains t the recurrence 
of the s i t u a t i o n . What is n e e d e d obv ious ly is a more 
regular , be t t e r spaced replacement of the Court, which could 
be done by conferring on the President the power to appoint 
th ree jus t ices in the course of his four year term, and as 
many more as might be needed to maintain the Court at a 
minimum membership of nine justices. In point of fact, this 
has been about the average r a t e of replacement of justices 
in the past. 
Nor , of course , is it by any means ce r t a in that even 
l ibera l i n t e rp re t a t ion of the Constitution would concede the 
nat ional government all the powers which present conditions 
cal l for. If this should prove to be the ca se , then there 
would be an effort to add to the powers of the nat ional 
government by const i tut ional amendment. While the adoption 
of such amendments would not be guaranteed by the Presi-
d e n t ' s s u c c e s s in p u t t i n g a c r o s s h is proposa l , it would 
undoubtedly be considerably aided thereby. 
In brief, the success of the P r e s i d e n t ' s proposal , or of 
some compromise proposal making substantially for the same 
resul t , would spell a decidedly lessened interference on the 
par t of the Court with the democratic process for the time 
b e i n g , and on the other hand, an improved likelihood of 
cons t i tu t ional reforms of a more durable charac ter , looking 
especially to the increase of national power. 
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But undoubtedly there are those who, although sympathetic 
with the New Deal program, fear that the success of the 
P re s iden t ' s proposal would, by set t ing a precedent, produce 
a new imbalance in the Constitution dangerous to liberty; we 
should have exchanged King Log for King Stork. Granting, 
h o w e v e r , t h a t a r e c u r r e n c e of the present s i tuat ion, in 
which we have a Court whose membership has not been suffi-
c ient ly renewed in recent years, can be prevented,—granting 
t h i s , such a p p r e h e n s i o n s seem insubs tan t ia l . The P re s i -
d e n t ' s proposal leaves the Cour t ' s powers untouched, and 
history shows that while the Court has had its ups and downs 
in the past , the single author of i ts worst humiliations has 
a l w a y s b e e n i t s e l f . A C o u r t s i n c e r e l y a c c e p t i n g the 
democra t ic p rocess , and reasonably contemporaneous in its 
point of view, will never be molested in any endeavor to 
p ro t ec t l iber ty in any sense of that term which makes its 
preservation of concern to the average American citizen. 
Part Five 
A New Era 
The post-war era brought new constitutional and political 
issues regarding the presidency, international relations, 
and the changing American society. Corwin's work remained 
eclectic, but his primary interest became presidential 
powers, Franklin Roosevelt's expansion of powers during 
World War Two—coming after the Court-packing debacle--
further diminished Corwin's support for the president and 
gave the professor the substance of voluminous writing. The 
first two essays in this section examine the presidency 
under pressures of constant emergency and permanent multi-
national alliances, Corwin's conflict with Roosevelt also 
shaped his attitude toward the Democratic Party in general. 
His personal politics are evident in these late writings, 
Corwin frequently attacked Harry Truman and offered kind 
remarks for Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon, 
Corwin was also involved in several matters of public 
affairs after his retirement from the Princeton faculty in 
1946. Foremost of such activities came in 1953 when he 
co-chaired a prestigious national committee opposing the 
"Bricker Amendment" to the Constitution. The amendment 
would have severely restricted the government's treaty-
making authority. Reprinted here are Corwin's two essays 
explaining his opposition to Senator Bricker's amendment. 
Although Corwin's politics changed during the 1940s, his 
views of treaty powers remained generally constant. In the 
1910s he argued that the treaty powers could allow the 
federal government to expand its authority into new fields. 
Forty years later he fought to preserve that potentially 
sweeping capacity. 
16 
The Atom Bomb and the Constitution 
Pandora, Sindbad the Sailor, and the man who first conceived 
the idea of spl i t t ing the atom are dest ined to go down in 
his tory as th ree who conceded too much to curiosity; they 
loved inves t iga t ion , not wisely but too wel l . There is no 
doubt tha t our atomic physicists--which means an_ physicists 
ex t an t as of August 6, 1945--feel this reproach and have 
been busy ever s ince Hiroshima building up a l ib i s - - tha t is 
to say, ways to get t ing people to look in the other direc-
tion and think of something else . They have, for instance, 
been most lavish with predic t ions regarding the peace-time 
uses of atomic energy, predictions which are scheduled to be 
r e a l i z e d w i t h i n the n e x t t e n , fifteen, fifty, or hundred 
yea r s , depending on the emotional tempo of the predictor. 
Indeed, it is suggested that we are at the beginning of an 
Atomic Age when all kinds of substances, inert as well as 
r ad ioac t ive , will be required to yield up hypothetical vast 
resources of hitherto dormant atomic energy, and we shall be 
enabled to send the "Queen Mary" back and forth across the 
ocean any number of times on a lump of coal no bigger than 
your fist.l 
And meantime Sc ience ' s old re l iab le alibi of taking the 
S o c i a l S c i e n c e s to t a sk for l agg ing so far behind the 
Natural Sc iences has been revived, the implication thereof 
being that if the Social Sciences had been up to their job 
they would have had the world organized long ago to receive 
"The Atom Bomb and the Constitution." In A Constitution of 
Powers in a^  Secular State, pp. 29-56. Charlot tesvi l le : 
The Michie Company, 1951. Reprinted by permission from The 
Michie Company. [Bibliography Entry A18] 
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the blessings which are to be expec ted from spl i t t ing the 
a tom, w i t h o u t any of its de t r imen ts . But the answer is 
pla in . Alibi number two doesn't exonerate the exponents of 
"Science for Science' sake" one whit, inasmuch as they have 
long been aware that the Social Sc iences were hopelessly 
bogged down and have said so r epea ted ly .2 Never the less , 
they went ahead and split the atom just the same! 
Finally Sc ience has, by way of atonement for Hiroshima, 
been seeking an "answer" to the A-Bomb, and what is more, 
has at last come up with one, the H-Bomb, the potentialities 
of which were set forth in some detail and with considerable 
gusto by four atomic scientists at the University of Chicago 
Round Table , eight or nine months ago.3 Mr. Lilienthal did 
not like their per formance . "For thir ty minutes," said he, 
"four sc ien t i s t s speculated on how to wipe out the e a r t h . 
These fine minds came up with this fine con t r ibu t ion - - to 
t r a n s p l a n t t h i r t y to s i x t y million people . With all due 
re spec t to them, I want to state that this is a lot of high 
i n t e l l e c t u a l n o n s e n s e . It c a n ' t be d o n e . It w o n ' t be 
d o n e . " He added t h a t i t was "a mountainous e r ror" to 
bel ieve that hydrogen bombs would provide security.4 The 
Round Table had been advertised to be repeated the following 
S a t u r d a y , but if i t was 1 f a i l ed to p i ck i t up on my 
r ad io . For once Sc ience took the count at the hands of 
Social Science. 
I 
But is i t , in fact , true tha t the Social Sciences always 
lag after hones t - to -goodness Science? It is not; for as I 
shall now proceed to show, the art and science of Constitu-
tional Interpretat ion at least was ready for the A-Bomb and 
the problem it poses of in te rna t iona l security years before 
Hiroshima. One phase of the Passing of Dual Federal ism, 
which I s k e t c h e d in my p r e v i o u s l ec tu re , has been the 
t ransformation of the power of the National Government in 
t h e f ield of fo re ign r e l a t i o n s from a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y 
limited power into a const i tu t ional ly unlimited power. This 
t rend, issuing as it did from our participation in World War 
I, first involved the war power . In Federalist 23 Hamilton 
envisages the power of "common defense" as comprising a 
mosaic of par t icu la r de legated powers; "the authorities," as 
he puts it, "to ra ise armies, to build and equip fleets; to 
p rescr ibe rules for the government of both; to direct their 
opera t ions ; to provide for their support ." As to these he 
remarks tha t , s ince "the c i rcumstances which endanger the 
safe ty of the nation are inf ini te ," so must the power to 
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which the c a r e of the nat ion ' s safety is committed "be 
c o e x t e n s i v e wi th a l l the p o s s i b l e combina t ions of such 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " But manifest ly, the assumption that any 
a g g r e g a t e of s p e c i f i c enumerated powers can fulfill this 
r e q u i r e m e n t t a k e s s o m e t h i n g for g r a n t e d . This evident 
difficulty today's doctrine avoids. 
I quote the re levan t passage from Just ice Suther land ' s 
c r e a t i v e opinion for the Court in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corporation's decided in 1936: 
A pol i t ica l society [reads the passage I refer to] 
c a n n o t e n d u r e w i t h o u t a supreme wi l l s o m e w h e r e . 
Sovere ignty is never held in suspense. When, the re -
f o r e , t he e x t e r n a l s o v e r e i g n t y of Grea t Bri tain in 
r e spec t of the colonies ceased, it immediately passed 
to the Union. 
I t r e s u l t s t h a t the i n v e s t m e n t of the F e d e r a l 
government with the powers of external sovereignty did 
not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitu-
tion. The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude 
p e a c e , to m a k e t r e a t i e s , to m a i n t a i n d i p l o m a t i c 
re la t ions with other sovere ign t ies , if they had never 
been mentioned in the Const i tut ion, would have vested 
in the Federa l government as necessary concomitants of 
nationality. . . .6 
And again: "As a member of the family of nations, the right 
and power of the United S t a t e s in that field are equal to 
the r i g h t and power of the other members of the in te r -
national family ."7 
This, " the inherent -power" theory as we may term it, is 
o b v i o u s l y a v e r y l i b e r a t i n g t h e o r y of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Under the enumerated powers theory silence 
on the p a r t of the Cons t i tu t ion amounts to a denial of 
power, while under the "inherent-power" theory it amounts to 
an affirmance of power . The " inherent-power" theory thus 
l o g i c a l l y g u a r a n t e e s the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l adequacy q± the 
^Q^Q^g" re la t ions power b^ equating U with the ful^ actual 
PQwer of; the nation. It makes the full actual power of the 
nation const i tu t ional ly avai lable for not only war, but for 
all phases of foreign relationship.8 
II 
Adequate defense against the Bomb is the problem of all 
the nat ions act ing in concert; but until such concert can be 
obtained, each nation must provide such pro tec t ion for its 
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own p e o p l e as i t c a n . With this end in view our own 
g o v e r n m e n t had taken three important s teps even before 
S c i e n c e u t t e r e d the c r e a t i v e f i a t , "Le t t h e r e be an 
H-Bomb." It had set up in a new Department of Defense, the 
Department of the Air Force , it had enac ted the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946,9 and it had negotiated and ratified the 
At lan t ic C h a r t e r . Taken together these measures invoke the 
theory that any nation which may be inclined to use the Bomb 
a g a i n s t us wi l l pause to c o n s i d e r t he r isk involved of 
r e t a l i a t i o n on our pa r t , and that the measures mentioned 
wil l make t h i s r i sk g rea t e r , and- -wha t is of the utmost 
importance--will make it appear to be greater . 
That the c rea t ion of the Air Force as a separate force 
having its own independent depar tment should have aroused 
doubts as to its cons t i tu t iona l i ty even in the most scrupu-
lous mind, seems at first g lance r a the r r emarkab le . Yet 
t h a t it did th i s v e r y th ing in the c a s e of a c e r t a i n 
Mr. Bakewell , a Representative from California, is proved by 
h is i n t r o d u c t i o n into the 80th Congress of the following 
Joint Resolution to amend the Constitution: 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United S t a t e s of America in Congress assembled 
( two- th i rds of each House concurring therein), that the 
following a r t i c l e is proposed as an amendment to the 
Const i tut ion of the United States, which shall be valid 
to all in tents and purposes as part of the Constitution 
when ra t i f ied by the leg is la tures of th ree - four ths of 
the several States: 
"Art icle--
"Sect ion 1. In addition to the powers enumerated in 
Ar t ic le I, sect ion 8, hereof. Congress shall have power 
to provide and maintain an Air Force and to make rules 
for the government and regulation thereof. 
"Sec t ion 2. The Pres iden t shall be Commander-in-
Chief of the Air Force of the United States." 10 
Shortly following Mr. Bakewell's d-marche I was requested 
by General Counsel of the new department to prepare for them 
an op in ion on the q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r the Air Force was 
cons t i tu t ional , and I promptly assured them, with the proper 
display or erudi t ion, that they had nothing to worry about 
on that score . The basis of Mr. Bakewell's attempt to affix 
the bar s in is ter to the Air Force 's 'scutcheon was the fact 
t h a t wh i l e t he C o n s t i t u t i o n speci f ica l ly and in so many 
words gives Congress power to "raise and support armies" and 
" to p r o v i d e and maintain a navy," nothing is there said 
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about an air force . Well, then, must not this oversight be 
supplied, if the Air Force was to be ridded of the stigma of 
illegitimacy and Uncle Sam once more made an honest woman? 
My argument to lay these horrid doubts natural ly drew 
l a r g e l y on J u s t i c e S u t h e r l a n d ' s op in ion in the Cur t i ss -
Wright c a s e . This by itself, however, was not enough, for 
the query had st i l l to be sat isf ied, why the "armies" and 
"navy" clauses? For tuna te ly Justice S to ry ' s Commentaries, 
supplemented by Blacks tone ' s , provided a complete answer. 
What it boiled down to was that these clauses were inserted 
in the C o n s t i t u t i o n not for the purpose of clothing the 
National Government with the powers with which they deal, 
but for the purpose of designating the depar tment of that 
government which should exe rc i se them. Congress , to wi t . 
Otherwise these powers might have been claimed, by analogy 
to the p re roga t ive of the Brit ish Crown, as a part of the 
executive power of the President.! 1 
And to t h i s a r g u m e n t I added, perhaps superfluously, 
ano the r . Point ing out that radio broadcasting has been held 
by the Supreme Court to be "commerce" in the sense of the 
Const i tu t ion , I contended that by a like course of reasoning 
the Air Force was a species of Navy, as much so as are 
submarines; and I supported the content ion by quoting that 
w e l l - k n o w n author i ty on Const i tut ional Law, Alfred Lord 
Tennyson, in The Great Locksley Hall Case: 
Saw the heavens fill with commerce, 
argosies of magic sails. 
Pilots of the purple twilight, 
dropping down with costly bales; 
Heard the heavens fill with shouting, 
and there rained a ghastly dew 
From the nations' airy navies. 
Grappling in the central blue. 
But the outstanding exemplification to date of Congress's 
s o v e r e i g n t y in the f ie ld of defense is furnished by the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1946.12 The act establishes an Atomic 
Energy Commission of five members 
to c o n d u c t t h rough i t s own f a c i l i t i e s or to make 
c o n t r a c t s , a g r e e m e n t s , and loans for, r esearch and 
developmental ac t iv i t i e s re la t ing to nuclear processes, 
t he t h e o r y and p r o d u c t i o n of a tomic e n e r g y , the 
u t i l i z a t i o n of f i s s i o n a b l e and r a d i o a c t i v e mate r ia l s 
for m e d i c a l , i n d u s t r i a l , or other purposes, and the 
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p r o t e c t i o n of h e a l t h during resea rch and production 
activities. 
The act then continues in substance: 
The Commission shall be the exclusive owner of all 
fac i l i t i es for the production of f issionable ma te r i a l s , 
e x c e p t f a c i l i t i e s incidental to r e sea rch or develop-
mental ac t iv i t i e s which do not have a production rate 
adequate to produce atomic weapons within a reasonable 
p e r i o d of t i m e . All f i s s i o n a b l e m a t e r i a l produced 
sha l l be the p r o p e r t y of the Commiss ion ; it shall 
a l l o c a t e f i s s i o n a b l e m a t e r i a l s for r e s e a r c h or 
developmental ac t iv i t i e s and the by-produc ts of their 
p r o d u c t i o n ; and i t sha l l l i c e n s e a l l t r a n s f e r s of 
source materials. 
Expe r imen t s in the mil i tary appl ica t ion of atomic 
energy shall be conducted by the Commission and it 
shall produce atomic bombs, bomb parts, or other atomic 
military weapons at the direction of the President, 
P a t e n t s r e l a t i n g to fissionable ma te r i a l s shall be 
filed with the Commission, and the Patent Compensation 
Board shal l provide just compensation to the person 
i n v e n t i n g any d e v i c e or method for the product ion, 
refining, or other processing of fissionable material . 
S t i l l o t h e r p r o v i s i o n s of t h e a c t e s t a b l i s h a J o i n t 
Committee of nine Senators and nine Representatives to make 
continuing studies of the Commission's a c t i v i t i e s , authorize 
the t ransfer of ce r ta in government property to the Commis-
sion, and require reports by the Commission to the President 
and Congress; e tc . 
Judged for the fa r - reach ing powers which it asserts, this 
is undoubtedly the most remarkable p iece of legislation in 
our entire national history. 
What the ac t does is, first, to make the production of a 
ce r t a in a r t i c l e an exclusive monopoly, one which moreover 
embraces exclus ive ownership of the raw mate r i a l s for its 
p r o d u c t i o n ; s e c o n d l y , i t c o n f e r s t h i s monopo ly on the 
National Government; th i rd ly . It delegates the power of the 
National Government in the premises to a commission of five 
m e n . Comment ing on this las t fea ture of the ac t . Dean 
Stason has remarked: 
. . . no other peace t ime enactment of anything like 
the importance of the Atomic Energy Act has conferred 
upon an adminis t ra t ive agency anything like so much 
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uncanal ized discretionary power over an important phase 
of American l i fe . Conceding the necessity in this as 
in many o t h e r ins t ances , never the less , we are con-
fronted by the uncomfortable fact that the experience 
of h i s t o r y has not yet shown us how const i tu t ional 
d e m o c r a t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s can be p r e s e r v e d in the 
p r e s e n c e and under the c o n t r o l of ever increasing 
administrative discretion.13 
There a r e , moreover , ce r t a in co l l a t e ra l aspects of this 
legis la t ion which are by no means reassuring to one who is 
concerned for the "democratic freedoms." For one thing, the 
ac t furnishes a complete precedent for the government to go 
into other businesses which are related to war or defense— 
and the re are today very few which are not--and indeed for 
it to asse r t a monopoly of such businesses . Mr. Truman's 
recommendat ion a year ago concerning the steel business did 
not go t h a t fa r , but a l a t e r P r e s i d e n t ' s might; indeed, 
Mr. Truman's might la ter . Again, what kind of stresses and 
s t r a i n s does the act import for our const i tu t ional l iber-
ties? One can easily imagine that the restraints which the 
Fourth Amendment imposes upon governmental searches and 
s e i z u r e s wi l l not be c o n s t r u e d in a way to i n t e r f e r e 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y wi th the e f f e c t i v e e n f o r c e m e n t of such 
measures as the Commission deems to be necessary for the 
p r o t e c t i o n of i t s monopo ly ; nor wi l l the cons t i t u t iona l 
f r eedom of s p e e c h and p r e s s be p e r m i t t e d to qual i fy 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y the Commission 's own judgment as to what 
precaut ions are essent ia l for maintaining the secrecy of its 
o p e r a t i o n s . M o r e o v e r , the same need for secrecy must 
inevi tably interfere with the discharge by the Commission of 
its duty to repor t to Congress - - in fact , has a l ready done 
so, if the r e i t e r a t e d complaints of certain Senators are not 
baseless.14 And suppose the Hoover Commission's recommenda-
t i o n s to be g e n e r a l l y a d o p t e d ; t he i r appl icat ion to the 
Atomic Energy Commission would put the ultimate direction of 
its ac t iv i t i e s in the hands of the President, who in wartime 
w o u l d d o u b t l e s s c l a i m i t anyway in his c a p a c i t y as 
Commander-in-Chief; and wartime may easily come to include 
"cold war" time. 
Ill 
But as I r e m a r k e d e a r l i e r , the p rob lem of s ecu r i t y 
agains t the Bomb is the problem of all nations, not of one 
a lone . It is the re fore , one to be deal t with by agreement 
among the nat ions , and hence on the par t of the United 
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S t a t e s g o v e r n m e n t , by i t s power s in the field of i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t . Aga in we remind o u r s e l v e s t h a t the 
p o w e r s of the N a t i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t in the field of foreign 
r e l a t i o n s a r e t h o s e w h i c h a r e i n h e r e n t in t h e n a t i o n 
i t s e l f ; a r e , in s h o r t , s o v e r e i g n p o w e r s . It fol lows t h a t 
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s g o v e r n m e n t , a c t i n g th rough the p r o p e r 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a g e n c i e s , can c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y e n t e r into any 
a g r e e m e n t t h a t - - b r o a d l y speaking--any other government can. 
If G r e a t B r i t a i n or the U . S . S . R . a r e able to enter into an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t whereby atomic energy would be put 
in cha ins , so then can the United S ta tes , that is to say the 
United Sta tes government can. 
Th i s , in fac t , was the assumption underlying Mr. Baruch's 
proposal to the Atomic Energy Commission which was c rea ted 
by the Uni ted N a t i o n s Assembly a t i t s London m e e t i n g in 
J a n u a r y , 1946, as well as of the Plan which the Commission 
i t s e l f laid b e f o r e the S e c u r i t y Counc i l on S e p t e m b e r 11 , 
1947.15 The l a t t e r e n v i s a g e s a s t r o n g and c o m p r e h e n s i v e 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l sys tem of c o n t r o l and i n s p e c t i o n c a p a b l e of 
o v e r r i d i n g t h e s o v e r e i g n a n d t h e " v e t o " r i g h t s of any 
n a t i o n , and to t h a t end c a l l s for a t r e a t y or c o n v e n t i o n 
which would c r e a t e an i n t e r n a t i o n a l " A u t h o r i t y , " endowed 
wi th any and all p o w e r s n e c e s s a r y to d i s c h a r g e its duties, 
inc lud ing the power to own, manage, and control all atomic 
e n e r g y production throughout the globe and the right to send 
i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and i n s p e c t o r s i n t o a l l c o u n t r i e s 
without let or h indrance. 
O n c e the A u t h o r i t y was e s t a b l i s h e d and funct ioning, all 
fu r ther m a n u f a c t u r e , possession or use of atomic weapons by 
any na t ion would be p r o h i b i t e d , and the exis t ing stocks of 
atomic weapons (those of the United S ta te s were meant) would 
b e " d i s p o s e d of," p resumably by tu rn ing them over to a 
p o l i c e fo rce of the Uni ted N a t i o n s , as a d e t e r r e n t to any 
c o n t e m p l a t i n g a g g r e s s o r . Any v i o l a t i o n of th i s p roh ib i t ion 
w o u l d m e e t s w i f t and c e r t a i n pun i shmen t , e i t h e r by the 
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l or th rough a n o t h e r a g e n c y , w i thou t the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of any violator being able to escape by means of 
t h e v e t o . 1 6 E v e n s o , j u s t how o t h e r n a t i o n s could be 
a s su red t h a t the Uni ted S t a t e s had in fac t par ted with aU^ 
of its bombs, is not al together c l ea r . 
In a word , the P l a n would v i r t u a l l y e s t a b l i s h a_ wor ld 
g o v e r n m e n t w i th in a_ l imi ted and c l o s e l y de f ined j u r i s d i c -
t i o n a 1 a r e a . Y e t , if we a d h e r e to t h e l o g i c of t h e 
p r i n c i p l e t h a t the N a t i o n a l Government is endowed with the 
s o v e r e i g n t y of t h e A m e r i c a n na t ion in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
f ie ld , t h e r e can be no doubt t h a t the t reaty-making power. 
P r e s i d e n t and S e n a t e , could e n t e r into a t rea ty or conven-
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t ion by which the United S ta tes would become a member of 
this l imi ted g o v e r n m e n t and that Congress, as the sovereign 
l e g i s l a t u r e of the Uni ted S t a t e s in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l field, 
w o u l d b e c o m e o b l i g a t e d to pass implemen t ing l e g i s l a t i o n . 
What is m o r e , some of th is l e g i s l a t i o n , depend ing on the 
t e rms of the t r e a t y to be imp lemen ted , migh t c o n c e i v a b l y 
inc lude some r e m a r k a b l e p r o v i s i o n s . Suppose for i n s t ance , 
t h a t an A m e r i c a n c i t i z e n i n t e r f e r e d with the A u t h o r i t y ' s 
d i s c h a r g e of i t s d u t i e s , or c a r r i e d on the p roduc t ion of 
f i s s i l e m a t e r i a l w i t h o u t t h e A u t h o r i t y ' s p e r m i s s i o n , i t 
would undoub ted ly be wi th in C o n g r e s s ' s power and duty to 
make such c o n d u c t an offense against the United S ta tes , but 
beyond t h a t Congres s might be obligated to provide that the 
o f f e n d e r b e t u r n e d over to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r i buna l for 
t r i a l and p u n i s h m e n t . Or suppose the o f fender to be an 
o f f i c i a l of the N a t i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t - - n o doubt the Uni ted 
S t a t e s g o v e r n m e n t could i t s e l f be held accountable for such 
acts as violations of the t reaty establishing the Authori ty. 
Beyond t h a t , however , the t reaty might st ipulate that the 
e r r i n g o f f i c i a l b e h e l d p e r s o n a l l y a c c o u n t a b l e on t h e 
p r i n c i p l e t h a t g u i l t is p e r s o n a l , the p r i n c i p l e on wh ich , 
under the C h a r t e r of London, the Naz i war criminals were 
t r i ed and punished.17 Nor, if we adhere to the logic of the 
d o c t r i n e t h a t the power s of the National Government in the 
f ield of fo re ign r e l a t i o n s a r e those i n h e r e n t in the nation 
i t se l f , can t h e r e be any a r g u a b l e doubt as to the consti tu-
t i ona l power of Congress to adopt such implementing legisla-
tion. 
Commenting on Mr. Baruch's proposal in a communication to 
the New York Times, a leading member of the American Bar, 
Mr. Grenville Clark, said: 
The e s s e n c e of government is law--law in the sense 
of ru l e s b ind ing upon ind iv idua l s and e n f o r c e a b l e by 
s a n c t i o n s imposed by the l aw-mak ing a u t h o r i t y . The 
A m e r i c a n p lan c o n t a i n s t h e s e e s s e n t i a l s . Thus , when 
Mr . Ba ruch calls for a world agreement for renunciation 
of t h e bomb w i t h " c o n d i g n p u n i s h m e n t s se t up for 
v i o l a t i o n s of t h e r u l e s of c o n t r o l which a r e to be 
s t i g m a t i z e d as i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r imes , " he is speaking of 
no th ing less than b inding and e n f o r c e a b l e wor ld l a w . 
In a word, he is speaking of limited world government. 
Thus a lso when he s a y s t h a t " n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t i e s 
for the control and development of atomic energy should 
to the e x t e n t n e c e s s a r y " be " s u b o r d i n a t e " to the new 
a u t h o r i t y , and t h a t t h e r e must be a "clear demarcation 
of t h e s c o p e of d u t i e s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of such 
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n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t i e s , " he is s p e a k i n g of a wor ld 
government with a federal character . He is discussing 
the old p r o b l e m , f ami l i a r to all Americans , of the 
p r o p e r d iv i s ion b e t w e e n the de lega ted powers of a 
f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t and the powers reserved to the 
constituent units of the federation. 
We should not be misled by the fact that the field 
of f e d e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n is a t t h e s t a r t to be 
r e s t r i c t ed to atomic energy only. It remains true that 
within that field the plan cal ls for government in its 
true sense and with all its implications.18 
And commenting in the Senate on Mr. Clark's comment. Senator 
George of Georgia declared: 
If Mr. C la rk ' s evaluat ion of the proposal made by 
Mr. Baruch is accu ra t e , and it seems to me to be an 
accura te and fair appra isa l , then this proposal is one 
on which the American people are entitled to a referen-
dum, and I may add that I have no doubt the American 
people will in time take a referendum upon the proposal 
if it should be accomplished without submission to the 
people in advance. 
As will be seen l a t e r , the suggestion of a referendum has 
not been ignored by the proponents of international federal 
government. 
At th i s po in t and against this background it becomes 
d e s i r a b l e to leave the field of cons t i tu t ional i n t e r p r e t a -
tion more narrowly considered , and introduce a theoretical 
q u e s t i o n . This is whether the e x e r c i s e of cons t i tu t ional 
power which would be necessary to assoc ia te us with the 
other nations in the setting up and continued maintenance of 
the A u t h o r i t y which the Un i t ed Nat ions Atomic Energy 
Commission's proposal contempla tes , would not amount to a 
surrender of sovereignty which, by defini t ion, sovere ignty 
i tself cannot make? In other words, is the re not a line 
between the exercise of even the most unlimited of constitu-
t ional powers and their abdicat ion, and would not that line 
be passed in the ins tance just dealt with? Inasmuch as the 
s a m e q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t s i t s e l f a g a i n , and even m o r e 
e v i d e n t l y , in c o n n e c t i o n wi th c e r t a i n m o r e a m b i t i o u s 
proposals for a world government, I shall defer an attempt 
to answer it for the moment. 
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IV 
The idea of a World S ta t e is an ancient one, but the 
immediate cause of its revival was the bomb that levelled 
Hiroshima. The ashes of that devoted city had not ceased to 
smolder when hos t i l i t i es came to an abrupt c lose , and the 
view spread that the coming peace must culminate in a world 
government to which all nat ions would t ransfer their war 
r ights ; tha t only thus could the Bomb be answered, that less 
would not be worth attempting. Nowhere did this view find 
more a r res t ing exposi t ion than in an a r t i c l e in Ethics for 
July 1946, in which Mr. Emile Benoit-Smullyan, whom I know 
only through this a r t ic le , subjected the UN Plan to destruc-
tive criticism: 
There are [says this writer] two fundamental reasons 
for regarding such a "solution" [ i . e . the UN Plan] as 
h o p e l e s s l y u n r e a l i s t i c and superf ic ia l . The first is 
t h a t no i n s p e c t i o n s y s t e m can by i t s e l f p r o v i d e 
secur i ty unless the inspectors are en t i t led to inspect 
e v e r y t h i n g : e v e r y fac tory , l abora tory , a rsenal , and 
warehouse . Any definite l imitat ions on the power to 
i n s p e c t w i l l o f f e r a l o o p h o l e for e v a s i o n . But 
complete inspect ion is tantamount to the surrender of 
almost all mi l i tary s e c r e t s , and it is not possible for 
one s o v e r e i g n s t a t e to s u r r e n d e r a l l i t s m i l i t a r y 
s e c r e t s to the c i t i z e n s of o t h e r s o v e r e i g n s t a t e s 
against which it may soon have to go to war. 
The other difficulty is even more fundamental. Even 
if an atomic-disarmament pact were to be signed and its 
terms observed during peacetime, it would delay the use 
of atomic weapons only by the interval of time needed 
to develop and manufacture the bombs after the next war 
s t a r t e d . R e a l i z i n g th i s fact , the s ignatory nations 
would undoubtedly have put themselves in as advanced a 
s t a t e of preparedness for as rapid production of atomic 
weapons as t r ea ty r e s t r i c t ions would permit. In fact, 
one can i m a g i n e tha t controversy over whether the 
permissible line had or had not been overstepped might 
readily become the immediate occasion for war.19 
F u r t h e r m o r e , Mr. Benoi t -Smullyan cont inues, the Acheson-
Lil ienthal Repor t of March 1946, the d i rec t source of the 
Baruch proposal , "en t i re ly ignores the sec re t chemical and 
biological weapons of mass destruction," weapons which "need 
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not be produced in large plants of recognizable design and 
cannot be control led by controlling the supply of some rare 
element." 
Mr. Benoit-Smullyan then proceeds to set forth the type 
of world government which he regards as requisite to meet 
the threat of the Bomb: 
The fact [says he] that the United Nations in its 
present form is incapable of prevent ing war does not 
mean that it may not become an essential and valuable 
par t of an effect ive world government . In t rying to 
v i s u a l i z e the n e c e s s a r y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of such a 
government we must avoid two errors that are as common 
as they are serious. 
In the first p lace , we must not let our thinking be 
s h a c k l e d by premature decis ions concerning pol i t ica l 
feas ib i l i ty . We must never forget that the question we 
a r e a sk ing o u r s e l v e s i s , in the f i rs t ins tance , not 
wha t is p o s s i b l e , but w h a t is n e c e s s a r y , for t he 
avoidance of atomic war and for the survival of our 
c i v i l i z a t i o n . Any d e v i c e t h a t is no t qu i t e good 
enough, and device that will accomplish sl ightly less 
t h a n t h i s , is r e a l l y not w o r t h b o t h e r i n g wi th a t 
all. . . . 
The o t h e r , and opposi te , major e r ro r in thinking 
about world government is the error of asking for more 
than is s t r i c t ly necessary for survival . This resul ts 
from endowing the concept of world government with all 
the i d e a l a t t r i b u t e s it has usually possessed in the 
minds of its proponents. 
T h e d i f f i c u l t y is t h a t p e o p l e (even p o l i t i c a l 
theor is ts ) have too readily thought of world government 
as being essent ia l ly similar to a nat ional government 
but merely functioning on a higher l eve l . What this 
l e a v e s out of a c c o u n t is the f ac t t h a t a nat ional 
government is the government of a group living in a 
wor ld of p o t e n t i a l or a c t u a l e n e m i e s and that its 
f u n c t i o n s a r e l a r g e l y in t h e f ie ld of " e x t e r n a l 
r e l a t i o n s , " such as fo re ign t r a d e , d i p l o m a c y , and 
national defense. . . . 
A world government, on the other hand, would face an 
ent i re ly different s i tua t ion . Unless and until foreign 
r e l a t i o n s w e r e e s t a b l i s h e d wi th M a r s , the wor ld 
government would need to have no control whatever over 
the p o l i c i e s of the individual nat ions and over the 
daily lives of their c i t i zens , excep t in the matter of 
regulat ing armaments (including ce r t a in sc ient i f ic and 
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i n d u s t r i a l developments of mil i tary signif icance) and 
preventing acts of war. . . . 
Some "one-world" enthusiasts may feel let down by a 
solution that does not involve the prior elimination of 
t he many e v i l s a s s o c i a t e d wi th modern nationalism 
. . . w h a t is o v e r l o o k e d in a l l such c a s e s is the 
necess i ty of keeping the pa t ien t al ive until the more 
f u n d a m e n t a l or more f a r - r e a c h i n g remedies can be 
applied. 
. . . The grea t posi t ive contr ibut ion of the atomic 
bomb to world peace i£ that i_t has, for the first time, 
made the prevent ion of war practicable by enabling us 
to put a t t he c o n t i n u o u s d i s p o s a l of the c e n t r a l 
government absolutely overwhelming force--force which 
does not require vast armies for its exercise.20 
In short, in order to meet the treat of the Bomb a world 
government must be endowed with the power to repress all 
acts of war and to regulate all armaments, but on the other 
hand it must not be encumbered with other functions. At the 
same time it must, Mr. Benoi t -Smullyan ins is ts , be a real 
government and hence must include a legislature, an execu-
t i v e , and a j u d i c i a r y . The f i r s t should c o m p r i s e , he 
suggests , "a revamped UN:", the Genera l Assembly and the 
Secur i ty Council acting as lower and upper chambers respec-
t ive ly . The other two branches, however, would have to be 
built from the ground up. The role of the World Court would 
be especia l ly impor tant . "The world government would have 
o v e r w h e l m i n g f o r c e a t its disposal ," he wr i t e s , "but its 
legal powers would be severely restricted"; and it would be 
the task of the World Court to see that the limits of this 
j u r i s d i c t i o n w e r e n o t o v e r - s t e p p e d . 2 1 T h e " W o r l d 
F e d e r a l i s t , " to whom f u r t h e r r e f e r e n c e is made in the 
fo l lowing s e c t i o n , seem to me to have taken the main 
f e a t u r e s of t h e i r p r o g r a m from Mr . Benoi t -Smul ly an ' s 
article. 
Would our government have the const i tu t ional power to 
enter upon an arrangement by which it surrendered to another 
government its war powers? Or if not, could it be endowed 
with such power by amending the Constitution in accordance 
with the procedures that are prescr ibed in Article V? To 
the second question the short and obvious answer is "no." 
Inasmuch as the N a t i o n a l Government is, by hypothesis , 
s o v e r e i g n in the f ie ld of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , i t s 
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c o n s t i t u t i o n a l competence is a l ready complete and hence 
incapable of enlargement. 
But as was indicated a little while back, there may be a 
difference between the exe rc i se of sovereign power and its 
s u r r e n d e r . Indeed, if we adopt the concept ion of sover-
e i g n t y as " i n a l i e n a b l e , " the d i f f e r e n c e is fundamental . 
With this conception in mind, the question of the competence 
of the United S t a t e s to enter upon the kind of arrangement 
just descr ibed becomes the question whether any sovereign 
nation can do so . Our own pecul iar cons t i tu t ional history 
puts this broader question in an in te res t ing light. By one 
v iew of t he m a t t e r , former ly much favored in Virginia, 
e leven "sovereign" American S t a t e s in the period 1787-88 
entered into what to them was a super-government. Did they 
then s u r r e n d e r t h e i r s o v e r e i g n t y ? Calhoun and o the rs , 
i nvok ing the no t ion that sovere ignty is ina l ienab le , said 
"no." Yet they were forced to concede that the government 
c r ea t ed by the Const i tut ion exerc i sed some very extensive 
powers , including the power to determine within the system 
the scope of those powers . They saved their posit ion by 
adduc ing the supposed f ac t t h a t in the last r esor t the 
S t a t e s w e r e s t i l l e n t i t l e d to l e a v e the Un ion . When, 
however, as a resul t of the Civil War, the States lost this 
r i g h t , t hey t h e n , on the above premise, but only then, 
ceased being sovereign.22 
Applying the tes t of this doc t r ine to the hypothe t ica l 
case under discussion, that of the United States entering a 
wor ld s t a t e , s t i l l t he Un i t ed S t a t e s would not lose its 
sovere ignty if it retained the right to withdraw at any time 
from t h e w o r l d s t a t e ; but if, on the o t h e r h a n d , i t 
a t tempted to withdraw and the attempt failed, then it would 
have ceased to be sovereign, not indeed by its own act , 
s ince by hypothesis sovere ignty cannot be alienated, but in 
c o n s e q u e n c e of the r i se , outside and over it , of a new 
s o v e r e i g n t y . S o v e r e i g n t y c a n n o t be a l i e n a t e d , s i n c e 
a l ienat ion is a legal procedure, and the law does not reach 
sovere ignty , which is the source of the law. But sover-
eignty can, in fact , be ext inguished by the appearance of 
another sovereignty in which the former sovereignty becomes 
merged and submerged. 
La t t e r ly , owing to Russian intransigence, the movement in 
the United S t a t e s for an in te rna t iona l organization to meet 
the menace of the Bomb has split into two principal move-
ments . One group continuing the t radi t ion of Mr. Clarence 
S t r e i t ' s Union Now, seek a real federal union of the North 
A t l a n t i c d e m o c r a c i e s , wi th a common c i t i zensh ip and a 
government which would be empowered to coin money, to make 
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peace and war, to regulate inter-nation trade and communica-
t ions, and do other things of common interest to the member 
s t a t e s of the Union. The sponsors of the proposal include 
former Just ice Rober t s , former S e c r e t a r y of War Patterson, 
fo rmer Under S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Will Clay ton , Senator 
K e f a u v e r , and o t h e r s ; and in fu r the rance of it Senator 
K e f a u v e r i n t r o d u c e d into the Sena te , July 26, 1949, the 
following resolution: 
RESOLVED BY THE SENATE (the House of Representatives 
concurr ing) . That the Pres iden t is requested to invite 
t he d e m o c r a c i e s which sponsored the North At lan t ic 
Trea ty to name de lega te s , represen t ing their principal 
po l i t i ca l p a r t i e s , to meet this year with delegates of 
the United S t a t e s in a Federa l Convention to explore 
how far their peoples , and the peoples of such other 
d e m o c r a c i e s as the c o n v e n t i o n may invi te to send 
de l ega t e s , can apply among them, within the framework 
of the United Nat ions , the pr inciples of free federal 
union.23 
The other group, cal l ing themselves "World Federalists" had 
even e a r l i e r drafted for submission to the S t a t e legis la-
tures an ident ica l resolut ion pet i t ioning Congress to call a 
Const i tu t ional Convention under Ar t i c l e V of the Constitu-
tion, which body would prepare a constitutional amendment to 
a u t h o r i z e the Un i t ed S t a t e s to e n t e r "a l imi ted world 
federal government."24 
None of t h e s e s u g g e s t i o n s r a i s e s any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
q u e s t i o n of moment that has not been discussed a l r eady . 
Congress is en t i t l ed to debate any proposal it wishes to; 
the P r e s i d e n t is e n t i t l e d to summon any kind of in te r -
n a t i o n a l conference he chooses to; the S t a t e legis la tures 
a r e e n t i t l e d to p e t i t i o n C o n g r e s s for a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
convention vested with power to draft amendments to the 
Constitution for any purpose whatsoever, and such amendments 
become "to all intents and purposes" a part of the Constitu-
tion upon thei r ra t i f ica t ion in accordance with the terms of 
Article V of the Constitution. As we have seen, however, it 
is logical ly impossible to conceive of the National Govern-
ment, whose power in the field of foreign relations already 
c o m p r i s e s those of any completely sovereign government, 
rece iv ing any additional power in the field by the processes 
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment or o the rwise . On the other 
hand, it is widely accep ted dogma tha t even a completely 
sovereign government lacks one power, and that is the power 
to surrender its sovere ign ty . From which it follows that 
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any surrender of governing power by the United States to an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , world federal s t a t e , At lan t i c 
Union, or what not, would by the Calhounist analogy be 
subject always to recall . 
Conceding all this , there st i l l remain, nevertheless, two 
good arguments for employing the machinery of constitutional 
amendment for bringing about American adherence to any form 
of wor ld government and for the process to be made as 
e l abora t e as poss ib le . The first is the democratic argument 
that such a fateful s tep should res t on the widest possible 
c o m p r e h e n s i o n and discussion of it, leading to something 
akin to a national consensus, and this the methods which are 
contemplated by the sponsors of the North At lan t i c Union 
pro jec t would go far to guarantee. The second argument is 
suggested by the evident parallelism of these same methods, 
so far as they have been developed, with those by which the 
Const i tut ion of the United S t a t e s was i tself brought about. 
In t h e l a t t e r c a s e the S t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s w e r e t w i c e 
c o n s u l t e d , t he C o n g r e s s of the Confedera t ion was twice 
consulted, and the work of the Federal Convention was passed 
upon by popularly chosen State conventions. The basis was 
thus la id for the c o n c e p t i o n a d v a n c e d by Hami l ton in 
Fede ra l i s t 22, and adopted successively by Marshall, Story, 
Webster and Lincoln, that the Constitution was not an act of 
sovereign governments or S t a t e s , but an outgrowth of the 
u l t i m a t e r i g h t of t he p e o p l e t h e m s e l v e s to c r e a t e new 
governing ins t i tu t ions as the need for these appea r s . To 
the r i g h t of r e v o l u t i o n even s o v e r e i g n t y se t s no limit, 
s i n c e if the r e v o l u t i o n s u c c e e d s i t i n a u g u r a t e s a new 
sovereignty. 
But can the federal idea be adapted in any near future to 
the problem of world peace? Despite the belief of a number 
of our most eminent fellow-citizens that it can, I confess a 
rooted scepticism, which is not lessened by the proneness of 
some of these gentlemen to c i t e the es tabl i shment of the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n in 1789 as a prologue and p r e c e d e n t . The 
fa l lac ies which v i t i a t e that comparison are ably pointed out 
by Mr. R a n n e y in h is a r t i c l e in the William and Mary 
Quar ter ly for January, 1946,25 and I need not r epea t his 
cogent arguments. Two concessions, however, should be made 
the advocates of a world, or half-world state, on the basis 
of the American e x p e r i e n c e . The first is, that the estab-
lishment of the Constitution of 1789 was primarily a triumph 
of l e a d e r s h i p , and hence furnishes good ev idence of the 
t r a n s c e n d e n t impor t ance of leadership in such an en t e r -
pr i se . The second is that the present unity of the American 
p e o p l e is t he r e s u l t of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l unification much 
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more e v i d e n t l y than the l a t t e r was of t h e i r s e n s e of 
community in 1789. In other words, American federalism has 
been a cause even more than a consequence of the forces 
making for na t ional uni ty . The idea, the re fore , that an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community of felt mutuality of in te res t and 
understanding must necessar i ly precede any successful effort 
to bring about a federation among its members is one whose 
importance should not be ove r s t r e s sed . The forces making 
for un ion , t he p r i n c i p a l o n e s , must of ten a w a i t union 
itself. 
For the res t , I feel that if the federal idea sti l l has 
v iab i l i ty , the p lace to tes t it is Western Europe. Western 
Europe has been crying for federation ever since Waterloo. 
If i t c a n n o t a c h i e v e it now, the case for in te rna t iona l 
federalism would appear to be hopeless.26 
VI 
And so, while await ing the arrival of "the Federation of 
the World" and a kindly ear th " lapt in universal law," we 
have been compel led , as the French say, to " take some 
measures . " Two of these I have a l ready discussed. The 
c rea t ion of the Air Force and the enactment of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946. I now come to the third, the negotia-
t i o n and r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h e Nor th A t l a n t i c T r e a t y , 
popularly termed "Atlantic Pact." 
A r t i c l e V of the P a c t p r o v i d e s t h a t if one of the 
s i g n a t o r y s t a t e s is a t t acked the o thers will come to its 
a i d , " t a k i n g f o r t h w i t h . . . such a c t i o n as it deems 
n e c e s s a r y , i n c l u d i n g the use of armed force ." This, in 
fo rm, and in i n t e n t i o n t o o , no doub t , is a d e f e n s i v e 
a l l i ance , but c i rcumstances a re easily imaginable in which 
it would be tantamount to an offensive al l iance, as in the 
c a s e of an a t t a c k on one of the s igna tor ies which was 
p r e c i p i t a t e d by a s e r i e s of p r o v o c a t i v e ac t s less than 
o u t r i g h t a t t a c k . But this possibi l i ty ra ises no const i tu-
tional d i f f icul t ies . Our a l l iance with France in 1778 was 
open to the same contingency. By it we guaranteed French 
p o s s e s s i o n s in the West Ind i e s " f o r e v e r , " and w i t h o u t 
r e s e r v a t i o n as to how the war was brought about which 
rendered the guaranty o p e r a t i v e . The fact is that treaties 
of a l l i a n c e , whether defensive or offensive, were in the 
18th century the most important species of the treaty genus, 
as Ar t i c l e I, sect ion 10 of the Const i tut ion which forbids 
the S t a t e s to e n t e r into t r ea t i e s of a l l iance bears wit-
ness . That the Pac t was within the treaty-making power as 
originally gran ted , and without any necess i ty for invoking 
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the concept of an inherent national sovereignty in the field 
of foreign relations, is apparent. 
Two o t h e r quest ions , however, which were debated in 
connect ion with Ar t i c l e V are worth our attention both for 
the l igh t they throw on ce r t a in of the problems a l ready 
deal t with and also as paving the way for my third lecture. 
The f i r s t c o n c e r n s the n a t u r e of the o b l i g a t i o n which 
A r t i c l e V i m p o s e s , t h a t is to s a y , the n a t u r e of the 
obl igat ion which any t r ea ty imposes; the second is whether, 
in view of Congress 's power "to declare war," the President 
would be en t i t l ed to perform acts of war in fulfillment of 
t h e obligat ion c r ea t ed by Ar t i c l e V without first ge t t ing 
congressional approval. 
Tha t the duty of the P res iden t and/or of Congress to 
ca r ry out a t r ea ty is not a legal one in the precise sense 
of being compellable by judicial p rocess , is cer ta in . Nor, 
secondly , is it a legal duty in the sense that President and 
Congress may not impose a contravening rule which the courts 
will r ecognize and en fo rce . The fact is that Congress has 
repea ted ly repea led or modified provisions of treaties which 
i t t hough t w e r e working to the de t r iment of the United 
S t a t e s , and its r ight to do so has been sustained by the 
C o u r t a g a i n and a g a i n . In b r ie f , t he t r e a t y - m a k i n g 
a u t h o r i t y is not competent to diminish the cons t i tu t ional 
powers of either Congress or the President.27 
Two kinds of obl igat ion, however , remain . In the first 
p l ace , there is the obl igat ion of a treaty under the maxim 
of In te rna t iona l Law, that "agreements are made to be kept 
(pacta sunt servanda)." The United States, no more than any 
other nat ion, has in the contemplat ion of International Law 
the power to de termine by its own sole course of action, 
whether through Congress , the Pres ident , the Court, or the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n - a m e n d i n g p r o c e s s , i ts obl iga t ions under tha t 
law. Hence a t r ea ty provision which Congress has repealed 
is repea led only as "law of the land," and its international 
obl igat ion s t i l l remains, and may be made, as the Court has 
s a i d , " t h e s u b j e c t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s and 
rec lamat ions" by the other party to the treaty, "which may 
in the end be enforced by actual war."28 
Secondly, a t r ea ty obl igat ion of the United States is a 
m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n , o n e w h i c h a d d r e s s e s i t s e l f to t he 
consc iences of the persons who are vested with adequate 
cons t i tu t ional power to make the obl igat ion good in situa-
tions contemplated by the t r e a t y . In this connection some 
of Mr. Acheson's remarks in his radio broadcast of March 18, 
1949, a r e p e r t i n e n t , and have the further advantage of 
leading into our next quest ion. 
Article V, Mr. Acheson said: 
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Speaking with reference to 
This does not mean that the United States would be 
automat ica l ly at war if one of the nations covered by 
the p a c t is s u b j e c t e d to armed a t t a c k . Under our 
C o n s t i t u t i o n , the C o n g r e s s a lone has the power to 
dec l a r e war . We would be bound to take promptly the 
a c t i o n wh ich we deemed n e c e s s a r y to res to re and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. That 
decision would be taken in accordance with our consti-
tut ional p rocedures . The factors which would have to 
be considered would be on the one side, the gravity of 
the armed a t t ack ; on the other , the act ion which we 
bel ieved necessary to restore and maintain the security 
of the North At l an t i c a r e a . That is the end to be 
a c h i e v e d . We a r e bound to do what in our honest 
judgment is necessary to reach that result. . , , This 
is not a l ega l i s t i c question. It is a question we have 
frequently faced, the question of faith and pr inc ip le 
in c a r r y i n g out t r e a t i e s . Those who decide it will 
h a v e t he r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t a k i n g a l l a p p r o p r i a t e 
action under the treaty.29 
In th i s c o n n e c t i o n i t is in te res t ing to adver t to the 
Monroe Doc t r ine , which a century and a quar ter ago gave 
expression to what for that period was a vast ly enlarged 
concept ion of the defensible in te res t s of the United States 
a b r o a d . But w h i l e t he P a c t is b i l a t e r a l and incurs an 
o b l i g a t i o n , the Doc t r ine was un i - l a t e ra l and announced a 
policy which the United S t a t e s was morally free to pursue, 
qualify, or neg lec t at any time, and at various periods it 
has done each of these things. 
C o n c e r n i n g the m a t t e r of the P re s iden t ' s power, and 
co r r e l a t i ve duty, under the Pact, the following extract from 
Madison's Notes on the Phi ladelphia Convention is directly 
p e r t i n e n t . The question being up on August 17th, 1787, 
whether Congress should be given power "to make war," 
Mr. P i n c k n e y opposed the vest ing this power in the 
L e g i s l a t u r e . Its proceedings were too slow. It wd. 
meet but once a year. The Hs. of Reps., would be too 
numerous for such de l ibera t ions . The Senate would be 
the best depos i ta ry , being more acquainted with foreign 
a f f a i r s , and most capable of proper resolu t ions . If 
the S t a t e s are equally represented in Senate, so as to 
g i v e no a d v a n t a g e to l a r g e S t a t e s , the power will 
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notwithstanding be safe, as the small have their all at 
s take in such cases as well as the la rge S t a t e s . It 
would be singular for one authori ty to make war, and 
another peace. x • i ^ n^ 
Mr. But ler . The object ions agst the Legislature lie 
in a great degree agst the Senate. He was for vesting 
the power in the P r e s i d e n t , who will have all the 
requis i te qualities, and will not make war but when the 
Nation will support it. , . ^ 
M r . M ( a d i s o n ) and Mr . G e r r y moved to i n s e r t 
" d e c l a r e , " s t r i k i n g out "make" war; leaving to the 
Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.30 
Madison's motion carried 7 States to 2, one being absent. 
Six years later, to be sure, this same James Madison took 
a v e r y d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n . A t t h a t t i m e , H a m i l t o n 
defending the Proc lamat ion of Impart ia l i ty which President 
Washington had issued on the outbreak of war between France 
and G r e a t B r i t a i n in 1793 , advanced the conten t ion , in 
e f f e c t , t h a t by the opening clause of Ar t i c l e II of the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n , " the execut ive power" c lause , the P res iden t 
was endowed with the prerogative of the British monarch in 
t h e f ie ld of f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s e x c e p t so far as o t h e r 
c l auses of the Const i tu t ion provided o the rwise , as in the 
c lause giving Congress the power "to declare war. There-
upon Jefferson, whose own mouth was shut by the fact that he 
was Washington's Secretary of State, dragooned Madison^^ into 
a n s w e r i n g Hami l ton . "For God's sake, my dear sir he 
wro te , " take up your pen and cut him to pieces in the face 
of the public ." Madison complied with a series of ingenious 
papers in which he developed the thesis that the power of 
Congress "to declare war" was the very core of the foreign 
re la t ions power, and embraced all large quest ions in that 
f i e ld , especia l ly all questions involving the issue of war 
and peace. . ^ ^i4.u^f 
It can s c a r c e l y be said tha t the reputa t ion of e i the r 
J e f f e r s o n or Mad i son for s i n c e r i t y is enhanced by this 
e p i s o d e . The l a t t e r f r ank ly owned t h a t he had never 
under taken a task that was less to his taste, ^n/ ^ a ^ ^ ^^" 
tes t i f ied at the time of the disputed election of 1800 that 
J e f f e r s o n , as S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e under Washington, had 
c o n s i s t e n t l y s u p p o r t e d a s t r o n g concept ion of execu t ive 
power, something he would hardly have said had he known of 
J e f f e r s o n ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for M a d i s o n ' s p e r f o r m a n c e in 
1793 . Thomas Jefferson was pre t ty good at covering nis 
tracks.31 
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At any r a t e , the incont rover t ib le verd ic t re turned by 
his tory is overwhelm.ingly in favor of Hamilton's argument in 
1 7 9 3 . Few P r e s i d e n t s have sys temat ica l ly ta i lored their 
foreign pol ic ies to the fact that if those pol ic ies should 
lead to hos t i l i t i e s , they would have to go to Congress and 
ask for a dec la ra t ion of war. Nor, on the other hand, has 
Congress ever failed to comply with such a request although 
u n q u e s t i o n a b l y it is const i tu t ional ly free to do so. The 
War of 1812 and the Spanish-American War may be set down as 
having been hatched by Congress , but our four great wars, 
i n c l u d i n g the M e x i c a n and Civ i l Wars, were the d i rec t 
outgrowth of P res iden t i a l pol ic ies in the shaping of which 
Congress enjoyed at best a secondary role. 
But even more d i rec t ly per t inent to the present issue is 
the power which Pres iden t s have exerc i sed almost unchal-
lenged from an early date to employ the armed forces of the 
United States in the performance of what amounted to acts of 
war in support of American rights and interests abroad. In 
his l i t t le volume on World Pol icing and the Constitution32 
James Grafton Rogers lists 149 such episodes stretching from 
the undeclared war with F rance in 1798 to Pea r l Harbor . 
While invit ing some pruning, the list demonst ra tes beyond 
p e r a d v e n t u r e the e x i s t e n c e in the P r e s i d e n t , as Chief 
Executive and Commander-in-Chief, of power to judge whether 
a s i tuat ion requi res the use of avai lable forces to protect 
American r ights and in te res t s abroad and to take action in 
harmony with his decision. 
To be sure, such employment of the forces has usually 
been justif ied as being "an act of self-defense" rather than 
"an act of war ," but the victims of them were entitled to 
t r e a t them as ac ts of war never theless , although they have 
usually been too weak to asser t their p re roga t ive in this 
r e s p e c t , and have sometimes actual ly chosen to turn the 
other cheek. Thus when in 1900 President McKinley, without 
consulting Congress , contr ibuted a sizable contingent to the 
joint forces that went to the rel ief of the foreign lega-
tions in Peking, the Chinese Imperial Government agreed that 
this action had not constituted "war."33 
In short , the only novel feature of the Article V of the 
At lan t ic P a c t - - a n d that in view of the Monroe Doctrine, is 
not without p r e c e d e n t - - i s the enlarged conception which it 
sets forth of defensible American in te res t s abroad. In the 
words of t h e p u b l i s h e d a b s t r a c t of the R e p o r t of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations on the Atlantic Pact, 
Article 5 records what is a fact, namely, that an armed 
a t t ack within the meaning of the t rea ty would in the 
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presen t -day world cons t i tu te an attack upon the entire 
c o m m u n i t y c o m p r i s i n g the p a r t i e s to t he t r e a t y , 
including the United S t a t e s . Accordingly the President 
and the C o n g r e s s , w i t h i n t h e i r s p h e r e of assigned 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l respons ib i l i t i e s , would be expec ted to 
take all act ion necessary and appropr ia t e to p r o t e c t 
the United S t a t e s against the consequence and dangers 
of an armed a t tack committed against any party to the 
treaty.34 
But from the very nature of things, the discharge of this 
o b l i g a t i o n wil l ordinar i ly res t with the P res iden t in the 
first ins tance , just as has the discharge in the past of the 
l i ke o b l i g a t i o n in the p r o t e c t i o n of American in t e r e s t s 
abroad; just as has cur ren t ly the d i scharge of our obliga-
tions under the United Nat ions Cha r t e r . 35 Furthermore, in 
t h e d i s c h a r g e of t h i s o b l i g a t i o n t h e P r e s i d e n t wi l l 
o r d i n a r i l y be required to use force and perform ac t s of 
war . To be sure , if such ac ts of war develop into a real 
war, then to my way of thinking, it would be the President 's 
const i tu t ional duty to ask Congress to "dec la re war." His 
fa i lure to do so would, if ev idences of pas t P res iden t i a l 
opinion and p r a c t i c e s t i l l count, amount to a serious inroad 
upon Congress ' s role in the field of foreign a f fa i r s - -one 
more step toward presidential autocracy.36 
17 
Of Presidential Prerogative 
In c h a p t e r XIV of his famed S e c o n d Trea t i s e on Civil 
Government, the pr incipal source of the political science of 
our Revolut ionary and Constitutional forefathers, John Locke 
wrote : "Where the leg is la t ive and execut ive power are in 
d is t inct hands, as they are in all moderated monarchies and 
wel l f ramed gove rnmen t s , there the good of the society 
r e q u i r e s t h a t s e v e r a l t h i n g s s h o u l d be l e f t to the 
d iscre t ion of him tha t has the execut ive power. For the 
leg is la tors not being able to foresee and provide by laws 
for all that may be useful to the community, the executor of 
the laws, having the power in his hands, has by the common 
law of Nature a right to make use of it for the good of the 
society, in many cases where the municipal law has given no 
d i r e c t i o n , t i l l t h e l e g i s l a t i v e c a n c o n v e n i e n t l y be 
a s semb led to provide for it; nay, many things there are 
which the law can by no means provide for, and those must 
necessar i ly be left to the d iscre t ion of him that has the 
execut ive power in his hands, to be ordered by him as the 
public good and advantage shall require; nay, it is fit that 
the laws themselves should in some cases give way to the 
execut ive power, or rather to this fundamental law of Nature 
and government--viz., that as much as may be all the members 
of the socie ty are to be p rese rved . . . ." And he la ter 
adds: "P re roga t ive is nothing but the power of doing public 
good without a ru le ." My purpose on this occasion is to 
"Of Presidential Prerogative." Whittier College Bulletin 
4.7 (September 1954): 3-29 [Revised edit ion, July 1, 1955]. 
Reprinted by permission from 1/fliittier College. [Bibliog-
raphy Entry D170.2] 
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examine the extent to which "prerogat ive" in the above sense 
has come to be a t t r i b u t e d to the P r e s i d e n t , and especially 
w i t h i n r e c e n t y e a r s , and to c o n s i d e r b r i e f ly w h e t h e r the 
f i n a l p i c t u r e r a i s e s a n y p r o b l e m s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
revision. 
P r e s i d e n t i a l p r e r o g a t i v e is a t any p a r t i c u l a r t ime the 
p r o d u c t of t h r e e f a c t o r s : p e r s o n a l i t y , c r i s i s ( i . e . publ ic 
n e c e s s i t y as it is judged by the P r e s i d e n t ) , and a v a i l a b l e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e . In t h e c o u r s e of the l a s t half 
c e n t u r y e x p a n s i o n of t h e p r e s i d e n t i a l r o l e , fo l lowing a 
ra ther extended era when the Presidency was more or less in 
the doldrums, has been subs tan t i a l ly continuous, thanks to a 
succes s ion of " s t r o n g Pres iden t s , " to our involvement in two 
world w a r s , in "an economic c r i s i s more serious than war," 
and in a "co ld war" more baffling in some respects than a 
" s h o o t i n g w a r , " and to our c u r r e n t i n t e r e s t in e f f o r t s to 
organize peace on a universal sca le . Nor should we overlook 
the i n t e r e s t e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s to p r e s i d e n t i a l a g g r a n d i z e m e n t 
of o r g a n i z e d l a b o r in r e c e n t d e c a d e s . In w h a t fash ion , 
th rough w h a t v e r b a l appara tus , so to speak, has enlargement 
of the p r e s i d e n t i a l ro le been a r t i c u l a t e d from time to time 
with the Constitutional Document? 
T h e o p e n i n g c l a u s e of A r t i c l e II of the C o n s t i t u t i o n 
r e a d s : "The Execut ive power shall be vested in a Pres ident 
of t h e Un i t ed S t a t e s of A m e r i c a . " It is c l e a r from the 
r e c o r d s of t h e P h i l a d e l p h i a C o n v e n t i o n t h a t the p r ima ry 
purpose of th is c l a u s e , which was n e v e r s e p a r a t e l y a c t e d 
upon by it, was to se t t le the question whether the Execut ive 
b r a n c h should be plural or single, while a secondary purpose 
w a s to g ive the P r e s i d e n t a t i t l e . The term " E x e c u t i v e 
p o w e r " c o m p r i s e d the power s c o n f e r r e d upon him in the 
s u c c e e d i n g p rov i s ions of the A r t i c l e - - " T h e p o w e r , by and 
w i t h t h e a d v i c e a n d c o n s e n t of t h e S e n a t e , to m a k e 
t r e a t i e s , " t h e p o w e r to " r e c e i v e A m b a s s a d o r s and o t h e r 
publ ic m i n i s t e r s , " the power to "pardon offenses against the 
U n i t e d S t a t e s , " and so o n . Y e t t h e f i r s t C o n g r e s s to 
a s s e m b l e under the C o n s t i t u t i o n was c o m p e l l e d to c h o o s e 
b e t w e e n s e e i n g t h e P r e s i d e n t " s t u c k " i n d e f i n i t e l y wi th 
s u b o r d i n a t e s appo in t ed by the a d v i c e and c o n s e n t of the 
S e n a t e or of at tr ibuting to him on the score of his "Execu-
t i v e power" the right to remove such officers at wil l . Very 
s e n s i b l y , it chose the l a t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e - - a d e c i s i o n which 
the Supreme Court finally ratified in 1926. 
L ikewise , in 1793 Hamilton invoked the "Execut ive power" 
c l a u s e in suppor t of P r e s i d e n t Washington ' s Proclamation of 
Neutrali ty upon the outbreak of war between France and Great 
B r i t a i n . This time the Court 's acquiescence was not so long 
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d e l a y e d . Even in the act of asserting in 1803 the power of 
t h e C o u r t to p a s s upon t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a c t s of 
C o n g r e s s , Ch ie f J u s t i c e Marsha l l said: "By the Constitution 
of the Uni t ed S t a t e s the P r e s i d e n t is invested with cer ta in 
i m p o r t a n t p o l i t i c a l p o w e r s , in the e x e r c i s e of which he is 
to use his own d i s c r e t i o n , and is a c c o u n t a b l e only to his 
c o u n t r y in h i s p o l i t i c a l c h a r a c t e r , and to his own con -
s c i e n c e , " 1 t h e r e b y l ay ing the founda t ions for the d o c t r i n e 
of " P o l i t i c a l Q u e s t i o n s , " which has many t imes a f forded 
e x e c u t i v e a c t i o n an e s c a p e h a t c h from the t r ammel s of 
j u d i c i a l r e v i e w . And for once the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r e e d of 
t h e g r e a t Ch ie f J u s t i c e and that of his cousin and congeni-
ta l enemy , J e f f e r son , w e r e in h a r m o n y . Said the la t te r in 
an of f ic ia l op in ion which as Secre ta ry of S t a t e he rendered 
Wash ing ton in 1790, "The E x e c u t i v e [branch] possessing the 
r i g h t s of s e l f -government from n a t u r e , cannot be controlled 
in the exerc i se of them but by a law, passed in the forms of 
the C o n s t i t u t i o n , " words which r e - e c h o Locke's and at the 
same t ime b r i d g e the two centuries between the great Whig 
p h i l o s o p h e r and the f i r s t of the above-ment ioned "strong 
Presidents ." 
E x p o u n d i n g his s o - c a l l e d " S t e w a r d s h i p T h e o r y " of the 
P r e s i d e n c y , T . R . w r o t e , in 1913, t h a t " i t was not only his 
( the P r e s i d e n t ' s ) r i g h t but his duty to do anything that the 
n e e d s of t h e N a t i o n " - - a s judged by himself , of c o u r s e - -
" d e m a n d e d u n l e s s s u c h a c t i o n w a s f o r b i d d e n by t h e 
C o n s t i t u t i o n or by the l aws . "2 An astr ingent cr i t ic of the 
S t e w a r d s h i p T h e o r y was ex-Pres iden t Taft, who protested in 
his Chief Magis t ra te and his Powers , wri t ten while he was a 
p r o f e s s o r a t Y a l e , t h a t the C o n s t i t u t i o n did not c a s t the 
P r e s i d e n t in t h e r o l e of " U n i v e r s a l P r o v i d e n c e , " bu t 
c o n f i n e d h i s a c t i v i t i e s to the p o w e r s g iven him by the 
d e f i n i t e c l a u s e s of A r t i c l e I I .3 A few y e a r s l a t e r , 
n e v e r t h e l e s s , we find Chief Jus t i ce Taf t d e m o n s t r a t i n g at 
vas t length in one of the thickest opinions ever handed down 
by the Court, how very right indeed Madison et^ aj_. had been 
in 1789 in deducing an unqualified power of removal from the 
open ing c l a u s e of t h a t A r t i c l e . 4 And T a f t ' s s u c c e s s o r to 
the Presidency underwent a comparable conversion. 
In C o n g r e s s i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t , pub l i shed in 1886, Wilson 
w r o t e : " E x c e p t in so far as his power of veto consti tutes 
him a p a r t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , the P r e s i d e n t migh t , not 
i n c o n v e n i e n t l y , be a p e r m a n e n t o f f i ce r ; the f i rs t of f ic ia l 
of a c a r e f u l l y - g r a d e d and i m p a r t i a l l y r e g u l a t e d c i v i l 
s e r v i c e s y s t e m , th rough whose sure s e r i e s of m e r i t - p r o m o -
t i o n s t h e y o u n g e s t c l e r k m i g h t r i s e e v e n to the ch ie f 
m a g i s t r a c y . He is p a r t of the of f ic ia l r a t h e r than of the 
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p o l i t i c a l m a c h i n e r y of the g o v e r n m e n t , and his du t i e s 
c a l l r a t h e r for t ra ining than for cons t ruc t ive genius. If 
there can be found in the official systems of the States a 
lower grade of service in which men may be advantageously 
d r i l l e d for P r e s i d e n t i a l func t ions , so much the b e t t e r . " 
Twenty yea r s la ter his outlook on the National Executive is 
radica l ly d i f ferent . I quote from his Blumenthal Lectures 
of 1908: "His is the only nat ional voice in af fa i rs . Let 
him once win the admiration and confidence of the country, 
and no other single force can withstand him, no combination 
of forces will easi ly overpower him. His position takes the 
imagination of the count ry . He is the representative of no 
cons t i tuency, but of the whole people . . . . The President 
is at liberty, both in law and in conscience, to be as big a 
man as he can. . . . He may even substitute his own orders 
for acts of Congress which he wants but cannot get." 5 
T h e s e c o n d i m p o r t a n t t i m b e r in the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
r o o f t r e e of p r e s i d e n t i a l p re roga t ive is the clause which 
makes the President "Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy 
of the Un i t ed S t a t e s and of the Mili t ia of the severa l 
S t a t e s when cal led into the actual se rv ice of the United 
S t a t e s . " Expounding this clause in The Federalist, Hamilton 
had opined that it would be altogether erroneous to compare 
this power with the superf icial ly similar prerogative of the 
Brit ish Monarch. The Pres iden t was top Admiral and top 
Genera l , and nobody could issue him a military command; but 
that was a l l . And in 1850, in a case growing out of the 
Mexican War, the Supreme Court, speaking by Chief Justice 
T a n e y , substant ia l ly r epea ted Hamil ton 's language.6 The 
"Commander-in-Chief" clause remained the forgotten clause of 
the Const i tut ion until the day when Sumter fell, April 14, 
1861. Then came the great break-through. 
F i rs t calling Congress to assemble on July 4th, then more 
than ten weeks away, Lincoln proceeded forthwith to take 
ce r t a in measures of his own, based on the idea that in the 
c i rcumstances " the war power" was his; and on this premise 
proclaimed a blockade of the Southern por t s , summoned an 
army of 300,000 volunteers, increased the Regular Army and 
N a v y , took ove r t he r a i l and t e l e g r a p h l i n e s be tween 
Washington and Bal t imore, and eventually as far as Boston, 
and suspended the writ of habeas corpus along these lines. 
All t h e s e e x t r a o r d i n a r y measures , save tha t touching 
habeas corpus, were grounded on the theory that the Rebel-
lion possessed from the outset the dimensions of public war, 
a theory which the Supreme Court underwrote in the Prize 
Cases of 1863.7 Lincoln's general suspension of the habeas 
c o r p u s p r i v i l e g e as to p e r s o n s a r r e s t e d for a l l e g e d 
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"dis loyal p r ac t i c e s " in September 1862 and order ing their 
t r ia l by mil i tary commission stemmed, on the other hand, 
from the notion that the entire country, and not merely the 
p o r t i o n of i t w i t h i n the e n e m y ' s l i n e s , c o n s t i t u t e d "a 
t h e a t r e of m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s , " a concept ion which the 
Court r e jec ted in 1866 in the famous Milligan Case.8 The 
war being now safely over, the Court could indulge its long 
p e n t - u p c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s c r u p l e s . S e c r e t a r y S e w a r d ' s 
e s t i m a t e of w h a t L i n c o l n ' s P res idency signified for the 
office was more d iscern ing . It was compactly set forth in 
1863 in his s t a t e m e n t to R u s s e l l , co r responden t of the 
London Times: "We elect a king for four years, and give him 
absolute power within certain limits, which after all he can 
interpret for himself."9 
Between the Civil War and World War I two profound 
con t ras t s appear in r e t r o s p e c t . In the first place, most of 
the f i g h t i n g - - a l l the land f igh t ing in the l a t t e r - - t o o k 
place 3000 miles from our shores. There was, consequently, 
no ^^  question at any time of treating the country at large as 
a " t h e a t r e of mi l i tary operations" in the conventional sense 
of t h a t t e r m . In the s econd p l a c e , however , the vast 
d e v e l o p m e n t b e t w e e n the two wars of the technological 
a s p e c t s of w a r f a r e had c r e a t e d in th i s g r e a t e s t of 
industr ia l nat ions an industr ial t hea t r e of war of immense 
propor t ions . Grea t industry in the United S t a t e s had, in 
br ief , become par t and parce l of the fighting forces not 
only of the United S ta t e s but of its allies as well, and as 
such it had to be subjected to detailed regimentation by the 
government of the United S ta tes . To meet this requirement 
C o n g r e s s was c o m p e l l e d to develop a new technique in 
leg is la t ive p r a c t i c e , one capable of meeting the fluctuating 
demands of a fluid war situation. This it did by delegating 
vast unchannelled powers to the President to be exercised by 
him through men of his own choosing. John Locke's ban upon 
delegated legis la t ion simply went by the board, nor has it 
s i n c e been revived so far as concerns powers which are 
s h a r e d by t he two Depar tmen t s . As to these "cogna te" 
powers , as it terms them, the Court will not attempt even 
today to p l o t n i c e l y , or a t a l l , t he de l imi t i ng l ine.10 
More than tha t . P res iden t Wilson took upon himself, without 
consult ing Congress , both the government of Labor Relations 
and the s c r e e n i n g of information regarding the War, the 
former function being performed by the War Industries Board, 
under Mr. Baruch; the l a t t e r by the Committee of Public 
I n f o r m a t i o n , h e a d e d by Mr. C r e e l . Both agencies were 
created out of hand by the President. 
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World War II is World War I w r i t large, and the quasi-
l e g i s l a t i v e p o w e r s of F . D . R . as " C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f in 
War t ime , " to use his own f a v o r i t e formula , bu rgeoned and 
bloomed c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y . The precedents were there , to be 
s u r e , most of them from World War I, but these precedents 
w e r e b l e s s e d w i t h a n u m e r o u s p r o g e n y . What is m o r e , 
F . D . R . t o o k h i s f i r s t s t e p of t h i s n a t u r e s o m e f i f t e e n 
months p r io r to the o u t b r e a k of " shoo t ing w a r , " a fact of 
c o n s i d e r a b l e signif icance. The term "war" had expanded into 
"war e m e r g e n c y " or simply " e m e r g e n c y . " The two t e rms- -
i ndeed , the two t h i n g s - - b e c a m e hope l e s s ly confused both in 
c o n g r e s s i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n , as I sha l l show presen t ly , and in 
the a p o l o g e t i c s of A t t o r n e y s G e n e r a l , for it is no function 
of the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s family l a w y e r to i n s t r u c t i t s head 
wha t he may or may not do, but to assure him that he is 
ent i t led to do what he has decided to do, and why. 
F . D . R . took his f i r s t long s t ep t o w a r d w a r , t h a t is to 
say, away from neutral i ty , in September 1940, when he handed 
o v e r 50 s o - c a l l e d " o v e r a g e " d e s t r o y e r s to G r e a t B r i t a i n . 
The fac t is , they w e r e not " o v e r a g e " at all , but had been 
r e c e n t l y r e c o n d i t i o n e d and r e c o m m i s s i o n e d . Mr . Rober t H. 
J ackson , l a t e r a member of the Sup reme Court , duly wrote 
t h e r e q u i r e d o p i n i o n of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . It bo i l ed down in 
e f f e c t to t h i s : " E v e r y b o d y admi t s t h a t the P r e s i d e n t can, 
as C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f , d i spose the fo rces of the Uni ted 
S t a t e s . Why then may he not d i spose oX them?" W a l t e r 
B a g e h o t , i t is i n t e r e s t i n g to n o t e , s a y s in his Eng l i sh 
C o n s t i t u t i o n t ha t the Br i t i sh Mona rch can d i spose of the 
fo rces , that he can sell the ships of the Navy and discharge 
the Army at any moment , by v i r t u e of his " p r e r o g a t i v e " - -
on ly , of c o u r s e today the said prerogat ive is in the custody 
of t h e C a b i n e t i . e . in the l a s t a n a l y s i s , in t h a t of the 
House of Commons . In sober fact, what Pres ident Roosevelt 
did was to t a k e ove r for the n o n c e C o n g r e s s ' s power to 
" d i s p o s e of" the p r o p e r t y of the United S ta te s (Article IV, 
S e c t i o n 3) and to r e p e a l at l e a s t two s t a tu tes . Congress 's 
endorsement of his action I shall notice l a t e r . H 
As I have a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d . P r e s i d e n t \¥ i l son , without 
t r o u b l i n g C o n g r e s s , c r e a t e d two i m p o r t a n t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
a g e n c i e s in Wor ld War I . V a s t l y m o r e i m p r e s s i v e was 
F . D . R . ' s per formance a quarter of a century l a te r . In April 
1942 , I w r o t e the E x e c u t i v e Off ice of the P r e s i d e n t and 
a sked it to g ive me a l i s t of all t he war agencies and to 
spec i fy to me the supposed legal war ran t by which they had 
been b rough t into e x i s t e n c e . I got back a detai led answer 
w h i c h l i s t e d 43 e x e c u t i v e a g e n c i e s , of w h i c h 35 w e r e 
a d m i t t e d to be of pure ly e x e c u t i v e p r o v e n i e n c e . Six of 
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t h e s e r a i s e d no quest ion, for what they amounted to was an 
a s s i g n m e n t by the P r e s i d e n t of add i t iona l duties to already 
e x i s t i n g o f f i c e r s , and of o f f i ce r s whose a p p o i n t m e n t had 
b e e n , in m o s t c a s e s , r a t i f i e d by the S e n a t e . Thus , our 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the Combined Chie f s of S ta f f b e c a m e an 
a d d i t i o n a l duty of c e r t a i n m i l i t a r y and nava l c o m m a n d e r s , 
and the Combined Raw Mater ia l s Board was a similar c rea-
t i o n . N o b o d y w a s a s s i g n e d to such du t i e s who was not 
a l r e a d y in an o f f i ce to which the du t i e s w e r e l og i ca l l y 
r e f e r a b l e . But the Board of Economic Welfare, the National 
Housing Agency, the National War Labor Board, the Office of 
C e n s o r s h i p , the Off ice of C iv i l i an D e f e n s e , the Off ice of 
D e f e n s e Transpor t a t ion , the Office of Fac ts and Figures, and 
the Off ice of War In fo rma t ion , the War P r o d u c t i o n Board 
(which s u p e r s e d e d the e a r l i e r Off ice of Production Manage-
m e n t ) , t h e War M a n p o w e r Commiss ion , and l a t e r on the 
Economic S t a b i l i z a t i o n B o a r d - - a l l of these were crea ted by 
F . D . R . by v i r t u e of his power s as " C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f in 
Wartime" or by virtue of the "aggregate of powers" vested in 
him "by the C o n s t i t u t i o n and the s t a tu t e s " - - a quite baffling 
formula, the invention also of Mr. Jackson. 
But the so lu t ion of the problem of " a g e n c i e s " presently 
g a v e r i s e to a n o t h e r , inasmuch as the p o w e r s and du t i e s 
e n t r u s t e d to t h e s e bod ie s w e r e a lso f r equen t ly unknown to 
a n y s t a t u t e , w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t if t h e i r o r d e r s - - o r 
r a t h e r , " a d v i c e " - - w a s ignored by those to whom i t was 
a d d r e s s e d , t h e l a t t e r c o u l d not be b rough t to book for 
h a v i n g commi t t ed an "of fense a g a i n s t the Uni ted S t a t e s . " 
How then were such reca lc i t ran t s to be deal t with? 
A g a i n , a W i l s o n i a n e x p e d i e n t suppl ied the a n s w e r . I 
r e f e r to w h a t came to be va r ious ly known as " s a n c t i o n s , " 
" a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s a n c t i o n s , " or " i n d i r e c t s a n c t i o n s . " An 
i l l u s t r a t i o n of the way in which "sanctions" were applied is 
afforded by an episode involving the Remington Arms Company 
of B r i d g e p o r t , C o n n e c t i c u t , in the autumn of 1918. I am 
fo l lowing the n a r r a t i v e of a member of Mr. Wi lson ' s War 
Labor Board. After a prot racted strike and the rendering of 
a d e c i s i o n by t h e B o a r d , t h e s t r i k e r s s t i l l r e fused to 
return to work, whereupon Mr. Wilson took his pen in hand in 
the Board's behalf. He pointed out that an appeal from that 
body should be made through the regular channels and not by 
s t r i k e , and i n f o r m e d t h e s t r i k e r s t h a t if t h e y did not 
return to work at once, they would be barred from any work 
in B r i d g e p o r t for a year ; that the United S ta tes Employment 
S e r v i c e would not ob ta in jobs for them elsewhere; and that 
the g o v e r n m e n t would no longer c o n s i d e r t he i r e x e m p t i o n s 
from the d ra f t to be justified on the theory that they were 
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useful in war product ion. The na r r a t ive concludes: "That 
ended the strike." 12 
F . D . R . a l s o g o v e r n e d labor r e l a t ions , at times indeed 
wi th a high hand , a l b e i t without s ta tu tory au thor iza t ion 
prior to the enac tment of the War Labor Disputes Act of 
June 25, 1943. His pr inciple technique was to seize plants 
in which s t r ikes were going on, and some plants he seized 
for other reasons. For example, he ordered Montgomery Ward 
to adopt a maintenance of membership rule. Ward's at first 
a g r e e d , but a f t e r Mr . Sewell Avery got to thinking the 
mat te r over he decided--and I am strongly inclined to agree 
wi th h im- - tha t the Pres iden t en t i re ly lacked author i ty to 
issue such an order; and so Mr. Avery reneged. What next 
happened was this: A morning or two later, when Mr. Avery 
got down to his office, he found that the 70 persons whom 
the Chicago post office was accustomed to send Ward's each 
day to look after their pa rce l post orders had not shown 
up . He t h e r e u p o n c a p i t u l a t e d , but not u n t i l a f ter the 
touching episode in which, looking "the knight of the rueful 
countenance," he was carried out of his office on the joined 
hands of Se rgean t Lepak and Pfc . Dies. Eventually a case 
dealing with the episode reached the Supreme Court, which 
d e c l i n e d ju r i sd ic t ion , saying that the ma t t e r had become 
"moot." 
Being an e n t i r e l y a r t i cu la t e gent leman, Mr. Roosevel t 
e labora ted ra ther early in the game the theory on which he 
intended to proceed and, presumably, did proceed. This was 
in support of his demand on September 7, 1942 that Congress 
r e p e a l f o r t h w i t h c e r t a i n so -ca l l ed "pa r i ty" provisions of 
the P r i ce Control A c t . This is what F .D.R. said: "I ask 
the Congress to take this act ion by the first of October . 
I n a c t i o n on your p a r t by t h a t d a t e wi l l l e a v e me an 
inescapable responsibi l i ty to the people of this country to 
see to it tha t the war effort is no longer imperiled by the 
threat of economic chaos. 
"In the event that the Congress should fail to act, 
and act adequate ly , I shall accep t the respons ib i l i ty , 
and I will act. 
"At the same time tha t fair p r ices are s tabi l ized, 
wages can and will be stabilized also. This I will do. 
"The Pres iden t has the powers , under the Constitu-
t ion and under Congress ional ac t s , to take measures 
n e c e s s a r y to aver t a d i sas te r which would in t e r fe re 
with the winning of the war. 
"I have given the most thoughtful cons idera t ion to 
m e e t i n g th i s i ssue wi thout further r e f e rence to the 
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Congress . I have determined, however, on this vital 
matter to consult with the Congress. 
"The American people can be sure that I will use my 
powers with a full sense of my responsib i l i ty to the 
Const i tu t ion and to my coun t ry . The American people 
can also be sure that I shall not hesitate to use every 
power vested in me to accomplish the defeat of our 
enemies in any part of the world where our own safety 
demands such defeat. 
"When the war is won, the powers under which I act 
a u t o m a t i c a l l y r e v e r t to the p e o p l e - - t o whom they 
belong." 13 
What we have here is cer ta in ly a r a the r f a r - reach ing 
propos i t ion . The Pres iden t of the United States is claiming 
the right to repeal an act of Congress, although he does not 
deny that Congress had the power to pass i t . To be sure, 
o ther P res iden t s have occasional ly refused to enforce acts 
of Congress , though very r a r e l y , and always on the ground 
that the ac t s in question were uncons t i tu t iona l . This was 
Andrew Johnson's contention in 1867 respecting the Tenure of 
Office Act. Nobody can deny that Congress had the right to 
pass the Emergency Price Control Act or that it was the only 
organ of the Government that did have that right; and yet 
the P re s iden t claimed the r ight to repea l tha t law. That 
was a c la im of power to suspend the Const i tu t ion, and 
moreover , to suspend it as to i ts most important fea ture , 
the division of power between the President and Congress. 
Yet any candid person must admit that a situation might 
ar ise in which it would be necessary to suspend the Consti-
t u t i o n . Abraham Lincoln admitted that he did not know 
w h e t h e r or no t he had suspended a par t of it when he 
suspended the wr i t of habeas corpus; but, said he, "Are all 
the laws to go unenforced in order that one law may be 
p r e s e r v e d ? " On the occasion when Mr. Roosevel t spoke, 
however . Congress was in session, and it would seem that if 
the s i tua t ion is so despe ra te as to require suspension of 
the Cons t i tu t ion , the safe view to take is tha t Congress 
ought to be considered to be aware of the fact as well as 
t he P r e s i d e n t , and so he joined in the e n t e r p r i s e . And 
y e t - - s u p p o s e t h a t an atom bomb were to be dropped on 
Washington or New York, or Los Angeles--whose duty would it 
be to proclaim martial law, and thereby suspend the Consti-
tution? 
For the res t , it must be admitted that F.D.R. 's attempt 
to es tabl ish a whole se r ies of new offices, and his attempt 
to rule labor for two y e a r s without a whit of authorization 
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by Congress , prevailed in fact, why not then, in law? And 
if rn law, then does this law hold when "peace"--at least in 
the sense of the absence of a "shooting w a r " - - o n c e more 
supervenes , a query which brings us logica l ly , as well as 
chronologically, to the Steel Seizure Case.14 
Pres iden t Truman, in order to aver t a nationwide strike 
of s teel workers in April 1952, d i rec ted the Sec re ta ry of 
Commerce to seize and operate most of the steel mills of the 
count ry . The Pres iden t c i ted no specif ic statutory warrant 
for t h i s s t e p , but u rged the r e q u i r e m e n t s of n a t i o n a l 
defense at home and of our allies abroad, and cited gener-
ally " the authori ty vested in me by the Const i tu t ion and 
laws of the United Sta tes ." 15 Before he could execute the 
order , the Sec re t a ry was stopped by an injunction which, in 
due course, the Supreme Court affirmed. 
The pivotal proposi t ion of "the opinion of the Court" by 
J u s t i c e B lack is t h a t , inasmuch as Congress could have 
ordered the seizure of the mills, the President lacked power 
to do so w i t h o u t i t s a u t h o r i z a t i o n . In support of this 
posi t ion, which purported to have the indorsement of four 
o t h e r m e m b e r s of t he C o u r t , J u s t i c e Black invoked the 
pr inciple of the Separation of Powers, but otherwise adduced 
no proof from p r e v i o u s d e c i s i o n s or from governmental 
p r a c t i c e . The opinion bears, in fact, the earmarks of hasty 
i m p r o v i s a t i o n , as we l l as s t r o n g p r e p o s s e s s i o n , and is 
u n q u e s t i o n a b l y c o n t r a d i c t e d by a cons iderab le record of 
p r e s i d e n t i a l p i o n e e r i n g in t e r r i t o r y that was eventual ly 
occupied by Congress. 
Thus Washington, act ing on his own in 1793, issued the 
f i r s t N e u t r a l i t y P r o c l a m a t i o n , as was mentioned e a r l i e r . 
The year following Congress , at the Pres ident ' s suggestion, 
e n a c t e d the f i r s t n e u t r a l i t y s t a t u t e . In 1799 the e lder 
Adams ex t r ad i t ed the first fugitive from jus t i ce under the 
Jay Treaty, and was successfully defended by Marshall in the 
House of Repre sen t a t i ve s for his course. Not till 1848 did 
Congress provide another method. And in 1799, an American 
n a v a l v e s s e l , a c t i n g under pres iden t ia l o rde r s , se ized a 
Dan i sh c r a f t t r a d i n g in the West I n d i e s . A l t h o u g h it 
disallowed the se izure as v io la t ive of an ac t of Congress, 
the Court , by Chief Just ice Marshal l , took pains to assert 
t h a t but for the ac t , the P res iden t could in the c i rcum-
s tances have ordered the se izure by virtue of his duty "to 
take ca re that the laws be faithfully executed" and of his 
power as commander of the forces. That the President may, 
in the a b s e n c e of l e g i s l a t i o n by C o n g r e s s , control the 
l a n d i n g of fo re ign c a b l e s in the United S t a t e s and the 
passage of foreign troops through American t e r r i t o r y , has 
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been d e m o n s t r a t e d r e p e a t e d l y . Likewise, until Congress 
a c t s , he may s e t up m i l i t a r y commiss ions in t e r r i t o r y 
occupied by the armed forces of the United States. During 
the Civil War Lincoln 's suspensions of the wri t of habeaf 
££r2us paved the way to authorizing legislation. S i m " u ^ ^ 
his a c t i o n in s e i z i n g the r a i l r o a d and t e l e g r a p h l ines 
between Washington and Balt imore in 1861 was followed in 
1862 by an a c t of C o n g r e s s g e n e r a l l y authoriz ing such 
seizures when dictated by military necessity.16 
On the specif ic issue of se izures of industrial property. 
Just ice Frankfur te r incorpora tes much pe r t inen t data in an 
appendix to his concurr ing opinion in the S tee l Case. Of 
s t a tu te s author iz ing such se izures he lists 18 between 1916 
and 1951 ; and of P r e s i d e n t i a l s e i z u r e s without specif ic 
s ta tu to ry au thor iza t ion he l ists eight for the World War I 
period and eleven for the World War II period, several of 
which occurred before the outbreak of hos t i l i t i e s . In the 
War Labor Disputes Act of June 25, 1943 such seizures were 
put on a statutory basis; and in United States v. Pewee Coal 
C o . , Inc . , they were , in implicat ion, sustained as having 
been validly made.17 ^ 
In consequence of the evident belief of at least four of 
the Just ices who concurred in the judgement in the S tee l 
Case tha t Congress had exercised its powers in the premises 
of t he c a s e in oppos i t ion to se izure , by the procedures 
which It had laid down in the Taft-Hartley Act, the lesson 
of the case is somewhat b lurred. But that the P res iden t 
does possess , in the absence of r e s t r i c t i ve legis la t ion , a 
residual or resu l tan t power above, or in consequence of his 
granted powers, to deal with emergencies which he regards as 
th rea ten ing the nat ional secur i ty , is expl ic i t ly asserted by 
Just ice Clark and the same view is evident ly shared, with 
ce r t a in qual i f ica t ions , by Just ices Frankfur ter and Jackson; 
while the dissent ing Just ices would apparent ly go further! 
Speaking by the la te Chief Justice, they quote with evident 
app rova l - -no t to say gus to- -a passage e x t r a c t e d from the 
Government 's brief in United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 18 in 
which in 1915 the Court sustained the power of the President 
to o r d e r w i t h d r a w a l s from the Public Domain, not only 
without the sanct ion of Congress , but even contrary to its 
l e g i s l a t i o n t o u c h i n g the sub jec t , such legis la t ion having 
been sys temat ica l ly ignored by successive Presidents through 
a long term of years. 
The passage alluded to reads : "The function of making 
laws is pecul ia r to Congress , and the Execut ive can not 
exe rc i se that function to any deg ree . But this is not to 
say that all of the subjects concerning which laws might be 
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made are per force removed from the possibility of Executive 
influence. The Executive may act upon things and upon men 
in many re la t ions which have not, though they might have, 
been actual ly regula ted by Congress . In o ther words, just 
as t h e r e a r e f i e lds which are pecul iar to Congress and 
f ields which are pecul iar to the Execu t ive , so the re a re 
f i e ld s w h i c h are common to both, in the sense tha t the 
Execut ive may move within them until they shall have been 
o c c u p i e d by l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n . . . . T h i s s i t u a t i o n 
r e s u l t s from t h e f ac t t h a t t he P r e s i d e n t is the ac t ive 
agent , not of Congress , but of the Nation. . . . He is the 
agent of the people of the United S t a t e s , deriving all his 
powers from them and responsible direct ly to them. In no 
s e n s e is he the a g e n t of C o n g r e s s , . . . T h e r e f o r e it 
fol lows tha t in ways short of making laws or disobeying 
them, the executive may be under a grave constitutional duty 
to ac t for the nat ional p ro tec t ion in situations not covered 
by the acts of Congress, and in which, even, it may not be 
s a i d t h a t h is a c t i o n is t he d i r e c t e x p r e s s i o n of any 
par t i cu la r one of the independent powers which are granted 
to him speci f ica l ly by the Cons t i tu t ion . Instances wherein 
the P res iden t has felt and fulfilled such a duty have not 
been r a r e in our h i s t o r y , t hough , be ing for the public 
b e n e f i t and approved by al l , his ac t s have seldom been 
challenged in the courts." 19 
The reason for the evident sa t i s fac t ion expe r i enced by 
the Chief Just ice in quoting this passage is tha t the joint 
a u t h o r of i t was one John W. D a v i s , in 1915 Sol ic i to r 
General of the United States, in 1952 chief counsel for the 
Steel interest. 
What , t h e n , is t he lesson of the S tee l Case? It is, 
perhaps , a bit difficult to say; but unquestionably it tends 
to supplement presidential emergency power with a power to 
adopt temporary remedial legislation when Congress has been, 
in the judgment of the P res iden t , unduly remiss in taking 
cognizance of and act ing upon a given si tuation. In other 
words, the lesson of the case is that, just as nature abhors 
a vacuum, so does an age of emergency . So then, let 
Congress see to it tha t no such vacuum occurs . The best 
escape from pres iden t ia l autocracy in the age we inhabit is 
no t , in s h o r t , j u d i c i a l review, which can supply only a 
vacuum, but timely legislation. 
In br ief , the P r e s i d e n t ' s duty "to take ca r e tha t the 
laws be faithfully executed" becomes often the power to make 
laws. Nor is this the whole story by any manner of means. 
I am re fe r r ing , again, to the practice of Congress in recent 
decades of making broad unbounded delegations of power to 
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the P r e s i d e n t . The approach of war with Germany in 1917, 
t he war itself, the economic cr is is which confronted the 
c o u n t r y in 1932 and the y e a r s i m m e d i a t e l y fo l lowing 
p r o d u c e d a c o n s i d e r a b l e c r o p of s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s 
de lega t ing powers to the Pres iden t to be exercised by him 
"in cases of emergency," of "extreme emergency," of "suffi-
c ien t emergency," "in time of war or similar emergency," in 
"a s t a t e of public per i l , " and so on; and this practice was, 
of course , resumed following our abrupt p rec ip i t a t ion into 
World War II. The dimensions it assumed are hinted at by 
t he fact tha t in his Proclamat ion of December 31, 1946, 
P re s iden t Truman announced tha t it terminated some' twenty 
s t a tu te s at once, and foreshadowed the demise of 33 others, 
while as to st i l l o thers he intended to ask Congress for 
their renewal in whole or in part.20 
No doubt the most remarkable of these emergency statutes, 
from the point of view of the scope of the power delegated 
by it to the President was the Lend Lease Act of March 11, 
1941 which empowered the President, whenever he deemed it to 
be in the i n t e r e s t of the national defense, to authorize the 
S e c r e t a r y of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or any other 
h e a d of d e p a r t m e n t or a g e n c y of the g o v e r n m e n t , to 
manufacture , or "o therwise procure ," so long as funds were 
a v a i l a b l e , "defense a r t i c l e s " - - i . e . anything from but te r to 
b a t t l e s h i p s - - a n d "se l l , t ransfer , exchange , l ease , lend or 
o t h e r w i s e d i spose of the same to any government whose 
defense the P res iden t deemed vi ta l" to that of the United 
S t a t e s , and on any terms tha t he deemed " sa t i s f ac to ry . " 
F i r s t and l a s t t he Uni t ed S t a t e s underwrote under this 
au thor iza t ion the defense of i ts a l l ies to the tune of 40 
bil l ions of do l la rs , including a des t roye r to the Queen of 
Holland, then an exile in England! 
At the same time, it ought to be pointed out, that while 
Lend-Lease marks a climax in the development of the tech-
nique of de lega t ing leg is la t ive power to the Pres iden t , it 
is also featured by a new device calculated to minimize one 
d a n g e r of t h i s p r o c e d u r e , namely , the re ten t ion by the 
P res iden t of such powers beyond the period when Congress 
des i res to end them. Thus the ac t was to run for certain 
s t ipula ted per iods , unless the houses should by "concurrent 
resolut ion" revoke i t . In a r ecen t a r t i c l e in the Harvard 
t ^ w R e v i e w , 2 1 J u s t i c e J a c k s o n r e v e a l s that F .D.R. was 
strongly incl ined to p ro tes t against this feature of the act 
as invasive of his power of veto and hence unconstitutional, 
but withheld his hand for fear lest he might not get the act 
a t a l l . O n e can but be t o u c h e d by th i s a n x i e t y of 
Mr. Roosevelt to preserve the Constitution, but in my humble 
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opinion his scruples were quite uncal led for. There seems 
to me to be no reason why, when Congress delegates a power 
to the President, or to anybody else, it may not attach such 
a c o n d i t i o n of l i m i t a t i o n . To c o n t e n d o the rwise is to 
affront common sense. 
We now r e t u r n to b a s e , i . e . to the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
D o c u m e n t . I wish to t r e a t more speci f ica l ly the c lause 
which imposes upon the President the "duty to take care that 
the laws be faithfully execu ted . " Ordinari ly this has been 
o f f i c i a l l y invoked as a m a k e - w e i g h t j u s t i f i c a t i o n for 
pres ident ia l action, as it was by Lincoln when he laid claim 
to "the war power" on the premise that he could not other-
wise d ischarge the duty put upon him by the " take ca r e " 
c l a u s e . But the c l a u s e has a l so had , as it w e r e , an 
independent c a r ee r as a d i r ec t source of presidential power 
vis a_ vi£ Congress. 
The s t a r t ing point is Hamil ton 's contention, advanced in 
support of Washington 's Proc lamat ion of Neutrality in 1793, 
t h a t the " law" whose faithful execut ion the P re s iden t is 
obliged to forward comprises not only the Constitution and 
laws and t r e a t i e s of the United States but International Law 
as well , and hence ex tended to the discharge of American 
duties and to the p ro tec t ion of American rights and inter-
ests abroad. He thus adumbrated a presidential function the 
performance of which has been at times difficult to demark 
from the w a r - d e c l a r i n g power of Congress. The Framers of 
the Const i tu t ion had, in truth, pointed the way to this very 
development. 
I refer to the fact tha t , when it was proposed in the 
Federal Convention, on August 17, 1787 to authorize Congress 
"to make war," Madison and Gerry "moved to insert 'declare, ' 
s t r iking out 'make ' war, leaving to the Executive the power 
to repel sudden a t t a cks , " and the motion carried.22 When, 
on the o t h e r hand, ear ly in Jefferson 's first adminis t ra -
t ion, the question arose whether he had the right to employ 
n a v a l f o r c e s to p r o t e c t A m e r i c a n s h i p p i n g aga ins t the 
T r i p o l i t a n p i r a t e s , the Pres iden t was so doubtful on the 
point that he ins t ructed his commander that if he took any 
pr isoners he should r e l ease them; and that while he could 
d i sa rm c a p t u r e d vessels in se l f -defense , he must r e l ea se 
t h o s e t o o . T h e s e s c r u p l e s e x c i t e d t h e d e r i s i o n of 
Hamil ton. If, the latter argued, we were attacked, we were 
ipso facto at war willy nil ly; tha t Congress ' s p re roga t ive 
was exclusive only when it came to putting the country into 
a s t a t e of war a_b in i t io . At the time Jefferson 's view 
preva i led . Congress formally voting him war powers against 
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the Bey of T r i p o l i . L a t e r d e v e l o p m e n t s have securely 
established Hamilton's thesis.23 
Thus, commenting on the act ion of Lieutenant Hollins in 
1854 in ordering the bombardment of Greytown, Nicaragua, in 
d e f a u l t of r e p a r a t i o n s from the local au thor i t ies for ' an 
attack by a mob on the United States consul stationed there. 
Jus t i ce Nelson, on c i rcu i t , said: "As respec t s the in te r -
posit ion of the Execut ive abroad for the protection of the 
l ives or proper ty of the c i t i zen , the duty must, of neces-
s i t y , r e s t in the d i s c r e t i o n of the P res iden t . . . under 
our sys tem of government the c i t izen abroad is as much 
e n t i t l e d to p r o t e c t i o n as the c i t izen at home,"24 words 
which were endorsed by the Supreme Court in 1890. The 
P r e s i d e n t ' s d u t y , sa id Jus t ice Miller , is not limited "to 
the enforcement of ac ts of Congress or of t rea t ies of the 
U n i t e d S t a t e s a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r e x p r e s s t e r m s , " but 
includes "the r ights , duties and obl igat ions growing out of 
t he C o n s t i t u t i o n i t s e l f , our i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t ions , and 
all the p ro tec t ion implied by the nature of the Government 
under the Constitution."25 
In his l i t t l e volume on World Policing and the Constitu-
U^n, Mr. James Grafton Rogers lists 149 episodes similar to 
the Greytown affair, s t re tch ing between the undeclared war 
with F r a n c e in 1798 and Pearl Harbor. While inviting some 
p r u n i n g , the l i s t d e m o n s t r a t e s beyond pe radven tu re the 
ex i s t ence in the P res iden t , as Chief Execut ive and Com-
m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f , of power to judge whether a s i tuat ion 
r e q u i r e s the use of avai lable forces to p ro t ec t American 
r ights of person and property outside the United States and 
to t a k e act ion in harmony with his decis ion . It is true 
that such employment of the forces has usually comprised 
j u s t i f i a b l e a c t s of se l f -defense , but the countr ies where 
they occurred were en t i t l ed to t r ea t them as acts of war 
neve r the le s s , although they have genera l ly been too feeble 
to a s s e r t t h e i r p r e r o g a t i v e in th i s r e s p e c t , and h a v e 
sometimes actually chosen to turn the other cheek. So when 
in 1900 P re s iden t McKinley, without consulting Congress , 
c o n t r i b u t e d a s izable cont ingent to the joint forces that 
went to the re l ief of the foreign legat ions in Peking, the 
Chinese Imperial Government agreed that this action had not 
constituted war. 
And A r t i c l e V of the A t l a n t i c P a c t bu i lds on such 
p r e c e d e n t s . The novel feature is its enlarged conception of 
defensible American in t e res t s abroad. In the words of the 
published abstract of the Report of the Committee on Foreign 
Rela t ions on the P a c t , "Ar t i c l e 5 records what is a fact, 
n a m e l y , tha t an armed a t t ack within the meaning of the 
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t rea ty would in the p resen t -day world consti tute an attack 
upon the e n t i r e community comprising the pa r t i e s to the 
t r e a t y , i n c l u d i n g the Un i t ed S t a t e s . A c c o r d i n g l y , the 
P r e s i d e n t and the Congress , each within thei r sphere of 
ass igned const i tu t ional respons ib i l i t i es , would be expec ted 
to take all act ion necessary and appropriate to protect the 
United S t a t e s against the consequences and dangers of an 
armed a t tack committed agains t any party to the treaty."26 
But from the very nature of things, the d i scharge of this 
obligat ion agains t over t force will ordinari ly rest with the 
Pres iden t in the first ins tance , just as has the d i scharge 
in the p a s t of the l i ke o b l i g a t i o n in the p ro tec t ion of 
American r ights abroad . Fur thermore , in the d ischarge of 
this obligat ion the P res iden t will ord inar i ly be required to 
use force and perform acts of war. Such is the verdict of 
h is tory , a verdict which has been currently confirmed by our 
i n t e r v e n t i o n in K o r e a under the auspices of the United 
Nat ions . So Pres iden t Eisenhower had the book on his side 
when he said on St. Patrick's Day--absit omen--that "hanging 
ought to be the fate of any P res iden t who failed to ac t 
ins tant ly to p ro t ec t the American people agains t a sudden 
a t tack in this atomic age." What, however, of his "implied 
agreement" with S e c r e t a r y Dul les ' view tha t the President 
can s t r ike back also against an assaul t on any one of 33 
a l l i e d c o u n t r i e s in E u r o p e , t he Middle E a s t , or t he 
Americas? In such a case, it would appear, indeed, that the 
Pres iden t would be act ing not as executive of International 
Law, but of ce r t a in t r e a t i e s of a sor t tha t even Sena to r 
Bricker has no magic against. 
The l a s t p h a s e of pres ident ia l p r e roga t ive to r e c e i v e 
a t ten t ion he re is one that has recen t ly been much in the 
public e y e . It also stems logical ly from the " take c a r e " 
c l a u s e . I mean the P r e s i d e n t ' s r ight to p r o t e c t official 
c o n f i d e n c e s between himself and subordinates from undue 
judicial and congress ional cu r ios i ty . The leading case on 
the s u b j e c t is s t i l l Marbury v^ . Madison,27 in which the 
Court under Chief Just ice Marshall asse r ted i ts power and 
duty to pass upon the cons t i tu t iona l i ty of acts of Congress 
when cal led upon to enforce them. In the course of the 
argument the At torney Genera l , pointing out that he was 
act ing as S e c r e t a r y of State at the time of the transaction 
involved, s t a ted that "he felt himself bound to maintain the 
r ights of the execu t ive" and that he ought not to answer 
concerning "any facts which came officially to his knowledge 
wh i l e act ing as S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e . " The Chief Jus t ice , 
while of the opinion that nothing conf ident ia l was in fact 
involved, conceded none the less tha t "if he (the Attorney 
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General) thought that anything was communicated to him in 
confidence he ought not to answer concerning it." 
But even ea r l i e r , as Attorney General Brownell shows in 
his r ecen t Memorandum28 on the subject. President Washing-
ton had t a k e n the p o s i t i o n , a p r o p o s of a congressional 
inquiry, that while he ought to communicate to the committee 
conducting the inquiry, at its request , such papers as the 
public i n t e r e s t demanded, he ought, on the other hand, to 
w i t h h o l d t h o s e whose d i s c l o s u r e might injure the public 
i n t e r e s t , and that he was the judge of this matter. Nearly 
a century l a t e r the Senate Judiciary Committee tangled with 
President Cleveland on the same issue. The Attorney General 
of that day having refused to furnish it certain documents, 
the commit tee advanced the sweeping contention that it was 
en t i t l ed to know all that officially takes p lace in any of 
the d e p a r t m e n t s of g o v e r n m e n t , to which asser t ion the 
P r e s i d e n t r e p l i e d t h a t , wh i l e he had no i n t e n t i o n of 
w i t h h o l d i n g any o f f i c i a l pape r s , he denied that "papers 
inherent ly p r iva t e or conf ident ia l" became official merely 
by being lodged in the custody of a public department. In a 
s imilar con t roversy in 1909 between the Sena te Judiciary 
C o m m i t t e e and P r e s i d e n t T h e o d o r e Roosevel t the l a t t e r 
assured the chairman of the committee that he, T.R., had the 
desired papers , but that the only way the Senate could get 
them was t h rough his i m p e a c h m e n t . Some of the facts 
conta ined in the papers, he further explained, were given to 
the Government under the seal of secrecy, and "I will see to 
it tha t the word of this government to individuals is kept 
sacred." 
In Apri l 1941, to turn to a more modern ins tance , the 
Chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs , in a 
l e t t e r addressed to Attorney General Jackson, asked that the 
Committee be furnished with all F .B. I , r epor t s since June 
1939 and a l l f u t u r e r e p o r t s . The A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
a n s w e r e d : " I t is t he p o s i t i o n of th i s Depar tment , now 
repea ted with the approval of and at the direction of the 
P r e s i d e n t , t h a t a l l inves t iga t ive repor t s are confident ial 
documents of the executive department of the Government, to 
aid the duty laid upon the President by the Constitution to 
' t ake ca re tha t the laws be faithfully execu ted , ' and that 
congress ional or public access to them would not be in the 
public i n t e r e s t . " "Disclosure of the repor t s could not do 
o t h e r w i s e , " he c o n t i n u e d , " t h a n ser iously prejudice law 
e n f o r c e m e n t , " as by identifying sources , e t c . It "would 
a l so p r e j u d i c e the n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e and be of aid and 
comfort to the very subversive elements against which you 
wish to p r o t e c t the count ry ." It would v io la te pledges of 
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secrecy and "might produce the grossest kind of injustice to 
innocent individuals ." The opinion is bolstered by a wealth 
of p r e c e d e n t s both of e x e c u t i v e and of judicial p rove-
nience.29 
A r e c e n t c o n t r o v e r s y was p r e c i p i t a t e d by P res iden t 
Eisenhower's letter of May 17 to Secretary of Defense Wilson 
banning ce r t a in testimony in the McCarthy-Army dispute. It 
r e a d s in p a r t : "Because it is essen t ia l to eff ic ient and 
e f f e c t i v e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t h a t employes of the Execut ive 
Branch be in a position to be completely candid in advising 
with each other on official ma t t e r s , and because it is not 
in the public i n t e re s t that any of their conversa t ions or 
communications or any documents or reproductions concerning 
such advice be disclosed, you will instruct employes of your 
d e p a r t m e n t t h a t in a l l of t h e i r appea rances before the 
subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Opera-
tions regarding the inquiry now before it, they are not to 
test ify to any such conversa t ions or communications or to 
produce any such documents or reproductions."30 Although 
the order was assai led by Senator McCarthy, who demanded 
that it be "trimmed," it seems to be well within the pattern 
set by the precedents compiled by the Attorney General. 
On the other hand, the P re s iden t ' s announced determina-
tion on June 6th to prevent , i . e . rn toto appa ren t ly , any 
inves t iga t ion of the Cent ra l Intelligence Agency by Senator 
McCarthy plainly exceeds this p a t t e r n . Indeed, it contra-
d i c t s the P r e s i d e n t ' s own r e c o g n i t i o n in h is l e t t e r to 
S e c r e t a r y Wilson of the g e n e r a l r i g h t of congress ional 
committees to request "information re la t ing to any ma t t e r 
w i t h i n " t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n t h e r e o f , " c e r t a i n h i s t o r i c a l 
excep t ions" as ide . In the words of the New York Times in 
its ed i tor ia l column of June 8th: "The intelligence work of 
the C . I . A . unde r i t s ab le d i r e c t o r , A l l e n W. Dulles , is 
vi ta l to this Government . . . ." Yet , "no one outside the 
agency itself rea l ly knows whether it is doing an efficient 
job, whether it is overs taffed, whether it dupl ica tes work 
of other agenc ies , whether it gets into operations where it 
has no b u s i n e s s , w h e t h e r i t w a s t e s m o n e y , w h e t h e r i t 
in te r fe res with the conduct of our foreign pol icy, and so 
f o r t h . B e c a u s e i t is a l m o s t c o m p l e t e l y cu t off from 
C o n g r e s s , i t is an o b j e c t of s u s p i c i o n by C o n g r e s s . 
Obviously, we are not urging publicity for the work of the 
C.I .A., and of course an inves t iga t ion of the type Senator 
M c C a r t h y would c o n d u c t (or for that ma t t e r any public 
inqui ry) could well be d isas t rous ." A suggestion for the 
avoidance of such clashes is mentioned in a moment. 
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And so much for the record of "presidential aggrandize-
ment ." What does it import for the Constitutional scheme of 
things as we know it; more particularly, what does it import 
for the idea of " the rule of law"? It will not be amiss in 
this connect ion to turn again to Locke's Second Treatise on 
Civil Government . In chap te r XI of this work its author 
ins t ruc ts us that the supremacy of the legislative power is 
the hal l -mark of all free governments. Yet, obviously, this 
did not de te r him from penning chap te r XIV, "Of Preroga-
t i v e , " from which th i s discourse sets out . Does Locke, 
t h e n , c o n t r a d i c t h imse l f - -does he, in the final analys is , 
abandon the concept of the "rule of law"? This has been 
charged agains t him at times, but I do not concede that he 
was a r e n e g a d e , e i t h e r i n t e n t i o n a l l y or un in ten t iona l ly . 
Locke h imsel f would have been the first to acknowledge 
t h a t he was no unswerving devotee of sy l logis t ic t r u t h - -
i n d e e d , he avowed himself an "Empir ic is t , " teaching that 
that can be only a par t i a l view of things which experience 
and common sense do not confirm. And from this point of 
view I submit that the record I have sketched above of the 
development of p res iden t ia l power throughout the last half 
century is not too alarming. 
Unquest ionably, the most audacious strainer of precedents 
among the P r e s i d e n t s of t h i s period was F.D.R. , whose 
ex t remis t assumption of power was his 50 des t royer deal , 
which was presen t ly underwr i t ten by Congress itself, as we 
have seen, in the Lend-Lease Act. Then, as to Mr. Truman's 
most cha l l engeab le ac t ion , his abortive seizure of the Steel 
I n d u s t r y , in v i o l a t i o n of t he c l e a r i m p l i c a t i o n s of the 
Taf t -Har t l ey Act , it is possible that some allowance should 
be made for personal id iosyncrasy . Whenever he ventured 
w i t h i n s n i f f i n g d i s t a n c e of T a f t - H a r t l e y , Mr. Truman 
invariably threw a conniption fit and became to all intents 
and purposes drunk and disorderly. Anyway, he was foiled by 
the Court , a lbe i t at the expense of considerable bad logic 
and the de l i be ra t e blacking out--no pun intended--of most of 
the his tory which was pe r t inen t to the constitutional point 
at issue. 
Nevertheless, that things might be improved somewhat from 
the p o i n t of v iew of p re se rv ing a due ba lance between 
Congress and the President in an era of crisis, seems to me 
a tenable proposit ion. Let me say at once, however, that I 
do not think that Mr. Br icker has the answer. Indeed, the 
p r i n c i p a l d e f e c t of h is main p roposa l was its complete 
i r r e l evance to the outstanding problem of the preservation 
of the "rule of law," the treaty-making power being one of 
the mos t c a r e f u l l y safeguarded powers conferred by the 
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C o n s t i t u t i o n . The power of the P res iden t to en te r into 
Execut ive ag reemen t s - - l i ke the 50 destroyer deal--is, to be 
sure, something e l s e . But I should hesitate to concede that 
even that power can be material ly cut down in the current 
s t a t e of the world, a lbei t this does not mean that it may 
not be brought under better control. Thus I was much struck 
by some words of Rober t Sherwood, in his Roosevel t and 
H o p k i n s , a n e n t the At l an t i c Conference , from which the 
s o - c a l l e d A t l a n t i c C h a r t e r , wh ich s eems to h a v e died 
abornin ' , issued in 1941. This event, says Sherwood, "gave 
Hopkins an opportunity to observe more clearly than ever the 
d i f f e r ences between the American and Bri t ish systems of 
democracy . This was the first time he had seen both the 
Pres iden t and Prime Minister in opera t ion away from their 
home bases. He remarked on the fact that whereas Roosevelt 
was completely on his own, subject only to the advice of his 
immediate and se l f -e lec ted entourage, which advice he could 
accep t or r e j ec t , Churchil l was constantly reporting to and 
c o n s u l t i n g the War C a b i n e t in London , a d d r e s s i n g his 
communications to the Lord Privy Seal, who was then Clement 
A t t l e e . During th ree days more than thirty communications 
passed between the (bat t leship) Prince of Wales and White-
hal l , and the speed of communication and of action thereon 
was astonishing to the Americans."31 
I suggest tha t in the p resen t s t a t e of things a spec ia l 
Cabinet r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of both pa r t i e s and both houses of 
Congress might supply the answer to the problem of mini-
mizing the element of whim from the conduct of our foreign 
re l a t ions , an element only too obtrusive in such agreements 
as those of Yal ta and Potsdam. Indeed, some such device 
would seem c l e a r l y to be i n d i c a t e d as an a p p r o p r i a t e 
i n s t r u m e n t of t h a t b i - p a r t i s a n outlook upon questions of 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y w h i c h P r e s i d e n t E i s e n h o w e r a s p i r e s to 
inculca te in his own official family and in the houses of 
Congress. 
And o the r reforms may beckon- - re forms often easy to 
accomplish. The endeavor of Mr. Eisenhower from the outset 
of his Administration to put the Vice Presidency on the map 
and, through its agency, to open new channels of communica-
tion and understanding between the Presidency and the people 
a f fo rds a b r i l l i a n t i l lus t ra t ion . Nor, indeed, is this the 
only thing to be said for this exper imen t . The first care 
of the head of a g rea t corporation is to take thought of a 
possible successor and to se t him on a course of training. 
That very idea - -who can doubt i t - -has also presented itself 
to the Pres ident ' s mind in his effort to enable Mr. Nixon to 
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earn his s a l a r y . We can be glad that he has such good 
material to work upon. 
Moreover, I am inclined to agree with Senator Bricker on 
one point , and that is that executive agreements which rest 
solely on P res iden t i a l p re roga t ive ought not to be cogni-
z a b l e by the courts as " in te rna l law" without Congress ' s 
consent , but I fail to see that a cons t i tu t ional amendment 
is r e q u i s i t e to a s s u r e t h i s . A s imple ac t of Congress 
should be enough, just as it was enough in 1868 to stop the 
courts from enforcing the old common law ban on expatria-
t ion.32 After al l , the only two agencies of the government 
which the Const i tu t ion recognizes as capable of making law 
en fo rc ib l e by the cour ts , tha t is " in te rna l law," are the 
t r ea ty -making authori ty and the houses of Congress, acting 
subject to the President's veto power. 
When, on the other hand, the structure of the government 
requires a l t e r a t i on , then undoubtedly must recourse be had 
to the amendment process ; and there is one feature--one of 
first impor tance in the presen t connection--as to which the 
Const i tut ion has long cr ied for amendment, and that is the 
Elec tora l system by which the President and Vice President 
are chosen. Suppose that a strong Third Party should put in 
an appea rance , with the resul t tha t no cand ida te for the 
Pres idency commanded a majori ty in the Electoral College, 
s o - c a l l e d - - a c o l l e g e which never mee t s . It would then 
become the duty of the House of Representatives, voting by 
s t a t e s , to choose from the three candidates standing highest 
in the Co l l ege . Under this arrangement Nevada would count 
one and Cal i fornia would count the same. That this bizarre 
a r rangement has not h i the r to provoked a civil war in this 
country must be set down to that Providence which looks 
after children and fools and the American people. We should 
tempt Providence no longer. 
The vas t majori ty of Americans desire to remain a free 
people and as far as possible to live under a regime of law; 
and to date no irreparable inroad has been made upon these 
values. At the same time, we live and have our being in an 
e ra of immeasurable per i l s , and we possess no conjurer ' s 
wand whereby to draw about ourselves a magic circle capable 
of excluding our enemies , no impenetrable shield capable of 
w a r d i n g off t h e s e twin c o n t r i b u t i o n s of sc ience to the 
advancement of human felicity—the A and H bombs, with the 
Cobalt bomb in the offing. Faced with this situation, the 
best that most of us can do is to cu l t iva te the Chr is t ian 
v i r t u e s and Roman f o r t i t u d e , r eca l l i ng as to the l a t t e r 
Bulwer Lytton's words: "There is but one philosophy (though 
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there are a thousand schools) and i ts name is fortitude; to 
bear our fate is to conquer it." 
18 
The President's Treaty Making Power 
At the open ing of the first , the current , session of the 
83rd Congress ( legis la t ive day of January 6, 1953), Senator 
Bricker of Ohio, for himself and s ix ty - two other Senators, 
o f f e r ed w h a t was l a b e l l e d S e n a t e Jo in t R e s o l u t i o n 1, 
proposing a new a r t i c l e to the Const i tut ion for amending 
the t r ea ty -making power and for bringing the power of the 
P r e s i d e n t in the making of E x e c u t i v e agreements under 
leg is la t ive con t ro l . Subsequently, on May 7th, the original 
proposals were replaced by others which, on June 4th, were 
approved by the Foreign Relations Committee by a vote of 8 
to 4 . Since the questions raised by the Senate's proposals 
a r e l i k e l y to p r o v i d e a subject of public discussion for 
some t i m e , t he ques t i on natural ly a r i ses : What are the 
merits of the Senate's proposals, if any? 
A r t i c l e II of t he C o n s t i t u t i o n g ives the P r e s i d e n t 
"power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to 
make t r e a t i e s , provided two- th i rds of the Senators concur." 
Ar t ic le VI, paragraph 2 of the Constitution--the "Supremacy 
Clause" - -b lends t r e a t i e s "made under the authori ty of the 
United S t a t e s " with "this Const i tut ion and the laws of the 
United S t a t e s which shall be made in pursuance thereof" as 
par t and parcel of "the Supreme Law of the land" by which 
"the judges in every S ta t e . . . shall be bound," "anything 
in the Const i tut ion or laws of any S ta t e to the cont ra ry 
no tw i th s t and ing . " A prior i there is no good reason why 
"The P re s iden t ' s Treaty Making Power." Think 19 (July 
1953): 5-7, 30 . Reprinted by permission from Think 
Magazine. Copyright 1953- International Business Machines 
Corporation. [Bibliography Entry D167] 
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these provisions should not be amended to conform them to 
present needs , and especial ly since the Convention of 1787, 
in framing them, conspicuously consulted the needs of their 
d a y . Just why the P r e s i d e n t was not brought into the 
p i c t u r e until less than a fortnight before the Convention 
adjourned sine die is unexplained; but the "two-thirds" rule 
for Sena te consent is not . It owes its ex i s t ence to the 
fear of Southern delegates that at some later date a similar 
bloc of Sena tors from Northern S t a t e s would trade off the 
r ight to naviga te the lower Mississippi for a s l ice of the 
Newfound land f i s h e r i e s . Otherwise , it is fairly evident , 
approval of t r e a t i e s by a majority vote in the two houses 
would have been adopted. 
S i m i l a r l y , the a c t i o n of the C o n v e n t i o n in g iv ing 
t r e a t i e s the s ta tus of law which the S t a t e judiciaries must 
always prefer over local law was due to a sharp controversy 
then going on with England over the systematic disregard by 
the S ta te legislatures of Article IV and VI of the Treaty of 
Peace of 1783. Both these articles were intended primarily 
for the b e n e f i t of pr iva te persons , Brit ish c red i to r s and 
former Loyal is ts r e spec t ive ly ; and the anticipated effect of 
the inclusion of treaties in "the Supreme Law" was to enable 
these in te res t s to asser t the i r r ights in the S t a t e cour t s . 
While no doubt it was foreseen tha t comparable si tuations 
would ar ise l a t e r , as they have many times, it was appar-
ently ne i ther expec ted nor intended to requi re any court 
w h a t s o e v e r to take cognizance of t r e a t i e s of the United 
S t a t e s in cases not or iginat ing in State courts, or at least 
involving S t a t e law. Otherwise , the opening clause of the 
Const i tu t ion, in saying that "aU_ l eg i s la t ive powers here in 
granted shall be vested in a Congress ," was made to talk 
palpable nonsense. 
Ye t in 1803 Chie f Jus t ice Marshal l , speaking for the 
Court in a case which did not involve a S t a t e law (The 
Peggy, 1 Cranch 103), ruled that the Court was "as much 
bound as the Executive to take notice of a treaty." Later, 
however , he abandoned this sweeping doc t r ine for another, 
one which purports to distinguish between "se l f -execut ing" 
t r ea ty provis ions, which are cognizable and enforceable "in 
courts of jus t ice ," and those which "import a contract" and 
have to be executed by Congress before they "can become a 
r u l e for t he C o u r t " ( F o s t e r y_. N e i l s e n , 2 P e t e r s 253 ; 
1827). The dis t inct ion has never been sufficiently c l a r i -
f ied to p e r m i t c o n f i d e n t p r e d i c t i o n as to i ts p r ac t i ca l 
a p p l i c a t i o n . In the absence of legis la t ion by Congress , 
that still remains the Supreme Court's last guess. 
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Despi te , however, the ra ther casual fashion in which the 
elements of the t r ea ty -making authori ty were assembled by 
the Framers , and the resul t ing obscur i t ies in i ts in te rpre -
ta t ion , no effort to amend it mater ia l ly has been hitherto 
s e r i o u s l y p r e s s e d . What is the s o u r c e of the p r e s e n t 
d iscontent? So far as the treaty-making power is concerned 
(in con t rad i s t inc t ion to the President 's power in the making 
of "Execu t ive agreements") , the fuse was apparently set off 
by the decision three years ago by a Los Angeles court that 
the Cal i fornia land law was incompatible with the United 
Nations C h a r t e r , To be sure, this theory has since been 
unanimously repudia ted by the California Supreme Court (see 
Fuj i i v_. S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a , 242 P .2d 617; 1952); but 
m e a n t i m e , a cons iderable group of "ea rnes t people" have 
drawn up an Anti-Genocide Convention, a Declaration of Human 
R i g h t s , and one or two other similar p ro jec t s , which, if 
adopted as t r e a t i e s of the United States, would undoubtedly 
pledge this country to endless in ter ference in the domestic 
a f f a i r s of o t h e r countr ies and indeed invite their in te r -
ference with ours. How does the Bricker Resolution propose 
to deal with this situation? 
S e c t i o n 1 of S e n a t e Joint Resolution 1, as it s tands 
today, says tha t any t r ea ty provision "which conflicts with 
this Const i tu t ion shall not be of any force or effect." But 
no such t r e a t y p r o v i s i o n has today any such "force or 
effect ." The decision of any such cha l lenge to a t r ea ty 
p r o v i s i o n i s , I i n f e r , s t i l l to be lef t to the S u p r e m e 
C o u r t ; and so far the Court has never found any t r ea ty 
p r o v i s i o n to be in confl ict with the Const i tu t ion . It is 
t r u e tha t in Missouri v. Holland (252 U.S. 416; 1920)--of 
which more l a t e r - - J u s t i c e Holmes indulged in some specula-
tion as to whether "author i ty of the United S t a t e s means 
more than the formal acts prescr ibed to make the conven-
tion," but the s t ra ightway added: "We do not mean that 
the re are no qualifications to the treaty-making power," and 
pointed out tha t the convention before the Court did "not 
con t ravene any d i rec t ly prohibi tory words of the Constitu-
t ion." F ina l ly , the Just ice drew a t ten t ion to a l imitat ion 
which is inheren t in the very nature of the treaty-making 
power . He said: "Here a nat ional interest of very nearly 
the first magnitude is involved. It can be p ro tec ted only 
by nat ional act ion in conce r t with that of another power." 
In shor t . Sec t ion 1 of the Bricker proposal, which specifies 
no new l imi ta t ions to the t r ea ty power, would leave things 
just as they stand today--it would be surplusage. 
Sect ion 2 of the proposal provides that no treaty shall 
" b e c o m e e f f e c t i v e as in ternal law in the United S ta t e s " 
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e x c e p t " t h r o u g h legis la t ion which would be valid in the 
absence of the t r ea ty" (my i t a l i c s ) . The principal justifi-
c a t i o n o f f e r ed for th i s p r o p o s a l , which seems to have 
or iginated in the American Bar Associa t ion , is that it is 
required to p ro tec t S t a t e s Rights , and in this connect ion 
the decision in Missouri v_. Holland (ci ted above,) in which 
the r ight of the United S t a t e s to make common cause with 
Canada in the pro tec t ion of game birds seasonal ly passing 
from one country to the other was sustained, is assai led 
with g rea t vehemence . {S^e Alfred J. Schweppe, "Treaties 
and Agreements ," April 20, 1953, pp. 5, 9-13). The answer 
is t w o - f o l d : F i r s t , it was prec ise ly the purpose of the 
Supremacy Clause to subordinate State power to the treaty-
making power; secondly, Missouri v^  Holland asserts no novel 
d o c t r i n e . In the c o u r s e of the n i n e t e e n t h century the 
nat ional government en te red into many treaties extending to 
t he n a t i o n a l s of o the r governments the r ight to inher i t , 
hold and dispose of real proper ty in the S t a t e s , although 
t he tenure of such proper ty and its modes of disposi t ion 
were conceded to be otherwise within the exclusive jurisdic-
t i o n of the S t a t e s . (See M c C o r m i c k y_. S u l l i v a n t , 10 
Wheat. 192, 202; 1827; United S t a t e s y^ . Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 
3 2 0 ; 1896) . Mis sou r i y_. H o l l a n d s imply fo l lows t h e s e 
precedents. 
In other words, it is proposed to strip the treaty-making 
power of the right to enter into conventions of a kind which 
have here tofore furnished the ordinary grist of the t reaty-
making process in times of peace--convent ions extending to 
the n a t i o n a l s of o t h e r count r ies the r ight to engage in 
ce r t a in businesses in the S t a t e s , to hold property there, to 
enjoy access to the courts thereof on terms of equality with 
A m e r i c a n c i t i z e n s , and so on, a l l in r e t u r n for l i ke 
concessions to our na t ionals residing abroad . Nor is this 
the whole story by any means. Actually, the proposal bites 
even more deeply, for it aims to repeal the necessary and 
p r o p e r clause as an adjunct of the t r ea ty -mak ing power . 
Thus that whole area of power which today rests in the cases 
on the mutual support that the treaty-making power and the 
power of Congress under the necessary and proper clause lend 
one another would be expunged from the map of nat ional 
power; and the r ight of Congress to accord judicial powers 
to foreign consuls in the United States (4 Stats . 359 and 10 
S t a t . 614) would become at least doubtful; so also would its 
r ight to confer judicial powers upon American consuls abroad 
(in re Ross, 140 U.S . 453; 1891); its r ight to provide for 
the ex t rad i t ion of fugitives from jus t ice (18 USCA, pa r s . 
3181-3195); i ts r ight to penal ize acts of violence within a 
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Sta t e against al iens (Baldwin y_. Franks , 120 U.S. 578, 683; 
1887); and so on and so forth (see Neely v_. Henkel , 180 
U.S. 109, 121; 1901). B^ the same token, the treaty-making 
power would be demoted from the rank of a_ substantive power 
of the United S t a t e s to that of a^  mere auxiliary power to 
the other delegated powers. 
No such act of mayhem on the Constitution is required to 
m e e t exis t ing pe r i l s . The Ant i -Genocide Convent ion, the 
p r o p o s e d C o n v e n t i o n on Human Rights and the like are 
undoubtedly i l l - cons idered proposals , but the Sena te i tself 
has the power, has it but the in tes t ina l fort i tude to use 
i t , to adminis ter the conge to all such Utopian p ro j ec t s . 
Can it be that some Senators prefer to be able to invoke the 
Const i tu t ion as a reason for doing the sensible thing rather 
face up to cer tain pressure groups? The Bricker proposal is 
real ly a vote of lack of confidence in the political courage 
and integrity of the body from which it emanates. 
Fur the rmore , behind the Sena te s tands a second line of 
defense agains t bad and foolish t rea t ies . I mean Congress, 
which, in the words of the Court, can at any time, "so far 
as the p e o p l e and a u t h o r i t i e s of the United S ta t e s are 
concerned . . . abroga te a t r ea ty between this country and 
a n o t h e r c o u n t r y . . . n e g o t i a t e d by the P r e s i d e n t and 
a p p r o v e d by the Sena te" (175 U.S. 423 , 460; 1899). No 
p r o p o s i t i o n in A m e r i c a n C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law is b e t t e r 
e s tab l i shed . (See also: Head Money Cases , 112 U.S. 580, 
598-599; (1884); the Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616 (1871); 
Bot i l ler v_. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238 (1889); Fong Yue Ting 
V. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 149 U . S . 698 , 721 (1893) . ) Can one 
reasonably ask for more? 
We come now to Section 3 of S.J.R. 1, which would give 
Congress " the power to regula te all Executive Agreements" 
with any foreign power, principality or any other thing, and 
s u b j e c t such a g r e e m e n t s " to the l imi ta t ions imposed on 
treaties by this article." 
T h a t t he P r e s i d e n t ' s power to e n t e r in to Execut ive 
agreements by vir tue of his powers as Chief Executive, as 
Commander- in-Chief and as the nat ional voice on foreign 
re la t ions has undergone considerable enlargement since 1899 
is unques t ionable . McKinley s ta r t ed the ball rolling with 
the armistice which he forced upon Spain for the termination 
of hos t i l i t i e s with tha t country in 1899; with the agreement 
under which we joined several European governments in 1900 
in p u t t i n g down the Boxer Rebell ion in China; with the 
agreement with the Imperial Chinese Government by which that 
episode was brought to an end. Then came Theodore Roosevelt 
whose most notable contribution to the same development was 
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a s e c r e t agreement with Japan sanct ioning that count ry ' s 
annexation of Korea--a document which the late Tyler Dennett 
exhumed in 1925 . M e a n t i m e , in 1917, the Lansing-Ishi i 
agreement recogniz ing Japan's superior interest in China was 
en te red into by Wilson, to continue in effect until it was 
dissolved as one consequence of the Harding-Hughes Washing-
ton Conference of 1921. 
But it was the second Roosevel t who, without question, 
imposed the seve res t s t ra in upon the tenuous line tha t is 
supposed to s epa ra t e Execut ive agreements from treaties of 
the United S t a t e s . The Hull-Litvinow agreement of 1933 by 
which this government recognized the USSR; the Hull-Lothian 
agreement of 1940 by which the President , taking over for 
the nonce the power of Congress to dispose of property of 
the United S t a t e s , handed over to Great Britain fifty newly 
condi t ioned and recommissioned des t roye r s ; and the Yal ta 
Agreement of 1945 whereby Russia was "induced" to enter the 
Eastern war--something she would have done anyway and indeed 
could not possibly have been prevented from doing—were all 
of them F.D.R.'s achievements. 
That this tremendous burgeoning of the Executive agree-
ment power should have prompted the question whether it 
ought not to be curbed is ce r t a in ly l i t t l e surpris ing. Nor 
is the doubt caused by it lessened when one turns to the 
holdings of the Supreme Court in United States v. Belmont 
(301 U.S. 324; 1937) and United S t a t e s v. Pink (315 U.S . 
203; 1942). In these cases the Court held that the Hull-
Litvinow agreement rendered effective a decree of confisca-
tion by the USSR as to the assets located in New York of a 
Russian insurance company, and this in face of the Court's 
admis s ion t h a t a l i e n r e s i d e n t s of the United S t a t e s are 
e q u a l l y e n t i t l e d w i th c i t i z e n s to the p ro tec t ion of the 
Fifth Amendment! 
That there is, the re fo re , a case for Sec t ion 3 of the 
Bricker proposal seems i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e . Yet even here, I 
suggest , tha t a d is t inct ion should be taken between, on the 
one hand, the impact of the proposal upon the President 's 
power to enter into such agreements and, on the other hand, 
his power to impart to them the quality of law noticeable by 
the courts. The Hull-Litvinow agreement comprised simply an 
ac t of recogni t ion of a new government , something which 
P r e s i d e n t s have p e r f o r m e d innumerable t imes . Congress 
i tself soon ra t i f ied in effect , and indeed vast ly extended, 
" the pr inciple of give-away" of the Hull-Lothian pact, when 
by a nearly unanimous vote it passed the Lend-Lease Act of 
March 11, 1941. And that Yal ta was within the powers 
ordinari ly a t t r ibu ted in war t ime to the Commander-in-Chief 
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in undeniab le . The real ly except ionable item in the above 
catalogue is the action of the Court in the Belmont and Pink 
c a s e s . He re , I submit, the pr inciple of "judicial abs ten-
tion" in the p resence of "political questions" was pushed to 
an unallowable ex t reme (s^e e ^ . the Opinion in Tucker y_. 
Alexandroff , 183 U.S. , 424, 449; 1902, of four dissenting 
justices). 
Even so, is a cons t i tu t ional amendment needed to supply 
the remedy? I venture to doubt it. Speaking on this very 
point r e c e n t l y . S e c r e t a r y Dulles said: "The danger to the 
n a t i o n from a g r e e m e n t s not submitted to the Sena te as 
t r e a t i e s or to C o n g r e s s for v a l i d a t i o n cannot be g rea t 
b e c a u s e , w i t h o u t e i t h e r S e n a t e or Congressional act ion, 
these agreements cannot become law of the land." This, 
while it t r a v e r s e s the theory of the Court in the Belmont 
and Pink cases , seems to me sound doc t r ine , and Congres-
s i o n a l a c t i o n in r e l i ance on it would, I be l ieve , survive 
j u d i c i a l s c r u t i n y . And c e r t a i n l y if, as is c o n c e d e d . 
Congress may repea l t r e a t i e s as internal law, it can repeal 
Execut ive agreements to the same extent. To hold otherwise 
would be paradoxical in the extreme in view of the opening 
clause of the Constitution. 
To sum up. Sec t ion 1 of the Bricker proposal would be 
just so much excess baggage, a fifth wheel to the Constitu-
t ional coach . Sect ion 2 would gravely disable the treaty-
making power as we have known it and have lived under it for 
164 y e a r s . Sec t ion 3 is addressed to a real problem, but 
i t s s o l u t i o n t h e r e o f is unnecessar i ly heavy-handed . The 
same objec t ive could probably be accomplished by ordinary 
legislation. 
As to s u b j e c t i n g the P r e s i d e n t ' s agreement power to 
l e g i s l a t i v e r egu la t ion in the p resen t s t a t e of the world, 
the idea is merely preposterous. Any statute would have to 
be couched in such fluid terms as to be utterly ineffective, 
mere brutem fulmen. 
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Case Against Bricker Amendment 
S e n . B r i c k e r ' s p r o p o s e d amendmen t to the Cons t i tu t ion 
(Senate Joint Resolution #1) provides in its opening section 
t h a t any " p r o v i s i o n of a t r e a t y or o t h e r i n t e rna t i ona l 
agreement which confl icts with this Constitution or which is 
not made in pursuance thereof shall not be the supreme law 
of the land nor be of any force or effect ." The reason 
suggested for this proposal is that under the Const i tut ion 
today, although acts of Congress to be supreme law of the 
land must be made "in p u r s u a n c e of the Cons t i tu t ion ," 
t r ea t i e s are supreme law if made "under the authority of the 
United States." 
Th i s d i f f e r e n c e in p h r a s e o l o g y is the r e s u l t of the 
s i m p l e f ac t t h a t a t the t ime of the a d o p t i o n of the 
Const i tut ion the United S t a t e s was already party to several 
t r e a t i e s which, being older than it, could not be described 
as h a v i n g been made "in p u r s u a n c e " of i t , y e t which 
everybody wished to see continue in e f f ec t - -one of them 
indeed being the Trea ty of 1783 whereby Great Britain had 
recognized our independence as a nation. 
It was never intended by the framers that treaties should 
not be conformable to the Const i tu t ion, even these earlier 
o n e s . Thus in Sec t ion 25 of the g rea t Judiciary Act of 
1789, w h i c h in the main is s t i l l on the s t a t u t e book, 
p r o v i s i o n is made for the j u d i c i a l de te rmina t ion of all 
cases "where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty 
ih 
"Case Against Bricker Amendment." New York Herald Tribune, 
May 23, 1955, p. 14-. Reprinted by permission. [Bibliog-
raphy Entry D175] 
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or s ta tu te of or an authori ty exerc i sed under the United 
States." 
In br ie f , it was r e c o g n i z e d from the outset that the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a l i d i t y of t r e a t i e s would be a j u d i c i a l 
question no less than that of statutes. 
Indeed, the doct r ine that treaties may not transgress the 
Const i tut ion has been indorsed by the court many times (see 
Geofroy vs . Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267; 1890, and cases there 
c i t ed ) . To be sure, the g rea t majority of these have been 
based on the content ion that the t r ea ty involved v io la ted 
the Tenth Amendment, which provides that "the powers not 
d e l e g a t e d to the United S t a t e s by the Const i tu t ion , nor 
prohibi ted by it to the s t a t e s , are rese rved to the states, 
r e spec t ive ly , or to the people ." The treaty-making power, 
however , is de lega ted to the United S t a t e s by the Consti-
t u t i o n ; no power is d e l e g a t e d in more e x p l i c i t t e r m s . 
Hence, such cases have not prospered. 
And t h i s b r i n g s us to t he s e c o n d s e c t i o n of S .J . 
Res . # 1 : "A t rea ty or other in te rna t iona l agreement shall 
become effec t ive as in ternal law in the United States only 
t h rough l e g i s l a t i o n valid in the absence of in te rna t iona l 
agreement." This section draws attention to one of the most 
usual and most useful type of t rea ty , treaties which extend 
to the nat ionals of the other country who are residents of 
the United S t a t e s the r ight to engage in business, to hold 
p r o p e r t y , to enjoy a c c e s s to the cour ts , and so on, in 
re turn for like concessions to our nationals residing in the 
other country. 
Such provisions a re today deemed "se l f -execut ing," i.e., 
judicial ly enforceable from the outse t , but under Section 2 
of S.J. Res . #1 they would remain so no longer. Curiously 
enough, the Senate last July 21 approved no fewer than eight 
such t r e a t i e s by a v o t e of e igh ty-s ix Sena to r s to five, 
a l t h o u g h fif ty-five of the e igh ty-s ix had at one time or 
other signed up with Mr. Bricker. 
No doubt Congress could st i l l implement ce r t a in t r ea ty 
provisions under S.J. Res , #1 simply by virtue of its power 
to r e g u l a t e c o m m e r c e and to p r o v i d e for t he n a t i o n a l 
d e f e n s e , but not o rd inar i ly those of the type mentioned 
above. Nor would its power "to pass all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the power 
of the Un i t ed S t a t e s " ( A r t . 1, S e c . 8, P a r . 18 of t he 
Const i tut ion) any longer afford it, if S. J. Res . #1 became 
a par t of the Const i tu t ion , the r ight to pass laws for the 
mere purpose of implementing a treaty or other international 
agreement. 
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As an aid to the treaty-making power the "necessary and 
proper" clause would be repea led . Indeed, Congress would 
henceforth be unable to provide for the carrying out of one 
of the most ordinary kind of t r e a t i e s , ext radi t ion treaties, 
to wit. By the same token, the act of Congress under which 
our government has prac t iced ex t rad i t ion ever since 1848 
would be s t r icken from the s ta tu te book. (See Neely v 
Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121; 1901). 
At t h i s p o i n t , h o w e v e r , M r . B r i c k e r ' s f o l l o w e r s , 
dist inguishing between the " in te rna t iona l" and the "consti-
t u t i o n a l " o b l i g a t i o n of t r e a t i e s , a r e ap t to urge t h a t 
S.J. Res . #1 would in no wise limit our power to enter into 
t r e a t i e s hav ing " i n t e r n a t i o n a l " obl igat ion. In short , we 
are informed that , having added S.J. Res. #1 to the Consti-
tution, we can then go gaily ahead and contract obligations 
which we h a v e ne i t he r the power, nor the intent ion, of 
d i s c h a r g i n g u n l e s s , of c o u r s e , the f o r t y - e i g h t S t a t e 
L e g i s l a t u r e s , the majority of which meet only every two 
y e a r s , can be rel ied upon to supply the necessary imple-
menting legislation. 
More than a hundred y e a r s ago the c o u r t f i t t i n g l y 
commented on a similar suggestion as follows: 
"It would be a strange anomaly, and forced construc-
tion, to suppose, that the national government meant to 
rely for the due fulfillment of its own proper duties, 
and the r i g h t s it i n t e n d e d to s e c u r e , upon s t a t e 
l e g i s l a t i o n , and not upon t h a t of the Union." (16 
Peters 539, 623; 1842). 
But wha t of the o p e r a t i o n of S.J . R e s . 1 on "other 
in te rna t iona l agreements"? "Executive agreements" are here 
re fe r red to and the re fe rence is well ca lcula ted to bring 
"Yal ta" into the discussion. That anything could have been 
more absurd than to offer inducements to Russia to bring her 
in to the war in the Far East is unimaginable; efforts to 
keep her out of it would have been at least understandable, 
albeit doomed to failure from the start. 
At the same time, as against Yalta and Potsdam should be 
se t some achievements of the executive agreement. Thus, as 
G e n . C lay has t e s t i f i e d , the Be r l i n a i r l i f t was brought 
abou t by e x e c u t i v e a g r e e m e n t s with our West European 
f r i e n d s . And more than a half c e n t u r y ago P r e s i d e n t 
McKinley, by en ter ing into executive agreements with Great 
Br i ta in , France, Germany, and Italy, under which we supplied 
5,000 troops and a naval squadron to a joint force of these 
powers , helped to prevent our legation staff in Peiping from 
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being slaughtered by the Boxers and having their heads stuck 
up on pikes to decorate those ancient walls. 
The e x e c u t i v e agreement is , in fact, an indispensable 
i n s t r u m e n t of the P re s iden t ' s in i t i a t ive in the diplomatic 
field. Nor do such agreements often purport to operate as 
"internal law." When they do, they are of course subject to 
judicial review (see U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203; 1942), and 
likewise to disallowance by Congress, just as treaties a re . 
Which brings us again to treaties. Two points need to be 
s t r e s s e d . The f i r s t is t h a t , a l though the line between 
t r ea ty provisions which are "self-executing" and those which 
r e q u i r e implementing legis la t ion by Congress in order to 
b e c o m e c o g n i z a b l e by the c o u r t s is not a l w a y s easi ly 
de te rminable , yet the legal tes t is plain enough in theory. 
It is the a s c e r t a i n a b l e i n t e n t i o n of t he t r e a t y - m a k i n g 
authority itself. 
If, t h e r e f o r e , the S e n a t e d e c i d e s t h a t a t r e a t y , or 
c e r t a i n p r o v i s i o n s t h e r e o f , ought to be s a n c t i o n e d by 
C o n g r e s s b e f o r e t hey b e c o m e j u d i c i a l l y c o g n i z a b l e as 
i n t e r n a l l aw, i t has only to adopt a r e se rva t ion to its 
approval of the said t r e a t y , or t r ea ty provis ions , and the 
rese rva t ion becomes a par t of the t r ea ty involved upon its 
r a t i f i c a t i o n by the Pres iden t and its a c c e p t a n c e by the 
o t h e r con t r ac t ing government . (See Cranda l l , " T r e a t i e s , " 
2nd Ed., Sees. 87-88). 
The second point is the power of Congress, just alluded 
to, to abroga te t r e a t i e s in their quality as domestic law. 
No p r o p o s i t i o n in A m e r i c a n C o n s t i t u t i o n Law is be t t e r 
es tab l i shed . (See "Head Money Cases," 112 U.S. 580, 598-
599; 1884; "The Cherokee Tobacco," 11 Wall. 616; 1870; "Fong 
Yue Ting v. United S t a t e s , " 149 U.S . 698, 721; 1893). In 
other words, behind the Senate is a second line of defense 
a g a i n s t bad or foolish t r e a t i e s - - t h e l eg i s la t ive power of 
Congress. What more can we reasonably ask for? 
There is , in short , not the leas t necessity in the world 
for us to return to the Ar t i c l e s of Confederation, which is 
just what S.J. Res. #1 proposes. 
As to Sect ion 3 of S.J. Res . # 1 , it of course is mere 
nonsense , the reform proposed being obviously within the 
power of the Senate to determine its own rules of procedure 
(Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 5, par. 2). 
Part Six 
Some Views of Corwin 
Edward Corwin's diversity of expertise and insightful 
scholarship made him an attractive subject for press 
coverage. Reporters frequently sought his opinions, and he 
routinely granted interviews. The three articles reprinted 
here show three different ways that Corwin's thoughts 
appeared in the press: interviews, coverage of his public 
speaking, and reviews and analyses of his writings. They 
also show three different roles Corwin held in three 
different eras: author of scholarly studies in the 1910s, 
commentator on diverse legal issues in the 1920s, and public 
advocate of conservative issues in the 1950s, Corwin was a 
blend of scholar, commentator, and advocate throughout his 
life. Yet trends in the evolution of his interests, 
ambitions, and style are clear not only in his own writings, 
but also in writings about the professor. The following 
selections thus reveal as much about Corwin's life and 
career as they tell about his stand on matters of substance, 
from the death penalty to religious instruction. 
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Edward S. Corwin: Critic of American 
Constitutional Theory 
In the r e c e n t l i t e r a t u r e of const i tu t ional and public law 
the name of Edward S. Corwin has become familiar as that of 
one of the most conspicuously keen of contemporary students 
of the Cons t i tu t ion . Dr. Corwin, who since 1912 has been 
Professor of Po l i t i cs in Pr ince ton University, is the author 
of a r e c e n t work on the t r e a t y power which has been 
favorably r e c e i v e d , ! as well as of numerous a r t i c l e s and 
book n o t i c e s in l e a r n e d p e r i o d i c a l s . He is abou t to 
publish, through Henry Holt & Company, "The Doctr ine of 
Judicial Review," and through the Princeton University Press 
a more extensive work on "The Development of Constitutional 
L i m i t a t i o n s in the Uni t ed S t a t e s . " Q u a l i t i e s a l r e a d y 
revea led in previous work justify the expectation that these 
books will carry force and weight, and will add in no small 
degree to the reputation of the writer as an able critic and 
historian of constitutional principles. 
The doc t r ine of judicial review, that is, of the power of 
t he courts to dec la re s t a tu tes invalid as confl ict ing with 
t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , has f i l l ed a l a r g e p l a c e in r e c e n t 
d i s c u s s i o n . It would be unwise for any student of this 
s u b j e c t to n e g l e c t P r o f e s s o r C o r w i n ' s f e r t i l e contr ibu-
t ions . He has sifted the evidence with an industry and a 
fairness seldom equaled, and his conclusions derive added 
f o r c e from a v o i d a n c e of t he s w e e p i n g , o v e r - c o n f i d e n t 
proposi t ions to which many invest igators of this topic have 
been addicted. In this connection his able summing up, in a 
"Edward S. Corwin: C r i t i c of American Cons t i t u t i ona l 
Theory." Green Bag 26 (October 19U): 4-35-439. [Bibliog-
raphy Entry G4.] 
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r ecen t a r t i c l e , tends to dispel clouds of ^^^'^^^l^^l^^^^^^^ 
to a p p r o x i m a t e to an ul t imate solution of the h i s to r ica l 
problem:2 
What is the e x a c t legal basis of the power of the 
Sup reme Cour t to pass upon the cons t i tu t iona l i ty of 
a c t s of Congress? Recen t l i t e r a tu r e on the subject 
revea ls a cons iderable var ie ty of opinion. There are 
rad ica ls who hold that the power owes its existence to 
an act of sheer usurpation by the Supreme Court itselt, 
in the d e c i s i o n of Marbury v. Madison. There are 
conserva t ives who point to c lauses of the Constitution 
which, they assure us, specif ical ly confer the power. 
There are legists who refuse to go back of Marbury v. 
M a d i s o n , c o n t e n t in the r a t i f i c a t i o n w h i c h , t hey 
asser t , subsequent events have given the doc t r ine of 
that decis ion. There are h is tor ians who show that a 
considerable portion of the membership of the body that 
f ramed the C o n s t i t u t i o n a r e on r e c o r d as h a v i n g 
p e r s o n a l l y f a v o r e d j u d i c i a l r e v i e w a t one time or 
a n o t h e r , e i t h e r b e f o r e , d u r i n g , or a f t e r t h e 
C o n v e n t i o n . F ina l ly , the re are legal h is tor ians who 
rep resen t judicial review as the natura l outgrowth of 
ideas that were common property in the period when the 
Constitution was established. 
In the following a r t i c l e I accep t this last view as 
in a general way the correct one. 
It wi l l be n o t e d t h a t Professor Corwin cons iders the 
mode rn d o c t r i n e of judicial review ne i ther to have been 
actual ly incorpora ted in the Constitution, nor to have been 
a subsequent c r ea t i on . It was r a the r , in his opinion, the 
outgrowth of ideas current at the time of the framing of the 
Const i tu t ion, and regarded by the framers as so included in 
i t as to furnish a legal bas i s . He thinks the ava i lab le 
record shows the members of the Constitutional Convention to 
h a v e s tood about two to one in favor of the r ight ot 
j u d i c i a l r e v i e w . 3 Y e t t he m i n o r i t y had too formidable 
popular backing for any expression one way or the other to 
find i t s way into the Cons t i tu t ion . Instead the question 
was left open, was noncommittally dea l t wi th . There was 
enough to satisfy the advoca tes of judicial review in the 
language t rea t ing the Constitution as law enforceable by the 
cour ts , and in the in tent of the framers of that provision 
to make it de f ine a s e p a r a t i o n between leg is la t ive and 
interpretative functions. 
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Here , then, was the legal basis for the doctr ine first 
c lea r ly established in 1803 in Marbury v. Madison. Recogni-
tion of the separa t ion of powers tended to give courts the 
s e n s e of an independen t judge-made law, and they were 
fortif ied by the common-law tradition according to which the 
judges alone really know the law, while under the prevailing 
p o p u l a r t h e o r y a t t h e t i m e of t h e a d o p t i o n of the 
Const i tu t ion, the people conceived of itself as the supreme 
l e g i s l a t u r e , with sole power to i n t e rp re t the fundamental 
law. The s t a t e leg is la tures had got in bad odor, and the 
demand was for means to check legis la t ive power. The 
execu t ive veto was c r ea t ed , prohibi t ions were inserted into 
cons t i tu t iona l amendments, and a construction was put on the 
d o c t r i n e of s e p a r a t i o n of p o w e r s which e n l a r g e d the 
a u t h o r i t y of the c o u r t s in in te rpre t ing the laws. When 
Marshall decided Marbury v. Madison in such a way as to 
affirm the supremacy of judicial law, he did not commit an 
ac t of "usurpat ion"; on the con t r a ry , " the re was never a 
decision handed down by any court more in harmony with the 
popular view."4 
S t r i k i n g as the foregoing h is tor ica l analys is is, it is 
not more striking than Dr. Corwin's views on "due process of 
law," which are quite necessary to an understanding of his 
a t t i tude with respec t to judicial r ev iew. On "due process 
of law" he expresses himself with an almost i conoc las t ic 
independence . He disputes Professor Goodnow's treatment of 
the Fifth Amendment as limiting the power of Congress in the 
same way that the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of 
the s t a t e l eg i s l a tu res . It would be a deplorable s tep , he 
b e l i e v e s , to a c c e p t as a r e s t r i c t i o n on C o n g r e s s the 
doctrine of due process of law: 
Fo r the t r u th of the m a t t e r is tha t the modern 
concept of due process of law is not a legal concept at 
a l l ; it comprises nothing more nor less than a roving 
commission to judges to sink whatever legislative craft 
may appear to them to be, from the standpoint of vested 
interests, of a piratical tendency.5 
The reason for the foregoing s ta tement will be imper-
f e c t l y understood till one perce ives that the doct r ine of 
due process of law is, for Dr. Corwin, another name for the 
doc t r ine of vested r igh t s . The latter, he explains, was the 
first g rea t achievement of the courts after the es tab l i sh-
ment of j u d i c i a l r e v i e w . 6 Judicial review, with cer ta in 
r e s e r v a t i o n s , would have been " i n e f f e c t i v e and l ifeless 
enough" without the doct r ine of vested r igh t s . Owing its 
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i n c e p t i o n to the same m e d i a t i n g s p i r i t of conse rva t ive 
republicanism which moved the framers of the Constitution to 
reconci le popular rule and pr iva te security, the doctrine of 
v e s t e d r ights , at first the obsession of a superior c lass , 
became the prepossession of a nation whose democracy was 
t empered by the individualism of the se l f - r e l i an t wes te rn 
world. So its maintenance was assured. 
The d o c t r i n e of v e s t e d r i g h t s , masquerading as "due 
p r o c e s s of l aw ," thus g r e a t l y b r o a d e n e d the s c o p e of 
judicial review, and Professor Corwin implies that the Fifth 
Amendment thus acquired an inhibitive force with regard to 
l e g i s l a t i o n wh ich it was never designed to have by the 
framers of the Cons t i tu t ion . He would apparently maintain 
t h a t the prohibi t ions of the Fifth Amendment are mainly 
a d d r e s s e d to the e x e c u t i v e and j u d i c i a l b ranches , tha t 
Congress is sufficiently r es t ra ined by a grant of specified 
powers as judicial ly i n t e rp re t ed , and that the fundamental 
r i g h t s of l i f e , l i b e r t y and the pursuit of happiness are 
" rese rved ," and there fore ex te rna l to the Const i tut ion and 
independent of any of its provis ions . This view tha t the 
Fifth Amendment, which seems designed to secure substantial 
r ights of l ife, l ibe r ty , and property under the formula "due 
process of law," does not limit the power of Congress, may 
seem somewhat difficult to reconc i le with the cur ren t of 
a u t h o r i t y . It should not be s u p p o s e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t 
Professor Corwin 's conclusions have been reached without a 
thorough examination of contrary doctrines enunciated by the 
Supreme Court at different times: 
There was undoubtedly a time when the Supreme Court, 
under the dominance of la isser faire principles, would 
fain have extended the doc t r ine of natura l r ights , as 
embodied in the doctrine of due process of law, to the 
Fifth Amendment. But the decision in United States v. 
Adair , par t icu la r ly when read in conjunction with the 
decis ion in United S t a t e s v. Delaware & Hudson Canal 
C o . , I t a k e to amount to not ice that the Court is 
u n w i l l i n g to ac t as a third house of Congress . At 
l e a s t it is to be hoped that this is the c a s e . The 
doc t r ine of due process of law, as a res t r ic t ion upon 
f o r t y - e i g h t s t a t e l eg i s l a tu re s armed with powers to 
m o l e s t p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t s s p r e a d t h r o u g h o u t the 
country , has much to be said in its favor, but even in 
this connect ion it has produced some egregious results 
and the present indications are that the Supreme Court 
would like to get rid of it. (Cj[. Welch v. Swazey, 214 
U.S.; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104.) But 
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th^ c ^""'^^°[^ s t ep . Not only would it indeed make 
he Supreme Court the "tyrant of ti,e Constitution " b u t 
n the in te rva l between the enactment of a C o ' res 
^ . o n a l s t a t u t e and a final decision by the Supreme 
l anks of n a t i o n a l leg is la t ion . (Cf. the decision of 
c a s e ? " B e s d " ' ' T ' " " ' "^""^ ' " " ' ' ^ famous Hoxie 
the i r use of 1 ^ ' ' / " ^ respons ib i l i ty of the c o u r i n ^ 
g e n e r " r c o n H ? M " ? ' ° ' ' '"" "''"'''' °f ' ^ - f"-" the g e n e r a ] c o n d i t i o n of c o r p o r a t e l a w l e s s n e s s in fh,-. 
country is certainly most serious.7 ' ^ ^ ' ^ « ^ " e s s in this 
not '^ea'sHv'^bt ' « M ' r ' ' ' ' ° " ' " ^ maintained, Dr. Corwin may 
of over zea lo . , , H ' ' ° " ' " ' " " " ' ' " ^ 8 ^ ' ' " «°'n« ^"arters! 
seeks o S a b l L h H ? " ' ° ' '\' co r r ec t i ve propositions he 
f«r in 1 ^^tablish. He may perhaps be accused of going too 
far in the attempt to discredit due process of law as "not « 
lega concept at all." as it might be more prudent to speak 
^^ nLiit7t\i[;::r'V'''''' '^^^' conceptions.^ " HI 
/ ixi^ewise De c h a r g e d with over ra t ing the sunnn^pHi^ 
i Z l ' V Z t V " ' ' ' ' ' ' ' " ^ ° " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 'y the C o n s X t 
T e i a r d ^o ^ ^ ' " " ^ ' ° ' " P P ° ' ^ <=an be exerted withou 
Changing c o n c e p t ^ o ^ ^ t h ' = : " i ^ ^ ; e r ? e " : t . r ^ i ^ t ^ w L h 
Professor Corwin r ight ly objects may in time be cured and 
It is even doubtful whether the concept ion of any of the 
d e T l S ^ i t h ' r ^ T ' " ' •=^" ' ' j u r i d i c a l l y sound 'w" h u 
wUh which th lv conjunction with the individual rights 
The Zurl "" " ^ . reciprocally bound up. The doctrine of 
t he p o l i c e power i t s e l f may thus owe something to the 
d o c t r i n e of individual r igh t s . This , however, is no° the 
at tUude° ' H " " " ' ' ' ' • ' " ' ' ^ ' " °' ""'• Cor- ln ' s v i e ; s . And t L 
mn. m . ^ ' ^ ^ Y ' ^ ' ° '^^ ^ ' S * " °f j u d i c i a l r e v i e w is so 
mollified in the following passage that its author wii not 
be pronounced hopelessly dogmatic or partisan: 
To-day the ac t iv i ty of the legislatures in the field 
of social reform imparts to the law more and more the 
^h^l^T" - l " , ^ ' ' ^ ' " " ° " "f authority, with the result 
tha t the possibi l i ty of a purely mechanical interpreta-
ion of It comes to be denied. At the same time, with 
he r i s e of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b o d i e s , the c o u r t s a r e 
l o s i n g t h e r o l e w h i c h o n c e was t h e i r s a l m o s t 
e x c l u s i v e l y , of mediat ing between the s t a t e and the 
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, , ,^h th, . r esu l t tha t men to-day find It 
i n d i v i d u a l , J ' \ h ^ ; ^ ' ' % j ^ r h e m for t h e i r r i g h t s l e s s 
r e q u i s i t e to l o o k to tn accounts 
frequently than in the past O" 5°^%^'^",^^ ^ends to 
the theore t i ca l argument for judicial review 
ose touch with the nourishing earth of solid facts and 
lose toucn w persuasiveness to weaken. But 
congenial ideas , an^ its p ^^.^ ^^^^ ^^^^ 
on the other hand it is by no m ^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^^ 
will a lways be ' ' ' e case- ' " 3,, of judicial 
^ ^ v i e r ' e n ^ m o ^ s ' l k h L ^ r t e n d e r e d it correspondingly 
^ fLTi^ .e . G r a n t i n g the J u d g e s due w.sjom ^e re^^^ 
" - ^ ^ L t " ° b e ^ ° t h r o w n " r b o u r a . r s t \ T sensible measure of 
s : c ^ a T ^ e " o r r T o g i v e it - g a l s tabi l i ty Who can 
r ^ u c r k e r r : f \ ' : - r y : ; ; ; = r s . n d - p a t t e r s 
of to-morrow?8 
professor Corwin's work on the treaty P o - - ^ [ ^ ^ - ^ ^ ^ " [ r a t 
by c a p a b l e c r i t i c s to contain an lll^^^^^^'^Ze, to be 
federa l i s t i c position which is now ^---^ J ^ ^ ^ ^ „ , , , , , e 
the sound one . " f . " ° \ '""^^ook in an ef fec t ive re joinder posit ion mainta ined in tha t DOOK 
"" r'oV r. ti.::° or,::J. r,'"".*.p. to,. .,o„ 
past and of the present. presented a general estimate of 
the inadequate ; - f - ; « ^ f ; , ; / ^ : ; ^ " ; ; e a t clearness of concep-
' ' ' T.' skUl and vTgorof presentation, and in the main by t ion. by skill and vigor o ' ' j^ j ^ nan,ed attain-
an essent ia l soundness of '"^S™^'^- , , ' " \ / _ . „{ all o ther 
ui^u ie 1-hP qfrensth of pol i t ica l as ui aii 
a t l e a s t i m p a r t s an a i r ot s a n i t y anu H F 
Dr. Corwin's treatment of pregnant the-ne^ chiefly 
Coming now to b i o g r a p h i c a l ' ^ f ^ ' / ' . ' . ^ ^ 3 . ^ ^ ' , , ^ e n by 
in inrpssed bv the a d d i t i o n a l proof of industry given oy 
? r ! ^ C : r ^ : ? n ' r a c q u i s i t i o n of his p resen t - n ^ in -^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^ 
sion at so comparat ively early an age H^ - - ^^^^^^ ^^  
farm near Plymouth, Michigan, ^^ ^ ^ ^ J ; . ^ f ,^ ,7^^^^ of his 
the Universi ty of Michigan in 1900, being presiu 
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c lass , and in 1905 took the degree of Ph.D. at the Univer-
si ty of Pennsy lvan ia , where he pursued studies in history 
and p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e . He was P r e c e p t o r in H i s t o r y , 
Po l i t i c s , and Economics at Princeton 1905-11, having charge 
of Woodrow Wilson's courses from February , 1911, to June, 
1912. In 1912 he became Professor of Politics at Princeton, 
wi th work in c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law and 
political theory. He was married in 1909. 
Dr. Corwin der ived his tas te for studies in the field of 
l e g a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l h i s t o r y from P r o f e s s o r A. C . 
McLaughlin, now head of the Department of History at the 
U n i v e r s i t y of C h i c a g o , but in his u n d e r g r a d u a t e d a y s 
Professor of American History at the University of Michigan, 
whom he found always a most inspiring teacher. 
Among the a r t i c l e s P r o f e s s o r Corwin has wr i t t en , in 
addit ion to those a l ready re fer red to, a re : "The Doctrine 
of Due Process of Law before the Civil War," 24 Harvard Law 
Review 366, 460, Mar . -Apr . , 1911 (see 23 Green Bag; 255); 
"The Pe la t i ah Webster Myth," 10 Michigan Law Review 619, 
June, 1912 (see 24 Green Bag 401); and "The Supreme Court 
and the Fourteenth Amendment," 7 Michigan Law Review 643, 
June, 1909 (see 21 Green Bag 400). We have also seen no 
cr i t ic ism of Professor Beard ' s "Economic In te rp re ta t ion of 
the Cons t i tu t ion of the United S t a t e , " so sa t i s fac tory as 
D r . C o r w i n ' s p e n e t r a t i v e a n a l y s i s and r e c t i f i c a t i o n of 
P r o f e s s o r B e a r d ' s a r g u m e n t , in the H i s t o r y T e a c h e r ' s 
Magazine ear ly in the present y e a r . To quote from tha t 
n o t i c e : "Had he [ P r o f e s s o r B e a r d ] been l e s s bent on 
d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e t r u t h of the s o c i a l i s t i c t h e o r y of 
economic determinism and class struggle as an interpretation 
of h i s t o r y , his own p e r f o r m a n c e would be less open to 
c r i t i c i sm." In so many words Dr. Corwin makes plain his 
opposit ion to soc ia l i s t ic tendencies which are now and then, 
in v a r y i n g d e g r e e s , apparent in cur ren t pol i t ica l discus-
s ion , and his a d h e r e n c e to sound t rad i t ions of pol i t ica l 
theory ; ye t as has a l ready been seen, despi te his s trong 
d i s t as te for socialism in every guise, he is anything but a 
r e a c t i o n a r y , or an uncompromising defender of the individu-
a l i s t i c doctr ines in vogue in the days of Kent, Webster, and 
Cooley . In truth he is a "modern" man- -a term in some 
q u a r t e r s c o n s i d e r e d , possibly, somewhat depreca to ry , but 
usually accounted a compliment—certainly a compliment at a 
t ime when recons t ruc t ion of pol i t ica l and legal theory if 
gradually but inevi tably taking place under the influence of 
a m a t u r e r and more r a t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h y of l ega l and 
political institutions. 
21 
How To Reduce Crime 
"Risk alone is going to diminish cr ime," said Dr. Samuel 
Corwin, professor of jur isprudence at Pr ince ton university, 
on his r e c e n t v i s i t to A t l a n t a as the guest of Houston 
White, son of Mr. and Mrs. W. Woods White, of 809 Myrtle 
street, N.E. 
"As long as a criminal can break the law and get away 
wi th it he is going to do s o , " c o n t i n u e d Dr . C o r w i n . 
"Nothing will have g rea te r weight in prevent ing him from 
plying his t r ade than the thought of capture, and at present 
the chances are all on his s ide . From 10,000 to 12,000 
homicides a year are committed in this country, and only a 
few of the murderers are caught , and barely forty or fifty 
of these are convicted. 
"Of c o u r s e , the r easons criminals are not brought to 
jus t ice are numerous and are bound up with the very social 
system of the twentieth century. Good roads and automobiles 
make it eas ie r for the law violator to escape, and the size 
of the country permits him to vanish in the mazes of large 
cities. 
"Another obstacle in the way of capturing criminals is 
our federal system of government. It is actually easier for 
England to capture a fugitive who has fled to America than 
it is for officers of one s t a t e to pursue a criminal into 
another s ta te . 
"If a criminal breaks the law in England and flees to 
America , Great Britain applies to the federal government for 
"How To Reduce Crime." Atlanta Journal, July 17, 1927, 
p. 15. Reprinted by permission from the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution. [Bibliography Entry G28] 
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help, and United S t a t e s officials e i ther in t e rcep t the law 
violator when he lands or follow him from s t a t e to s t a t e 
unt i l he is c a p t u r e d . But if a murder is committed in 
G e o r g i a and the c r i m i n a l c r o s s e s the b o r d e r to South 
Carol ina , Georgia au thor i t ies cannot a r r e s t him until they 
have obtained ex t rad i t ion papers signed by the governor of 
South Carolina. 
"Care lessness in the dis tr ibut ion of f irearms is also a 
f a c t o r a d d i n g to t h e d i f f i c u l t y of c a p t u r i n g l a w l e s s 
persons . Every man in this country who plans to break the 
law pro tec t s himself with a pistol or gun. In England it is 
almost impossible for him to procure firearms, and even the 
Bobby is not equipped with such weapons. 
"Today there are so many organized gangs of criminals in 
this country that after a gang member has broken the law he 
is often assis ted by a wel l -banded group of companions in 
e f f e c t i n g his e s c a p e . T h e s e gangs a r e p r o v i d e d wi th 
f irearms, sometimes even machine guns, and they lay their 
plans to the last de ta i l , building up their ge t - aways step 
by step. 
"However, we probably exaggerate the criminal population 
of the United States. I doubt very much if it is growing by 
the leaps and bounds often asserted. We must remember that 
the re is not one criminal for every crime committed, but 
t h a t most of the s e r i o u s o f f e n s e s a g a i n s t the law are 
committed by men belonging to lawless c lans , and tha t a 
gangster does not stop at one murder. 
"It often happens that with the capture of a gang a whole 
ser ies of crimes is c leared up. This was true in the case 
of a group rounded up not long ago in Bal t imore . The 
evidence indicated that these men were guilty of a number of 
crimes which had been puzzling the police. 
" A f t e r t he c r imina l is caught ," continued Dr. Corwin, 
" the thing that holds up justice is our judicial system. We 
have not given the judges enough power and therefore we are 
not, in most cases , get t ing the best men on the bench. In 
my opinion, judges should be named, not for a limited period 
of time, but for good behavior. Lawyers hesitate to abandon 
a large practice for five or six years as a judge. 
"On the other hand, to avoid usurpation of power, a judge 
should be subject to recall. Impeachment is a clumsy way of 
p u t t i n g a p e r s o n out of o f f i c e . It would be be t t e r , I 
think, if r eca l l s were determined by a two- th i rds vote of 
both houses of the legislature. 
"If the bench were occupied by men with the r ight to 
direct the jury, as is done in England, we would not have so 
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many c a s e s brought up for r e t r i a l . Our courts are now 
clogged with cases that have been appealed. 
"Take the Gray-Snyder trial. Three hundred and fifty men 
were rejected before a jury was selected. Why? Because our 
s t a t u t e s ru le t h a t a t a l e s m a n is d i squa l i f i ed if he has 
already formed an opinion of the case that only evidence can 
c h a n g e . It is almost impossible to find a person at all 
cognizant of the facts who has not formed an opinion or is 
not prejudiced in some way. Why do we have such a law? 
Because we do not trust our judges, we do not allow them to 
ins t ruct the jury in the manner of the law, concerning the 
c r e d i b i l i t y of w i t n e s s e s , and the value of ev idence . In 
other count r ies , the judge, who is supposed to be a trained 
exper t in these ma t t e r s , advises the jury while entrusting a 
fair decision to the judgment of the men in the box. 
" T h e r e a r e no a r t i f i c i a l r u l e s for the s e l e c t i o n of 
jur ies in Canada . The sheriff of the town makes out a list 
of e l igible men and presents it to both sides concerned in 
the c a s e . The defense and prosecution have the privilege of 
s t r ik ing off any names that appear undesirable to them, but 
when the jury is approved, it is composed of capable men. 
"Just ice Scudder, of New York, in whose court the Gray-
Snyder t r ia l was held, is an exce l l en t judge, but he was 
hampered in conducting the trial by our laws prohibiting him 
from ins t ruc t ing the jury on legal points. The case will be 
taken to the court of appeals , but all cases in New York 
a u t o m a t i c a l l y go to the a p p e l l a t e court , which, in that 
s t a t e , I consider the finest court in the country, with the 
exception of the supreme court of the United States. 
" Y e s , I be l i eve in capi ta l punishment, for, as I said, 
the thought of the penalty and of the sureness with which it 
is enforced is the one thing that is going to lessen crime. 
Mass sent iment is easily worked up in favor of the criminal 
and this is necessar i ly a danger to justice. In almost any 
c r i m i n a l t r i a l ba sed on c i r cums tan t i a l ev idence , a keen 
critic can work up a case in behalf of the defendant. Above 
al l t h i n g s , we w a n t f a i r n e s s , but we want it based on 
reason, not on emotion. For ins tance , in the case of the 
S a c c o - V a n z e t t i t r i a l , the defendants have every right to 
expec t the court and the people to consider their case with 
an unprejudiced mind, but justice has a right to demand that 
we look a t i t with minds unswayed by false feelings of 
s y m p a t h y . I h a v e not s tudied this par t icu la r case with 
suf f ic ien t thoroughness to be convinced of the just ice or 
injust ice or the results, but it does seem the judge made an 
unfortunate remark when he charged the jury to act as 'loyal 
men. 
tn 
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Dr. Corwin 's r ecen t visit to the south was occasioned by 
a lecture he was asked to give in Athens before the Southern 
Institute of Politics on Foreign Relations. 
For twenty- two years Dr. Corwin has taught at Princeton. 
In 1911 he b e c a m e p r o f e s s o r of p o l i t i c s , and in 1918 
p r o f e s s o r of j u r i s p r u d e n c e , which position he has s ince 
filled, occupying the same chair Woodrow Wilson once held. 
"Mr . Wilson was a man of b r i l l i a n t i n t e l l e c t , " sa id 
Dr. Corwin. "He liked to cross swords with people. He was 
hard to convince, but a lways willing to en te r into discus-
s ions . While at Pr ince ton he was in several verbal battles 
and succeeded in introducing there the preceptorial method 
of conducting c lasses which has been so successful at the 
u n i v e r s i t y . Instead of giving th ree lec tures a week, we 
hold two lectures and one conference. Three years ago a new 
plan of study was begun, whereby in the last two years at 
co l lege , the student does a ce r t a in amount of independent 
reading , and writes a thesis covering the work of these two 
years . Some of these papers are excellent documents, worked 
out by the student's own method of thinking and reasoning." 
Asked w h a t he t hough t should be the law's a t t i tude 
t o w a r d s the d i v o r c e and mar r i age quest ions . Dr. Corwin 
repl ied he thought the divorce problem was working itself 
out, and that , if anything, laws should be so constructed as 
to make marriage easier. 
"There ought to be uniformity in divorce laws," he said. 
"They should be e i ther more rigorous or more lax, but the 
same in e v e r y s t a t e . The problem, however , is solving 
i t s e l f . E c o n o m i c and social condi t ions and the changed 
views of manners and morals are more important than the 
legal aspect of divorce." 
Dr. Corwin expressed himself as being opposed to a third 
te rm for p r e s i d e n t s . " L i m i t i n g the p r e s i d e n t ' s term of 
office to eight years is an understanding which has become a 
par t of our const i tu t ional system," he said. "Although only 
a t r ad i t ion , it is an element of equilibrium which e s t a b -
lished i tself between the depar tments of government and to 
discard it would be dangerous." 
22 
Corwin scores McCollum decision 
On Thursday evening, October 14, the tide of eminent legal 
judgment turned against the McCollum decision. Up to that 
hour only popular feeling and the efforts of conscient ious 
and c o m p e t e n t , but not e m i n e n t l y au tho r i t a t i ve , wr i t e r s 
formed a b reakwate r against the onrush of secularism set up 
by the Supreme Court when it declared released-time programs 
of r e l i g i o u s ins t ruc t ion in the public schools unconst i tu-
t iona l . The prospects of reversing the decision depended on 
whether some authority on American constitutional law would 
t h row in to the d e f e n s e enough pres t ige and learning to 
r e m o v e al l doub t s abou t the w e a k n e s s of the C o u r t ' s 
position. 
D r . Edward S. Corwin, one of the th ree top American 
s c h o l a r s in the f ie ld of our c o n s t i t u t i o n a l h is tory , has 
t a k e n t h i s s t e p . In a n i n e t e e n - p a g e l e c t u r e de l ive red 
before the Men's Club of Chr is t Church (Methodist) in New 
York C i t y , he has fully subs t an t i a t ed the const i tu t ional 
o b j e c t i o n s of M r . John L. F r a n k l i n , a t t o r n e y for the 
Champaign Board of Education, of Rev. Wilfrid Parsons, S.J., 
in The F i r s t Freedom, and of Rev. Robert C. Hartnett, S.J. 
in his A m e r i c a a r t i c l e s , repr in ted in the America Press 
b o o k l e t . Equa l R i g h t s for C h i l d r e n . He h a s , b e s i d e s , 
contributed several brilliant objections of his own. 
No one can question Dr. Corwin 's authority. Brought to 
Pr ince ton University by Woodrow Wilson in 1905, he rose to 
"Corwin scores McCollum decision." America, October 30, 
194.8, pp. 90-91. Reprinted by permission from America 
Press. [Bibliography Entry GU7] 
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the position of McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence in 1918 
and honored t h a t pos t by his lec tures and wri t ings for 
twen ty -e igh t y e a r s . He has published no less than fifteen 
volumes in the field of American constitutional law, besides 
s e v e r a l o t h e r n o t a b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n s in c l o s e l y r e l a t e d 
f i e lds of p o l i t i c a l s c i ence . His work on The Pres iden t : 
Office and Powers (1940) is the s tandard t r e a t i s e on the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a p p a r a t u s of our Ch ie f E x e c u t i v e . The 
members of the Supreme Court cannot ignore the weight of his 
historical learning and legal acumen. 
"My principal in te res t in the case," he declared, "is not 
in the question of its p rac t i ca l soundness, but in that of 
i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s o u n d n e s s ; in the q u e s t i o n , in brief, 
w h e t h e r the C o n s t i t u t i o n does r e q u i r e t h a t al l publ ic-
supported education be kept s t r i c t ly secular ." He cannot 
reconci le the McCollum decision with the judicial approval 
given to New Je r sey ' s system of reimbursing the parents of 
c h i l d r e n a t t e n d i n g p r i v a t e s c h o o l s for e x t r a o r d i n a r y 
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n c o s t s , or wi th the a p p r o v a l g iven the 
Louisiana system of providing free textbooks to children of 
public and pr iva te schools a l ike . "Federa l appropr ia t ions 
in s u p p o r t of f ree l u n c h e s for school chi ldren embrace 
p a r o c h i a l s c h o o l s , p resumably on the same jus t i f ica t ion . 
Are, however, these holdings inval idated by the McCollum 
decision?" He thinks not--though it contradicts them. 
As for w h a t he c a l l s " t h e a l l e g e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
'p r inc ip le of Separa t ion of Church and S t a t e , ' " Dr. Corwin 
a r g u e s : "In s h o r t , i t is my c o n t e n t i o n t h a t J u s t i c e 
R u t l e d g e sold his b r e th ren a bill of goods." The F i r s t 
Amendment was never before interpreted to mean that Congress 
could not s u p p o r t r e l i g i o n , p r o v i d e d it did so wi thout 
d iscr iminat ion . The "h i s to r ica l " argument from Madison is 
i n v a l i d . Madison never pre tended , when he proposed the 
F i r s t Amendment, that it meant any more than a prohibition 
of any action by Congress establishing a State church. That 
in the days of his r e t i r ement he "ca r r i ed the principle of 
Separa t ion of Church and State to pedantic lengths" (object-
ing even to the proclamation of a Day of Thanksgiving by the 
P r e s i d e n t ) is n e i t h e r h e r e nor t h e r e . "In al l t h e s e 
r e spec t s , of course, Madison has been steadily overruled by 
the verdic t of p r ac t i ce under the Const i tu t ion, as Just ice 
Reed points out. . . ." 
As for Jefferson, besides the fact that he was in Paris 
when the First Amendment was adopted. Dr. Corwin cites his 
s u g g e s t i o n t h a t p r o v i s i o n be made at the Universi ty of 
V i r g i n i a w h e r e b y r e l i g i o u s sec ts could conduct rel igious 
exe rc i se s on public premises . Just ice Story, whose opinion 
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as a l e a d i n g cons t i t u t iona l authori ty and member of the 
early Court (1811-1845) should weight heavily in the scales, 
contended that " the genera l , if not universal , sentiment of 
America was that Christianity ought to receive encouragement 
from the State," and the First Amendment was adopted in full 
view of that attitude. 
D r . C o r w i n p o i n t s out , we th ink c o n c l u s i v e l y , how 
i r r e c o n c i l a b l e is the McCollum decision with that in the 
Oregon School case and even with r ecen t decisions of the 
presen t Cour t . It is hard to see how the Justices can save 
t h e i r j u d i c i a l s e l f - r e s p e c t un les s they beg in an e a r l y 
r e t r e a t from what is here stigmatized as a blunder on a par 
with the Dred Scott decision. 
F ina l ly , this question may be asked. Is the decision 
f a v o r a b l e to d e m o c r a c y ? Pr imar i ly democracy is a 
system of e th ics , and that this system of e th ics , so 
far as the American people are concerned, is grounded 
in religion will not be denied by anybody who knows the 
h i s to r ica l record. And that the agencies by which this 
system of e th ics has been transmitted in the past from 
genera t ion to g e n e r a t i o n - - t h e family, the neighborhood, 
the chu rch - -have today become much impaired, will not 
be seriously questioned by anybody who knows anything 
about contemporary condi t ions . But what all this adds 
up to is that the work of transmission has been put 
m o r e and m o r e upon the s h o u l d e r s of the pub l i c 
s c h o o l s . Can t h e y , t h e n , do the job w i t h o u t the 
a s s i s t a n c e of r e l i g i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n ? At l e a s t the 
popular verdict seems to be to the contrary. 
The very evil which Just ice Holmes so cogently condemned, 
tha t of judges imposing their personal prepossessions on the 
American people under the guise of constitutional interpre-
t a t i o n , has been r e v i v e d by t h o s e who b o a s t of the i r 
a l l e g i a n c e to his c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m . It is a hear ten ing 
sign when an outstanding scholar has the courage to apply to 
the p resen t Court the Holmesian epithets of "naive, simple-
minded m e n " - - o n e mark of n a i v e t e of mind be ing " i t s 
preference for slogans over solutions." 
Dr. Corwin has done all a great scholar can do to make 
his predic t ion about the McCollum decision come true: "Its 




All notes to the repr in ted a r t i c l e s appear below from the 
o r i g i n a l p u b l i c a t i o n s with any incons is tenc ies and i r reg-
ularities of form. 
Notes to Introduction 
Pages 3 to 9 
1. See page 207. 
2 . For a full biography of Corwin, see Kenneth D. 
Crews, Edward S. Corwin and the American Constitution: A 
B i b l i o g r a p h i c a l A n a l y s i s ( W e s t p o r t , Conn . : Greenwood 
Press, 1985). 
3. See page 29. 
4. See page 15. 
5. See pages 55, 58, and 60. 
6. See pages 208-209. 
7. See page 235. 
8. See note 2 above. 
Notes to Chapter 5 
"International Law Imperilled" 
Pages 33 to 49 
1. 12 Coke 63. 
2. The Sussex pledge was given two months later! 
3 . Even German a p o l o g i s t s seem today disposed to 
abandon this p i t iable f ict ion. See excerpts from an article 
by Lieut . Gen. Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven, Chief of the 
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Supplementary General Staff, quoted in The New York Times of 
August 12, 1917. 
4 . S e e a lso his P r i n c i p und Zunkunft des Volkerrechts 
(Berlin, 1871). 
5 . On the g e n e r a l sub jec t of P a n - G e r m a n i s m s e e the 
fami l i a r volumes of Usher and Cheradame; also Nippold's Der 
d e u t s c h e Chauvin ism us . The Berliner Tagebla t t of April 21, 
1913, makes th is i n t e r e s t i n g s t a t ement : "It has lately been 
c l e a r l y d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t numerous t h r e a d s c o n n e c t the 
c l a m o r o u s l e a d e r s of P a n - G e r m a n i s m w i t h t h e o f f i c i a l 
w o r l d . " C e r t a i n l y o n e f i n d s it imposs ib le to avoid the 
conc lus ion t h a t if Ge rmany w e r e to win the war, the Pan-
German influence would determine the use she would make of 
her v ic tory . 
6 . The full t i t l e is Not Kennt Kein Gebot, die Theorie 
d e s N o t r e c h t e s und d i e E r e i g n i s s e u n s e r e r Z e i t (Ber l in , 
1915). 
7. The author of these words was Prof. Th. Niemeyer of 
t h e U n i v e r s i t y of K ie l , a l so a P r u s s i a n P r i v y C o u n c i l l o r , 
and himself the Pres ident of the German Branch. For further 
e v i d e n c e of t h e d i s t u r b a n c e which K o h l e r ' s th ink ing has 
u n d e r g o n e in c o n s e q u e n c e of the war, see an ar t ic le of his 
on "The New Law of Nations," t ranslated for the June, 1917, 
number of the Michigan Law Review by Prof. Jesse S. Reeves . 
For proof, however, that not all German publicists have gone 
off the i r heads since August, 1914, see a le t te r by Dr. Hans 
Wehberg of Dusseldorf in the Berliner Tagebla t t of September 
24, 1915. Prof . R e e v e s r e fe r s to this le t ter and a t ransla-
t ion of it a p p e a r s in the A m e r i c a n Journal of International 
Law for October , 1915, pp. 925-7. 
8 . L.R. , 14 Q . B . D . 273 ; Law Quarterly Review, I, 282. 
See also ib. 51 . 
9. S e e the d i scuss ion by Prof . C . de V i s s c h e r of the 
U n i v e r s i t y of G h e n t in his a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d "Les Lois de 
Guerre et la Theorie de la Necess i te" in the Revue Genera le 
de D r o i t I n t e r n a t i o n a l e Pub l i c for J a n u a r y - F e b r u a r y , 1917; 
a l s o P r o f . J o h n W e s t l a k e ' s I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a w : P a r t I, 
"Peace , " Ch. XIII. 
10. On th is sub j ec t , s ee the a r t i c l e c i t e d in no t e 9, 
sup ra , wi th the w r i t e r s t h e r e given; Westlake 's Chapters on 
the P r i n c i p l e s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, 238 ff.; Prof. Amos S. 
H e r s h e y ' s T h e E s s e n t i a l s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i c Law, 
pp . 353 and 389, wi th a c c o m p a n y i n g notes; also ar t ic les by 
Profs . Reeves and Niemeyer in the Michigan Law Review, XIII, 
175 ff. 
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Notes to Chapter 6 
"Some Possibil i t ies in the Way of 
Treaty-Making" 
Pages 53 to 58 
1. Germany, Denmark, France , Italy, Luxemburg, Switzer-
land, and the Nether lands . 
2 . A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , B e l g i u m , S p a i n , G r e a t B r i t a i n , 
Portugal and Sweden. 
3 . At B e r n e , S e p t e m b e r 25, 1913, by Norway and all 
n a t i o n s m e n t i o n e d in the two p r e c e d i n g foo tno te s e x c e p t 
Denmark and Luxemburg. 
4. The scope and import of Art ic le VI, Paragraph 2, was 
wel l unde r s tood by the o p p o n e n t s of the Const i tu t ion: see 
Federal is t , 44 and 64. 
Notes to Chapter 10 
"Franklin and the Constitution" 
Pages 101 to 112 
1. V o n H o l s t , C o n s t i t u t i o n a l h i s t o r y o_f t h e U n i t e d 
Sta tes 1: 9-10, Chicago, 1889. 
2 . I t a l i c s a d d e d . McLaugh l in , C o n s t i t u t i o n a l h i s t o r y 
of th^ Uni ted S t a t e s , 2 0 - 2 1 , New York, A p p l e t o n - C e n t u r y . 
1935. 
3 . Ibid., 2 1 . 
4 . M o r s e , B e n j a m i n F r a n k l i n (Amer i can S t a t e s m e n ) , 
212-213. 
5. Ibid., 407. 
6 . N e v i n s , The A m e r i c a n S t a t e s dur ing and a f t e r the 
Revolution, 1775-1789, 198, New York, Macmillan, 1924. 
7. F a r r a n d , Records of the Federal Convention 2: 236-
237, New Haven, Yale Univ. Press , 1911. 
8. Morse, 410. 
Farrand, 1: 450-452. 






S e e my T o t a l war and the C o n s t i t u t i o n , 3-4 , New 
York , Knopf, 1947. The i tem r e f e r r e d to is the following 
e x t r a c t from V o l u m e I of H e n i n g ' s V i r g i n i a S t a t u t e s : 
" M a r c h 5, 1 6 2 3 - 4 . . . . T h a t a t the beginning of July next 
the i n h a b i t a n t s of e v e r y c o r p o r a t i o n sha l l fall upon t he i r 
adjoyning salvages as we did last year . " 
13. Farrand, 3: 9 1 . 
14. Ibid., 235-236. 
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Notes to Chapter 16 
"The Atom Bomb and the Constitution" 
Pages 167 to 188 
1 T h i s p r e d i c t i o n is no d o u b t ba sed on the much 
a d v e r t i s e d formula E = M x C ^ See Lincoln Barnet t , The 
Universe and Dr. Einstein, pp. 57-59. 
r ~ I ~ f £ ^ n e s s it ought to be added that the notion of 
" S c i e n c e for S c i e n c e ' sake" seems to be in discredi t among 
some s c i e n t i s t s t h e s e d a y s . Under the date line of Haver-
ford , P a . , September 17 (1949), The New York l i m e s of the 
following day reported: 
A group of sc ien t i s t s and engineers who propose "to 
f o s t e r t h r o u g h o u t t h e wor ld a t r a d i t i o n of p e r s o n a l 
mora l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the c o n s e q u e n c e for humanity 
of p r o f e s s i o n a l a c t i v i t y , " f o r m e d t h e S o c i e t y for 
Social Responsibility in Science at a meeting h e r e . 
T h e g r o u p s a i d i t wou ld e m p h a s i z e " c o n s t r u c t i v e 
a l t e r n a t i v e s to m i l i t a r i s m " by p l e d g i n g its members to 
" a b s t a i n from d e s t r u c t i v e w o r k " and by d e v o t i n g 
themselves to construct ive efforts." 
V i c t o r P a s c h k i s of N e s h a n i c S t a t i o n , N . J . , d i rec tor 
of an e n g i n e e r i n g r e s e a r c h l a b o r a t o r y of Columbia 
University, was e lected pres ident . , , „ , , 
M r . P a s c h k i s s a i d t h a t s c i e n t i s t s h a d u s u a l l y 
omi t t ed al l the soc i a l and moral aspects of their^^ work 
in t h e i r d e c i s i o n s as to what problems to t ack le . He 
e x p l a i n e d t h a t the new s o c i e t y ' s members were e x c e p -
t i o n s to t h i s t e n d e n c y and t h a t t h e y t r a c e d t h e i r 
"heterodoxy" back to Leonardo da Vinci 's invention of a 
s u b m a r i n e which he re fused to d e s c r i b e pub l ic ly lest 
man put it to evil purposes." 
As a p r e s e n t - d a y example of "scientif ic consc ience , 
Mr . P a s c h k i s c i t e d N o r b e r t Wiener, founder of the new 
s c i e n t i f i c f ie ld , c y b e r n e t i c s , "who r e c e n t l y refused to 
put his k n o w l e d g e a t the d isposa l of the armed forces 
of this country." 
R e g i o n a l , fo re ign and func t iona l un i t s of the new 
S o c i e t y wil l be o r g a n i z e d , i t was announced. English, 
German and Swiss s c i e n t i s t s have expressed in teres t m 
joining the soc ie ty . 





Id. February 27, 1950. 
Id. March 2, 1950. 
299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
Id. at 317-318. 
(July 
7. Id. at 318. 
8. See my Total War and the Constitution (1947), 37. 
9. 80th C o n g r e s s , F i r s t S e s s i o n , Pub l i c Law 253 
26, 1947). 
10. 80th Congress, Second Session, H.J. Res . 298. 
1 1 . S t o r y , Comrns. §§ 1187 and 1197; cf. 1 B l a c k s t o n e 
Comms., 253, 257, 263. 
1 2 . 7 9 t h C o n g r e s s , S e c o n d S e s s i o n , Pub l i c Law 585 
(Aug. 1, 1946). 
13. Total War and the Constitution, v i i i . 
1 4 . As S e n a t o r M c M a h o n h a s p u t i t , p i l ing " s e c r e t 
w e a p o n " on top of " s e c r e t weapon" t ends i n c r e a s i n g l y to 
exclude both public and Congress, and more and more to leave 
t e r r i b l e d e c i s i o n s in fewer and fewer "exper t" hands. New 
York Times, February 12, 1950. 
15. A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Sena te Document 
No. 123, 81st Congress, 1st Sess . , pp. 1078-1135, passim. 
16. New York Times, August 6, 1947. 
1 7 . S e e T o t a l War and the C o n s t i t u t i o n , no te 46 on 
pp . 1 2 2 - 2 4 , and P r e f a c e ; a l so J u s t i c e Doug la s , c o n c u r r i n g , 
in Hirota v. MacArthur , 338 U.S. 197, 199-214 (1948). 
18. New York Times, June 23, 1946. 
56 Ethics 281. 19. 
20. 
2 1 . 
22. 
2 3 . 
Id. at 283-84. 
Id. at 286-88 passim. 
Total War and the Constitution, 165-66. 
S e e a lso S e n a t o r K e f a u v e r ' s i n f o r m a t i v e speech in 
The S e n a t e , July 11 , 1949. As r e c e n t l y as July 30, 1950, 
f o r m e r J u s t i c e R o b e r t s c a l l e d upon P r e s i d e n t Truman and 
Sec re t a ry Acheson to push the resolution. 
2 4 . E a r l y in Ju ly 1949 t h e W o r l d F e d e r a l i s t s w e r e 
c l a i m i n g to have c a p t u r e d the support of no fewer than 22 
S t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s but r e c e n t l y some of th is suppor t has 
been r e t r ac t ed . See Freedom and Union for March, 1950. An 
Adjunc t or p a r a l l e l p roposa l was t h a t s e t for th in S e n a t e 
C o n c u r r e n t R e s o l u t i o n 5 2 , 8 1 s t C o n g r e s s , 1s t S e s s i o n , 
sponsored by Senator Thomas of Utah and Senator Douglas of 
I l l i n o i s . "What the T h o m a s - D o u g l a s Reso lu t ion p r o v i d e s , " 
w r o t e S e n a t o r Doug la s , in a l e t t e r dated August 8th, 1949, 
"is t h a t the Uni ted S t a t e s should p r o p o s e a supp lementa ry 
convent ion , open to all members of the United Nations, under 
which t h o s e who sign the c o n v e n t i o n a g r e e tha t they: (1) 
w i l l u s e f o r c e a g a i n s t a n y n a t i o n d e c l a r e d to be an 
a g g r e s s o r by a t w o - t h i r d s v o t e of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s 
A s s e m b l y - - i n c l u d i n g t h r e e of the permanent members of the 
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , and (2) wil l d e s i g n a t e in a d v a n c e the 
m i l i t a r y c o m p o n e n t s to be used as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c e 
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force ." See also Hinton in New York Times, February 3, 
1950 . Months e a r l i e r , in an address de l ivered at David 
Lipscomb Col lege, Nashville, Tennessee on February 4, 1949, 
"a t 10 AM," Mr. Fyke Farmer, "founder of World Government 
Fund," had' informed his hea re r s tha t , "A World Const i tu-
t i o n a l Convention is now being organized to assemble in 
Geneva, Switzerland, December 25, 1950. All nations of the 
world are invited to send delegates on the basis of one per 
million populat ion. According to the plan of representation 
for the United S t a t e s the people will be ent i t led to elect 
one hundred and t h i r t y - o n e d e l e g a t e s . This number of 
de lega tes has been apport ioned among the S t a t e s and the 
Dis t r i c t of Columbia so that every state will be entitled to 
e l e c t at l e a s t one d e l e g a t e . " On August 3rd, in fact , 
T e n n e s s e e c h o s e her t h r e e d e l e g a t e s at the S t a t e - w i d e 
primary election, one of them being Mr. Farmer himself. To 
the New York Times correspondent, Mr. Farmer commented: 
There will be a meeting of the assembly if only the 
th ree Tennessee de lega tes are there. If there are not 
enough nat ions represen ted to take act ion on a world 
c o n s t i t u t i o n , t he a s sembly wi l l e i t h e r r e m a i n in 
c o n t i n u o u s s e s s i o n or ad journ un t i l a l a t e r d a t e , 
possibly 1951, to permit other nations to take action. 
He further observed that the plan calls for delegates to be 
paid the same sa lary as United States Senators, with travel 
e x p e n s e s . The Tennessee bi l l , however , makes any such 
appropr ia t ions cont ingent on similar action by fifteen other 
S t a t e s , so that the three Tennessee delegates would probably 
be expected to pay their own expenses at this time. 
He a l so added the i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t a bill to insure 
I ta l ian pa r t i c ipa t ion at the world assembly was introduced 
on June 29 in the I tal ian par l iament with the support of 
Count Sforza, the foreign minis ter , and that a " l e t t e r of 
encouragement" for the proposed world assembly had been 
rece ived from I s rae l ' s foreign min i s t ry . New York Times, 
Sunday August 13, 1950, p. 42. 
2 5 . "The Bases of American Federa l i sm," by John C. 
Ranney, 3 William and Mary Quarterly (3rd Ser.), 1-35. 
26. Probably there was never a more favorable moment for 
European federat ion than following World War I. That the 
idea was not seriously urged was due primari ly to British 
p o l i c y , which r e v e r t e d to the old "divide and conquer" 
m o t t o ; and B r i t i s h pol icy is st i l l blamed by the former 
P r i m e M i n i s t e r of Be lg ium, Paul Henri Spaak, for West 
European disuni ty . Speaking recen t ly at Phi lade lphia , he 
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said: "We are confronted here with a well-known British 
t e n d e n c y . Grea t Bri ta in , which for cen tur ies has always 
been drawn into our quarre ls , has always refused, however, 
to proclaim unreservedly her European character. Her dream, 
he r p o l i c y , has a l w a y s been to be the a r b i t e r of our 
d i s p u t e s . But t imes have c h a n g e d and c o n d i t i o n s a r e 
entirely new. There is no really great power in Europe. A 
ba lance-of -power has become impossible. Great Britain can 
no longer be the beam of a balance, the scales of which no 
longer e x i s t . She must be herself, a posi t ive and ac t ive 
element in Europe." New York Times, January 14, 1950. More 
recen t ly Dr . Adenauer has voiced a similar criticism. New 
York Times, April 3, 1950. On the movement for Western 
European Union, see the exce l l en t study by Professor Jane 
P e r r y Clark Carey , in 26 Foreign Pol icy Repor ts , No. 7 
(June 15, 1950). 






3 1 . For the details, see my President, Office and Powers 
(3rd ed., 1948), 217-20, 465-66. 
32. Boston 1945. See also Total War and the Constitu-
tion, 144-52. 
3 3 . 5 Moore Digest , 478, 479, 482, 500, 502, 507, 508, 
510. P res iden t s have sometimes, however, claimed a broader 
p re roga t ive , in which connect ion the following anecdote by 
Mr. Churchill in his Second World War is interesting: 
The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884). 
New York Times, March 19. 1949. 
2 Fa r rand , Records of; the Federal Convention, 318-
I w r o t e to General Smuts, who had raised la rger 
issues, 9 Nov. 41. I do not think it would be any use 
for me to make a personal appeal to Roosevelt at this 
juncture to en te r the war . At the Atlantic meeting I 
told his c i rc le that I would r a the r have an American 
dec la ra t ion of war now and no supplies for six months 
than double the supplies and no declaration. When this 
was repea ted to him he thought it a hard saying. We 
must not under ra te his Const i tu t ional diff icult ies. He 
may take act ion as Chief Executive, but only Congress 
can dec la re war. He went so far as to say to me, "I 
may never declare war; I may make war. If I were to 
ask Congress to declare war they might argue about it 
for three months." . . . New York Times, Feb. 2, 1950. 
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34. A Decade oX American Foreign Pol icy, Sena te Document 
No. 123,~81st Cong., 1st Sess. , pp. 1339, 1347. 
35. The basis provided by Art ic le V of the Atlant ic Pac t 
for i ' n t e r v e n t i o n by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s on i t s own so le 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y is , in f ac t , much c l e a r e r and more d e f i n i t e 
than t h a t suppl ied by the Uni ted Nat ions Char te r preceding 
a c t i o n by the Securi ty Council. See Art ic les 2, 25, and 40 
of the Char te r . 
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bibl iography for a detai led explana t ion of ent ry numbers. 
Some annota t ions below refer to other entry numbers in the 
full bibliography. 
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c o n t r i b u t i o n s a t pages 53-55 and examines at pages 229-230 
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Amendment. 
G219b Stevens, Richard G. 
M e a n t to C o r w i n . " 
(Fall 1980): 1-53. 
"The Constitution and What It 
Po l i t i ca l Science Reviewer 10 
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major publications. H 
-w-Index 
The following index includes 
and i d e n t i f i e s most of them 
death, and highest re levant oc 
o therwise noted, all individual 
individuals mentioned in the text 
by name , y e a r s of b i r th and 
;cupation or achievement. Unless 
!s are United S ta tes residents or 
c i t i z e n s . Surnames with par t ic les "von," "van," or "da" are 
listed alphabetically without re 
A c h e s o n , Dean (1893-1971) , 
secre tary of s ta te , 177, 
184-185, 247n.23 
1 A c h e s o n - L i l i e n t h a l R e p o r t , 
177-178 
[ Adams , Ab iga i l (1744-1818) , 
j wife of John Adams, 86 
A d a m s , John ( 1 7 3 5 - 1 8 2 6 ) , 
1 p r e s i d e n t , 5 5 , 9 6 , 
1 110-111, 198 
1 A d e n a u e r , K o n r a d ( 1 8 7 6 -
1 1967), German chancel-
1 lor, 249n.26 
1 Adkins v. Children 's Hospital, 
1 89 
1 A e g o s p o t a m i , B a t t l e of (405 
1 B.C.), 20 
1 Agriculture, secre tary of, 68 
1 A g r i c u l t u r e Adjus tment Act, 1 ^^^ 1 A i r F o r c e , D e p a r t m e n t of. 
1 170, 183 
1 Albany Congress, 102-103 
i Aliens, 55, 133, 216 
1 Alton Railroad Case, 149 
1 Ambassadors, 66-67, 190 
ference to the par t ic les . 
America (periodical), 7, 237 
America Press , 237 
A m e r i c a n Bar A s s o c i a t i o n , 
214 
A m e r i c a n L ibe r ty League , 
152 
A m e r i c a n P h i l o s o p h i c a l 
Society, 109 
A m e r i c a n P h i l o s o p h i c a l 
S o c i e t y , P r o c e e d i n g s 
of (periodical), 101 
A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c a l Sc ience 
Association, 4 
Amer i can Revolution, 29-30, 
104-105 
A n d e r s o n , F rank M. (1871-
1 9 6 1 ) , c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
historian, 92 
A n t i - G e n o c i d e C o n v e n t i o n , 
213-215 
Arbitration law, 133 
A r i s t o p h a n e s (ca . 448-380 
B .C. ) , Athenian play-
wright, 18 
A r t i c l e s of C o n f e d e r a t i o n , 
56, 75, 103, 222 
258 / CORWIN'S CONSTITUTION 
Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York, 255 
A t l a n t a Journal (pe r iod ica l ) , 
233 
Atlant ic Char te r , 170, 208 
Atlant ic Conference, 208 
A t l a n t i c P a c t . S e e Nor th 
Atlantic Treaty 
A t l e e , C l e m e n t (1883-1967) , 
Br i t i sh prime minister, 
208 
Atomic bomb, 168-170, 173, 
177, 179-180, 209 
Atomic energy, 167, 171-172, 
174, 176-179 
Atomic Energy Act, 170-173, 
183 
Atomic Energy Commiss ion , 
171-174 




A v e r y , S e w e l l (1873-1960) , 
businessman, 196 
B a g e h o t , Wal t e r (1826-1877), 
English author, 194 
B a k e w e l l , C l a u d e I. (1912-), 
c o n g r e s s m a n a n d 
l a w y e r from Missour i , 
170 
B a l d w i n , A b r a h a m ( 1 7 5 4 -
1807), statesman, 83 
Baldwin, Simeon Eben (1840-
19 2 7 ) , C o n n e c t i c u t 
jurist and governor, 57 
Baldwin v. Franks, 215 
Balfour , Arthur James (1848-
1 9 3 0 ) , B r i t i s h p r i m e 
minister, 16 
Bank of the U.S. , 56, 64, 93 
B a r k l e y , Alben (1877-1956) , 
s e n a t o r a n d v i c e 
president . 111 
Baruch , Bernard (1870-1965), 
s t a t e s m a n and b u s i -
nessman, 174-177, 193 
B a y a r d , James (1767-1815) , 
politician, 84-85 
B e a r d , C h a r l e s A . (1874-
1948), h i s to r i an , 110, 
231 
Beck , James M. (1861-1936), 
lawyer and wri ter , 99 
B e d f o r d , G u n n i n g ( 1 7 4 7 -
1812), statesman, 77 
Belgium, 245n.l 
China and, 132-133 
Germany and, 34, 39, 42-
43,46-47 
World War One and, 34, 
39, 42-43 , 46-47 
B e n o i t - S m u l l y a n , E m i l e 
(1909-1978), economist 
a n d s t a t e s m a n , 
177-179 
Berlin airlift , 221 
B e r n h a r d i , F r i e d r i c h von 
(1849-1930) , P russ ian 
g e n e r a l and w r i t e r , 
41 , 47 
B e r n s o r f f , J o h a n n - H e i n r i c h 
v o n (1 8 6 2 - 1 9 3 9 ) , 
German diplomat, 67 
B e t h m a n - H o l l w e g , Theobald 
v o n ( 1 8 5 6 - 1 9 2 1 ) , 
G e r m a n c h a n c e l l o r , 
39-40, 43 
B i e n , Judge (un iden t i f i ed ) , 
134 
Bill of Rights 
American, 81 , 98 
Chinese, 122 
Biology, 48 
B i s m a r c k , O t t o E d u a r d 
L e o p o l d von (18 1 5 -
1 8 9 8 ) , G e r m a n 
chancellor , 16, 41 , 123 
B l a c k , Hugo ( 1 8 8 6 - 1 9 7 1 ) , 
Supreme Court justice, 
198 
B l a c k s t o n e , William ( 1 7 2 3 -
1780) , Engl ish j u r i s t 
and w r i t e r , 96, 152, 
171 
Blockade, 38 
Board of Economic Welfare, 
195 
B o n a p a r t e , N a p o l e o n . See 
Napoleon 
INDEX / 259 
Borah , Will iam (1865-1940) , 
senator , 154-155 
Botil ler v. Dominguez, 215 
Boxer Indemnity College, 113 
Boxer Rebellion, 215, 221 
B r e a r l y , David (1745-1790) , 
j u r i s t and s t a t e s m a n , 
77 
B r i c k e r , John ( 1 8 9 3 - 1 9 8 6 ) , 
senator , 165, 204, 207, 
209, 211, 219-221 
Bricker Amendment, 207 
Corwin and, 165, 255 
Ef fec t of, 213 , 2 1 5 - 2 1 7 , 
220-222 
Proposed, 211 
P r o v i s i o n s of, 2 1 3 - 2 1 5 , 
219, 220 
British West Indies, 103 
B r o w n e l l , H e r b e r t (1904- ) , 
a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l , 
205-206 
B r y a n , C h a r l e s W a y l a n d 
(1867-1945) , po l i t i c ian 
a n d b r o t h e r o f 
W.J. Bryan, 61-62 
B r y a n , W i l l i a m J e n n i n g s 
(1860-1925) , po l i t i c ian 
and lawyer, 16 
B r y c e , J a m e s ( 1 8 3 8 - 1 9 2 2 ) , 
British diplomat, 20 
B u c h a n a n , James (1791-1868), 
president , 69 
Burke , Edmund (1729-1797) , 
British political author, 
134 
B u r r , A a r o n ( 1 7 5 6 - 1 8 3 6 ) , 
l a w y e r a n d v i c e 
president , 61 
Butler (unidentified), 62 
B u t l e r , P i e r c e (1744-1822) , 
c o n g r e s s m a n a n d 
senator , 186 
Cabinet government, 120 
Cabinet 
American, 63-65, 208, 254, 
256 
British, 65, 117, 194 
C a l h o u n , J o h n C . ( 1 7 8 2 -
1850), v i c e p r e s i d e n t , 
180, 182 
C a l i f o r n i a Supreme Cour t , 
213 
Campus (periodical), 159 
Canada, 45, 58, 67-68, 103, 
235 
C a p i t a l punishment , 7, 223, 
235 
Capitulat ions, 126 
Capture , right of, 34 
Caroline affair, 45-46 
C a r r i a g e Tax Case, 82, 91, 
98 
Cathol ic Church, 119 
Censora te agencies, 120-121 
Cen t r a l Intell igence Agency, 
206 
C h a m b e r l a i n , George (1854-
1928), senator , 66 
C h a n g , T s u n g - c h a n g (1881-
1 9 3 2 ) , C h i n e s e 
mili tary governor, 134 
C h a r l e s I (1625-1649), king 
of England, 69 
C h a r l e s t o n Courier (periodi-
cal), 92-93 
Char te r of London, 175 
C h a s e , H a r o l d W. ( 1 9 2 2 -
1982), political scien-
tist, 256 
C h a s e , Samuel (1741-1811), 
Supreme Court justice, 
82 
C h e n g , F a t t i n g Tinsik (also 
C h e n g , T i e n - h s i ) 
( 1 8 8 4 - 1 9 7 0 ) , C h i n e s e 
s t a t e s m a n and British 
barr is ter , 134 
Cherokee Tobacco Case, 215, 
222 
Chiefs of Staff, 195 
Child labor, 53, 147 
China, 216 
American courts in, 130-
132 
Arbitrat ion law of, 133 
B r i t i s h c o u r t s in, 130, 
132 
C e n t r a l Pol i t ical Council 
of, 115-116 
Corwin's visit to, 6, 113 
Emigration from, 126-127 
Fo re ign t rade with, 126, 
130-131 
260 / CORWIN'S CONSTITUTION 
China (continued) 
Foreigners and, 127 
I m p e r i a l g o v e r n m e n t of, 
187, 203, 215 
Judiciary of, 133-135 
Legal e d u c a t i o n in, 134-
135 
Legal institutions in, 127-
128 
Legal philosophy in, 127-
129, 135 
Militarism in 123 
Organic Law of, 116-124 
Police power and 58 
Republican era of, 113 
Revolutions in, 129 
Supreme Court of, 133-135 
Treat ies of, 131-133, 215 
S e e a l s o G r e a t B r i t a i n ; 
Organic Law 
China Tomorrow (periodical), 
115 
China Weekly Review (peri-
odical), 125 
C h o a t e , Joseph (1832-1917) , 
lawyer, 99 
C h r i s t e n s e n , Asher Norman 
( 1 9 0 3 - 1 9 6 1 ) , p o l i t i c a l 
scientist , 254 
C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e Mon i to r 
(periodical), 7, 139 
C h u C h e n g ( 1 8 7 6 - 1 9 5 1 ) , 
Chinese jurist, 134 
C h u r c h i l l , W i n s t o n ( 1 8 7 4 -
1 9 6 5 ) , B r i t i s h p r i m e 
minister, 208, 249n.33 
C.I.O., 90 
Civil service system, 119-120 
Civi l War, U . S . , 2 9 - 3 0 , 57, 
64, 95 , 98, 180, 187, 
193, 199, 231 
Great Britain and, 38 
Lincoln and, 64, 66 
Supreme Court and, 153 
C l a r k , Grenvi l l e (1882-1967), 
lawyer, 175-176 
C l a r k , Thomas (1899-1977) , 
Supreme Court justice, 
199 
C l a u s e w i t z , Kar l von (1780-
1831), Prussian military 
officer and author, 46 
C l a y , H e n r y ( 1 7 7 7 - 1 8 5 2 ) , 
s t a t e s m a n and pol i t i -
cian, 87, 155 
C l a y , L u c i u s ( 1 8 9 7 - 1 9 7 8 ) , 
army general , 221 
C l a y t o n , W i l l i a m ( 1 8 8 0 -
1966), u n d e r s e c r e t a r y 
of s ta te , 181 
C l e v e l a n d , G r o v e r (1837-
1908), p r e s i d e n t , 66, 
69, 205 
Cobalt bomb, 209 
C o k e , Edward (1552-1634) , 
English jurist, 95-96 
Cold war, 190 
Columbia University, 246n.2 
C o m b i n e d R a w M a t e r i a l s 
Board, 195 
Commerce, secre ta ry of, 198 
C o m m i t t e e for De fense of 
the Constitution, 255 
See also Bricker Amend-
ment 
C o m m i t t e e o n P u b l i c 
I n f o r m a t i o n , 7, 193, 
255 
See also World War One 
Common law, 227 
C o n c u r r e n t resolutions, 201-
202 
Congress, 172-173, 184, 192-
193, 199-203, 206, 209 
A c t s of, 139, 141 , 143, 
154, 197, 209, 219 
Cabinet and, 64-65, 254 
C o m m i t t e e on F o r e i g n 
Relations of, 203 
Debates in, 119 
Delegation of powers by, 
66, 149-150 
Jud ic ia l rev iew and, 97-
99 
New Deal and, 156 
Oath of office of, 86-87 
P o w e r s of, 6, 75 , 148-
149, 154-156, 158, 161, 
170-171, 181, 184-188, 
197-200, 204, 212, 214, 
216, 227-229, 238 
Pres ident and, 207 
P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s 
and, 61-62 
INDEX / 261 
Congress (continued) 
Removal powers of, 81 
R e p r e s e n t a t i o n in, 104-
105 
S u p r e m e Cour t and, 72, 
161-162 
Trea t ies and, 67, 174-175, 
215, 217, 220-222 
W a r p o w e r s a n d , 6 0 , 
249n.33, 250n.36 
C o n n e c t i c u t Supreme Cour t , 
57, 229 
C o n s t i t u t i o n , U.S., general ly, 
105, 123, 215, 217 
Air Force and, 170-171 
Amendment p r o c e s s , 147, 
149, 161 
A m e n d m e n t s p r o p o s e d , 
170, 181 
Amendments to, 152, 155, 
158, 161-162, 179, 182, 
184, 209, 213, 217 
Charac te r of, 182 
Church and s ta te , 237-239 
Corwin on, 6, 225 , 227, 
238-239, 255-256 
Delegation of powers, 149-
150, 161 
Emergency powers of, 69 
Enumerated powers of, 53-
54, 169 
E x e c u t i v e power s of, 59, 
186, 190-192, 198, 200, 
202, 204-205 
F r e e d o m of speech under, 
255 
Hamilton and, 74 
History of, 6, 51, 75, 180, 
182, 184, 219, 226-228, 
230, 238-239 
I n h e r e n t p o w e r s t h e o r y 
of, 169 
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of, 1 4 0 -
143, 147, 149-150, 152-
153, 160, 162, 168, 176, 
231, 239 
Jud ic ia l r e v i e w and, 7 1 -
93 
New Deal and, 147-150 
President ia l oath of, 142 
Re l ig ious ins t ruc t ion and, 
237-239 
Constitution (continued) 
Reserved powers of, 161, 
176, 220 
School prayer and, 7 
Taxes and, 148 
Theories of, 99 
T r e a t i e s and, 183, 207, 
209, 211, 220 
War powers and, 168-169, 
1 7 9 , 1 8 4 - 1 8 8 , 192 , 
1 9 4 - 1 9 7 , 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 , 
249n.33 
C o n s t i t u t i o n , U . S . , specif ic 
provisions of 
A d v i c e a n d C o n s e n t 
Clause, 190 
Army Clause, 170-171 
Bill of Attainder Clause, 
91 
Bill of Rights, 81 , 98 
C a s e o r C o n t r o v e r s y 
C l a u s e , 8 7 - 8 8 , 139, 
141 
Chi ld Labor Amendment, 
147 
Commerce Clause, 4, 140, 
148, 161, 171, 220 
Defense Clause, 220 
Due Process Clause, 100, 
149-150, 161, 227-231 
Eleventh Amendment, 147 
Equal P r o t e c t i o n Clause, 
132 
Ex Post Fac to Clause, 75, 
79, 91 
F i f t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t , 
104 
F i f t h A m e n d m e n t , 100, 
149, 216, 227-228 
F i r s t A m e n d m e n t , 100, 
238-239, 255 
F o u r t e e n t h Amendment , 
6 2 - 6 3 , 100, 132, 227, 
231 
Fourth Amendment, 173 
G e n e r a l Wel fa re Clause, 
148 
J u d i c i a l P o w e r C l a u s e , 
78-79, 139, 143, 154 
Navy Clause, 170-171 
N e c e s s a r y and P r o p e r 
C l a u s e , 7 9 - 8 0 , 214, 
220-221 
262 / CORWIN'S CONSTITUTION 
Constitution (continued) 
Norris Amendment, 62 
Search and Seizure Clause, 
173 
S e v e n t e e n t h Amendment , 
147 
Sixteenth Amendment, 147 
S u p r e m a c y Clause, 55-57, 
77-78, 97-100, 211, 214, 
219 
T e n t h A m e n d m e n t , 5 7 , 
100, 220 
T w e l f t h Amendment , 6 1 , 
147 
C o n s t i t u t i o n of Powers in a 
S e c u l a r S t a t e (book) , 
167 
Consti tutional Convention, 56, 
69, 7 1 , 74-79, 90, 97, 
103-111, 152, 185, 190, 
202, 212, 226 
Consti tutions, s ta te , 75, 79 
Consuls, 214 
Con t inuous v o y a g e , d o c t r i n e 
of, 38 
Contraband goods, 38 
C o o l e y , Thomas (1824-1898), 
jurist, 231 
C o r w i n , E d w a r d S . ( 1 8 7 8 -
1963), p o l i t i c a l scien-
tist, 225, 237 
Air Force and, 170 
Bibliography of, 253 
B r i c k e r Amendment and, 
255 
Career of, 4-6, 11, 23-28, 
165, 225, 231, 233, 236-
238, 255-256 
Court-packing and, 4-5 , 7, 
137, 153, 255 
Criticism of, 9 
Democratic Party and, 165 
Educat ion of, 4, 11, 230-
231 
New Deal and, 137-138 
1936 election and, 145 
Roosevelt and, 137, 165 
Self-crit icism of, 7 
Supreme Court and, 5, 7, 
137-138, 157-158 
Theories of, 255-256 
Treaty powers and, 165 
Corwin, E .S . (continued) 
Woodrow Wilson and, 4 -5 , 
11, 51 , 231, 236-237 
Wr i t i ngs of, 3 -4 , 11-12, 
51-52, 165, 223, 225-
231, 238, 253, 256 
Corwin, Mildred (d. 1969), 6, 
231 
Court-packing, 90, 163, 165 
Corwin and, 4 -5 , 7, 137, 
153, 255 
Effect of, 159-162 
Proposed, 4 -5 , 137, 159 
S e n a t e hearing on, 5, 7, 
137 
C r a t e s (5th c . B.C.), Greek 
poet, 18 
Crat inus (5th c . B.C.), Greek 
poet, 18 
C r e e l , G e o r g e (1876-1953) , 
journalist , 193 
Crime, 7, 233-235 
Crusades, 126 
Cuba, 58 
Culture, theories of, 40-42 
C u s h i n g , C a l e b (1800-1879), 
a t torney general , 55 
C u s h i n g , W i l l i a m ( 1 7 3 2 -
1810), jurist, 96 
D a i l y P r i n c e t o n i a n ( p e r i -
odical), 11, 29 
D a u g h e r t y , H a r r y ( 1 8 6 0 -
1 9 4 1 ) , a t t o r n e y 
general , 65-66 
D a v i d L i p s c o m b C o l l e g e , 
248n.24 
D a v i e , Will iam (1756-1820), 
l a w y e r and polit ician, 
77-78 
D a v i s , John ( 1 8 7 3 - 1 9 5 5 ) , 
l a w y e r and p res iden -
tial candidate , 60, 62, 
200 
D a w e s , C h a r l e s G. ( 1 8 6 5 -
1951), v ice president , 
60 
Death penal ty . See Capital 
punishment 
D e b s , Eugene (1855-1926) , 
socialist poli t ician, 66 
INDEX / 263 
Declara t ion of Human Rights, 
213, 215 
D e c l a r a t i o n of Independence, 
96, 103 
Declarat ion of Par is , 38 
Defense, Department of, 170 
D e l a m a r r e , Louis -Emmanue l 
( 1 7 7 4 - 1 8 6 8 ) , F r e n c h 
jurist, 127 
D e l e g a t i o n of power s , 161, 
172, 176 
Democracy, 208 
Charac te r of, 122 
Ind iv idua l rights and, 18-
20, 22, 122 
O p e r a t i o n of, 160, 162-
163 
Representa t ives in, 20-21 
Democrat ic Par ty , 59 
Corwin and, 165 
Pres iden t i a l elect ions and, 
61-62 
D e n b y , E d w i n (1870-1929) , 
polit ician, 64 
Denmark, 47, 245n.l 
D e n n e t t , T y l e r (1883-1949) , 
historian, 216 
D e p r e s s i o n (1929), 160, 190, 
201 
D e s t r o y e r - B a s e s A g r e e m e n t , 
194, 207-208, 216 
D i c k i n s o n , John (1732-1808), 
s tatesman, 76 
Dinant, Belgium, 46 
D i n g l e y , M r s . E d w a r d R. 
(unidentified), 109-110 
D i o n y s i d a r u s , A l e x a n d r i a n 
grammarian, 17 
Diplomatic immunity, 125-126 
Divorce legislation, 7, 236 
D o c t r i n e of Jud ic ia l Review 
(book), 71 
D o o l e y , M r . S e e D u n n e , 
Finley Pe te r 
Douglas , Paul H. (1892-1976), 
senator , 247n.24 
Dr. Bonham's Case, 95 
Dred Scot t Case , 87-88, 140, 
143, 239 
Dual federal ism, doctr ine of, 
79, 168 
Dulles, Allen W. (1893-1969), 
CIA director , 206 
Du l l e s , John F o s t e r (1888-
1 9 5 9 ) , s e c r e t a r y of 
s ta te , 204, 217 
Dunne , F in l ey Pe t e r (1867-
1936), humorist, 145 
E c o n o m i c S t a b i l i z a t i o n 
Board, 195. 
E d m o n s o n , R o b e r t Edward 
(unidentified), 110 
E i s e n h o w e r , Dwight (1890-
1 9 6 9 ) , p r e s i d e n t , 7, 
165, 204, 206, 208 
Electoral col lege, 60-62, 209 
E l i o t , G e o r g e (1819-1880) , 
English novelist, 124 
E l l s w o r t h , O l i v e r ( 1 7 4 5 -
1807), Supreme Court 
chief just ice, 55, 75 
E m e r g e n c y P r i c e C o n t r o l 
Act, 196-197 
E m p l o y e r s ' L iab i l i ty Cases, 
57 
E p h i a l t e s (d. ca . 456 B.C.), 
Athenian political and 
military leader, 18 
Ethics (periodical), 177 
Europe , 104, 183, 204, 215, 
221, 248n.26 
E u t h y d e m u s ( d i a l o g of 
Plato), 17 
E v a n s , M a r y A n n . S e e 
Eliot, George 
E x e c u t i v e a g r e e m e n t s , 208-
209, 213, 216-217 
Abrogation of, 217 
B r i c k e r Amendment and, 
211, 215, 217, 221 
Charac te r of, 222 
Defined, 68 
Effect of, 68, 217 
Uses of, 221-222 
Executive powers, 59, 65 
Executive privilege, 204-206 
Extradi t ion, 214, 221, 234 
Ext ra te r r i to r ia l i ty , 125-135 
264 / CORWIN'S CONSTITUTION 
F a l l , A l b e r t ( 1 8 6 1 - 1 9 4 4 ) , 
sec re ta ry of the inter-
ior, 65 
F a r m e r , F y k e ( 1 9 0 1 - ) , 
N a s h v i l l e l a w y e r , 
248n.24 
F e d e r a l B u r e a u of I n v e s -
tigation, 205 
Federal courts, 85 
Federal government 
P o w e r s of, 5 3 - 5 6 , 168, 
171-172, 174-175, 179-
181 
Sovereignty of, 179-180 
Sta tes and, 55-57 
F e d e r a l i s t Papers , 72-74, 78, 
92, 96-98, 168, 182, 192 
Feller (unidentified), 19 
Fong Yue Ting v. U.S. , 215, 
222 
Foster v. Neilsen, 212 
France , 186 
Agreements with, 221 
American war with, 102 
Government of, 65, 127 
Trea t ies with, 55, 183, 245 
War with, 187, 190, 203 
World War One and , 37, 
39, 46-47 
F r a n k l i n , B e n j a m i n ( 1 7 0 6 -
1790), statesman 
A r t i c l e s of Confederat ion 
and, 103 
Autobiography of, 101 
Const i tut ional history and, 
101-108, 111-112 
Corwin on, 6, 52 
Early life of, 101 
F e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t and, 
102-104, 107-108 
Inventions of, 101 
Jews and, 109-111 
Madison and 104 
Religion and, 105-108 
Vice presidency and. 111 
Wilson (James) and 104 
Franklin Institute, 109 
F r a n k f u r t e r , F e l i x ( 1 8 8 2 -
1965) , Supreme Cour t 
justice, 199 
F r a n k l i n , J o h n L. (1907- ) , 
Champaign (111.) lawyer, 
237 
F r e y t a g - L o r i n g h o v e n , Baron 
Hugo von (1855-1924), 
G e r m a n m i l i t a r y 
o f f i c e r and a u t h o r , 
243n.3 
Fujii V. California, 213 
G a r v e y , G e r a l d ( 1 9 3 5 - ) , 
polit ical scient is t , 255 
Geer v. Connecticut , 58 
Geofroy v. Riggs, 220 
G e o r g e , Wal te r (1878-1957), 
senator, 176 
G e o r g e W a s h i n g t o n Law 
R e v i e w ( p e r i o d i c a l ) , 
255 
G e r a r d , R i c h a r d H. (1876-
1948), a m b a s s a d o r to 
Germany, 39 
Germany, 40, 42 
Agreements with, 221 
Invas ions by , 34, 39-40, 
43, 46 
S u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e of, 
35-38, 47 
Trea t ies with, 245n.l 
V i o l a t i o n s of i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l law by , 36-
37, 40-42, 47 
War with, 201 
World War One and, 34-
49 
World War Two and, 110 
See also Pan-Germanism 
G e r r y , Elbridge (1744-1814), 
polit ician, 76, 186, 202 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 56-57 
G o o d n o w , F r a n k J. (1859-
1939), polit ical author, 
227 
G o r g i a s ( ca . 485-380 B.C.), 
Greek philosopher, 17 
Governors, 59 
G r a n t , M a r s h a l l ( 1 8 6 5 -
1 9 3 7 ) , l a w y e r a n d 
author, 110 
Gray-Snyder t r ia l , 235 
Great Britain, 169, 174, 186, 
190, 192, 248n.26 
A g r e e m e n t s w i t h , 194, 
208, 216, 221 
INDEX / 265 
Great Britain (continued) 
A m e r i c a n Revolution and, 
29 
Arbitrat ion law of, 133 
Cabinet of, 65, 117, 194 
C a r o l i n e Affai r and, 45-
46 
China and, 130 
Courts of, 128 
Crime in, 233-234 
Embargo by, 35, 37 
G o v e r n m e n t of, 118, 194, 
208 
Juries in, 234-235 
Peerage of, 119 
Trea t ies with, 67-68, 219, 
245n.2 
United S ta tes and, 38, 212 
World War One and, 35 , 
37 
G r e a t War . See World War 
One 
Greek philosophy, 17-21 
G r e e n Bag (periodical) , 225-
231 
G r e y , E d w a r d (1862-1933) , 
B r i t i s h s e c r e t a r y of 
s t a t e f o r f o r e i g n 
affairs, 38 
G r e y , V i scoun t of Fol lodon. 
See Grey, Edward 
Greytown Affair, 203 
G r o t e , G e o r g e (1794-1871) , 
English historian, 17 
G r o t i u s , Hugo (1583-1645) , 
Dutch legal theorist , 46 
Grove , William Robert (1811-
1896), British jurist, 44 
G u f f e y C o a l C o n s e r v a t i o n 
Act, 148 
Gun control , 7, 234 
Habeas corpus, 122, 192, 197, 
199 
H a m i l t o n , A l e x a n d e r (1755-
1804), poli t ical s ta tes -
m a n , 1 0 6 , 1 8 2 , 187 , 
190, 192, 202 
Bank proposal and, 56 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r y of, 
74, 79-80 
Hamilton (continued) 
1800 election and, 61 
Jud ic ia l powers and, 72-
7 3 , 7 8 - 7 9 , 8 1 , 8 5 , 
91-92, 96-98 
P r e s i d e n t i a l powers and, 
59-60 
War p o w e r s a n d , 168 , 
186, 202-203 
H a r d i n g , W a r r e n ( 1 8 6 5 -
1923), president , 160, 
216 
H a r d i n g - H u g h e s Washington 
Conference, 216 
H a r t n e t t , Robert C. (1904-), 
e d i t o r and C a t h o l i c 
priest , 237 
H a r v a r d Law Review (peri-
odical), 231 
H a t c h , Louis Clinton (1872-
1931), American histo-
rian, 111 
Head Money Cases , 215, 222 
H e g e l , G e o r g W i l h e l m 
F r i e d r i c h (1770-1831), 
G e r m a n p h i l o s o p h e r , 
40, 42-43 
H e n r y , P a t r i c k (1736-1799), 
lawyer and revolution-
ary leader, 101 
Henderson v. New York, 57 
Henry Holt & Company, 225 
Hepburn v. Griswold, 99 
Higher law, 256 
Hipp ia s (5th cen tury B.C.), 
Athenian lecturer , 17 
Hiroshima, 167-168, 177 
H i s t o r y T e a c h e r ' s Magazine 
(periodical), 231 
H i t l e r , Adolf (1889-1945) , 
German dictator , 110 
H o b a r t , H e n r y (d . 1625), 
English jurist, 95 
Hoke V. U.S., 54 
Holland, 34 
H o l l a n d , T h o m a s E r s k i n e 
( 1 8 3 5 - 1 9 2 6 ) , Engl ish 
professor, 24-25 
Hol l in s , George (1799-1878), 
naval officer, 203 
266 / CORWIN'S CONSTITUTION 
H o l m e s , O l i v e r W e n d e l l 
( 1 8 4 1 - 1 9 3 5 ) , Supreme 
Cour t justice, 90, 146, 
151, 213, 239 
H o l t , J o h n ( 1 6 4 2 - 1 7 1 0 ) , 
British jurist, 95 
Holy Roman Empire, 61 
Homicide, 233 
Hoover Commission, 173 
Hopk ins , H a r r y (1890-1946) , 
p r e s i d e n t i a l a d v i s o r , 
208 
Hot Oil Cases, 149, 161 
House of Commons, 194 
House of Representa t ives , 6 1 -
62, 104, 118-119, 181, 
185, 198, 205, 209 
Hoxie Case, 57, 229 
Hughes, Charles Evans (1862-
1948) , Sup reme Cour t 
chief just ice, 142, 148, 
160, 216 
H u i d e k o p e r , F r e d e r i c Louis 
( 1 8 7 4 - 1 9 4 0 ) , m i l i t a r y 
author, 30 
H u l l , C o r d e l l ( 1 8 7 1 - 1 9 5 5 ) , 
secre ta ry of s ta te , 216 
Hull-Litvinow Agreement, 216 
Hull-Lothian Agreement, 216 
H u t c h i n s o n , Thomas ( 1 7 1 1 -
1780), co lon i a l po l i t i -
cian, 96 
H y d r o g e n b o m b , 168, 170, 
172, 209 
Hyphenatism, 29 
I h e r i n g , Rudolph von . S e e 
Jhering, Rudolph von 
Immigration, 51, 54, 68 
Impeachment, 120, 205, 234 
Income Tax Case , 99 
Indians, 111 
Individual rights, 33, 43, 122-
123, 129, 135, 229, 256 
I n l a n d e r (periodical) , 11, 13, 
17 
Interior, secre tary of, 64 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l B u s i n e s s 
M a c h i n e s C o r p o r a t i o n , 
95, 211 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l law, 184, 202, 
204 
Germany and, 42, 46, 48 
Nature of, 125 
Pro tes t s under, 135 
Purposes of, 33 
R i g h t s under , 34, 37-38, 
43, 131, 135 
Vio la t ions of, 36-37, 40, 
45, 47 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law A s s o c i a -
tion, 42 
I n t e r s t a t e commerce, 54, 57 
S e e a l s o C o n s t i t u t i o n , 
U.S. , Commerce Clause 
Ireland, 103 
I s h i i , V i s c o u n t K i k u j i r o 
(1866 -1945 ) , Japanese 
diplomat, 68, 216 
I t a l y , 3 7 , 1 3 2 - 1 3 3 , 2 2 1 , 
245n. l , 248n.24 
J a c k s o n , A n d r e w ( 1 7 6 7 -
1845), president 
Bank proposal and, 64 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r i e s 
of, 99 
Judicial powers and, 87 
P r e s i d e n t i a l powers and, 
87 
Sup reme Court and, 140, 
142, 153 
J a c k s o n , R o b e r t H. (1892-
1 9 5 4 ) , a t t o r n e y 
g e n e r a l and S u p r e m e 
Court just ice, 194-195, 
199, 201, 205 
J a m e s , Henry (1843-1916) , 
novelist, 39 
Jameson , J. F r a n k l i n (1859-
1937), historian, 110 
Japan, 51 , 68, 216 
Jay Trea ty , 198 
J e f f e r s o n , T h o m a s ( 1 7 4 3 -
1826), pres ident , 186, 
191, 202, 238 
Alien rights and, 55 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r i e s 
of, 99 
1800 elect ion and, 61 
Impeachment and, 120 
INDEX / 267 
Jefferson (continued) 
Jud i c i a ry and, 74, 82-87, 
98 
P r e s i d e n t i a l powers and, 
59-60 
Supreme Cour t and, 140, 
153 
Jews, 109-111 
J h e r i n g , Rudolph von (1818-
1 8 9 2 ) , German j u r i s t , 
33 
J o h n s o n , A n d r e w ( 1 8 0 8 -
1875), president, 197 
Judicial powers, 75, 87-90 
J u d i c i a l r e v i e w , 7 1 - 7 2 , 90 -
92, 1 3 9 - 1 4 3 , 150-152, 
191, 200, 204, 225-230, 
256 
Blackstone on, 96 
Corwin on, 52, 225-226 
Defined, 95 
Doctrines of, 73-93 
Ef fec t of, 71 -74 , 8 2 - 8 6 , 
91-92, 98, 100 
F e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n and, 
97-98 
Finali ty of, 72, 74, 82, 85-
86, 89, 98 
H i s t o r y of, 95 -96 , 143, 
152, 162 
Limits of, 154-158 
Natural law and, 95-100 
New Deal and, 52 
Operation of, 159 
Purposes of, 142 
Scope of, 72, 82, 91, 95-
96 
S t a t e a c t i o n and, 97 -98 , 
151 
Supreme Court and, 63 
Theories of, 71-72, 90-92, 
97-98, 226 
Treat ies and, 222 
Types of, 52 
Ultra vires and, 79, 91 
J u d i c i a r y , 141-143, 146, 154, 
219, 234-235 
Judiciary Act of 1802, 84 
J u d i c i a r y Act of 1789, 85 , 
219-220 
Juries, 234-235, 255 
Kefauver , Estes (1903-1963), 
senator, 181, 247n.23 
K e l l o g g , F r a n k B . ( 1 8 5 6 -
193 7 ) , s e c r e t a r y of 
s ta te , 131 
K e n t , J a m e s ( 1 7 6 3 - 1 8 4 7 ) , 
jurist, 231 
Kentucky Resolutions, 75, 83 
K e r r , Ph i l i p Henry (1882-
1940), Br i t i sh d ip lo -
mat, 216 
K i r k p a t r i c k , E v r o n M . 
( 1 9 1 1 ) , p o l i t i c a l 
scientist , 254 
K o h l e r , Josef (1849-1919) , 
G e r m a n j u r i s t a n d 
author, 42-44, 249n.7 
Korea, 216 
Korean War, 204, 250n.36 
Kra tes . See Cra tes 
Krat inus. See Cratinus 
Kuomintang, 115-116 
Labor regulation, 53-54 
LaFollet te , Robert M. (1855-
1925), senator, 62 
Laissez-faire theory, 228 
Lake Mohonk Conference on 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Arbi t ra-
tion, 6, 53 
L a n s i n g , R o b e r t ( 1 8 6 4 -
1 9 2 8 ) , s e c r e t a r y of 
s ta te , 68, 216 
Lansing-Ishii Agreement, 68, 
216 
Lasson , Adolf (1832-1917) , 
G e r m a n p h i l o s o p h e r , 
40-42, 47 
L a w y e r s , 22, 88 , 90, 146, 
234 
League of Nations, 125 
Legal education, 134-135 
Legal ph i losophy , 127-129, 
132-135, 231 
Legal Tender Cases , 99 
Legislative powers, 65, 152 
L e g i s l a t i v e v e t o . S e e 
Concurrent resolutions 
L e i b n i t z , G o t t f r i e d Wilhelm 
v o n ( 1 6 4 6 - 1 7 1 6 ) , 
G e r m a n p h i l o s o p h e r , 
42 
268 / CORWIN'S CONSTITUTION 
Lend Lease Act, 201-207, 216 
Liberation (periodical), 109 
Library of Congress, 109-110 
Li l ienthal , David (1899-1981), 
c h a i r m a n of A t o m i c 
E n e r g y C o m m i s s i o n , 
168, 177 
Lille, Denmark, 47 
L i n c o l n , A b r a h a m ( 1 8 0 9 -
1 8 6 5 ) , p r e s i d e n t , 30 -
3 1 , 182, 192-193, 197, 
199, 202 
Cabinet and, 64 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l t heo ry of. 
99 
Dred Scot t Case and, 87-
88 
P r e s i d e n t i a l power s and. 
66 
Supreme Cour t and 140-
142, 144, 153 
L i t v i n o w , M a k s i m ( 1 8 7 6 -
1951), Soviet diplomat. 
216 
L o c k e , J o h n ( 1 6 3 2 - 1 7 0 4 ) , 
E n g l i s h p h i l o s o p h e r . 
152, 189, 191, 193, 207 
Locksely Hall (poem), 171 
Lords of Trade , 101 
L o t h i a n , M a r q u i s of. S e e 
Kerr, Philip Henry 
Louvain, Belgium (Leuven), 46 
Lucas , Sco t t W. (1892-1968), 
senator, 250n.36 
Lusitania (ship), 37, 46, 48 
Luxembourg, 39, 245n.l 
Ly t t on , Bulwer (1803-1873) , 
English author, 209 
M c C a r t h y , J o s e p h ( 1 9 0 8 -
1957), senator , 206 
McCollum Case , 237-239 
McCormick v. Sullivant, 214 
M c K e n n a , J o s e p h ( 1 8 4 3 -
1926) , Supreme Cour t 
justice, 54 
M c K i n l e y , W i l l i a m ( 1 8 4 3 -
1901), p r e s i d e n t , 187, 
203, 215, 221 
M c L a u g h l i n , A n d r e w C . 
( 1 8 6 1 - 1 9 4 7 ) , h i s t o r i a n 
102-103, 231 
; 
Maclay, William (1734-1804), • 
senator . 111 • 
M c M a h o n , J a m e s ( 1 9 0 3 - • 
1952), senator , 247n. l4 • 
Madi son , James (1751-1836), • 
p r e s i d e n t , 106, 185 - V 
186, 191, 202, 238 J 
Alien rights and, 55 • 
Franklin and, 104 H 
Jud ic ia l powers and, 74, • 
76, 78-84, 92, 97-98 • 
P r e s i d e n t i a l powers and, • 
60 • 
S ta tes rights and, 148 1 
Magna Car ta , 96 • 
M a i n e , Henry James Sumner B 
( 1 8 2 2 - 1 8 8 8 ) E n g l i s h • 
lawyer and author, 24 1 
M a l t k e , v a n . S e e Mol tke , m 
Helmuth von H 
Mann Act, 54 • 
Marbury v. Madison, 71 , 73, • 
8 5 - 8 7 , 90, 92, 97-98, I 
1 4 3 , 1 9 1 , 204, 226- I 
227 1 
M a r k b y , W i l l i a m ( 1 8 2 9 - 1 
1914), Engl i sh jur is t , 1 
24 1 
Marriage legislation, 236 • 
M a r s h a l l , John (1755-1835), • 
S u p r e m e Cour t ch ie f H 
just ice, 54-57, 79, 90- • 
9 1 , 9 6 - 9 7 , 152, 155, • 
157, 182, 198, 212 • 
M a r b u r y c a s e and , 7 3 , • 
8 5 - 8 6 , 9 2 , 97, 191 , • 
204, 227 • 
M a r s h a l l , T h o m a s ( 1 8 5 4 - H 
1925), v i ce president , H 
63 • 
Martial law, 197 • 
M a r t i n , G e o r g e ( 1 9 2 6 - ) , • 
author, 255 1 
M a r t i n , Lu the r ( ca . 1748- • 
1826), lawyer, 76 • 
Mason , G e o r g e (1725-1792), • 
s tatesman, 76 V 
Maximilian, Pr ince of Baden 1 
( 1 8 6 7 - 1 9 2 9 ) , German • 
kaiser, 134 I 
M e r c e r , John (1759-1821) , • 
polit ician, 76 H 
Mexican War, 29-30, 187, 192 
Mexico, 58 
M i c h i g a n Alumnus ( p e r i o d i -
cal) , 23 
M i c h i g a n L a w R e v i e w 
(periodical), 231 
Middle East, 204 
Migra tory Game Bird Trea ty , 
67-68 
Military draft, 11, 30-31 
Military enlistment, 30-31 
M i l l e r , S a m u e l F . ( 1 8 1 6 -
1890) , Supreme Cour t 
justice, 157-158, 203 
Milligan, Ex par te , 193 
Minimum Wage Case, 141-142 
Minnesota Rate Cases , 57 
Missouri Compromise, 93, 140 
Missouri v. Holland, 68, 213-
214 
M o l t k e , Helmuth von (1800-
1891), Prussian military 
officer, 16 
M o n d o u V. N . Y . , N . H . & 
H.R.R. Co. , 57 
Monroe Doctr ine, 185, 187 
M o n t e s q u i e u , B a r o n (1689-
1755), French political 
philosopher, 73, 117 
M o r r i s , G o u v e r n e u r (1752-
1 8 1 6 ) , s t a t e s m a n , 76, 
108 
Mouse's Case , 36 
Municipal law, 33 
Myers v. U.S. , 142 
Napoleon (1769-1821), French 
emperor, 119 
National Housing Agency, 195 
N a t i o n a l Indus t r i a l Recovery 
Act, 140, 148 
N a t i o n a l S u p r e m a c y (book) . 
55 
N a t i o n a l War Labor Board , 
195 
Natural law, 95-100 
Natural izat ion, 62, 104 
Navy, secre ta ry of, 64, 201 
Nazi Par ty , 109-110, 175 
Necessi ty , theory of, 39, 42-
46 
Neely v. Henkel, 215, 221 
INDEX / 269 
Nelson , Samuel (1792-1873), 
S u p r e m e Cour t ch ie f 
just ice, 203 
Netherlands, 201, 245 
Neutrali ty Act, 198 
N e u t r a l i t y P r o c l a m a t i o n of 
1793, 59 
Neutra l i ty rights, 34, 37-38, 
43 
New Deal, 139, 144 
Congress and, 156 
Const i tu t ional i ty of, 147-
149, 156, 158 
Corwin and, 4-7 , 137-138 
Judicial review and, 52 
Supreme Court and, 4-5, 
7, 9 9 - 1 0 0 , 1 3 7 - 1 3 8 , 
145, 148-150, 153, 156, 
159-160, 163 
See also Court-packing 
New York Court of Appeals, 
235 
N e w York Hera ld Tr ibune 
(periodical), 219 
New York Times (periodical). 
4, 9, 175, 206 
Nicaragua, 203 
N i e m e y e r , Theodor (1857-
1 9 3 9 ) , German lega l 
scholar, 244n.7 
N ixon , R i c h a r d M. (1913-), 
president, 7, 165, 208-
209 
Noble S ta te Bank v. Haskell, 
228 
Nordau , Max Simon (1849-
1923), German author. 
20 
Nor th At lan t ic Trea ty , 181, 
1 8 3 - 1 8 5 , 188 , 2 0 3 -
204, 250n.35 
Nor th A t l a n t i c Union, 180-
182 
Office of Censorship, 195 
Off ice of C iv i l i an Defense, 
195 
O f f i c e of D e f e n s e T r a n s -
portat ion, 195 
Office of Fac ts and Figures, 
195 
270 / CORWIN'S CONSTITUTION 
Office of Production Manage-
ment, 195 
O f f i c e of War In fo rmat ion , 
195 
Organic Law of China, 6, 113 
C h a r a c t e r of, 117, 122-
123 
Effect of, 115-124 
Purpose of 116, 123-124 
See also China 
O t i s , J a m e s ( 1 7 2 5 - 1 7 8 3 ) , 
lawyer, 95-96 
Outlook (periodical), 13 
Oxford University, 23 
Pacifism, 29-31 
Panama Canal , 58 
Pan-Germanism, 41 , 244n.5 
See also Germany 
Pardons, 190 
Par is , Treaty of, 212, 219 
Parl iament, 104 
Parl iament, Chinese, 134-135 
P a r s o n s , Wilfrid (1887-1958), 
C a t h o l i c p r i e s t and 
author, 237 
Par t ies , poli t ical , 123-124 
P a s c h k i s , V i c t o r ( 1 8 9 8 - ) , 
engineer, 246n.2 
P a t t e r s o n , R o b e r t ( 1 8 9 1 -
19 5 2 ) , s e c r e t a r y of 
war, 181 
P e a r l H a r b o r , bombing of. 
187, 203 
Peggy Case , The, 212 
Pel ley, William Dudley (1890-
1965), author, 109-110 
P e n n s y l v a n i a , c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
103-104 
Pension Case , 82 
P e r i c l e s ( d . 4 2 9 B . C . ) , 
A t h e n i a n p o l i t i c a l 
leader, 18, 20 
P h i l a d e l p h i a Record ( p e r i -
odical), 7, 145 
P h i l l i p s , H . C . ( 1 8 8 0 - ) , 
a s s o c i a t i o n s e c r e t a r y . 
53 
P i c k n e y , C h a r l e s ( 1 7 4 6 -
1 8 2 5 ) , s t a t e s m a n , 77, 
83, 109-110, 185 
P i e r c e , William (1740-1789), 1 
m i l i t a r y o f f i ce r and 1 
statesman. 111 1 
P i t t s b u r g h L e g a l J o u r n a l | 
(periodical), 52, 71 1 










o l i t i c a l quest ions doctr ine, 1 
191, 217 1 
o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Reviewer 1 
(periodical), 255 1 
o i k , J a m e s Knox ( 1 7 9 5 - 1 
1849), p r e s i d e n t , 30, 1 
69 1 
o l l o c k , F r e d e r i c k (1845- 1 
1 9 3 7 ) , Engl i sh l ega l 1 
scholar, 122 1 
ortugal, 245n.l I 
otsdam, 208, 221 • 
ou l t ry Case , 139-142, 144, • 
160 • 
owell, Thomas Reed (1880- I 
1955), l ega l s c h o l a r , I 
143, 150-151, 155 • 
residency, 6, 68, 165, 172, 1 
184, 187 • 
A p p o i n t m e n t power of, 1 
59, 63-64, 66, 90 • 
Cabinet of, 51 1 
Chief execut ive , 203, 215 • 
C o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f , 51 , • 
59, 66, 170, 173, 187, • 
1 9 2 , 1 9 4 - 1 9 5 , 2 0 3 , • 
215-216 • 
Congress and, 207 1 
De lega t ion of powers to, 1 
149 • 
Disability of, 63 • 
Duties of, 65-66, 68 • 
E l e c t i o n of, 5 1 , 6 0 - 6 3 , • 
147, 209 • 
Eligibility for, 62, 104 • 
E x e c u t i v e p r iv i l ege and, • 
204-206 • 
F o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s and, 1 
66-67, 215-216, 222 • 
History of, 190 • 
Jud ic i a l r e v i e w and, 95, • 
99 • 
L e a d e r s h i p of, 5 1 , 68 , 1 
87-88 • 
1928 elect ion, 120 • 
1936 elect ion, 145-147 • 
1940 elect ion, 7 • 
Presidency (continued) 
Oath of, 63, 86-87, 142 
Powers of, 4, 6, 59-60, 63, 
66-67, 69, 75, 88, 171, 
173, 181, 184-188, 190-
195, 197-204, 207 
R e m o v a l power s of, 59, 
63 , 65 , 83 , 142, 190-
191 
S u p r e m e Cour t and, 72, 
140-142, 145, 153 
Theories of, 68-69, 191 
Third term for, 7, 236 
T r e a t i e s and, 66-68, 131, 
174-175 , 184-185, 212, 
222 
Veto power of, 63, 68, 76, 
155, 191, 201, 209 
War powers of, 249n.33 
President : Office and Powers 
(book), 51, 238 
P r e s i d e n t i a l Success ion Act, 
63 
P r i n c e t o n A l u m n i W e e k l y 
(periodical), 59 
P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y , 23-27, 
225, 231, 233, 236-237 
China affiliation of, 113 
Corwin and, 4, 11 , 165, 
255-256 
Faculty of, 24-27 
Library of, 109 
Preceptor ia l system, 4, 11, 
23-28, 236 
Students of, 23-27 
Wilson at, 4, 11, 236-237 
1 P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 
t 33, 225 
Pr ize Cases, 192 
P r o c l a m a t i o n of Impartial i ty, 
186 
P r o c l a m a t i o n of N e u t r a l i t y , 
190, 198, 202 
P r o d i c u s ( 5 t h c . B . C . ) , 
A t h e n i a n p h i l o s o p h e r . 
17 
' Prohibit ion, 66 
1 P r o t a g o r a s (5 th c . B . C . ) , 
A t h e n i a n p h i l o s o p h e r . 
17 
Prussia, 48, 244n.7 
INDEX / 271 
Queue Case, 132 
Raher, In re , 57 
R a n n e y , J o h n C . ( 1 9 1 5 -
1950), political scien-
tist, 182 
R e e d , S t a n l e y (1884-1980) , 
Supreme Court just ice. 
99, 238 
Referendum measures, 176 
R e g i n a v . D u d l e y a n d 
Stephens, 44 
Relat ivi ty , theory of, 246n.l 
R e l i g i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n , 223 , 
237-239 
R e m i n g t o n Arms Company , 
195 
R e p u b l i c a n P a r t y , 59, 6 1 -
62, 120 
Retal ia t ion, law of, 37-38 
Revista Brasileira de Estudos 
P o l i t i c o s (per iod ica l ) . 
254 
Rheims, France (Reims), 46 
R o b e r t s , Owen (1875-1955), 
Supreme Court just ice. 
99, 181, 247n.23 
R o d r i g u e s , L e d a B o e c h a t 
( 1 9 1 7 - ) , B r a z i l i a n 
political scientist , 254 
R o g e r s , J a m e s G r a f t o n 
( 1 8 8 3 - 1 9 7 1 ) , l e g a l 
scholar, 187, 203 
Roman Empire, 126-127 
Roman law, 126 
R o o s e v e l t , F r a n k l i n (1882-
1 9 4 5 ) , p r e s i d e n t , 7, 
197, 208, 216, 249n.33 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l theory of. 
99 
Corwin and, 165 
C o u r t - p a c k i n g and, 4 - 5 , 
7, 90, 159-163 
Labor relat ions and, 196 
New Deal and, 4-5 , 137-
139, 144 
1936 e l e c t i o n and, 90, 
146-147 
Powers of, 165, 194, 196, 
201, 207 
272 / CORWIN'S CONSTITUTION 
Roosevelt, F. (continued) 
Supreme Court and, 90, 
137-138, 144, 146 
S u p r e m e C o u r t appoint-
ments of, 162 
Roosevel t , Theodore (1858-
1919), president, 215 
Character of, 15-16 
Confidentiality and, 205 
Congressional leader, 68 
Const i tu t ional theory of. 
99 
Corwin and, 5, 11-12 
Reformer, 15-16 
Stewardship theory of, 69, 
191 
Supreme Court and, 153 
War and, 15-16 
Ross, In re, 214 
R o s s i t e r , C l i n t o n ( 1 9 1 7 -
1970), pol i t ical scien-
tist, 108 
Rumania, 34 
Rusk in , John ( 1 8 1 9 - 1 9 0 0 ) , 
E n g l i s h s o c i a l 
commentator, 16 
R u s s e l l , W i l l i a m Howard 
( 1 8 2 0 - 1 9 0 7 ) , Eng l i sh 
n e w s p a p e r cor respon-
dent, 193 
Rut ledge, John (1739-1800), 
statesman and Supreme 
Court justice, 77 
Rutledge, Wiley (1894-1949), 
Supreme Court justice. 
238 
Sacco-Vanzetti trial, 235 
Sawyer , Charles (1887-1979), 
secretary of commerce. 
198 
Scandinavia, 34 
S c h w e p p e , Al f red (1895-) , 
Seattle lawyer, 214 
S c u d d e r , Townsend (1865-
1 9 6 0 ) , N e w Y o r k 
justice, 235 
Sedition Act, 82 
S e l d e n , John ( 1 5 8 4 - 1 6 5 4 ) , 
English jurist, 115 
j 
Sena te , 118, 181, 185-186, 1 
205-206, 222 • 
Advice and consent of, fl 
63-64, 66-67 • 
Election to, 147 • 
Eligibility for, 104 • 
Foreign affairs and, 211 • 
Powers of, 190 1 
Supreme Court and, 162 1 
Treaties and, 67-68, 131, • 
215, 217, 220, 222 • 
Vice pres iden t and, 61- 1 
62 • 
S e p a r a t i o n of p o w e r s , H 
d o c t r i n e of, 65, 82, H 
117, 1 9 7 - 1 9 8 , 2 2 6 - • 
227, 256 • 
Serbia, 34 • 
Seward , William H. (1801- • 
1872) , s e c r e t a r y of B 
state, 64, 193 • 
Sforza , Car lo (1873-1952), • 
I ta l ian foreign minis- 1 
ter, 248n.24 • 
Shakespeare , William (1564- H 
1616), English p lay- • 
Wright, 16 1 
S h a r m a n . S e e S h e r m a n , • 
Roger H 
Sherman, Roger (1721-1793), • 
s ta tesman and politi- H 
cian, 106 H 
Sherman, William T. (1820- • 
1891), army genera l , H 
110 H 
S h e r w o o d , R o b e r t ( 1 8 9 6 - I 
1955), playwright and H 
speech writer, 208 H 
Shoup, Earl L. (1886-1953), • 
political scientist. 111 H 
Slavery, 79 H 
Smith V. Alabama, 57 • 
Smuts, Jan Christiaan (1870- H 
1950), South African H 
p r i m e m i n i s t e r , H 
249n.33 • 
Socie ty for Social Respon- H 
s i b i l i t y in S c i e n c e , H 
246n.2 • 
Sophistry, 17-22 • 
South Africa, 134 • 
South Carolina v. U.S., 53 
Southern Institute of Politics, 
236 
Sovie t Union, 123, 174, 180, 
216, 221 
S p a a k , P a u l - H e n r i ( 1 8 9 9 -
1972), Belgian premier 
and U . N . s e c r e t a r y 
general, 248n.26 
Spaight , Richard (1758-1802), 
statesman, 77 
Spain, 46, 215, 245n.2 
Spanish-American War, 187 
S t a r e decisis, 72, 88-90, 99, 
140, 142 
S t a s o n , E. B l y t h e ( 1 8 9 1 -
1972) , l ega l scholar . 
172 
State , Department of, 37, 81 
State , secretary of, 63, 204 
States, powers of, 6, 51, 56-
57 
S t a t e s Rights doc t r ine , 3 1 , 
180, 228 
Reserved powers and, 148-
150, 161 
Treaties and, 68, 214 
S tee l Seizure Case, 95, 173, 
198-200, 207 
S t e e l e , Richard (1672-1729), 
British playwright and 
politician, 107 
S tevens , Richard G. (1925-), 
political scientist, 255 
S t o n e , Harlan Fiske (1872-
1946), Supreme Court 
justice, 151 
S t o r y , Joseph (1779-1845), 
Supreme Court justice. 
171, 182, 238-239 
S t r e i t , C l a r e n c e ( 1 8 9 6 - ) , 
author, 180 
Suffrage, 104 
Sumter, Fort, 192 
Supreme Court, U.S., 57, 69, 
171, 184, 190-193, 196, 
198, 203, 207, 216, 221, 
226, 229, 231, 235, 237-
239, 255 
C h a r a c t e r of, 1 4 3 - 1 4 6 , 
151-152, 155 
INDEX / 273 
Supreme Court (continued) 
Civil War and, 153 
C o n g r e s s and, 141-142, 
154-155, 157-158, 161-
162 
D e c i s i o n s of, 140-141, 
152 
Judicial review and, 63 
Jurisdiction of, 85, 154 
Lawyers and 146 
New Deal and, 4 -5 , 7, 
99-100, 137-140, 145-
146, 148-150, 153, 156, 
158-160, 163 
Overrulings and reversals 
by, 99, 141-143, 152, 
155 
Po l i t i c s and, 153, 157-
158-159, 162-163 
Popular opinion and, 156-
158 
Powers of, 71-72, 159-
160 
P res iden t and, 140-142, 
145-146 
P r o p o s a l for , 157-158, 
162 
School prayer and, 7 
Size of, 153-154, 162 
Treaties and, 212-213 
Supreme Court justices 
Appointment of, 153, 162 
Oath of, 86-87 
Politics and, 145 
Qualifications of, 157 
Retirement of, 156-158 
Sussex (ship), 35, 38, 243n.2 
S u t h e r l a n d , George (1862-
1942), Supreme Court 
jus t ice , 141-142, 169, 
171 
Sweden, 245n.l 
S w i t z e r l a n d , 34, 2 4 5 n . l , 
248n.24 
Taft, William Howard (1857-
1930), pres ident , 69, 
191 
T a f t - H a r t l e y Act, 4, 199, 
207 
274 / CORWIN'S CONSTITUTION 
T a l l e y r a n d - P e r i g o r d , Charles 
M a u r i c e d e (1 7 5 4 -
1838) , F r e n c h s t a t e s -
man, 16 
T a n e y , Roge r Brooke (1777-
1864) , Supreme C o u r t 
justice, 87, 192 
Teapot Dome Scandal , 64 
T e n n y s o n , A l f r e d ( 1 8 0 9 -
1 8 9 2 ) , E n g l i s h p o e t , 
171 
Tenure of Office Act, 197 
T e r r i t o r i a l ju r i sd ic t ion , 126-
127 
Theology, 22 
Think (periodical), 95, 211 
Thomas , E l b e r t (1883-1953) , 
senator , 247n.24 
T h o m a s - D o u g l a s R e s o l u t i o n , 
247n.24 
Tientsin, Treaty of, 127 
Tories , 29 
Trade , internat ional , 54 
T r e a t i e s , 102, 174-175, 183-
184, 184, 202-203 
A b r o g a t i o n of, 131 , 215, 
217 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of, 55 , 
57-58, 83, 220 
Effect of, 219 
France and, 183 
L e g i s l a t i o n u n d e r , 2 1 3 -
214, 220-222 
Limits on 213 
M o s t F a v o r e d N a t i o n 
clause, 127, 131 
Negotiation of, 66-68, 131 
P o w e r s of, 6, 5 1 , 67-68, 
165, 190, 202, 207, 209, 
221-222, 211-213, 225 
President and, 211-212 
Ratification of, 67-68, 131 
S c o p e of, 5 3 - 5 5 , 5 7 - 5 8 , 
67-68, 165, 214 
Types of, 55 
Treasury, secre tary of, 63-64 
T r e i t s c h k e , H e i n r i c h von 
( 1 8 3 4 - 1 8 9 6 ) , G e r m a n 
historian, 41 , 47 
Tripoli , 202-203 
T r u m a n , H a r r y S . ( 1 8 8 4 -
1972), pres ident , 4, 7, 
165, 201, 247n.23 
Truman (continued) 
S t e e l S e i z u r e Case and, 
9 5 , 1 7 3 , 1 9 8 , 2 0 7 , 
250n. l5 
Tsing Hua Universi ty, 113 
Tucker v. Alexandroff, 217 
T u l s a H e r a l d ( p e r i o d i c a l ) , 
109 
Turkey, 126-127 
Tweed, William "Boss" (1823-
1 8 7 8 ) , T a m m a n y 
polit ician, 115 
T w i l i g h t of t h e S u p r e m e 
Court (book), 143 
U n i t e d N a t i o n s , 174, 181 , 
188, 247n.24 
Assembly, 174, 179 
Atomic energy and, 174, 
176-179 
Char te r of, 213, 250n.35, 
250n. l5 
S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , 174, 
179, 247n.24, 250n.35 
United S ta tes , 133 
China and, 130-131 
Immigration and, 127 
Judiciary of, 133-134 
Legal philosophy in, 132-
133, 135 
World War One and, 34-
48 
U n i t e d S t a t e s Employmen t 
Service , 195 
U.S . V. Adair , 228 
U.S . V. Belmont, 216-217 
U . S . V. C u r t i s s - W r i g h t 
E x p o r t C o r p o r a t i o n , 
169, 171 
U . S . V. Delaware & Hudson 
Canal Co. , 228 
U.S. V. Fox, 214 
U.S . V. Midwest Oil Co. , 199 
U.S . V. Pewee Coal Co. , 199 
U.S . V. Pink, 216-217, 222 
University of Berlin, 42 
University of Chicago 231 
University of Chicago Round 
Table, 168 
University of Kiel, 244n.7 
U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n , 4, 
11, 230-231 
INDEX / 275 
University of Pennsylvania, 4, 
231 
University of Virginia, 238 
U p t o n , E m e r y ( 1 8 3 9 - 1 8 8 1 ) , 
m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r and 
author, 30 
V a u g h n , S t e p h e n ( 1 9 4 7 - ) , 
historian, 255 
Versai l les , Treaty of, 67, 134 
Vested rights, 227-228 
V ice p r e s i d e n c y , 6 0 - 6 1 , 63, 
111, 208-209 
V i n c i , L e o n a r d o da (1452-
1519), Florent ine ar t is t 
and scientis t , 246n.2 
Vinson, Fred M. (1890-1953), 
S u p r e m e C o u r t c h i e f 
just ice, 199-200 
Virginia Resolutions, 75, 83 
Virginius Affair, 46 
V o l t a i r e (1694-1778), French 
author, 61 
War, 15-16, 29-31 , 46-48, 60, 
66, 194 
War a g e n c i e s , 193-195, 197-
198 
War Cyclopedia (book), 255 
War Industries Board, 193 
War Labor Board, 195 
War Labor Disputes Act, 196, 
199 
War M a n p o w e r Commiss ion , 
195 
War of 1812, 187 
War p o w e r s . See Congress; 
Presidency 
War Production Board, 195 
War, secre ta ry of, 201 
W a r r e n , C h a r l e s (1868-1954), 
lawyer and author, 85-
89 
W a s h i n g t o n , G e o r g e (1732-
1 7 9 9 ) , p r e s i d e n t , 59 -
60, 64, 103, 186, 190-
191, 198, 202, 205 
Waterloo, Batt le of, 183 
W e b s t e r , Dan ie l (1782-1852), 
l a w y e r , 4 5 , 87, 155, 
182, 231 
Vv^ebster, P e l a t i a h ( 1 7 2 6 -
1795), wri ter , 231 
W e e k s - M c L e a n M i g r a t o r y 
Bird Law, 58 
Welch V. Swazey, 228 
West Indies, 183, 198 
Whig Par ty , 29 
Whi t e , Houston (1901-1978), 
Atlanta lawyer, 233 
W h i t e , W. Woods ( 1 8 5 7 -
1927), Atlanta banker, 
233 
W h i t t i e r C o l l e g e Bu l l e t i n 
(periodical) , 189, 254 
W i e n e r , N o r b e r t ( 1 8 9 4 -
1 9 6 4 ) , e d u c a t o r and 
author, 246n.2 
W i l l i a m II ( 1 8 5 9 - 1 9 4 1 ) , 
k a i s e r or emperor of 
Germany, 43 
Will iam and Mary Quarterly 
(periodical), 182 
W i l l i a m s o n , Hugh ( 1 7 3 5 -
1819), s t a t e s m a n and 
physician, 77, 79, 106 
W i l l o u g h b y , Wes te l (1867-
1945), polit ical scien-
tist, 127 
Wilson , James (1742-1798) , 
Supreme Court justice, 
56, 76, 79, 104, 106 
W i l s o n , W o o d r o w ( 1 8 5 6 -
1924), president, 191-
195, 216 
Congressional leader, 68 
Corwin and , 4 -5 , 11-12, 
51, 231, 236-237 
Preceptor ia l program and, 
4, 11, 23-28 
Presidency of, 5, 11 
Pr ince ton University and, 
4, 11, 236-237 
R e f o r m m o v e m e n t and, 
160 
S ta tes rights and, 58 
Wilson, Charles (1890-1961), 
s e c r e t a r y of defense, 
206 
Women labor, 53 
World Court, 179 
World F e d e r a t i o n , 180-181, 
183, 247n.24 
276 / CORWIN'S CONSTITUTION 
World government, 175-176, 
178-182, 248n.24 
World War One, 5, 7, 11-12, 
3 4 - 4 9 , 66, 109, 126, 
131, 160, 168, 190, 193-
194, 199, 201, 244n.5, 
248n.26, 255 
World War Two, 108, 110, 
165, 190, 193-194, 199, 
201, 216, 221, 249n.33 
Wythe, George (1726-1806), 
jurist and law teacher, 
77 
Yale University, 191 
Yalta Agreement , 208, 216, 
221 
Yenching University, 113 
Yick Wo V. Hopkins, 132 
Yuan, Sh ih -K 'a i (1859-1916), 
C h i n e s e mi l i t a ry and 
political leader, 134 
About the Editor 
KENNETH D. CREWS currently practices law in Los Angeles. His publi-
cations appear in history and law journals, and he serves on the History 
of the Law Committee for the State Bar of California. He is the author of 
Edward S. Corwin and the American Constitution: A Bibliographical 
Analysis (Greenwood Press, 1985). 
Recent Titles in Contributions in Legal Studies 
Series Editor: Paul L. Murphy 
Essays on New York Colonial Legal History 
Herbert A. Johnson 
The Origins of the American Business Corporation, 1784-1855: 
Broadening the Concept of Pubhc Service During Industrialization 
Ronald E. Seavoy 
Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing 
War Criminals of the First World War 
James F. Willis 
The Network of Control: State Supreme Courts and State Security 
Statutes, 1920-1970 
Carol E. Jensen 
Drugs and Information Control: The Role of Men and Manipulation 
in the Control of Drug Trafficking 
Jerald W. Cloyd 
State Supreme Courts: Policymakers in the Federal System 
Mary Cornelia Porter and G. Alan Tarr, editors 
The Future of Our Liberties: Perspectives on the Bill of Rights 
Stephen C Halpern, editor 
Tightening the Reins of Justice in America: A Comparative Analysis 
of the Criminal Jury Trial in England and the United States 
Michael H. Graham 
The Development of Law on the Rocky Mountain Frontier: Civil 
Law and Society, 1850-1912 
Gordon Morris Bakken 
Clients and Lawyers: Securing the Rights of Disabled Persons 
Susan M. Olson 
The New High Priests: Lawyers in Post-Civil War America 
Gerard W. Gawalt, editor 
The Little Rock Crisis: A Constitutional Interpretation 
Tony Freyer 
Nuclear Weapons and Law 
Arthur Selwyn Miller and Martin Feinrider, editors 
Native American Ahens: DisloyaUy and the Renunciation of Citizenship by 
Japanese Americans during World War II 
Donald E. Collins 
